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Title: Nicholas N. Muraviev, Conqueror of the Black Dragon. 

APPROVED BY MEleERS OF THE THESIS CO~~ITTEE: 

The essential objective of this study was to reveal the de­
gree to which one man, Nicholas Muraviev, was instrumental in 
bringing about Russia's annexation of The Amur basin, as well as 
the territory that became the Maritime Province of Siberia. Intro­
ductory chapters provide: a) a background summary of Muraviev's 
education and of his career prior to his service in Siberia, and 
.. 
b) a brief historical survey of the area in which his achievements 
raised Russia to the position of a Far Eastern Power. The main body 
of the study comprises an analytical narrative of Muraviev's acti­
viti.es during the decade that culminated in the Chinese capitula­
tion at Aigun in 1858. Closing chapters explain the factors that 
turned the newly acquired territories into a burden for the Rus~ian • 
Government until it decided to build the trans-Siberian railway,• 
" 
and set forth some conclusions regarding the historical signifi­
cance of Muraviev's role as Russia's pro-consul in Eastern Siberia. 
Extensive use was made of the prime single source of informa­
tion on Muraviev's life, Ivan Barsukov's Graf N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii, 
po ego pismam, ofitsialnym dokumentam, razskazam sovremmenikov it . 
pechatnym istochnikam (materialy d1ia biografii). Also of signifi­
cant assistance was the bibliography contained in J. L. Sullivan's 
doctoral dissertation, Count N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii, a full-scale 
biography. Sullivan's dissertation preceded two important works 
bearing on the Muraviev period in Siberia and drawn on extensively 
in the present study; R. K. I. Quested's liThe Expansion of Russia 
1n East As!a, 1858-1860, and P. I. Kabanov's Amurskii Vopross. 
Among other particularly valuable sources was P. V. Schumacher's 
long article, ftK istorii priobretenia Amurai. Snoshenia s Kitaem 
s 1848 po 18to g ••', contained in Russki Arkhiv, which, together with 
Russkaia Starina and Krasny Arkh1v, also contain numerous other docu· 
ments, memoirs and contemporary accounts that were consulted. Of 
signal value, too, among the special studies, surveys and reference 
works consulted was the introductory chapter of Andrew Malozemoff's 
" Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. A complete selected biblio· 
graphy is included. 
The research undertaken for this study has led to the conclu­
.sion that had i~ not been for Muraviev's imagination and ingenuity, 
his willingness, on occasion, to flout authority and his dedication 
and extraordinary stamina, the annexation to Eastern Siberia of al- • 
most 400,000 square miles of territory might never have taken place•• 
" 

----
Muraviev was sometimes impatient, perhaps sometimes insuffi­
ciently impressed by broader politico-military considerations that 
dictated what he regarded as an inexcusably over-cautious attitude 
toward Russo-Chinese relations in st. Petersburg. He also tended 
to exaggerate the immediate benefits that would accrue to Russia 
once she acted boldly on the Amur. Yet the salient fact remains 
that it was the intensity with which he pursued his idee fixe, 
both with words and actions, the years of his methodical prepara­
tion, with minimal support from the Russian Government, that made 
it possible for that Government to nullify the Treaty of Nerchinsk 
and ~o extend the Russian Empire's realms on the Pacific's shores 
down to the Korean frontier. It took important external factors, 
such as the Crimean War, and the resulting replacement of Mura­
viev's nemesis, Nesselrode, and his clique, with more capable and' 
far sighted officials, to bring Muraviev's plans to fruition. But 
to say this is simply to say that the authorities in St. Peters­
burg, viewing the confluence of events on the international scene, 
finally recognized that in Muraviev they had the right man at the 
right place at the right time. 
" 
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PREFACE 
High on a bluff overlooking the Amur River at Khabarovsk, stands 
a heroically proportioned statue of Count Nicholas Nikolaevich Muraviev­
Amurskii, conqueror of the Heilungchiang, or Black Dragon, as the 
Chinese called that river. Erected in 1891, this memorial dominates 
the site to which he pointed, when first defiantly sailing dOl'm that 
forbidden waterway, and prophetical!y exclaimed, "There is where a city 
will rise!,ll 
Today Khabarovsk is but one of a number of flourishing cities 
and ports in the Amur basin and the Ussuri maritime area, relinquished 
to Russia by the Chinese, with rancor in their hearts and in the hope 
ultimately of obtaining revenge. This territory now figures prominently 
in the cold war between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's 
Republic. Lately, on the Amur and that other river sailed by Muraviev, 
the Ussuri, clashes have taken place between the armed forces of the: 
two Co~~unis~ empires. In 1969, the Soviet Government was impelled 
to issue a lengthy statement in rebuttal of Chinese irredentist claims 
and reciting the history of China's ancient "Dominion of the Northeast" 
that passed into Russian possession in the years 1858-1860. 2 
IJgtol'icheski Ve§.,tnik, Vol. XXXVI, 1884, p. 646, cited by P. I. 
Kabanov in Amursk.!.LY..Qpross (Blagoveschensk, 1959), p. 163. 
~oscow News, Supplement No. 25, 1969, p. 21. 
vi 
Russian acquisition of the area that has now become the subject 
of Russian and Chinese polemics was essentially based on the work of 
Nicholas Muraviev who, often in the face of indifference or active 
hostility in high Russian governmental quarters, succeeded in abro­
gating the Treaty of Nerchinsk and annexing thehAmur basin to Eastern 
Siberia. Subsequently, he was largely instrumental in further extend-
Ing the boundaries of Imperial Russia to Korea, gaining, in all, an 
area of some 360,000 square miles for his country, which thereby became 
a Far Eastern Power. 
With the exception of one relatively brief biography3 throughout 
which, in the words of its author, the emphasis ,is on the man himsel f, 
little has been written in the West concerning NiCholas Muraviev. The 
most complete account in Russian of the politico-military activities of 
this man is a two-volume work by Ivan Barsukov, Member of the Imperial 
Society of Russian History and Antiquities at the University of Mos­
4cow. This is, in effect, a large collection of letters, documents 
and memoiI's of Muraviev's contemporaries, together with occasional com­
mentary by Barsukov. 
The present study is based upon a detailed scrutiny of Barsukov's 
compendium and an examination of those sources cited by him that were 
3J • L. Sullivan, Count ~. N. Muraviev-Amur~~l, doctoral thesis, 
Harvard University, 1955. 
4J • P. Barsukov, G;.!L1:l.!~!.Y.y-ra.yi.£.v:'~!!l!.!.rski i..L ..P9_ ~.9.Q-p-!?mam.s_. 
onts t.a~!!Y.l!1--.9o~~melltarr! ,_r(,! zs~~~_m_?£y!fm!lI'}DJJ~L~~h.atny!.ll is !,_ocb!1ik~lJL 
!mat~!ialy dl ia b!ogr~fiJ_(Count~_•. N •• Mtl~vi~~:-~ftJQ:rskii,~re'ygaJJ~d 
!-h;r9ugh his_..1ette~§..Lin _o.f.fi£iaLQocum~l1t§_L narra1:Jyes_of hili con1.em20:, 
rar..ie§..sDQ...11..1,!bUshecL§ol!!.Cll Lmaterials for a biography!! 
vii 
available to me, as well as of others. It is hoped that the resulting 
synthesis, not previously undertaken in this form, succeeds in revealing 
the degree to which this one man, Nicholas Muraviev, determined the 
events of a decisive decade in Siberian history and in accurately 
evaluating the aftermath of the doughty countts exploits. Although 
appropriate attention is given here to other aspects of Muraviev's ad­
ministration of Eastern Siberia, the main emphasis is on the achievement 
that earned him his letters patent of nobility and on an analysis of the 
factors that delayed the full exploitation of his bloodless conquest. 
All dates in the text are in the Old Style (according to the 
Julian calendar, which in the nineteenth century was twelve days behind 
the Gregorian calendar)~ The transliteration system is that of the 
Library of Congress, without the diacritical marks and ligatures. 
The subject of this thesis was proposed by Dr. Basil Dmytryshyn, 
Professor of History, Portland State University. I am most grateful to 
him for his regular encouragement, careful perusal of earlier drafts, 
'-. 
guidance on sources and suggestions as to organization. 
Eric E. Oulashin 
Portland state University 
May 1, 1971 
• 

• 

CHAPTER I 
THE MAKING OF AGOVERNOR-GENERAL 
I. EDUCATION AND INITIATION TO WAR AND PEACE 
Nicholas Nikolaevich Muraviev was born on August 11, 1809, in St • 
.. 
Petersburg, of a well known family of the minor nobility, many of whose 
members had distinguished themselves as soldiers, diplomats and educators. 
His father, N,lcholas Nazarevich, formerly a naval officer, subsequently 
Governor of Novgorod, was a State Secretary; he later became a Senator and 
Chief of the Personal Chancery of Nicholas I. His mother, Catherine Niko­
laevna, came of ,a famous naval family, the MQrdvinovs. 
The Muravievs initially intended that Nicholas should prepare for 
entrance to the University of St. Petersburg. At the untimely death of 
his mother in 1819,1 he was sent for that purpose to the Godenius board­
ing school. Alexander I, however, because of his esteem for Muraviev's 
father, ordered that Nicholas and his younger brother, Valerian, be en­
rolled in the Corps of Pages, the exclusive school for the training of 
well-born young men for the military and government service. At the age 
of fourteen, Nicholas was assigned as a page-of-the-chamber and a sergeant­
1I. P. _ 
ofitsial'n dokumentam razskazam sovremennikov i isto­
chnikan materialy dlia biografii) (Count N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii, as 
revealed throu h his letters in official documents narratives of 
contemporaries and published sources materials for a biograph¥ ). 
iMoscow, 1891), Vol. I, pp. 8-9. Muraviev's father remarried and even­
tually had ten sons and seven daughters, of which three daughters and 
three sons survived to adulthood. 
.,-",--,,"-- ~ 
2 
•
major, one of a group of thirty-nine young aristocrats under the supervi­
• 
sion of the Grand Duke Michael. Thus began Muraviev's career in the sphere 
-. of the elite serving people of the Russian autocr,acy. 
Muraviev finished his course of studies in the Imperial Corps of 
Pages at the head of his class; for this distinction his name was duly in­
scribed on a marble plaque displayed in the school. He remained in the 
Corps, however, for another yearby reason of his extreme youth, and at 
the age of seventeen was commissioned a praporshchik2 in the Finnish Life­
" 
guard Regiment. Less than two years later, he saw action during the Russo-
Turkish was of 1828-9, at the seige of Varna, and was cited in despatches 
to the Emperor for his "exemplary manliness and fearlessness".3 He fell 
ill during the campaign, and at its conclusion was unable to accompany 
his regiment back to Russia. Having been promoted to second lieutenant, 
he was assigned as aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Evgenii Alexandro­
vich Golovin, who had just been appointed military governor of Varna. 
Golovin was a distant relative and good friend of Muraviev's father, a con­
nection that proved of considerable value to Nicholas during the earlier 
4years of his career.
In Varna, young Muraviev became intimately involved in the details 
of governing the city, thus gaining valuable experience in civil ad­
ministration, the field in which he eventually reached the apogee of his 
service to the Tsar. He continued also to see military action, being 
2en.... or cornet (there is no exact equivalent in English). 

3earsukov, Opt cit., I, p. 15. 

4v. Struve, ttGraf Muraviev Amurskii" in Russkava Starina, Vol. 33, 

(l882), p. 523. Barsukov fails to mention this advantageous circumst~e. 
3 
detailed by General Golovin to assault troops and pa~ticipating in the 
• 
taking of Sisopol and the bombardment of Akhoil. He-also fought in the 
Nevchinsk Valley, and at Kulevchi and Fort Shumla, where he distinguished 
himself by his elan in the storming of strongpoints, for which he was 
awarded the Order of St. Ann, Third Class~~ 
Upon his return to Varna, Muraviev contracted typhus, followed by 
another fever common to the area,6 and in the spring of 1830, was sent 
on leave to St. Petersburg. Here, enjoying the imperial favor of the 
Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna, whose page-of-the-chamber he had been, he 
briefly re-entered the glamorous routines of court life. 
In the winter of 1830, Muraviev rejoined his regiment as it was 
preparing to take the field against the Polish resurgents. The in­
fluence of his father failed to obtain him an appointment as aide-de-camp 
to the Russian commander in Poland, General Dibich-Zabalkanskii, but after 
participating as a regimental officer in a number of campaigns, he once 
again became aide-de-camp to General Golovin, now commanding an infantry 
division. Near the conclusion of the Polish campaign, having been desig­
nated as parlamentor7 to the Polish rebel leader, General Girolamo Romar­
ino, he obtained some first-hand experience at high-level negotiating - ­
which, incidentally, as a matter of delicacy and good taste, was carried 
out in French.8 
43arsukov t op.·cit., I, p. 19. 
6J. S. Curtiss, in The Russian Army Under Nicholas I, 1825-1855, 
(Duke university Press, 1965), p. 64, refers to "a sort of plague" that 
hit the army in Varna very heavily in 1829, although the mortality was 
not great. 
7Negotiator bearing a flag of truce. 
! ~. Bsarsukov, 0D. cit., I, p. 43.~ 
t r 
-~ 
4 
• 
Continuous field service, and a minor leg wound, earned Muraviev 
•four months· leave at the end of 1831. He returned to st. Petersburg, 
where at first he languished in a state of depres.sion. In a letter to 
his brother, Valerian, he bitterly recounted that, having fought with 
distinction through six severe campaigns in four months, he had been ig­
nored by his superiors, while many of his brother officers who had exhi­
bited less energy and valor had been decorated and promoted over him. His 
complaint was premature; a short time later he was thrice decorated, being
" 
made a Knight of the order of St. Vladimir, and receiving the Gold Saber, 
inscribed, "For Valor", and the Virtute Militari, Fourth Class (Polish) • 
• 
Thus reinvigorated, Lieutenant Muraviev returned to Poland in the spring 
of 1832. He resumed his duties under General Golovin, and in that year 
was promoted to Staff Captain, but a year later, because of recurrences 
of the fevers that had attacked him in Turkey, he was invalided out of the 
service. 9 
II. THE CAUCASIAN CRUCIBLE 
From 1833 to 1837, Muraviev managed a crown estate, "Stokl1shk.i" 
in the Vilno guberniya, which had been granted to his father for his life­
time by the Tsar. It was in sadly run-down condition, and what with poor 
crops, inadequate fertilizer and depressed market prices, it presented 
a challenge for which Muraviev had little enthusiasm.10 To his great 
relief, In March, 1838, through Golovin·s intercession, he received a 
civil service appointment to the latter·s staff in Warsaw. Shortly after­
9Ibid ., I, p. 48-49. 

10sarsukov, Ope cit., I, pp. 52-58. 

6 
5 

• 

wards, Golovin was appointed commander of the Caucasian Corps and civil 
• 
governor of the G~ian Armenian and Caucasian regions•. Muraviev 
thereupon returned to military service in the rank of Major, being assign­
ed for special duties to Golovin. Throughout that year, on the eastern 
coast of the Black Sea, he took part in punitive expeditions against 
Hadji-Berzek and other Circassian tribal leaders who refused to become 
subjects of the Tsar. In the fall of that year, he attained the rank 
of Lieutenant Colonel. ll At this time he was deputized by General Golo­
vin to parl ey with elders of the tribes regard ing the government' s cond i -... 
tions for peace. 
Muraviev evidently carried out his negotiations with considerable 
skill and authority. He made clear to the Caucasian chieftains that as 
loyal subjects of Russia, they would be obligated to carry out all orders 
of the local Russian authorities, to pay tribute, including all arrears, 
to harbor no bandits and to turn them over to the authorities, to use 
firearms only on sufferance of the authorities and, in case of provoca­
tion, to lodge official complaints and not to resort to armed self-de­
fense. They were to receive all officials sent to them and were to offer 
no resistance to their passage through their settlements; and without 
delay~ they were to elect four representatives and send them to Tiflis 
with a declaration of repentance and a plea for pardon. It is recorded 
that "The elders unanimously undertook to carry out these orders")2 
llIn his memoirs, G. I. Filipson, a contemporary of Muraviev's, 
relates that when Golovin learned of his recent promotion to Lieutenant 
Colonel, he immediately sought and obtained the same for Muraviev. 
(Russkii Arkhiv, 1883, Bk. III, p. 350). 
l2sobranye Akty Kavkazskoi Archeograficheskoi Kommissii, (Tiflis, 
~), cited by Barsukov, 0p. cit., I, p. 63. 
~~ 
6 

• 
In the spring of 1839, Muraviev took part in further campaigns in 
• 
northern Daghestan, culminating in the siege of Akhoulgo, refuge of the 
legendary chieftain, Shamil. Here, during eighty days of fierce and 
bloody assaults upon a series of strongpoints, Muraviev was again woun­
ded, a rifle bullet shattering bones in his right hand and largely para~ 
lyzing it. This action earned him the Imperial Crown to the Orders of 
St. Stanislav and St. Anne of the Second Degree, together with a per­
sonal commendation from the Emperor. l3 The decimated Russian forces fin­
ally took Akhoulgo, but the charismatic Shamil made his escape. 
Following a period of enforced inactivity while his wound healed, 
Muraviev was assigned in April, 1840, as commander of'the Third Section 
of the Black Sea Coast Line, with promotion to the rank of colonel. 14 
With headquarters in Bombori, in Abhazia, he was responsible for nine 
forts and strongpoints manned by regular line battalions, so that now 
at the age of thirty-one, he was exercising independent command over 
substantial troop formations. 
Though his services in the Caucasus did not go unrecognized or 
unrewarded, Muraviev constantly fretted at what he deemed to be the un­
sympathetic and uncooperative attitude of his superiors, Golovin, of 
course, excepted. He fumed at what he considered to be the indifference 
l3sarsukov, 0p. cit., I, p. 64. 
l~ilipson, Ope cit., p. 351, relates that after Muraviev was 
woulded in the hand, Golovin attempted to obtain his promotion, but that 
his effort elicited only a decoration; he appealed to the Emperor, who 
pointed out that Muraviev had been in grade for less than a year, and 
ordered the award of a second decoration. When Golovin, evidently at 
Muraviev's urging, persisted, pointing out that Filipson had been ad­
vanced to the grade of colonel within less than a year after obtaining 
his lieutenant-colonelcy, the Emperor gave in. Thus, Filipson observes, 
Muraviev was thrice rewarded for the same exploit. Filipson does not 
divulge his source. 
~ 
..<.~~-...j 
~ 
• 
of General Nicholas Alexandrovitch Raevskii, Commander of the Black Sea 
Coast Line, and. of senior staff officers in Tiflis, toward the needs of 
his· command and his own activities. In a letter of June, 1840, he had 
this to say to his brother, Valerian: 
In general, I will say that I find myself in great difficulties, 
having no means of communication with my section, and if this 
situation does not change, I shall be unable to remain as com-
mander at Bornbori. As commander of the section, I consider it 
my~uty either ,to defend my fortifications or to be blown up in 
them; but when Raevskii holds on to all the ships, then I can 
betake myself nowhere, nor help anyone - - and s~ I have no 
intention of subjecting my reputation to obloquy, and shall 
leave the service at the first opportunity; I submit that this 
would be obligatory for any well-intentioned man when he Iges 
that he is not being accorded the means to be of service. 
A little later he wrote again to Valerian; who, also evidently 
benefiting from family connections, was serving on the Corps staff with 
Golovin in Tiflis: 
What a man, Raevskii! He has gathered up all his ships and 
taken off for the southern Crimea, while here we haven't the 
wherewithal even to grow fodder, either in the outlying detach-
ments or in the section itself ••• You might take the occasion 
to tell Evgeny Alexandrovich L-Golovin_7 that if measures aren't 
taken to bring Raevskii to book and to make him hon~~ his oath 
as an officer, I shall be unable to serve with him. 
Three months later, he sent General Golovin his own proposed plan for 
expeditionary operations in the coming year. He noted in a letter to 
7 
l5Ibid., p. 71. Curtiss, Ope cit., pp. 157-159, points out that many 
forts of the Black Sea Coast Line had no connection with Russia proper, be-
cause the terribly wild country, torrential mountain streams, and miasmic 
swamps presented insurmountable obstacles to the building of supply roads 
on the coast. Some of the forts, therefore, had to rely entirely upon 
Russian warships and steamers in the Black Sea for supplies and reinforce-
ments. 
l6sarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 73. Muraviev obviously relied on the Cau-
casian Corps commander's affectionate indulgence; another, less well con-
nected officer might have been court-martialed for such a statement. 
,-~~ ... ". 
• 
8 
• 
Valerian that "it might be said that I am meddling in what is none of my 
•business, but I consider it my duty according to my ~onscience, and I am 
. 
sending it to him by private mail and do not regret the postalexpense"'.17 
Muraviev's frustration and bitterness continued throughout the fol­
lowing year, 1841. His superior officers were either unwilling or unable 
to provide him with men and equipment in strength sufficient - - in his 
view - - to assure the successful defense of his sector of the Black Sea 
Coast Line against anticipated attacks by the local tribes. Barsukov com­
" 
ments, without, however, adducing any evidence, that this was to be ex­
plained by jealousy of staff officers in higher headquarters and their 
unwillingness to give Muraviev further opportunities to distinguish him­
self. The fact
, 
that Muraviev was the protege 
t 
of a high ranking general 
was presumably not lost on his fellow officers, whose reactions to his 
requests and proposals may sometimes have been tinged with malice. A de­
tailed analysis of the military campaigns in the Caucasus and, in particu­
lar, of the situation of the Black Sea littoral during the period in ques­
tion, might perhaps reveal the accuracy or subjectivity of this view. 
That, however, would exceed the stated confines of this study; it should 
be noted, though, that at the time Muraviev was writing his complaints, 
the Abkhazians and most of the other Circassian tribes in the western Cau­
casus, while certainly not utterly subjugated, were not posing the major 
threat to the Russians. That existed farther to the east where Shamil was 
entering into his "brilliant epoch".18 It should be kept in mind, too, 
l7Ibid ., I, p. 77. It is not known what became of Muraviev's plan. 
18M. V. Nechkina, Ed., Russia in the Nineteenth Century, (J. W. 
Edwards, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1959), p. 342, and Lesley Blanch, The Sabres of 
Paradise, (Viking Press, New York, 1960), p. 253. Sham!l was at the 
apogee of his power during the period 1840-1847. In the spring of 1840, 
encouraged by the revival of Shamil's movement, the Circassians mounted 
9 
•that military commanders are traditionally loathe to concede that they have. 
•been provided with forces and equipment adequate to cope with the particu­
larsituations and contingencies that they face. , Be that as it may, Mura­
viev's near obsession with the requirements of his command and the degree 
of confidence that he merited was a forecast of the approach with which 
he was to carry out his future assignments in the military and governmental 
service. It was an attitude of mind that sometimes seemed to border on the 
paranoid. 
~ 
In fairness to Muraviev, it should be noted that during this period, 
the Russian High Command in the Caucasus was grievously incompetent, as 
well as divided by personal ambitions and jealousies. Here is what a bio­
grapher of Shami1 has to say about the general then in command of the cam­
paign in Daghestan (Shami1's base): "Grabbe was a personal friend of the 
Tsar, in whose eyes he could do no wrong. Again and again during his com­
mand, from 1839 to 1842, his blunders were overlooked." The same writer 
also refers to a report by .General Golovin stating that "the suppression 
of this terrible despotism {-ShamH t~7 must be our first care". ·'But'·, 
comments this writer, "the Russian High Command, equally despotic, was 
now weakened by a series of bitter intrigues and quarrels by which the 
various generals feuded among themselves and jockeyed for favor with the 
19Tsar". 
Just as at an earlier stage of his career, when he unfairly com­
p1ained that his services in Poland were being ignored, so while bemoan­
ing his lot in the Caucasus, Muraviev learned that General Raevskii, whom 
a general uprising and took several forts of the Black Sea Coast Line; 
these were soon re-taken, however, and strongly reinforced by the Russians. 
See Curtiss, Ope cit., pp. 157-159. 
19B1anch, Ope cit., pp. 217-219. 
,~,,:. 
,f 
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he despised, had recommended him for promotion. He recounted in a letter 
• 
to Valerian, in February, 1841, that "Raevskii has recommended me for pr~­
motion, although I tried to dissuade him", and went on to say that whether 
or not he was promoted, he was determined to leave the caucasus. 20 But 
in a later letter to his brother, he said, "No matter how they squeeze me 
from all sides, I carry out my responsibilities conscientiously and do 
not pity myself".2l 
This rather querulous self-righteousness and petulance that some­
times permeated Muraviev's letters should be judged with some moderation, 
keeping in mind that they were private communications to his own, and 
evidently favorite, brother (letters to his other brother, Alexander, 
are rarely quoted by Barsukov, and may be presumed to have been much less 
frequent, since they had all been made available to Barsukov by Muraviev's 
family) • 
Despite his self-absorbed grumbling and occasionally insubordinate 
attitude, the young colonel was clearly performing his duties with vigor 
and flair. At the conclusion of operations in the spring of 1841, his 
commander, Major General Arpen, reported to the headquarters of the Cauca­
sian Corps regarding Muraviev's pacification expeditions. He related 
how Muraviev, aware that the belligerent Ubichs were intimidating other, 
loyal Circassian tribes, rallied the latter, and with two regiments of 
Cossack cavalry and other regular troop detachments, proceeded on a 
triumphal tour through the territory of the loyal Dzhigets in a show of 
20Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 90. One suspects that his attempt at 
dissuasion was limited to a token show of modesty. 
2l~., I, p. 91. 
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force against some of the Ubichs, who were being sti;red up by Hadji­
•Berzek. The psychological effect had been overwhelming, and peace had 
been preserved. Arpen, in a report to Corps headquarters, heartily pralsed 
Muraviev's forceful activity and efficiency in leading this, the first 
Russian troop movement inland from the Black Sea coast at Gagry, and ex­
pressed his full confidence in his judgment and capabilities. 22 
It was sh9rtly after this expedition that Muraviev, at the age of 
thirty-two, was prom9ted to the rank of Major General. In June, 1841, 
he fot.lowed up his earlier success by mobilizing the loyal Dzhigets and 
troops of his own in sufficient force to intimidate some of the Ubichs 
and those of the Dzhigets who had not yet submitted to Russian rule. 
In ceremonial parleys, and with the traditional use of preliminary inter­
mediaries, he succeeded in exacting oaths of fealty from leaders of the 
tribes and promises that they would keep the peace and remain within 
their respective territories. 23 
Muraviev's promotion and his success in subjugating the mountain 
tribes - - without loss of life - - were not enough for him to resign 
himself to his situation in the Caucasus. He was depressed and discour­
aged.by the dismal failures of the High Command and apparently sufficient­
ly seriously considering retirement to write Valerian asking him to con­
sult with his father and brother, Alexander, regarding the purchase of 
a modest property near St. Petersburg where he could settle down. At the 
same time, he speculated about the possibility of obtaining an appoint­
ment as Councilor of State, in recognition of his military ser~ices. His 
22aarsukov, op. cit., I, p. 94. 

23Ibid., I, p. 96. 
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rancor on the score of his superiors was unabated, and he inveighed against 
• 
generals like Arpen, who lived "in luxury in the Crimea, making occasional 
.. 
inspection trips, as on an excursion", in ships that his, Muraviev's com­

mand desperately needed for communications and logistical support. 24 

Once again, just as he was plunged into deep gloom because of real 

or imagined injustices that he was suffering, he received news from his 

brother of yet another commendation from the Tsar that was on its way to 

~ 
him. His reply to his brother: 
Thanks to the Tsar~ Thanks to the Great One for not for­

getting us little ones •••Clearly it is undeniable that prayer 

to God--and service to the Tsar--are not lost. Of course, 

dearer than my general's rank is the ~steem of my Sovereign••• 

I can imagine how our old batiushka / father 7 is rejoicing-­

and I am sure that except for the two of us,-he is the only 

one who sincerely rejoices. But now there lies on me the 

heavy obligation of justifying my Soveriegn's words; help me, 

Lord, to do so -- that is my constant grayer. God must give 

me the necessary wisdom and strength. 2 • 

In the summer of 1842, Muraviev saw action again, when the Navaginsk 

redoubt was threatened by a massing of the mountain tribesmen. On July 

29th, Muraviev arrived there with a small force, sending two ships back 

along the'Jcoast for further reinforcements. The following two days saw 

an artillery duel between the mountaineers and the defenders of Nava­
ginsk under Muraviev's personal command. The attackers t batteries were 

silenced and the mountaineers dispersed. Regarding this action, General 

Arpen reported to the Minister of War as follows: "I consider it my most 

pleasant duty to identify the individual chiefly responsible for this new 

exploit. I have no fear of offending the brave defenders of the Navaginsk 

24aarsukov, op. cit., I, pp. 97-98. 
,­
25 ~., I, p. 100. 
.~,,-
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• 
redoubt when I say that with such a commander as General Muraviev, any 
• 
troops would do the same.,,26 This, it will be noted, from the same General 
Arpen with whom, Muraviev had written his brother, his relations could 
never improve, presumably because the general was jealous of Muraviev's 
prowess. 
In the fall, operations against the Ubichs, only a fraction of 
whom Muraviev had earlier subdued, continued. General Arpen moved on 
them with a substantial force, with Muraviev in command of the advance 
guard. Muraviev made contact with the enemy at the entrance to the Arug 
Valley and vigorously attacked the right bank of the Arug River. After 
a sharp fire fight, the Ubichs withdrew and he occupied the right bank. 
The following day saw savage fighting, often hand to hand, with all forces 
on both sides fully committed. The Ubichs were defeated and fled, leav­
ing many dead. 27 
Following the victory on the Arug River, General Arpen decided to 
build additional defenses at the mountaintop Navaginsk redoubt, but when 
it came time to move out for that objective, Muraviev and his advance 
guard were nowhere to be found. He had moved forward despite Arpen's 
orders, and had proceeded with such speed that the Ubichs had not had 
time to regroup to defend the mountain top, which he took without firing a 
shot. Muraviev left his advance guard at Navaginsk and rejoined the main 
force, which had just formed another advance guard to move on theobjec­
tive he had already taken. When Arpen demanded an explanation for his 
outdistancing the main force, he replied that he moved, "not at a German 
~ 
26aarsukov, op. cit., I, p. 102. 

27Ibid ., I, p. 106. 
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but at a Muraviev pace".28 
• 
Arpen's force completed the construction of watch towers at Nava­
ginsk and prepared to return to the coast and sail back to their bases in 
Chernomorie and Savastopol. The time of year, mid-November, posed a pro­
blem, however, with respect to transport of some 2,500 horses of the wagon 
train, artillery and cavalry. Apart from the enormous number of trans­
ports this would have required, heavy seas would have made the project un­
feasible. Muraviev, knowing that during Ramadan, the ~uslim tribesmen 
~ 
would not be alert, at night (when they would be breaking their day-long 
fast), proposed taking the horses back to Abkhazi along the shoreline at 
night. This plan was carried out, and on November 15, the Black Sea Fleet 
at Abkhazi up-anchored. The year's operations had come to a successful 
conclusion, although the Russian forces had not moved deep into the heart 
of Ubich territory, a tactic that Muraviev had persistently urged, but 
which Arpen rejected because of logistical problems. 29 
Wintering back at Abkhazi, although a dull interlude, would normally 
at least have offered some prospect of rest and relaxation for Muraviev. 
He was periodically suffering, however, from recurrences of fevers he had 
contracted in Turkey, and following the conclusion of the active operation­
al season, he was granted leave on grounds of ill health, and returned to 
St. Petersburg for several months. In letters to his brother Valerian, 
28sarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 108. An interesting remark, considering 
that Nicholas I, upon whom Muraviev's future ultimately depended, the 
product of German tutors and the son of a German mother, was known for 
his rigidly Teutonic outlook. 
29Ibid., I, p. 109. 
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he mentioned his straitened circumstances. 30 With the sole exception of 
• 
a recital by Franz Liszt, he was denying himself any plays or concerts, 
and when he went out he walked, since a carriage was "damnably expensivett • 
His economies extended to his table and he contented himself ,with beer in 
place of wine. His leave was extended throughout the summer since, al­
though his health was improving, his doctors advised him not to return to 
Abkhazi in the hot season for fear that he might again succumb to the 
3lfevers so common there on the humid coast.
While Muraviev was recuperating in St. Petersburg, major changes 
were taking place in the Caucasus command. Following an inspection carried 
out there by Count A. I. Chernyshev, Minister of War, Golovin, Muraviev's 
longtime benefactor, was replaced by General Alexander Ivanovitch Neid­
hardt; General Paul Christoforovitch Grabbe, whose mission had been to 
destroy Shamil and who had titally failed, was replaced by General Vladi­
mir Josifovich Gurko. But, comments Barsukov, matters did not improve. 
t'These new appointees came to th~ Caucasus to straighten out matters in 
an area of which they knew nothing, to teach others, themselves being un­
taught. They were both prejudiced against everything that had taken place 
, in the Caucasus prior to their arrival -- and were totally helpless to im­
prove the situation. lt32 
~ 
30Curtiss, Ope cit., p. 192, states that even in 1860, when the pay 
of Russian officers had risen by from ten to twenty percent, a Russian 
lieutenant general's pay was little more than one third of that in the 
Austrian, Pruss ian or French armies. 
3lBarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 121. 
32aarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 126, and Blanch, Ope Cit., p. 219, Ac­
cording to Blanch, tlNeidhardt prolonged the series of disasters and blunders 
which had so dispirited the Russian army under Grabbe's command. He was 
stupid, pedantic and slow, and no one has ever explained why the Tsar chose 
him as Supreme Commander", and p. 230: "He was a Gennan pedant, t'only great 
16 

~ Muraviev returned to Abkhazi in the early fall of 1842, and soon 
•came down again with fever, while at the same time his wound reopened. In 
February, he requested sick leave in order to go abroad to take the wateTs 
at Carlsbad and Teplitz. While awaiting action on his request, he re­
turned to active service, taking part in a number of minor operations, 
throughout the spring and summer of 1843. In a letter to his brother, he 
told him that his leave request, he had just learned, had been pigeon­
holed in corps headquarters for eight months. Thoroughly despondent, he 
said that unless he left the Caucasus, or at least the Black Sea coast, 
he would certainly die. He added that in accordance with Asiatic custom 
he could lay upon his brothers the responsibility for avenging his death, 
but that being in his soul a Christian, he would say only, "Forgive them, 
33for they know not what they dotl • 
In a later, letter to Valerian, Muraviev praised the fine fall wea­
ther in Abkhazi, Ita rare phenomenon, saving more lives than all the doc­
tors or medicines", and then summarized his experience in the Caucasus. 
In the period 1840-41, he had ttenjoyed the full confidence of his super­
iors, the result of which could be found in the official files". The mid­
dIe period, 1842, prior to his return from leave, had been chiefly marked 
by his suffering from his wound and his generally poor state of health. 
It had not been easy for him to persuade himself to return to Abkhazi, 
but he had "unquestioningly obeyed the call of duty". While en route, 
his wound had flared up again, as had his fever, but the hope of making a 
in small matters, constitutionally incapable of commanding the Caucasian 
fronts. He was indecisive and weighed down by the unrealistic program 
outlined for him by the Tsar". 
33earsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 126. 
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! real contribution had bolstered him, and so he had arrived at Kerch to 
!-
t .. 
begin the current phase of his Caucasian service. It did not need much 
r 
perception, he wrote, to discern the unfavorable influence on his command, 
the Third Sector, of the coming changes in the top echelons. His orders 
had taken him from Kerch to Tiflis, but he had arrived after Golovin's 
departure, and it had become plain to him there that the role of his 
command did not loom large at headquarters. 34 
If Muraviev was not in the thick of the fray with the most important 
enemy, he was, nevertheless, doing valuable work for which he was pro­
bably not receiving adequate support. He was clearly convinced of the 
desirability and feasibility of achieving a bloodless conquest by per­
suading the Caucasian tribes voluntarily to pledge allegiance to the Rus­
sian government, and he strove to go about it in a systematic way. In 
Abkhazi, the key port of the Third Sector, he had at the outset culti­
vated close relations with Michael Sharvashidze, the local chieftain, and 
with Sharvashidze's close associate, one Katso-Margani. He flattered the 
former ~th special deference, and when Sharvashidze's first son was barn, 
he ordered a lOl-gun salute at his headquarters. Through such tactics he 
succeeded in turning this chieftain into a willing and pliable puppet. 
Katso-Margani he had found more difficult to manipulate. However, that 
worthy, an intelligent and cunning mountaineer, over sixty years of age, 
but robust and energetic, eventually succumbed to Muraviev's blandish­
ments and became his devoted agent. Sharvashidze and Katso-Margani car­
ried on negotiations over several months in order to persuade their 
neighbors, the Dzhigets, to accept fealty to the Russian Tsar. Three of 
34aarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 129-133. 
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the coastal clans finally agreed to pledge their aliegiance,35 a good 
•
example of Muraviev·s adroit policy of peaceful conquest~ That had been 
in the initial period of Muraviev's service in ~he Caucasus, and his abili­
ty in this direction had evidently been noted by his subsequent superiors. 
At the end of October, 1843, General Neidhardt sent him, together with 
Sharvashidze, to negotiate with the more warlike and obstinate Ubichs at 
Navaginsk. Here, again, following hours of negotiation, Oriental-style, 
through initial intermediaries, the Ubichs, under the redoubtable Hadji-
Berzek, agreed to pledge their allegiance to Russia. Hadji-Berzek under­
took, furthermore, to conclude agreements with two other Circassian 
tribes. This, noted Muraviev, in yet another letter to Valerian, took 
place at a time when Shamil's agent, Hadji-Mahomet, was exhorting those 
tribes to greater resistance. It would take three months to conclude 
final agreements with the tribes, and since Muraviev was anticipating 
an extended leave by that time, he hoped that "the foolish niggardU­
ness, suspicions, inexperience and obstinacy" of General Neidhardt would 
not ruin the outcome. What Muraviev had mainly in mind when writing this 
was the frustration he had encountered in obtaining subsidies for the 
loyal tribes. 36 
35sarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 135. 
36Ibid., pp. 130-132. During his maneuvers with the loyal Dzhigets 
against Hadji-Mahomet, Muraviev had been allowed to disburse six .silver 
roubles a head to the mountaineers, but had been required to report for 
exactly what intelligence or services he had spent these monies, which he 
found unrealistic and impracticable. Also, he had requested authoriza­
tion to recruit six hundred native levies, meaning to put them under a 
noted Caucasian staff officer, Major Zvanbai, wholwould thus be able to 
keep order in the important area of Tsebeldi. Instead, he had been al­
lowed to recruit only three hundred, and had been ordered to choose them 
from elements of the population which he regarded as the least reliable; 
his superiors, moreover, had designated as the levies' commander one of 
their ilk from Tiflis. They had not been really effective, but 13,000 
rubles had been expended for them; this, however, had been "by the book" 
19 
.. 
The noxious climate of the Black Sea coast was again thinning out 
• 
the Russian ranks. Muraviev's orderly, Ivan, died during the fall of l84~t 
and 'the fever was taking hold of his master again. Muraviev sought per­
mission to enter the hospital at Theodosia in the Crimea, but was persuad~ 
by Boudberg to remain at his post pending arrival of his replacement. Boud­
berg, who evidently saw eye to eye with Muraviev regarding the policy of 
peaceful conquest of the tribes, was being sorely tried at this time by 
the inept directives and orders emanating from Tiflis. 37 Since 1841, Mura­
" 
viev had been insisting on the need to subsidizethesDzhigets to the amount 
of four thousand silver roubles a year. Because of local circumstances and, 
Ifof course, of General Arpen", this business had been drawn out until Neid­
hardt's arrival. Neidhardt had finally approved a subsidy of 2,100 
roubles, and ordered that he be informed of the date of the entry on duty 
of Major Zvanbai, at which time the funds could be released. Zvanbai en­
tered on duty at the end of June, 1843, and Muraviev had thereupon ad­
vanced him funds against the anticipated transfer from Tiflis. Fourmontm 
later, only half of the funds had been received, the basic agreement was 
abrogated, and Muraviev was asked: "What do the Dzhigets represent, and 
of what use are they to us?" Muraviev wrote his brother that he had sent 
a reasonable reply to this query but could not predict the outcome. 
and Neidhardt was unperturbed. Muraviev had later been rebuked for re­
cruiting these unreliable levies, but General Boudberg t the new commander 
of the Black Sea Coast Line, had intervened, pointing out that the mis­
take had been that of the departed Arpen. Characteristically, Muraviev 
was convinced that Neidhardt had known of this all along, but had simply 
sought to make difficulties for him. 
37.Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 132. 
2)
• 
Muraviev 	was now convinced that "to serve in the Caucasus was not to 
• 
serve the Tsar, since in Tiflis they did not understand and, indeed, denied 
something that was clear, i.e., the benefit to be derived from assuring the 
38loyalty of the Caucasian tribesu • Now his mind was made up. As soon 
as he was relieved, he would journey to Bogoroditsk in the Tula Gubernia, 
the home of Vasili Ivanovich Muraviev, his cousin and good friend. There, 
he planned to spend his leave and if his wounded hand did not heal, he 
" 	 would at least recover from his malaria and its debilitating after effects. 
If he could not obtain another assignment and if he was required to return 
to the Caucasus under the present corps commander, he would, within an 
appropriate time, request retirement and settle down in Bogoroditsk, where 
he thought he could purchase a small house and garden for 2,000 assignat 
rubles. 39 
In another letter to his brother, after going into some details 
about his possible retirement, Muraviev noted the persistent reports that 
fifty thousand fresh troops would be sent to assist the Caucasian Corps, 
and saw that as an "action of the mighty Tsar, concerned for the benefit 
and the glory of his Empire"; but, he said, a heavy doubt weighed down on 
t 	 his spirit when, recalling all his memories of this region, he was convinc­
ed that "even with the mightiest of forces, reverses ~ould be suffered 
through the inexperience of the high commanders and through the misconcep· 
tions and impetuosity of leaders preoccupied by their ambitions and thirst 
for miHtary glory". In reflecting on Russian policy and actions in the 
Caucasus, he wrote in this same letter: 
38x..oc. cit. 

39sarsukov, Ope cit., pp. 134-135. 
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.. 
Who would have expected GeneralPullo's winter operations 
for collecting arms, money and sheep from those very settle­ .. 
ments where he had been met with bread and salt? On the first 
of January, the commandant of Bladikavkaz mustered a hundred 
of our native levies to capture Shamil, hiding with twenty­
one men in a hamlet on the border of one of the unconquered 
clans, which, however, gave him no assistance or food, for 
fear of offending the Russians. A few days later, all of 
the conquered Chechen, angered by Pullo's actions invited 
Shamil to be their leader against the Russians!40 
In the spring of 1844, Muraviev finally obtained his leave and 
traveled to Bogoroditsk, the provincial town where he knew he could rest 
~ 
and recover his health. From there he wrote to Michael Sharvashidze, 
chieftain of Abkhazi, who was planning to visit st. Petersburg., He told 
him he would not stir from Bogoroditsk until August, inasmuch as the en­
tire Imperial family was going abroad until then .. • an inauspicious 
period, one gathers, for Muraviev to be seeking a new assignment in the 
Caucasus or elsewhere.41 Accordingly, he advised Sharvashidze not to has­
ten to St. Petersburg too early. Somewhat later, he wrote his brother 
Alexander, asking him to cease attempting to obtain an appointment for him 
40earsukov, Ope cit., pp. 138-140. with regard to General Pullo, 

Blanch, Ope cit., p. 207, has this to say: "For a man to win a reputa­

tion for cruelty in the Caucasus betokens a degree of savagery quite un· 

imaginable in the West. Yet the Russian General Pullo had achieved this 

distinction. He was in command of a number of punitive raids throughout 

Avaria and Chechnia in the months following the disappearance of Shamil. 

He was unscrupulous and brutal and loathed by the Chechens. But when, 

holding down a rising province with too few men, he appointed the rene­

gade Tatars as pro-consuls or officers, he was playing directly into 

Shamil's hands. These renegades treated the mountaineers with terrible 

cruelty and injustice. There was no redress -- nowhere to appeal; but 

when it was rumored that the Caucasian provinces were to be disarmed and 

converted into peasant communities on the rural Russian pattern, subject 

to the same taxes, serfdom and conscription, the whole Caucasus arose, 

blazing with revolt and once again Shamil appeared, as a revenant, to 

rally the tribesmen around his black standard." 

41Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 146. 
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in Astrakhan; "it is clear", he observed, that the matter is not going 
• 
well and I assure you that I do not wish any appointment through pres­
';;-
sure".42 His health had significantly improved and he repeated his de~ 
sire to resume active service if he were given the means to do some good, 
bit' polezny, and not to "vegetate and rot" as he had done for the last 
year and a half in the Caucasus. While still in Bogoroditsk, Muraviev 
received the Order of St. Stanislav, First Class, with a commendation 
from the Emperor, "for exceptional courage and wise direction in operations 
against the mountaineers".43 
At the beginning of 1845, Muraviev's father died and hel hastened to 
st. Petersburg. While there, he learned of the appointment of Count 
Michael Vorontsov as Viceroy of the Caucasus and Commander-in-Chief of 
J 
troops, in place of the incompetent Neidhardt. Much was expected of this 
appointment, for Vorontsov, scion of one of Russia's most ancient noble 
families with a great tradition of loyalty and service to the state, was 
held in high esteem as an able soldier and brilliant civil administrator. 
Muraviev, encouraged at this news, obtained permission of Prince Chernyshev, 
Minister of War, to seek an interview with Vorontsov and went to him to ~ 
~ offer his services in the Caucasus. Barsukov relates that the Count re-
r 
ceived him warmly and promised to take up the matter with the Minister oft 
War. Because of his father's funeral, Muraviev was unable immediately to 
report on this conversation to Chernyshev. Following Vorontsov'sdepar­
ture, Muraviev spoke of it to the Adjutant-General, who reported on it to 
the Minister. Chernyshev immediate1 y wrote to Vorontsov to asc'ertain his 
f· ~ 42Ibid., p. 147. ~. 
43r.oc. cit. 
"~i'~"'0'. 
23 

•
wishes regarding Muraviev's assignment. "The matter", Barsukov states, 
•I'dragged on for reasons unknown to us'l , and at the same time Muraviev's 
-. heal th deteriorated" aga in, so that he was obliged to seek another extens'ion 
of leave. He received approval to go abroad to take the waters, but was 
detained on family matters, so that on April 24, he received an inquiry 
from the War Ministry as to whether he had changed his mind regarding his 
leave. On the following day Muraviev replied: 
~ It will be essential sooner or later to obtain the mineral 

waters treatment for the,~ound in my hand, but over the course 

of five years I have postponed this five times, when in each 

case I perceived the need to do so because of the Service • • 

My feeling of unlimited submission to the will of the Emperor 

and devotion to the needs of the Service are unchanged, and 

if there should arise any need to give me an active assignment 

at this time, I am unreservedly prepared to give up my leave. 

To this the Adjutant-General replied: 
Je m'empresse de vous avertir, mon general, que vous pouvez 
faire vos publications de voyage et vos preparatifs en toute 
surete; l'affaire du Caucase est coulee au fond. On dira 
que vos blessures s'etant reouvertes, vous avez de~~nde et 
recu un semestre pour l'etranger et tout sera dit. 
This curious exchange obviously leaves much unsaid. Certainly, it 
seems as though someone in the higher echelons was anxious to leave Mura­
t 
viev without an assignment and to speed his departure from Russia.t 
l 
t Muraviev went abroad in the spring of 1845 for his medical treatment. 
He stayed first at Aix-la-Chapelle, whence he wrote Valerian to be sure to 
f 
44Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 150. til hasten to advise you, General, 
that you may gazette your travel plans and make firm preparations for 
your voyage; the Caucasus matter has run its course. It will be announced 
that your wounds, having reopened, you have requested and received six 
months leave to go abroad and that will be all there is to it."r 
,'. 
...•.. 
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• 
inform the War Ministry of his whereabouts, in case the need should arise 
•for him to proceed back to the Caucasus. In June, he wrote again, regard­
ing his 'plan to go to Paris for further treatment. In this letter he al­
lowed himself some philosophical musings: 
Monuments, towers and churches cannot satisfy my curiosity; 

paintings, music and landscapes charm me only briefly; but a 

passion for delving into the human heart grows within me, the 

more I meet new people; a passion to know the behind-the-scenes 

reasons for peoples' actions; a passion for reality in all its 

nakedness is developing in me more and more, and I am increas­

.. 
ingly convinced that superficial judgments are always erroneous 

and that only experience and observation open for us the ways 

of Providence••• Europe makes a strange impression on me, 

an impression totally unexpected and at the same time for me, 

a Russian, quite pleasant: at home everything is large, here~ 

small; here in detail everything is good, convenient, arranged, 

smooth, calculated, enumerated, brought into conformity, re­

duced to measure and weight; the people know all, it seems 

even about that which it is impossible to know, and for that 

reason there is no future here. Here everyone lives in the 

present; there may be broken hopes and promises, but such things 

pass quickly and are submerged in the material. Here they 

speak and write of the unknown, l'inconnu, as of a reasoning 

out, proving the degree of the development of thought in the 

present epoch, of the degree of superiority over the eighteenth 

century, but which, in fact, is all words, since here tout est 

connu, au moins toute Ie monde tache de prouver qu'il connait 

tout; nothing is left to the imagination; I will say more 

strongly, nothing is left to the heart, which should enjoy the 

unknown. Here they say that les Russes n'ont pas de coeur, 

mai qu'ils ont beaucoup d'intelligence; et bien, je crois que 

ceux qui Ie disent, promoncent un jugement bien severe sur 

eux-memes, c'est qu'ils ne comprennent pa~5ce que est Ie coeur 

et que leur intelligence est tres bornee. 

III. GOVERNING IN THE PROVINCES 
Upon his return to Russia, Muraviev was detailed in December, 1843, 
to the Ministry of the Interior in preparation for assumption of duties as 
a military governor. Barsukov gives no hint of the means whereby Muraviev 
45aarsukov, Ope cit., p. 153. 
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obtained this new assignment. L. A. Perovskii, Minister of the Interior, 
•however, just as General Golovin, was an old family friend and one may 
presume this connection was useful.46 
At the beginning of 1846, Muraviev was assigned to inspect the 
gubernia of Novgorod and the Land Court. His wounded hand was giving him 
trouble again and made it difficult to traverse the area over rough roads 
in an uncomfortable stage coach, but he pursued his task with energy and 
~ submitted a report that drew praise from his superiors. As a result, on 
June 16, 1846, he.was appointed military governor of the city of Tula and 
civil governor of the province by that name, retaining his military rank.47 
Following his first tour around his area of responsibility, Muraviev 
submitted his initial observations to the Ministry of the Interior. He 
had found that the prisons or jails in all of the towns of the gubernia 
were in a sad state of dilapidation, and recommended that they should all 
be replaced by new construction. He pointed out that timber was being cut 
extravagantly, with no thought for conservation and replacement, and urged 
establishment of regulations to control this practice, which threatened 
eventually to plunge the area into economic difficulties; in this connec­
tion, he stated that more use should be made of coal deposits in the area 
and undertook later to furnish specific details. He found that develop­
ment of trade in the area was inhibited by lack of sufficient water com­
munications and recommended construction of wharves in the towns of Odoev 
and Novosil, so that cargo could move down the rivers Zusha and Upa, 
46J • L. Sullivan, Count N. N. Muraviev-Amursky, doctoral disserta­
tion, Harvard University, 1955. 
47Barsukov, Ope cit., I, pp. 158-159. 
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•falling into the Oka. Unitl this was done, he pointed out, the latter 
•
river would benefit the area but little, since it flowed along the far 
limits of the gubernia. He had also found that agriculture in the gubernia 
was not being developed along rational lines and stated his intention to 
revive an earlier proposal that there be established a local Society for 
the Rural Economy. 
Muraviev's preoccupations at this time extended beyond the responsi­
bilities of a provincial governor. Thus, he was the first of all the gover­
~ 
nors in Russia to !aise the question of freeing the serfs. He obtained 
the signatures of nine prominent landowners to a petition to the Emperor, 
seeking the serfs' liberation. The Emperor had been favorably impressed, 
but ordered that the matter be pursued with great caution, and that first 
of all a greater number of signatures should be obtained. This it proved 
impossible to do, so that the project had to be dropped.48 
In Tula, Muraviev's outlook was a good deal more cheerful.than it 
had been for the previous two or three years. This was not only because 
of his new success in civil government, but also because the time of his 
marriage was approaching. His betrotheG was Catherine de Richemond, daugh­
ter of an aristocratic family from Lorraine. Muraviev had met her ~e year 
before while in Paris, had fallen in love with her and, as soon as his 
uncertain status in the government service had been clarified, had written 
her to propose marriage. She had accepted and came to Russia, the marriage 
taking place in Bogoroditsk on January 19, 1847. Barsukov states that ac­
cording to those who had known her personally, she was beautiful, intelli­
gent and well educated, as well as "even tempered, kind hearted and notably 
48sarsukov, Ope cit., I, pp. 161-162. 
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•49attached to her new fatherland ... 
• 
-IV. THE TSAR MAKES HIS CHOICE 
The challenges and satisfactions of a provincial governor's life 
quickly began to pall on Muraviev and he was soon restlessly seeking 
some new field of activity. In a letter to Valerian written just a year 
after taking up his post in Tula, he asked his brother to take some sound­
ings in St. Petersburg regarding a possible appointment for him. He
" 
pointed out that having served six years as a general officer, including 
two years in the Ministry of the Interior, one of them as a goyernor, it 
would be "unseemly" to remain much longer in his present position. He com­
plained, too, that the authorities did not relieve officials of whom he 
wished to be rid, nor did they approve his recommendations for promotions 
and decorations for those whom he deemed deserving. In a subsequent let­
ter to Valerian, he exhibited a lively interest in the question of a suc­
cessor to the discredited Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, William Y. 
~ 
I Rupert, removed from his position in the wake of the unfavorable reporti 
f 
, made by Senator I. N. Tolstoy, following his inspection of Rupert's ad­
! 
k ministration.50 
f' f .Muraviev's inquiry regarding Rupert's successor was clearly inspired 
I 
~ 
by something more than idle curiosity. Filipson recounts that on the occa­
t sion of a visit to Tula, Nicholas I, dining with Muraviev and others, had ~ ~ 
i 
,V 49aarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 163. 
5OIbid ., I, pp. 164-167. The Tsar ordered that Rupert "request" 
to be relieved. Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 68, relates that Rupert, in the 
tradition of most of his predecessors, had amassed 500,000 rubles during 
his governorship. 
'­
~ 
! 
I. 
t 
t 
I 
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confirmed that Rupert was to be removed, and that during subsequent con­
• 
versation, the Emperor had been impressed by Muraviev's knowledge and 
understanding of the problems of Eastern Siberia,'on which he had evident­
ly thoroughly briefed himself. 5l 
Soon after he had sent his inquiry to Valerian, Nicholas N. Mura­
viev was designated by an imperial prikaz of September 5, 1847, as Gover­
nor-General of Irkutsk and commander of troops in Eastern Siberia. In a 
letter to Valerian, Muraviev recounted how the Tsar had personally in­
formed him of his new appointment, when his train had stopped at Ser­
geievsk, during a tour of the provinces: 
It was at seven in the morning. The Tsar immediately told 

me of my appointment, and spoke of it in the most flattering 

terms. Then he questioned me about Tula, and explained that he 

had no time to stop either at Tula or Orel, since he had a long 

way to go. He ordered me to come to st. Petersburg, where he 

would give me his detailed directives, and then excused him­

self. Without going into detail about our conversation, I will 

say that it moved me to tears.52 

Muraviev's appointment as Governor-General of Eastern Siberia 
created a sensation. Many highly placed officials in St. Petersburg re­
garded it as scandalous. And in Omsk, wrote M. I. Veniukov, when the Gov· 
ernor-General of Western Siberia, Prince Gorchakov, learned that his oppo­
site number would be a young man of thirty-eight, he flew into a pas· 
53
sion. B. V. Struve, another of Muraviev's contemporaries, had this to 
say: 
51Filipson, Ope cit., p. 352. 

54Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 169. 

5~usskaia Starina, 1882, Feb., p. 524. 
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The unprecedently rapid, by the standards of the times, ele­
vation of Muraviev, was the subject of general conversation in .. 
the capital. After December 14, 1825, the Emperor Nicholas, as 
is known, was not very favorably disposed to the Muraviev fam~ 
ily54 and did not appoint them to the highest administrative 
posts ••••There was all kind of speculation, even to the foolish 
theory that the authorities had confused his name with that of 
General N. N. Muraviev-Karskii, the corps commander.55 
There is no readily available specific account of the circumstan­
ces that led to Muraviev's appointment. Struve points out that it 

should be ascribed in large part to the influence that the Grand Duchess 

Elena Pavlovna "exerted in certain instances" on the Emperor Nicholas. He 

observes that the choice of Muraviev for this responsibility had
• 
fallen 

to the Minister of the Interior, L. A. Perovskii; "he brought about this 

appointment, jointly conceived of by him and the Grand Duchess Elena 

Pavlovna, who had been increasingly well-disposed to Muraviev from the 

days when he had been her page-of-the-chamber. The Grand Duchess, dis­
tinguished by an enlightened intellect and a deep understanding of the 

contemporary position of Russia, which she loved like a second father­

56 
~ 
land, perceived in Muraviev just such a worker as he turned out to be... 
The Emperor's choice of Muraviev, unlike many of his other appoint­
ments, was evidently a case where the confluence of exceptional ability 

and powerful connections had its logical outcome. Muraviev had proven 

himself on battlefields in Turkey, Poland and the Caucasus, and at the 

same time had demonstrated administrative and diplomatic talent, begin­
ning with his youthful experience in Varna, and with the Polish rebel 

~. Muraviev-Apostol, a member of one branch of the family, had 

been a leader of the Decembrists. 

55sarsukov, op. cit., I, p. 170. 

56Ibid • 

:n 
leaders, then through his successful dealings with thee Caucasian mountain­
eers, his inspection of the gubernia of Novgorod and his governorship in • 
Tula. In all these capacities he had exhibited firmness, energy, re­
sourcefulness and integrity - qualities that had rarely, if ever, been 
found in candidates for the governorship of the remote vastness of East­
ern Siberia. The patriotic combination of gallant warrior and devoted 
civil servant understandably appealed to the Emperor, particularly as it 
must have been described to him by such highly placed personages as the 
~ 
Grand Duchess Elena and the respected Perovskii. If Muraviev possessed 
other attributes such as vanity, petulance, arrogance and impatience, 
these were no doubt most openly disclosed only to individuals who were 
his intimates, such as his brother Valerian, and his fond mentor, Gen­
eral Golovin. If the Tsar was aware of them, he was not disturbed and 
probably regarded them merely as concomitants of the more positive traits 
that qualified Muraviev for his new responsibilities. 
• 

....
, 
! 
.. 
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CHAPTER II 
"SIBERIA, TOO, IS RUSSIAN LAND" 
I. "THE RUSSIAN RIVER AMUR" 
There was at least as much poetry as truth. in the reference to "the 
Russian River Amur", made by Nicholas I during Muravlevt s farewell audi­
ence. That the Amur once ran red with Russian blood is highly probable. 
In 1658, Onufrii Stepanov, who had waged a five-year campaign against 
the Chinese, met his death on that river in a battle in which most of 
his cossacks were annihilated. For the Chinese, this battle was in de­
fense of the Celestial Empirets "Dominion of the Northeast" beyond the 
Great Wall, acquired in the first half of the fourteenth century, when 
the Ming emperors drove the Mongol hordes to the north of the Gobi desert 
and west of the Buir Nor. One scholar states that this new dominion in­
cluded not only the traditionally Chinese territory of Liao-tung, but also 
"the whole of the Extra-Liao region south of the Amur". This region, main­
ly a land of the Tungus tribes, was divided, under the Ming dynasty, into 
native "Guards" and "Posts" under the control of a high central command 
established at the mouth of the Amur River. l 
IT. C. Lin, "The Amur Frontier Question Between Russia and China, 
l85O-l8601t , Pacific Historical Review, Vol. III, No.1, p. 1; Lints ref­
erence to the region "south of the Amurlt , though imprecise, would imply 
that the Chinese had no claims north of that river. On the other hand, he 
refers to a "high central command" at the mouth of the river, which would 
indicate a "Chinese River Amurt•• His study is based on a compilation of 
Imperial Edicts and government documents published in Peking in 1899. Lin 
states that a good summary of Ming rule in the Amur region is to be found 
in I. A. Inaba's History of the Development of Manchuria (Tokyo; 1915, in 
Japanese). 
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Over two centuries later, one of the Tungus Guards, Chien Chous, re­
•
volted against Ming rule and made himself overlord of the,Tungus tribes. 
The Ming regime, by then fallen into decadence, was powerless before the 
tribe of Chien-Chous, later known as the Manchus, who broke into Liao­
tung in 1621 and entered Peking in 1644, when the Ch'ing dynasty was estab­
lished upon the dragon throne. 2 These events coincided with a period of 
greatly accelerated Russian advance to fue Pacific, the genesis and devel­
opment of which may briefly be traced here. 
" 
Russia's move into Asia began with Prince Semeon Kurbski's military 
expeditions in 1483 and 1499 across the Pechora and to the Ob River east 
of the Urals. Kurbski returned with furs and prisoners, but his venture 
did not result in permanent penetration of Siberia. It remained for a 
clan of traders and industrialists to stimulate Russian acquisition of 
territory there: The Novgorodian family of Stroganovs, favored by Mos­
cow, thanks to old Luke Stroganov's having ransomed Prince Vasi1i the 
Blind, who had been captured by the Khan of Kazan, sent expeditions be­
yond the Urals and obtained a succession of royal trants to enormous 
tracts of land there. By a final grant of 1574, the Stroganov domain was 
estended to the banks of the Tobol River. 3 The Stroganovs' progress, how­
ever, was not uncontested. The Tatar Khan Kuchum, self-styled "Tsar of 
Siberia", had been attacking the Russian settlements and the Stroganov 
garrison needed reinforcements. These were provided by Iermak Timofeievich, 
2tin, 0p. cit., p. 2. 
3A• Lobanov-Rostovski, Russia and Asia (The George Wahr Publish­
ing Company, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1951), p. 40. 
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leader of some 600 robbing and piratical cossacks4 who took service with 
• 
the Stroganovs in 1579. In 1589, this force, bolstered by some 300 me~ 
of the Stroganov garrison, took the field under lermak to secure the 
Stroganovs' hold on the land granted ~em by the charter of 1574. In the 
fall of 1582, lermak drove Kuchum from his capital of Sibir and occupied 
it. The oonquest of Siberia was under way.5 
In 1586, the Russians founded the town of Tiumen, the first perma­
nent Russian settlement beyond the Urals, to be followed, in 1587, by the 
~ 
town of Tobolsk.6 A year later, a cossack force re-engaged Tatar forces 
and drove them southwards into the steppe. Kuchum survived for ten years, 
however, and to counter his continuing threat, the Russian outpost of Tara 
on the Irtysh was established in 1594.7 This outpost, Tiumen and Tobo1sk 
were the first in a chain of ostrogs (blockhouses or fortified settlements) 
. 
4rerence Armstrong, Russian Settlement in the North (Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, 1964), pp. 21-22, states: lilt is not easy to determine 
just who the Cossacks were. They are first found in the Middle Ages act­
ing as a frontier force protecting Kiev and later, Muscovy, from the 
south. There were Cossack communities on the Dnieper and the Don and 
although independent, they generally allied themselves with the Slavs. 
Their origins are obscure. The word itself seems to come from the Turkic 
kiz or kez, meaning to wander." Armstrong adds that once in Siberia, 
recruitment was open to any local Russians and even in some cases to non­
Russians, and that many hunters and traders became cossacks who, during 
the advance east, were employed as leaders of pioneer detachments, as 
soldiers and as frontier guards. In territory already secured, they 
came to act as a kind of police force and later took charge of all com­
munications. See also M. A. Czaplicka, "Evolution of the Cossack Com­
munities", in Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 5, Part II, 
1918. 
5tobanov-Rostovski, op. cit., pp. 41-43. 
~eorge Alexander Lensen, (Ed.), Russia's Eastward Expansion, 

(Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964) p. 21. 

7Armstrong, Ope cit., p. 16. 
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that eventually secured all of Siberia for Moscow. The building of these 
• 
ostrogs was stimulated primarily by the fur-fever that se~zed the Russians, 
"much like", observes Fisher, "the gold-fever which possessed the Ameri~ 
can ·forty-niners· of a later century. In Siberia, sables worth from 10 
to 20 rubles, black foxes worth from 100 to 300 rubles were to be found. 
Could a man but obtain a few of them, a single trip would then suffice to 
enable him to settle down in comfort for the rest of his life."8 
.. The fall of Sibir and the driving south of the remaining Tatars 
marked the end of the brief era of extraordinary military exploits began 
by Iermak. The march north and east henceforth met little resistance,
, 
for while the Central Asian steppe was held by the warlike Kazakhs and 
Turkic peoples, the Siberian forest contained only scattered and weak na­
tive tribes. 9 The Russians, furthermore, were by far better acquainted 
with milita~y techniques, had firearms (whereas their adversaries gener­
ally had only bows and arrows and spears), knew how to construct fortifi­
cations and, despite the enormous distances involved, were receiving a 
flow of support in the form of people, arms and supplies from the homeland. lO 
~aymond H. Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade, l550~1~, (University of 
California press, 1943), p. 29. He points out that in 1623, two black fox 
pelts brought 110 rubles, with which the owner could buy fifty-five acres 
of land, erect a good cabin, buy five horses, twenty head of cattle, 
twenty sheep, several dozen fowl and still have half his capital left. 
9Donald W. Treadgold, The Great Siberian Migration, (Princeton Uni­[ 
 versity Press, 1957), p. 18, and, as stated inuSibiru, Entsiklopedicheski! Slovar, Vol. 58, p. 801, ttAmong the Samoyeds (and most other tribes) 
there was no class distinction. For that reason, conflict with them pre­
sented no difficulty for the Russians." Some tribes, notably the Buriats, 
Kirghiz and Chukchi, did offer resolute resistance at later stages of ex­
pansion into Siberia. 
lOIbid. 
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The town of Bereznov was founded in 1593 on the lower Ob, and to the 
northeast, the town of Surgut in 1594 and Narym in 1596. These settle­
• 
mentsand those to follow were official creations of the Russian govern- .. 
ment, following the footsteps of private individuals seeking fortunes in 
the fur trade, for now MOSCOW realized the value of the region for de­
fending the eastern limits of European Russia against the raids of Siber-. 
ian peoples, as well as for the establishment of a profitable base for an 
advance into Asia. ll 
Tobolsk was the first main administrative cente·r for the territory 
wrested away from the Siberian tribes. The movement of cossacks, free­
booters and traders, followed by military forces and government officials, 
proceeded down the Tobol and also over the Urals by the original route 
from the Pechora. As they proceeded, the native princelings agreed to 
pay iassak to them.12 The iassak was rendered to the Moscow government, 
which was the chief fur trader. In addition to collecting this tribute, 
the government levied a ten per cent tax on the best furs from the pri­
vate traders and trappers. It also insisted on the right of buying from 
merchants and trappers the best furs they obtained. Furthermore, the 
government exercised a monopoly on the sables, black foxes and other fine 
furs that constituted the most important single item in the foreign and 
llRobert J. Kerner, The Urge to the Sea (University of California 
Press), 1946, p. 68. 
12Fisher, Ope cit., pp. 49-60, explains the origins of the term 
iassak, the fur tribute collected by the Russians from the natives of 
Siberia during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the 
methods of collecting it. Iassak was tribute paid by the conquered to 
the conquerors, and as a sign of subjection it carried with it the im­
plication of degradation. It had existed in Siberia long before the ad­
vent of the Russians, having been taken over by the peoples of Siberia 
from the Mongolian-Tatar conquerors who penetrated to the Urals. 
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domestic commerce of Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
• 
The fur trade paid the Siberian administrative expenses of. the government, 
which retained a large surplus, while adding an immense region to the 
13state.
There was a standard pattern in the development of the ostrogs and 
townships marking the Russian march eastward. Private individuals did 
the initia~ pioneering. 14 Whenever the government learned of the discov­
ery of profitable fur trading areas, it moved in with a voevoda (military
~ 
commander) and troops, together with priests and monks. 15 A monastery 
would generally be built and conversion of the natives to the Orthodox 
faith would begin. The churchmen were to some extent a leavening influ­
ence on the rough Russian frontiersmen and also served to protect the 
natives from annihilation, in part no doubt, because these monks wished 
to preserve the evidence of their evangelical zeal. The Moscow govern­
ment, too, was concerned with the preservation of these people, who were 
the main suppliers of furs •. Not that the system was a benevolent and 
humanitarian one; pious expressions of intent and official government 
policy were one thing, the reality quite another. The influx of Russians 
with their "civilizing" and '·Christianizing" mission had its definite 
l~erner, op. cit., pp. 84-85. 
14Fisher, op. cit., pp. 29-30, distinguishes two types of private 
enterprisers, the traders (torgovye liudi) and the promyshlenniks •. The 
former included merchants or their agents and small traders, the latter 
were men who worked for themselves, exploiting natural resources in a 
role similar to the coureurs de bois of Canada. 
15A comprehensive study of the early Siberian governmental ad­
ministrative apparatus, as well as the organization for remote control 
from Moscow, is to be found in George Lantzeff's Siberia in the Seven­
teenth Century, (University of California Press, 1943). 
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black aspects' of brutality, exploitation and corruption. 
• 
The movement eastward, while not preconceived in detail or closely 
directed from Mowcow, was nonetheless methodical and vigorous. The cos­
sacks and voevods struck out in all directions, using the magnificent 
river network of Siberia, based on four vast systems, the Ob, Enisei, 
Lena and Amur, the tributaries of which formed an almost perfect unbroken 
line of communication from the Urals to the Pacific. The speed of their 
.. progress, considering the immense distances involved, was extraordinary• 
Thus, in rapid succession, were formed the towns of Tomsk (1604), Eniseisk. 
(1619), ~rasnoiarsk (1628), Iakutsk (1632), and the ostrog of Okhotsk on 
the Pacific in 1648, only sixty-five years after Iermak's first conquest 
of Sibir. Some five years later, cossacks were making initial probes 
into the Amur territory.17 The stage was thus set for the conflict be­
tween the Russians and the Manchu rulers of Peking. 
The first incursion into China's "Dominion of the Northeast lt was 
made by Vassili Poiarkov, who penetrated there in 1643 in search of grain 
to supplement chronically inadequate supplies in Iakutsk. He was followed 
by Ierofei Khabarov, peasant turned cossack and merchant industrialist. 
In 1650, Khabarov reached the Amur River and the walled cities of the 
Manchu tribe of Dauria under Prince Lafkai, whom ne routed in a battle at 
the town of Albazin. This became his base and that of his successor, 
Onufrii Stepanov, whose forces were annihilated on the Amur below the 
18
mouth of the Sungari in 1608. Stepanov's defeat cleared the cossacks 
16Kerner, Ope cit., p. 88 • 
. 17F• A. Golder, Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1841-1850 (Glou­
chester, Mass.) 1960, pp. 50-01. The easternmost extremity of Siberia, 
Kamchatka, was taken by another cossack, Vladimir Atlassov, some fifty 
years later. 
18Golder, Ope cit., p. 03. 
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from the Amur basin as far as the Nerchinsk area, where they had small 
• 
forces in three ostrogs. In the following year, the Chinese besieged and 
captured Albazin and destroyed it. 
The quarter of a century following the destruction of Albazin saw 
no significant Russo-Chinese confrontation, but Russian forces at Nerchin* 
were steadily and substantially augmented during this period, when Irkutsk 
was also founded (166l), as well as Selenginsk (1665).19 Meanwhile, Alba­
zin was rebuilt and fortified by Nikifor Chernigovskii and his band of ~ 
cossacks who had fled there after mutinying and killing the veovod of 
Iliimsk. They terrorized the natives in the area and the Chinese pro­
tested to the voevod of Nerchinsk who, however, failed to curb Cherni­
govskii t S lawlessness. This, plus the fact 'that the Russians were now 
building numerous new ostrogs and interfering with Chinese traders in the 
area, goaded the Chinese to take up arms. In June of 1685, a superior 
force of the Chinese army besieged Albazin, which yielded after a few day~ 
reportedly because of lack of ammunition. The garrison was allowed to 
return to Nerchinsk, and the Chinese commander once more burned Albazin. 
In the following year, the Russians re-entered and refortified Albazin, a 
challenge that the Chinese answered by besieging the settlement for eleven 
months until the fall of 1687, when a messenger from the Tsar arrived at 
Peking asking that the siege be raised, and announcing the despatch of a 
Russian plenipotentiary to negotiate the frontier question. 20 
The Tsar's envoy, Feodor Golovin, had in fact left Moscow in 1685 
19W• A. Douglas Jackson, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands (Van Nostrand, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1962), p. 41. Jackson points out that despite 
establishment of these and other posts, the line of supply was too long 
for an effective Russian posture along the Amur•. 
2OGolder, op. cit., p. 63. 
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with instructions to conclude a lasting peace with China, and to estab­
.. 
lish the right to trade. He was to negotiate an agreement fixing the Amur 
River as the boundary between the two empires, but was left free, if nec­
essary, to give up the Amur as far as the mouth of the Zeia and even to g~e 
up Albazin, which was tantamount to giving up the Amur as a frontier. 21 
Golovin's instructions reflected the relatively low level of importance 
attached by Russia, at that time, to the strategic and economic.,implica­
tions of control of the Amur River. The Ch'ing regime, on the other
'. 
hand, clearly attached a positive value to possession of the Amur basin, 
as evinced in the memorial written by Prince Songotu, before departing for, 
negotiations with the Russians: 
Nepuchin (Nerchinsk) now occupied by Russia, is originally 
the pasturage of OUr Mao-ming-an tribe. Yaksa (Albazin) is 
the old home of Pei-leoh, Our Dahueur (Daurian?) chieftain. 
Neither do these territories belong to the Russians, nor are 
they a neutral ground between two borders. The Heilung 
(Amur) River is most strategically situated and should not be 
regarded with slight. If they descend it they can reach the 
Sungari. From the Sungari they can reach the Nonni and the 
Kueshan. Facing south they can reach Oula (Kirin) and Ninguta 
and the land of the Sibos, Khorchins, Solons and Dahueurs. 
Turning back to the mouth of the Heilung River, they can reach 
the sea. Into the Heilung River flows the Angun (Argun) and the 
Niumang (Bureia) and the Ginchiri (Zeia). Along both sides of 
these rivers are our protectorate peoples, the Gorchons, Giliaks 
and the Bisars, as well as the land of the Hochen and Feiyako. 
If we do not take possession of all of them, Our frontier 
people will never enjoy peace. It is our opinion that Nipuchin, 
Yaksa, the Heilung River, upper and lower, and all the rivers 
and rivulets flowing into it belong to us and none shall be 
abandoned to Russia. 22 
The parleys at Nerchinsk were protracted but the Chinese had a telling 
advantage, in that their negotiators arrived at the scene with a military 
21Yuri Semyonov, Siberia (Helicon Press, Baltimore, 1963), p. 115. 
22So-fang Pei-shing (1860), Introd. Vol. VIII, 2, cited by Lin, 

0p. cit. 
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• 
"escort" far outnumbering that of the Russians. It was, furthermore, 
• 
reinforced during the course of the negotiations until they had a prepon­
,- . 
derance of ten to one. This was consistent with the instructions given 
by the Chinese Emperor to his envoy, Prince Songotu. They stated that 
the ambassadorial mission should lose no opportunity to flaunt imposing 
military power, should circumstances so require. 23 
At the first meeting, on August l2,theChinese demanded that "all 
of Dauria" be recognized as part of the Chinese Empire. 24 This would have 
meant cession of lands long settled by the Russians and their withdrawal 
to the Lena River. 25 Songotu based his claim on the contentio~ that this 
land had been Chinese as early as the time of Alexander of Macedon, and 
that later it had become a domain of Genghis Khan, from whom the reigning 
Manchu dynasty claimed descent. Golovin dismissed this as preposterous 
and asserted that" the Buriats, Mongols and other peoples living in those 
lands had never rendered iassak to the Chinese, whereas they had been 
doing so to the Russians. He proposed designating the Amur River as the 
frontier. The Chinese insisted on their position and the first day's meet-
Ing broke up. On the following day, Songotu's Jesuit interpreters trans­
mitted what appeared to be a veiled threat of force, to which Golovin 
gave a.stout reply, saying that Chinese troops did not frighten the 
~ 
23P. T. Iakovleva, Pervyi Russko-Kitaiskii Dogovor 1689 Goda (Mos­
cow, 1908), p. 161. 
24"Dauria" is not an exact geographic designation. It may be de­
fined generally as e<tending from the Iablonovoi Range to the Valley of 
the Argun, and as encompassing a part of the Transbalkal and the Priamur. 
(See F. Shperk, Entsiklopediteshki Slovar, Vol. 19, p. 160). The Bol­
shala Sovetskaia Entsiklopedi.a,. (Vol. 13, pp. 400-401) places Dauria in 
the watersheds of the Shilka, Argun, Zela, Bureia and Sungari. 
20p• T. Iakovleva, Ope cit., p. 160 and p. 180. 
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•Russians, as should be amply evident to the Chinese envoys (a reference 
•to the fact that the besiegers of Albazin had failed to take it after 
eleven months). ~-If the Chinese sought peace they should refrain t he 
said t from threats and, instead, should offer some acceptable proposals 
for delimitation of the frontier. 2' The Chinese then made a proposal 
that would have meant Russian renunciation of the entire Priamur t as 
well as of a substantial portion of Transbaikalia. Golovin countered 
with a proposal that from the River Zeia t the left bank of the Amur 
• 
should be Russian and the right bank, Chinese. The meeting reached an 
28impasse and broke up with no agreement as to a further meeting • 
• 
During the period August l4-27 t no meetings were held t but propo­
sals and counter-proposals were transmitted between the Russian 'and Chin­
ese camps by Andrei Bolobotskii for the Russians t and by the Jesuitst 
Francis Gerbillon and Thomas Pereira t for the Chinese. During this period 
Nerchinsk came under a virtual state of siege, being surrounded by Chin­
ese troops. On August 16, 2,000 Buriat cavalrymen joined tne Chinese 
forces around Nerchinsk t now numbering some l7,Ct:JO men with plentiful 
artillery and supplies. The town had no reserves of grain. For lack of 
fodder, the camels and horses of the Russians died in great numbers. The 
situation of the Russian garrison of 1,500 men, with few cannont dwindling 
supplies and protected only by the flimsy earthworks of the town, appeared 
26Ibid., p. 168. 
27Loc. cit. Iakovleva states that through Mongolian interpreters, 
Golovin then ascertained that the Jesuits were misrepresenting the Chinese 
position and that they had been instructed to "speak only of the frontier 
and had never been told to speak of troops". 
28Ibid., pp. 170-171. 
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hopeless. Golovin weighed the situation and decided to c&l the Chinese 
•bluff -- if bluff it was -- or to defend the town to the death. On August 
l8,with his personal bodyguard of regular troops and some cossacks, ne 
marched out of the town and prepared to do battle. The ChiRSe failed to 
attack, however, whereupon Golovin sent an emissary to the Chinese camp 
to ask why the town was being besieged. 29 The Chinese replied that they 
were merely deploying their forces "for their own security". On the same 
day they made a proposal that the border follow the Gorbitsa, Shilka and
• 
Argun Rivers. Golovin rejected this, and proposed instead that the fron­
tier should follow the Amur to the Odekon, then along the Argun to Lake 
Dalai. This would have meant Russian retention of Albazin and was cate­
gorically refused by Songotu. 3Q The Chinese then made obvious prepara­
tions to storm Nerchinsk. A flotilla of armed junks approached the city 
and ground troops moved close to the walls of the town. 
Golovin, with no hope of receiving any reinforcements, decided it 
was time to make concessions. He offered to give up Albazin and to dis­
cuss a frontier that would follow the Gorbitsa and Argun, then the Stan­
ovoi range to the sea. This meant giving up almost all of the land in 
the Amur region, but would preserve for the Russians a region where silver 
deposits had been discovered, as well as a salt lake and lands suitable 
for agriculture. Songotu agreed to discussions on this basis, but added 
the demand that the Russians recognize Chinese sovereignty over all of 
the Mongolian peoples. This last Golovin rejected on the grounds that 
neither party to the negotiations had any authorization to discuss such 
29~., pp. 175-176. 

30Ibid., p. 176. 
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a matter. 3l 
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.. 
Discussions continued on the basis of Golovin's last proposal. They 
were complicated by Chinese demands that the Mongolian Prince Gantimur 
and his people, who had, years earlier, defected to the Russians, be given 
up to the Chinese, and by Russian requests for generous provisions for 
trade. Negotiations almost broke down once more when Songotu demanded a 
frontier bounded by mountain ranges reaching to the "Holy Cape". It would 
have excluded the Russians not only from the Amur region but also from 
territories they had settled along the Ud River and the coast of the Sea of 
Okhotsk. 32 These demands were again accompanied by threats of force. Gol­
• 
ovin rejected them and declared that if the Chinese wanted war the Rus­
sians would defend themselves. This vigorous retort threw the Chinese 
into some confusion. After consulting among themselves, they notified 
Golovin that they were prepared to make no disposition in the Treaty of 
lands along the Ud and at the mouth of the Amur. 33 
On August 27, agreement was finally reached on the terms of the 
Treaty of Nerchinsk. 34 The frontier was fixed from the Gorbitsa River (a 
left-bank tributary of the Shilka) along the watershed between the basins 
of the Lena and the Amur, then along the peaks of the Stanovoi Range; all 
streams flowing down the southern slopes of the Range into the Amur were 
defined as Chinese, those flowing down "the other slopes", as Russian. 
All rivers and lands lying between the Stanovoi Range and the River Ud 
31Ibid., p. 100. 

32llli., p. 181. 

J 
33Ibid., p. 182. 

34The text is contained in Appendix t~ I. 

r!, 
, 
10........ 
44 
• 
were to remain ~elimited until such time as the governments of the Rus­
•
sian and Chinese Empires were prepared to discuss them. The Argun River, 
furthermore, was set as a boundary between the two Empires and all Rus­
sian buildings and dwellings on the south bank of that river were to be 
transferred to the north bank. Albazin was to be razed to the ground by 
the Russians and its inhabitants transported to Russian territory. De­
serters and fugitives who had fled from China or Russia before conclusion 
of the Treaty would remain where they were, but in future, subjects of
• 
either Empire fleeing to the other should immediately be secured and sent 
back. Commercial relations were to be maintained, merchants of both coun­
• 
tries being provided with letters of authorization. 
The Treaty of Nerchinsk in effect fixed only a small segment of the 
Russo-Chinese frontier. There was no clear delimitation of any part of 
the region to the" northeast of Nerchinsk, since that region was simply un­
known. Cahen points out that "The Stony Mountains, -Holy Cape', the 
river Ud itself, indeed, at that time were nothing more to either party 
than mere vague geographical expressions, the country not yet having been 
either traversed in a satisfactory manner, or its bearings recorded on any 
map. The country to the southwest of Nerchinsk, Transbaikailia, and all 
the remainder of Siberia were left without delimitation of the frontiers."35 
From the Russian standpoint, the only favorable aspect of the Treaty 
of Nerchinsk was the provision granting the right for Russian merchants to 
travel to China and to trade there. "There was more joy in the Kremlin at 
36this gain than sorrow ~ the loss of Albazin", comments Semyonov. This 
gain, restricted as it was to a brief and vague statement, did not of 
35Gaston Cahen, Earlv Russo-Chinese Relations (Shanghai, 1914) p. 16. 
36Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 121. 
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•
itself create settled conditions for trade with China, something in which 
•
the Chinese had little, if any, interest. China's chief preoccupation was 
• with keeping the native tribes under control. Her.long-standing objective 

was to maintain a thinly populated belt of buffer states, insulating her 

against the outside "barbarian" world. 

A succinct summary of Russian and Chinese policies for their border­
lands, following the Treaty of Nerchinsk, is provided in Father Sebes' 
Introduction to the diary of Father Pereira, a member of the Jesuit Mis­
sion in Peking, who had participated in the negotiations at Nerchinsk: 
•••The theory which guided Russ~was formulated by Pete~ the 
Great, who saw only two possibilities for Russia in the Far East: 
voyevat ili torgovat, "wage war or trade". Since his European 
wars kept him too busy for the former, he chose trade. China, 
on the other hand, had a completely different conception of her 
relations with Russia. She wanted neither trade nor war. She 
simply wanted to pacify the territories over which she claimed 
suzerainty bY'isolating them from Russian influence. Her prin­
cipal aim was to close Mongolia and the Amur region to the Rus­
sians and transform these territories into a belt of buffer 
states under the exclusive control of China. She agreed to 
trade until such a time as ,he could accomplish the pacifica­
tion of these territories. 3 
Within ten years after the Treaty of Nerchinsk, China had achieved 

considerable progress in her campaign of pacification and the transforma­
tion of Outer Mongolia into a dependency. She sought "neither the devel­
opment of this second-rate pastureland nor the increase of its population 

through colonization". On the contrary, Father Seves points out, "the 

Peking Government took every measure to hinder colonization". 38 It for­
bade the Chinese to cross the Mongolian border, to cultivate land there 

37Joseph Sebes, S. J., The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of 
Nerchinsk (1689) (Rome, 1961) p. 124. 
38~., p. 127. 
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• 
or to marry Mongol women. The object was to maintain a closed strategic 
buffer state outside China·s own borders, "the less popul,ated the better". 
In keeping with this policy, the Chinese forbade,the Mongolian chieftains 
• 
to enter into relations with foreign countries and intensified frontier 
39 ' 
control of foreign merchants and couriers. Russian harboring of Chin­
ese derserters and intrigues with native rulers, notably the Chief of the 
Ka1mycks, led China to manifest "a certain indifference" to Russian com­
• 
mercial efforts.40 
The Russians nevertheless persisted in their efforts to increase 
their trade, which at that time consisted of imports of low-grade Chinese 
silks, cottons, tobacoo, ginger, pepper and sugar, and exports of furs, 
41
wool, horses, oxen, glass and swords. Peter the Great, interested in ex· 
panding this commerce, sent emissaries to China, the most notable of which 
were the missions of Isbrandt Ides, in 1692, and Lev Ismai10v, in 1719. 
Their purpose, in addition to obtaining trading concessions, was to re­
solve the constant problem of dealing with border refugees in a manner 
satisfactory to both empires, and to gather intelligence. 42 At the same 
39Loc. cit. 
40Cahen, Ope cit., p. 69. 
• 41Lo-Shu-Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, 
1644, 1820 (University of Arizona Press, 1966), p. 121. 
42cahen, Ope cit., pp. 32-38, and pp. 69-77; These were by no means 
the first Russian attempts to negotiate with the Chinese in Peking. As 
early as 1616, a cossack ataman appeared at the court of the Chinese vas­
sal, Altyn Khan, and obtained perm ssion from an envoy of the Chinese Em­
peror to arrange for a RUssian mission to proceed to Peking. Two years 
later, the Petlin-Mundorff mission actually reached Peking, but achieved 
no notable results. In 1654, the Russian ambassador Baikov came to 
Peking, but was dismissed from the court because of his refusal to "kow­
tow", the bow of servile allegiance to the Chinese Emporor, considered 
a part of the court etiquette for admittance of any foreign ambassador. 
Subsequent embassies of Perfiliev and Setkul-Ab1in again in 1672, and of 
Pershennikov in 1674, and Spathary in 1676, all bore little fruit largely 
47 

.. 
time, they-avoided any Chinese efforts to reach agreement on formal bor­
• 
der demarcation, particularly from the Transbaikal to the east. Their 
• 
efforts bore no fruit, as far as improvement of trade was concerned. 
What the Chinese wanted was not trade, but a delimitation of the 
Russian-Mongolian border that had been left unsettled by the Treaty of 
Nerchinsk, something that Russia had no desire to expedite, since that 
would have amounted to recognizing Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia. 
.. 	 Almost a century earlier, the Mongolian chieftain, Altyn Khan, had de­
c1ared his fealty to the Tsar, thus providing Russia with her own claim 
to suzerainty there.43 At the insistence of the Chinese Emperor, how­
ever, and in the hope of preserving whatever trade could be continued, 
Russia agreed to a settlement. This was negotiated by Sava Vladislavich 
Raguzinskii, who, following months of inconclusive meetings in Peking 
and fifty-eight conferences in the border areas, concluded the Treaty of 
Kiakhta in 1728. A precise frontier was drawn between Siberia and Mon­
golia, but from the Iablonovoi Mountains to the Sea of Okhotsk, the border 
was left lundefined, as before. Kiakhta and Nerehinsk were designated as 
permanent trade centers. Trade caravans from Siberia to Peking were per­
mitted once every three years. A Russian Orthodox Mission was given formal 
permission to reside in Peking, with a priest and students sent there to 
for the same reason. Pemhaps another, equally cogent reason was that 
while the Russians were eager for trade, the Chinese authorities were 
not interested in this. "They looked down upon merchants and depreciated 
the importance of commerce. Being used to receiving only tribute bear­
ers, the Chinese court lacked the Western concept of trade." (See 
Vincent Chen, Sino-Russian Relations in the Seventeenth Century (The 
Hague, 1966) pp. 118-120. 
43Sebes, 00. cit., p. 124. 
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44 •learn Chinese. And, at Raguzinskii's request, it was stipulated that 
correspondence between the two governments should be carried out in the • 
name of the Russia'n Senate and the Chinese Meng-ku-li-fan-yuan, the 
"Office for the Control of the Barbarians of the Mongolian Dominions". 
This would prevent the Chinese Emperor's addressing the Tsar in'insult­
ingly condescending terms, as had happened when the diplomatic correspon­
dence had been conducted as from one Emperor to another. 45 It became the 
custom of the Russians and of other western nations to refer to this Office 
as the Tribunal. 
The Treaty of Kiakhta closed Outer Mongolia to the Russians. Offi­
.. 
cial caravans could pass through it on their way to Peking, but in general, 
Russian trade was limited to the border region, mainly Kiakhta, and the 
number of official caravans to Peking decreased. 46 
Following, the conclusion of the Treaty of Kiakhta, Raguzinskii sub­
mitted a memorial to the Government in Moscow in which he laid down four 
conditions for the eventual conquest of the Amur region -- or, possibly an 
even greater territory. These were: maintenance of peace in Europe, so 
that time and money could be devoted to developing Siberia; steady plant­
ing of crops in the Transbaikal so as to establish a plentiful food base; 
gradual build-up and training of strong military forces in Eastern Siber­
ia; and encouragement of the Mongols and other non-Manchu tribes in the 
buffer areas to strike for independence. 47 Three years later, evidently 
44Semyonov, op. cit., p. 123. 

4~. K. I. Quested, The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1857 ­
!§2Q (University of Malaya Press, 1969), pp. 4-5. 
46sebes, op. cit., p. 124. 
47Ibid ., p. 125-126. 
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~ 
upon more mature reflection, he prepared another analysis in his report on 
•
"The Condition and Strength of the Chinese State": 
We may easily conceive of a war with China, but we must take 
into consideration the fact that this would not be an easy 
undertaking. We would have to concentrate on the border at 
least ten regiments of the line and an equal amount of regiments 
of irregulars, which would have to face all the Chinese forces 
and perhaps the Mongolian as well. The cost of such an under­
taking, even assuming that it should be successful, will never 
be recovered, even in a hundred years. We would have to build 
fortresses, maintain,;strong garrisons there, supply them con­
,. 	 tinuously with food and ammunition. Peace would be menaced 
for a long time, trade with China would be interrupted and 
the Siberian population would become impoverished. Moreover, 
the Chinese would never acknowledge defeat, they would begin 
to arm themselv~s to an even greater extent and learn our 
military arts.4 
By virtue of this analysis, Raguzinskii is regarded by most scho­
lars as the initiator of the status quo policy that guided Russia's rela­
tions with China for over a century after the Treaty of Kiakhta. That 
policy was not without its opponents, however, and almost from the date 
of the Treaty itself, a recurring irredentism was manifest in some quarters 
of Russian officialdom. 
The denial of the Amur by the terms of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, con­
firmed by the Treaty of K~akhta, cut down the impetus of Russian coloni­
zation and diverted it to the north-east and across the Pacific. Under 
the circumstances, however, communications with Kamchatka, not to men­
tion Alaska, were extremely difficult. And from the Russian point of view, 
the limited trade through the single point of Kiakhta was far from satis­
factory. The considerably less than accurate concept of the warmer climes 
and fertile lands of the Amur region -- which had never received any 
large-scale testing -- undoubtedly also persisted in the minds of many 
48r.oC. cit • 
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• 
Russians. as did a certain revanchism. All these considerations nurtured 
• 
Nerchinsk "revisionism" at an early date. 49 
~ • In 1733, Lorenz Lange, a caravan leader who had played an important 
role in negotiating the Treaty of Kiakhta, was pressing for ~p10ita­
tion of Chinese difficulties with the Ozhungarians to force changes in 
the Treaty that would favor Russia. 50 Eight years later, the historian, 
G. F. Muller, was stressing that the only practical route to Kamchatka and 
the Pacific was down the Amur. He pointed out, in addition, that "the 
r, 
• difficulties of transport between Yakutsk and Okhotsk would be ended ••• 
f 
!,
., 
intentions with regard to Japan and the hoped for discoveries in America 
I would be more easily fulfilled, trade with India could be organized and 
trade with China itself, either by sea or up the River Sungari, would be­
come easier than hitherto ....51 He stressed, too, that the Treaty of Ner­
chinsk had been concluded under duress, and that it was time to right 
this wrong. Lorenz Lang, by then deputy Governor~enera1 of Eastern Si­
beria, agreed completely with Mul1er.52 
Another Siberian administrator, Governor W. A. Miat1ev, was com­
missioned in 1753 to organize a second Bering expedition. It was to 
start from Nerchinsk and reach Japan and the American coast via the Shi1ka 
49Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 250. 
5Orwo years earlier, the Chinese had dispatched envoys to Moscow to 
seek Russian neutrality in their planned campaign against tb!')Ozhungars. 
The Chinese envoys did not penetrate either to St. Petersburg or to Mos­
cow, but they brought back impressive reports regarding the extent and 
wealth of Russia. (Quested, Ope cit., p. 2, cites Leontiev's translation 
of Puteshestvi Kitaiskogo Poslannika to this effect. 
51Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 25. 
52LoC • cit. 
6 
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and Amur. The Chinese government denied perm,ission f~r navigation on the 
53 •Amur, however, and the plan was not carried out. Three years later, the 
commandant of Selenginsk, W. Jakobi, recommended assembling troops between 
Selenginsk and Nerchinsk and then confronting the Chinese with an ultima­
tum. Catherine II, at the beginning of her riegn, considered this plan 
but rejected it because of the heavy demands it would have made on Russian 
54military resources.
The cautious Russian government, unwilling to become embroiled in a 
military adventure in an area thousands of miles removed from Russia's 
basic sources of supply for military manpower and equipment, continued to 
reject all the overtures of the revisionists during the first half of the 
nineteenth century.55 One such proposal was made in 1805 by the navigator, 
I. F. von Krusenstern, who recommended that Russia obtain a stepping 
stone to Manchuria by occupying Anniwa Bay in southern Sakhalin; this was 
done in the following year by a Lieutenant Khvostoff, who took the bay in 
the Emperor's name by distributing medals and proclamations among the na­
56tive chiefs. This action, however, was disavowed by the government.
At the time of the Sakhalin adventure the Russian government was at­
tempting to modify ~e terms of the Treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta 
through conciliatory, rather than agressive methods. In 1805, Count Iuri 
53toc. cit. 
~ R. K. I. Quested, The Ex ansion of Russia in East Asia 1857­
1860, (University of Malaya Press, 1968 , p. 2, and Russkaia Starina, 

1881, Vol. 32, pp. 75-91. 

55v. P. Vasiliev, Russko-Kitaiskie Traktaty (st. Petersburg, 1860), 
cited by Quested, relates that Paul I planned an armed expedition -to pun­
ish China', but was murdered before it could take place. 
56Ravenstein, The Russians on the Amur (London, 1861), p. 113. 
r. 
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Golovkin, with a large retinue and costly presents, was dispatched with 
orders to negotiate liberalized trade agreements in Peking and to secure 
permission for limited Russian navigation on the Amur. He did not pro-
gress beyond Urga, where endless parleying about ceremonial wore out his 
57 patience so that he returned without accomplishing anything. A member 
of Golovkin's party later wrotea "All the inhabitants of Nerchinsk, 
Irkutsk and Transbaikalia think of the land of the Daurs as lost. Why 
should we not build much better ports at the mouth of the Amur than we 
have at Okhotsk and miserable Avachinsk (Petropavlovsk). They would be a 
hundred times better and more useful than our silly American possessions 
and all those Kuriles and Aleutians ••••• •• 58 
Following the conclusion of the abortive Golovkin mission, one of 
Golovkin's staff officers undertook a secret reconnaissance of the fron-
tier area from Nerchinsk to Gorbitsa, where he found some frontier posts 
with inscriptions in five languages, and where he was told by the natives 
that the Tungus tribes on the Amur and in the Nerchinsk area were sympa-
thetic to the Russians. Although it had been intended to develop 'plans 
59 for an expedition on the basis of this information, it was shelved. 
The failure of the Golovkin mission did not disturb the placid 
relations between Russia and China and in 1810 the Russians arranged a 
57Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 253; Quested, Ope cit., pp. 11-12, points 
out that Golovkin's main qualifications for appointment as head of this 
mission was that he was a relative of the Foreign Minister, Prince 
. Chartoryszky, that tfue mission was very badly organized and that it was 
found that the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry had lost its 
files on China, so that Golovkin had had to start out with inadequate 
instructions! 
58 F. F. Vige1, Zapiski (Moscow, 1928) Vol. I, p. 251, cited by 
P. I. Kabanov, Amurskii Vopross (Blagoveschensk, 1958) p. 87. 
59Quested, Ope cit., p. 16, citing P. I. Kabanov, Amurskii Vopross 
i ego Razreshenie (Moscow, 1947) 
• 
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• 
meeting between the Governor of Irkutsk, N. I. Treskin, and Chinese offi­
• 
cials at Urga. These were carried out in very amicable and ,equal manner, 

. - . ~ 

owing in large part to Treskin's care in conforming.to Chinese etiquette. 

The meetings failed in their political purpose because, as Quested points 

out, "The Chinese had hoped to persuade Russia to send another mission 

(to Peking) unconditionally, whereas the Russian Government :wished to make 

this dependent upon the sending of a reciprocal Chinese mission to St. 

Petersburg, in order to enlighten China as to the true extent of Russian

• 
power. It was highly shortsighted of the Chinese and greatly to their sub­
sequent disadvantage that they did not entertain this idea, but 
•
there 
would have been too much loss of face involved.1t61 
Some five years after ~Treskin negotiations, an official of the 
Russian-American Company urged occupation of the!·Amur delta and naviga­
tion of the river,' pointing out that almost 15,000 pack horses were re­
quired annually, at exorbitant expense, for the provisioning of the Rus· 
sian settlements on the Sea of Okhotsk.62 The Russian government, recov­
ering from Napoleon's invasion and engrossed in the events leading to his 
final downfall, understandably gave this notion short shrift. It re­
I!> 
mained unmoved, too, in 1827, when Admiral Nikoloi Mordivinov63 wrote 

Count Nesselrode, Metternich's disciple, saying, "We cannot forget the 

60N• I. Treskin, "Zhurnal druzheskogo svidania Irkutskogo grazh­

danskogo gubernatora Treskina s Kitaiskim pogranichyym pravitelem Vanom 

i Ambanom s 19 feb. po 13 marta 1810,11 Chtenia v imperialisticheskom 

. obshestve istorii i drevnostei Rossii pro Moskovskom universitete (Moscow, 

1860) Bk. I CSL, 227, p. 9b, cited by Quested, op. cit., p. 16-17. 

61Quested, op. cit., p. 17. 
62Ravenstein, op. cit., p. 113. 
6~uraviev's maternal grandfather 
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• 
concessions made by Russia to the Chinese on the boundary from the lablo­
•
novoi Mountains to the Amur. At the time of making those concessions, we 
were enjoying the great expanses of Siberia and disdained the wilderness 
of the conceded lands, but now we are suffering because the Amur, the only 
river in Siberia leading to the open sea, does not flow within our fron­
64tiers." 
A few years later, Siberian officials were listening to the report 
of an escaped convict, the Staroverets Guri Vasiliev, who had been re­
• 
turned to them by Tungus hunters for a reward of three rubles. Vasiliev 
and two companions had periodically roamed the Amur territory for some
• 
thirteen years and had drifted down the Amur in a boat to its mouth and 
the Sea of Okhotsk. Governor-General Lavinskii, of Eastern Siberia, was 
greatly impressed by Vasiliev's account of the navigability of the Amur 
River. He also noted the returned convict's report that the Chinese 
were taking no steps to defend or colonize the area it drained, which at 
this time was inhabited by only a few thousand Chinese and Manchus.65 
Lavinskii submitted a plan for the occupation of the Amur region 
to the authorities in St. Petersburg. The response was that Vasiliev's 
reports should be tested. Accordingly a Colonel Ladishenskii was sent on 
an extensive ttip on the Amur and subsequently worked out details for a 
military expedition into the territory.66 The plan was shelved, however; 
the Polish Revolution of 1831-2 had only recently been crushed, the Near 
64Archiv Ministerstva Inostrannikh Del f. kanz. za 1827, g_, 
d. 	7316 11.7-9, cited by Kabanov, Ope cit. 
6~. E. Grum-Grchimailo, Opisanie Amurskogo Kraia (St. Petersburg, 
1894), Ch. 	 I, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 22. 

66Semyonov, op_ cit., p. 255. 

55 
• 
Eastern crisis, later to be resolved by the Treaty of Unklar Skelessl, 
• 
was fermenting, and the Russian Government presumably had enough to worry' 
• aboot without undertaking military commitments in the southeastern reaches 
of the Empire. But even the cautious Nesselrode entertained hopes of 
peaceably adjusting the restrictions on trade and removing the prohibition 
of Russian navigation of the'Amur. In 1840, he ordered Liubimov, the 
secretary of the ecclesiastical mission to Peking, to initiate talks with 
the Chinese on the subject of the Amur. This proved impossible and con· 
-
vinced Nesselrodethat nothing further should be attempted.67 Interest 
in the Amur, however, was revived by the journey of the geogripher, A. T. 
von Middendorf, in 1842, which extended, contrary to the instructions of 
68the Imperial :Academy of Science, along the ill-defined border of China. 
Count Evfimii Vasilievich Putiatin, perhaps relying on the Emperor's well­
known penchant for "military expeditions",69 submitted a proposal in 1843 
to send forces into the area for the purpose of wringing commercial con­
cessions from the Chinese. According to a report by the British Ambassa­
dor in st. Petersburg, this was approved initially by Nesselrode, but 
70judged not worth the outlay by Vronchenko, the Minister of Finance. 
Even before Muraviev's appointment as Governor-General of Eastern 
·67Barsukov, Ope cit., Vol. II, p. 200. 
6~usski Arkhiv, 1878, Bk. III, p. 257. 
69G• Pushkarev, Rossia v XIX veke, (New York, 1962) footnote 12, p.48. 
7OReport from Sir John Crampton to H. M. Secretary of state for For­
eign Affairs, Nov. 18, 1860, cited by ~uested, Ope cit., p. 31. The 
accuracy of the British intelligence service in st. Petersburg at this 
time would be difficult to d.etermine; the report of Nesselrodets initial 
acquiescence in Putiatints project certainly seems questionable. 
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Siberia, Nicholas I had deter'mined upon exploration of the Amur estuary. 
In 1846, ensign Gwrilov, commander of the brig, "Grand Duke Constantine" 
in the service of the Russian-American Company, was ordered by the Emperor 
"to carry out hydographic investigations" in the Sea of Okhotsk. He was 
instructed to avoid any publicity and enjoined from letting his crew know 
where they were sailing. 71 This expedition had evidently been stimulated 
by information from the Tunguses, roaming along the shores of the Sea of 
Okhotsk, that many Russian vagabonds and refugees from the law had made 
their way to the mouth of the Amur and had established settlements there, 
much as similar adventurers had earlier done at Albazin. Gavriloy had 
been instructed to maintain the strictest incognito, passing himself off 
as a non-Russian fisherman and taking the utmost precautions to carry out 
his deception, even to carrying western European, rather than Russian, 
tobacco. In the event of meeting Russian settlers, he was to tell them 
that he had learned to speak Russian from Russians on the coast of the Sea 
of Okhotsk, where he had been fishing. Gavrilov encounterod sandbanks and 
turnad back and the Russian-American Company reported that the Amur estuary 
was not navigable. 72 
II. GRmlJING FRO~.rrIER OF EMPIRE 
While revanchism. real or imagined climatic and agricultural advan­
tages in the "lost" territory, and the need for better coml'nunications with 
the P.:lcific settlements underlay continued Russian interest in the Amur, 
there was another, more general, contributing factor. This was the growing 
economic development of Siberia and the rcSJ 1ting increasing awareness 
71Ba l'Sllkov, Q2.:...cit., Vol. I, p. 172. 

7~oc. cit. 
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within the government that this vast "realm" was becoming an integral part 
of Russia, rather than a sort of colonial possession. 73 • 
In addition to mounting agricultural production, mining was becoming 
a significant activity in the Transbaikal by the middle of the eighteenth 
century. Silver, lead and copper were smelted there and in Nerchinsk, 
plants smelting iron and pig iron were operating. A main highway crossed 
Siberia from Tiumen in the west to Nerchinsk in the east, and was joined 
also by roads from the south of Siberia and from the northern regions. 74 
.. 
The Kiakhta trade, which had languished during the second half of the eigh­
teenth century, was revived by the Russo-Chinese Convention of 1792. In 
1797, 34,000 poods 7~ of tea were imported through Kiakhta; 76 by 1824, 
this figure had risen to l~,OOO. In that year, peltry constituted 50% of 
Russian exports to China, and woolen textiles, some 15%. Of the latter, 
2,438 arshins77·were of Russian manufacture, and 29~,825 were foreign re­
exports. Some twenty-five years later, peltry constituted a negligible 
export item, while textile exports, exclusively of Russian manufacture, 
78had risen to 1,296,93~ arshins. This was a natural reflection of Russia's 
7~arc Raeff, in Speranskii and the Siberian Reforms of 1822, p. 6, 
refers to the superficial and erroneous analogy with the colonial possess­
ions of England and Spain drawn by Catherine II and her councilors who 
referred to Siberia as ~our India, Mexico or Peru". 
74M• G. Levin and L. P. Potapov, The Peoples of Siberia, (University 
of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 129-30. 
~ne pood equals approximately 37 pounds. 
76A. N. Radischev, the political writer exiled to Siberia at this 
time, noted in his Pismo 0 Kitaeskom Tor e, that this amounted to t of 
all imports into Russia; 2 3 of such imports consisted of textiles, 
(Semyonov, Ope, cit., p. l2~). 
770ne arshin equals 28 inches. 
78p. I. Kabanov, Amurskii Vopross (Blagoveschensk, 1959), p. 56. 
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• 
expanding economy. The value of manufactured output in Russia during the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century had risen from 46,524,000 silver 
rubles to l59,985,cx:x:> rubles, with textiles accounting for 48% of i.that 
• 
figure. Thus, by Muraviev's time, Kiakhta had become a prime outlet for 
Russia's most important export industry. By that time, too, annual tea 
imports through this point had risen to over a quarter of a million poods. 
• 
Almost one fifth of Russia's total customs revenue was now being derived 
79from Kiakhta. Of added significance to the Siberian economy was the dis­
covery of gold. First found toward the end of the 1830's, it was subse­
quently uncovered in the taiga of the lenisei and then in the valleys of 
80the Lena and the Vitium. 
As the economic importance of Siberia and its trade with China grew, 
so did its Russian population. In 1796, this amounted to 78,450, plus 
14,360 in the ~ransbaikal (almost all in the mines). By the mid-nine­
teenth century, this figure had grown to 1,152,978, with 
81the Transbaikal. Forty percent of this population was 
some 350,000 in 
non-agricultural, 
a circumstance that was to become critical in later years. 
A small proportion of Siberia's growing population was composed of 
82
convicts and political exiles. Some of the latter, notably the Decem­
bri~ts, exerted a marked influence on Eastern Siberia's cultural and eco­
nomic development. The Decembrists contributed greatly to communities 
79 ~., pp. 52-54. 
80Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 243. 
81Kabanov,op. cit., p. 58. 
82Raeff, Ope cit., p. 44, states that not more than 2,000 convicts 
entered Siberia in anyone year, and that they remained an insignificant 
fraction of the population. The number of other exiles, however, who 
were sent to Siberia .- not as punishment, but for purposes of augment­
ing the chronically sparse population -­ far exceeded this figure. 
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such as Petrovskii Zavod, Berezov, Narym Surgut, Pelym and lakutsk. Their 
•dispersal to these and other locations was meant to prevent their close 
association. It had the beneficient effect of spreading an intelligentsia 
throughout the area, which until then contained hardly any members of that 
stratum of Russian society. 
The Decembrists organized schools. They improved agricultural 
methods, through their instruction, the native inhabitants learned to cul­
t. 	
tivate all manner of fruits and vegetables not previously grown in Siberia, 
and learned to grow tobacco, rye, buckwheat and barley and to produce hemp 
oil. The Decembrists also organized medical clinics and undertook scienti­
fic research. In some cases they were even able to exercise a constructive 
influence on the Siberian governmental authorities. 83 Their activities 
were undoubtedly instrumental in spreading the growing consciousness within 
Russia that Siberia was in fact a part of the nation itself ("Sibir tozhe 
Russkaia zemlia"). 
Enlightened and progressive ~ough the Decembrists were, they consti­
tuted only a tiny leavening element in Eastern Siberian society, which 
differed markedly from the traditional Russian pattern. The provincial 
nobility that played a political role on the local level in European Russia 
did not exist in Siberia, whqe the government regarded the other classes 
there as too unreliable to be allowed any initiative or autonomy. The only 
social group in Siberia that might have played a political role, vis-a-vis 
the governmental bureaucracy, were the merchants, but ever since Peter the 
Great, the government had held the Russian merchant class in low esteem. ~ 
83A. G, Mazour, The First Russian Revolution. 1825, (Stanford Uni­
versity Press, 1937), pp. 222-260. 
~aeff, Ope cit., p. 7. Peter the Great recognized the importance 
of trade for the economy of his realm. He accorded special privileges to 
to 
• 
Geographic and economic conditions had favorably influenced the 
• 
growth and predominance of the merchant class in Siberian .society. It 
was trade that had brought Russian settlers to Siberia, which had been dis­
covered and conquered by merchants or by freebooters in their pay, while 
the Russian nobility, predominantly concerned with agriculture, (based on 
85 	 . 
serfdom, which did not exist in Siberia), found little attraction there. 
The stronghold of the Siberian merchants in the mid-nineteenth century 
• 	 was Irkutsk, where they constituted an economic oligarchy, living "in the 
world of seventeenth century Muscovy", and thinking .tin terms of privi­
lege, monopoly and special rights". 86 • 
During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the 
merchants of Irkutsk were constantly at odds with the administrative 
authorities, who reflected the government's prevauing philosophy of 
"benevolent despotism". Allowed no real role in local self-government, 
these commercial entrepreneurs were subject to the nearly absolute rule of 
the Governor, who was the personal and direct appointee of the sover­
eign, and was responsible to the monarch alone, and of his appointed offi­
cials. As is invariably the case under conditions of political and economic 
the Ru~~ian merchantry and made efforts to bring them into the mainstream 
of public life. Following Peter's death, the resentful nobility succeeded 
in arrogating to themselves the monopolies and other benefits enjoyed by 
the merchants and in relagating them to an inferior status. 
85rhat is, of the sort that was prevalent on the estates of land own­
ers throughout European Russia. One form of serfdom did exist in Siberia, 
i.e., the "enrollment" (prypisanie) of peasants for the rural mines. At 
the end of the eighteenth century, there were some 60,000 "enrolled work­
ers" of this sort. (See Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 241.) 
86Raeff, Ope cit., pp. 13 and 32. 
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absolutism, abuses of power were commonplace. •The merchants' only recourse 
was to forward complaints and present petitions to the capital -­ when • 
• these could be gotten through. One such complaint, in 1800,87 spurred 
the Russian Senate and the Council of State to an examination of the Sib­
erian governmental structure, and persuaded the Emperor that a fundamental 
reorganization was required. It was to take twenty-two years, however, 
before such a reorganization, at least on paper, was effected. The first 
• 
attempt, under Governor-General Selifontov, resulted only in further ex­
panding the powers of the governor general and in multiplying the number 
of officials and government bodies in an area already saturated with 
bureaucrats. This, comments Raeff, "considering the widespread corruption 
88 
among Siberian officials", led "only to more abuses and confusion". The 
situation reached a climax during the administration of Ivan Pestel 
(father of the prominent Decembrist) and his ruthless deputy, N. I. Tres­
kin, which "became a fourteen-year long history of clashes and conflicts 
between the bureaucracy and.the merchants". It also involved a struggle 
within the government itself. From the time of Catherine II and 
87Raeff, Ope cit., p. 9, cites the eleven major points of this com­
plaint byM. Sibiriakov, prominent merchant and mayor of Irkuts~, 1) 
Grain prices had been artificially raised; 2) The population was being 
distracted from useful work by forcible impressment for road building; 
3) The administration had neglected to apportion the required amount of 
land for each village; 4) The peasants were compelled to transport 
grain to remote places; 5) The Governor-General had forbidden the plant­
ing of tobacco in Irkutsk; 6) The mansion of the Governor had been re-. 
paired with the help of conscripted labor; 7) Military barracks had 
been built in the square in front of the cathedpal; 8) A distribution 
point for forced labor had been established at the very gates of the 
city, thus making the outskirts of the town unsafe; 9) The barracks of 
the police had been transferred to another spot in the city at the ex­
pense of the people; 10) The transportation of merchandise over Lake 
Baikal had been prohibited and the merchants had been compelled to use a 
longer route around the lake; 11) Sibiriakov himself had been deprived 
of his office of mayor without any reason. 
88Raeff, op~ cit., p. 11. 
• 
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particularly with the accession to the throne of Alexander I, the central 
government had become impressed with the advatages of free ~rade as a 
basis·for the nation's economic well-being. Within the government, how'" 
• 
ever, there were differing interpretations of the manner in which this 
should be fostered. The Ministry of Finance believed that local officials 
should be given as little power as possible in economic matters, allowing 
• 
individual merchants to compete freely for such benefits as were to be 
89derived from dealings with the State. What the Ministry appeared to 
overlook was that the merchants' clamor against bureaucratic interference 
largely reflected their determination to obtain a stranglehold ?ver the 
economy of the r~gion through their buying monopolies, rather than any 
90attachment to the principles of an open economy. 
The struggle between Treskin and the merchants of Siberia entailed 
the development of a wide range of beneficial economic projects, includ­
ing the building of roads, granaries, municipal facilities, and similar 
projects, on the one hand, and on the other, the spread of a scandalous 
system of bribery and corruption associated with these. Treskin was an 
indefatigable worker and undoubtedly did much to improve the economic 
base of Siberia. His high-handed methods, however, which were more 
suited.to the by-gone Petrine era, and the fact that he was apparently 
as guilty of dishonestly lining his pockets9l as were his unscrupulous 
89SuCh dealings included contracting for supplies and materials 
required by State-run mines and the then State monopolies of vodka dis­
tilling and salt mining. 
90IQ!g., p. 30. The combined action of a few powerful merchants 
for example, could force down the price that peasants could obtain for 
their grain. 
9lAn activity that he delegated to his wife. An excellent account 
of the Pestel-Treskin regime is contained in Chapter II of Raeff's pre­
viously cited work. 
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henchmen, finally caused his downfall. The mounting desperation of the 
• 
Siberian population succeed in 1819, through the usual device of petition­
ing the Emperor, in bringing about the dismissal of Pestel (who had spent 
most of his governor-generalcy in St. Petersburg) and of Treskin. In that 
year, Michael M. Speranskii (1772-1839) distinguished legislator and states­
man. became Governor-General of Siberia. 
Speranskii was charged with inspecting and reorganizing the area's 
entire administrative apparatus. The result of his efforts reflected the
-
division within the Russian bureaucracy between those who were determined 
upon a policy of strict etatism and bureaucratic authoritari~nism and 
those who favored the ideas of late-eighteenth century enlightened des­
potism, economic liberalism and humanitarianlsm.92 
Speranskii's reforms of 1822 established administrations for Western 
and Eastern Sioeria with capitals in Tobolsk and Irkutsk. The governor­
; general of each area was an appointee of the Emperor and responsible to 
him personally. As the lieutenant of the monarch he was head of the Main 
Administration, consisting of himself and an Advisory Council, to which 
he was to submit certain of his proposed measures for information and ad­
vice. His personal function was that of administrative supervision of 
the.execution of all measures, including those issued by the judiciary. 
He was responsible for regular inspection of his region and of its var­
ious branches of administration; he was to make recommendations for pro­
motions and honors and he had a qualified power of appointment, and dis­
missal of functionaries. In case of special need, the governor-general 
could issue temporary executive instructions subject to eventual confirma­
tion by St. Petersburg. In all other matters, the governor-general was to 
9~aeff, op. cit., p. 13:>. 
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work in conjunction with the Council. The Council, however, had only an 
• 
advisory opinion that was not binding on the governor-general. Moreover, 
• 
while it exercised general supervision over current administration, re­
viewed all matters pertaining to taxation, contractual obligations, sup­
plies, recruits, etc., and was consulted regarding execution of legisla­
tion, it had no power to implement its decisions. Its role was thus really 
very limited and eventually it deteriorated to an institution for dealing 
• with a limited number of specific matters; it soon completely lost its ori­
ginal function af advising the governor-general on matters of general poli~ 
cy.93 • 
While Speranskii's reforms did little to limit the vlcrroyal peroga­
tives of the governors-general, they nevertheless had a significant im­
pact on the administration of Siberia and on its economic life. A more 
systematic organizationfof local government was established, gubernia 
(provinces), okru9s (districts) and volosts (townships). More self-
government was allowed the native populations under their own clan ad­
ministrations and ..~ (parliaments) of the steppe". The judiciary 
was given greater autonomy, but most significantly, a far g~eater degree 
of laissez-faire was accorded the economy. The establishment of full free­
dom of trade had, indeed, been Speranskii's first concern. He restricted 
interference and participation of officials in economic activities and 
abolished most of the detailed regulations of trade which had been for the 
most part a facade for bureaucratic tyranny.94 He also instituted positive 
measures to encourage various forms of economic activity and to bring the 
whole area into closer trade relations jwith European Russia. His measures 
9~aeff, Ope cit., pp. 74-76. 
94!.lli., p. 54. 
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for the promotion and safeguarding of free economic activity were, in 
• 
fact, his major contributions to the administration of Siberia • 
• The application and implementation of Speranskii's new 
. 
legislation 
often faltered and proved inadequate and his successors tended to fall 
back into the corrupt practices of the earlier satraps of Siberia. His 
freeing of economic activity, too, sometimes took the perverted form of 
facilitating the monopolistic activities of the merchants whom Treskin 
.. 
had hated and distrusted, and ironically, often had the effect of en­
couraging collusion between government officials and private entrepre­
neurs. Nevertheless, as Raeff puts it, Speranskii's measures."encouraged 
a new outlook and gave new direction to the region's energies and re­
sources. In so doing, the reforms of 1822 helped to open Siberia as the 
future agricultural and industrial 'frontier of Russia' ".95 By the mid-
nineteenth century, the need of this new frontier for expanded trade, as 
well as Eastern Siberia's potential as a base for further eastward colon­
isation, were becoming increasingly clear to the merchants of Irkutsk 
as they were to become to Muraviev soon after his arrival there. The Amur, . 
he quickly perceived, would be the key to such developments. 
95!.!?J...g., p. 131.· 
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CHAPTER III 
EARLY PROBLEMS AND TACTICS 
I _ CHANGES COME TO IRKtrrSK 
Muraviev was clearly determined to impress upon the population of 
.. 
Eastern Siberia that his appointment was ushering in an administration 
far different from that of his predecessor. His arrival in Krasnoiarsk 
on February 27, 1848, .was awaited with trepidation. He was met there 
only by the city governor, Vasilii Kirilovich Padalka, and except for 
him, Muraviev received no one that evening_ At that time, recalls B. V. 
Struve, the corrupt practices in the administration of the gold mines 
was creating a major scandal. Particularly notorious was the disposi­
tion of the so-called governmental .remnants, being distributed in the 
guise of gracious monarchical bestowals on various individuals close to 
the throne. Comments Struve: 
This represented the most shameful and outrageous specula­
tion. Nowhere had bribery revealed itself in such blatant form 
J( '-and in such large dimensions••• The most highly placed per­
sonages did not shrink from participating_ Entire gangs of 
dishonest people were occupied in concocting reasons for in­
cluding this or that mine in the category of a ·'governmental 
remnant". Today a mine would be so classified and tomorrow 
there would already have arrived an application seeking the 
Tsar's permission to grant the right to work the mine to some 
highly placed person yr to a company in which such persons 
were silent partners. 
The mine scandals and other instances of collusion between government 
lRusski Vestnik, 1888, cited by Barsukov, op. cit., I, p., 175. 
j-- • 
• 
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officials and private entrepreneurs led Muraviev to undertake a sort of 
•demonstration before the wealthy inhabitants of the area. He had earlier 
promised the Masharovs, a family that had greatly prospered as supply' 
contractors to the gold mine operators and purveyors of vodka to their 
exploited workmen, that en route from Krasnoiarsk to Irkutsk, he would be 
their dinner guest in Kansk, where they owned a luxuriously appointed 
home. Now, however, he decided to make it clear that wealth should not 
be accorded any advantages before the law, and gave instructions in Kras­
noiarsk that the Masharovs be informed that he would not call UP9n them 
in Kansk. 2 
• 
Barsukov records that after a five-day inspection of the troops 
and of municipal and community establishments in Krasnoiarsk, Muraviev 
proceeded on to Nizhnii Udinsk, where he stopped for a few hours and 
where "certain-irregularities in the administration of the district came 
to his attentiontt Muraviev, states Barsukov, "issued lively and deci­• 3 
sive orders in order to reinstate confidence in the authorities which of 
late had been completely destroyed, and then proceeded to Irkutsk". It 
is a passage of this sort that brings down on Barsukov's head the scorn 
of critics like Butsinskii, who was quick to seize upon this rather ludi­
4 
crous exaggeration of Muraviev's effectiveness. 
On the day following his arrival in Irkutsk, Muraviev held a morning 
reception. It was obviously designed to signal the advent of drastic 
2Loc. cit. 
3Ibid., I, p. 176. 
4sutsinski, N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii, Trud I. P. Barsukova. Retzenziia 
Professora Kharkovsko90 Universiteta, (St. Petersburg, Imperial Academy 
of Sciences, 1895) p. 126. 
f' 
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changes in the regime. All of the notables in the area, military and civil 
.~ \ 
•figures, the merchants, members of the local duma and of the trade corpora­
tions, were gathered in the main salon of the Governor-General's resi­
dence. The account of I. V. Vagin, an eyewitness5 makes it plain that the 
proceedings were formal and chilly. Muraviev received the introductions 
of the military officers silently, bowing to no one, nor offering his 
hand. He coldly listened to the ceremonial address of the Governor of 
Irkutsk, A. V. Piatnitzkii, and then silently walked past the row of civi­
• 
lians. Among these stood N. E. Tiumentsev, Councilor of the Main Adminis­
tration of Eastern Siberia, who was "red as a lobster". Muraviev passed 
him by also. He then walked quickly to the next room, received bread and 
salt from the city community and immediately returned to the salon. After 
a few moments, he bowed left and right and the reception, which had taken 
twenty minutes, -was over, though the senior officials were requested to 
remain for a meeting which, Tiumentsev noted In his diary, "was grim and 
left everyone with an unpleasant impression". Vagin comments furthers 
For me, a novice to the governor-generals' receptions, the mat­
ter of the overall impression was of little moment. What I was 
interested in was Muraviev's personality. By its youthfulness 
and alertness it constituted a complete contrast with the person­
ality of Rupert. 
In the evening, little groups gathered in various places to 
comment on the reception and to go over its details. It was 
said that one of the most militant of the Rupertist officials, 
almost the most influential one through his connections, was $0 
put out of countenance that in response to some question of 
Muraviev's he babbled some utterly foolish answer. But what 
interested everyone the most was the Mangazeyev story. 
Mangazeyev was the officer in charge of the gold desk in the 
Mining Department. In addition to the sort of bribery in which 
01. V. Vagin, "Vostochnoe Obozrenie", in Literaturnyi Sbornik, 

1885, pp. 277-283, cited by Barsukov, Ope cit., I, pp. 177-179. 

, 
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officials at that time were involved, he had thought up a 

special field for himselfa He indicated to various indivi­

duals that the profitable crown-demesne remnants in the • 

gold fields and helped them to get these away from other appli­

• 	 cants••• He had hoped to oblige the inspectors (with Count 
Tolstoy) in this way, but his obligingness had hurt him. 
"There I stood", Mangazeyev related later, nand beside me 

stood Savinski. They introduced him to Muraviev (and the 

later said), -I have heard so many good reports about you· •• 

••and he scattered compliments. Then suddenly he asked, 

-But where is Mangazayev?- "Well" t I thought, "if he has 

praised Savinski, who is only in charge of the salt desk, 

so highly, he will embrace me no less." I bowed (and he 

said), -I trust you will not be serving with me.- Some 

praise: 

Although Mangazeyev was in excellent health, Muraviev ordered that 
he be given a medical retirement, this being the only way, because of the 
Mining Department's procedures, that he could get rid of him. Muraviev 
lost no time, tOOt in requesting the resignation of Governor Piatnitzki, 
who had been notoriously involved in the gold mine scandals. Further 
purges took place soon, and Muraviev's administration began to be staffed 
with eager and honest officials to replace those removed. A new order was 
being established, but it was a gradual process; it was not easy to at­
tract capable administrators to the remote expanses governed by Muraviev. 
Muraviev was appalled by the situation in which Eastern Siberia 
found itself because of years of maladministration. He was determined to 
bring order into the chaos that faced him, but he had no illusions about 
the dimensions of the problem. He knew that it was essential, if he was 
to achieve his ends, that the Tsar be aware of the realities of the situa­
tion. With that in mind, before leaving st. Petersburg, he had obtained 
the Emperor's consent to maintain direct correspondence with him on all 
matters he deemed to require the Emperor's personal attention.6 This ar­
rangement proved invaluable to Muraviev in the months and years ahead. 
6earsukov, op. cit., I, p. 181. 
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Matters occupying Muraviev's attention during his first days in 
Eastern Siberia included reviewing complaints from various individuals '! 
and from entire communities concerning oppression and extortion of gov- , 
ernment officials. He was particularly impressed by the petitions of the 
natives, the Buriats of the Irkutsk okrug, who waited upon him in crowds. 
In addition, there were troop inspections, visits to prisons and a myriad 
of other details affecting the administration of the area. 
The Kiakhta trade soon claimed Muraviev's attention, too. He had 
.. 
received a detailed letter, while passing through Moscow, from Muscovite 
traders doing business in Kiakhta, who pointed out that governmental 
7 • restrictions and interference were crippling commerce there. Upon his ar­
rival in Irkutsk, Muraviev sent his aide-de-camp to that border town to 
obtain first-hand information. On the basis of his aide's findings, he 
wrote a report to the Minister of Finance, T. P. Vronchenko, setting forth 
his preliminary view that the archaic regulations governing the Kiakhta 
trade might need revision and that control of this trade, so important to 
the Russian economy, should not be left in the irresponsible hands of the 
8people who currently monopolized it. 
Muraviev's next step was to prepare a report to the '~peror ~hibh 
created a commotion within the St. Petersburg administration. Wrote hel 
7Quested cites M. I. Sladkovskii, Orcherki ekonomicheskikh 
otnoshenie, S.S.S.R. s Kitaem (Moscow, 1957), pp. 88-94, to the effect 
that the most counter-productive regulation was that which prohibited 
trade other than by barter. The Chinese merchants suffered less from 
Government interference than the Russians, since the Manchu regime had 
allowed its regulations to lapse. Monopolies of Chinese and Russian 
merchants within their own countries also tended to stifle commerce. 
Be. V. Struve, "Graf Muraviev-Amurskii. Iz vospominanii 0 ego 

deiatolnosti", Russkaia Starina, Vol. 48, p. 339. 
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• 
Gold mining, which only recently has drawn everyone's atten­
tion to the inexhaustible riches of Eastern Siberia, is already 
tending to diminish. Low yield diggings have been abandoned 
because of the excessive cost of labor. the rich mines are being 
worked out, but there have been no significant, new strikes. In 
all probability, however, one may conclude that gold deposits 
in Eastern Siberia are virtually inexhaustible. I don't pre­
sume to judge the question as to whether it would be to the 
benefit of the realm were private gold mining to expand, but I 
am convinced that as long as it exists and is permitted, it is 
desirable for your Majesty that these riches be shared more 
fairly and correctly than has been the case to the present. At 
the saIne time, the existing order facilitates seizure by them 
of the claims of others and leads to the ruin of other prospec­
tors not possessing rich diggings • 
71 
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Shortly afterwards, he submitted a proposal to the Emperor calling 
for the establishment of a single gold mining company in Eastern Siberia.9 
Another aspect of the Eastern Siberian economy that excited Muraviev's 
indignation was that of the practices of the vodka distillers (otkupschiki) 
who exercised a monopoly. They maintained traktirs (gin mills) near the 
gold diggings and on pay days siphoned off the miserable gold miners' 
earnings before they reached their dwellings. Muraviev instituted a sys­
tern of "escorting" these men home, keeping them away from these drinking 
dens and encouraging them to keep their money for the needs of their hum­
ble households. lO He also developed proposals for removing both distill­
ing and salt manufacture from the government leasehold system, arguing 
that such action would gain significant benefits, both for the government 
and for the area in general. 11 
Muraviev's concern for the improvement of social and economic con­
ditions in Eastern Siberia was reflected in his attitude toward the exiled 
Decembrists. It is a reasonable assumption, too, that he preferred their 
9Barsukov, Ope cit., p. 184. 
lOIbid. 
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•company to that of the rest of such "society" as Eastern Siberia had to 
•offer. From the time of his arrival, he established close relations with 
• a number of them, including Prince Sergei G. Vo1konskii, Prince Sergei ' 
Trubetskoi, N. A. Bestuzhev, Ivan Gorbachevskii and Dmitri Zava1ishin. 
Among the Oecembrists were a number living in small localities in 
the vicinity of Irkutsk, but only the Princesses Vo1konskii and Trubetskoi 
lived in town, having received the right do do so for the purpose of their 
children·s education. All of the 'others had to obtain special permits for
.. 
each trip to town, a circumstance that created some hardship in cases of 
sickness or other domestic emergencies. Travel from one volost'to another 
also required special passes. Muraviev quickly put an end to such incon­
veniences.12 
Muraviev and his wife became friendly with the Princesses Vo1kinskii 
and Trubetskoi who, while they had always been widely respected in Irkutsk 
society, enjoyed, according to Barsukov, only a limited social life, since 
many of the government offic.ia1s and other prominent individuals feared 
the taint of guilt by association. 13\/ The Muravievs' example encouraged 
closer relations of government personnel with the Oecembrists. It also 
prompted a little intrigue of the sort to which Muraviev was more than once 
subjected. 
Governor Piatnitskii, disgruntled at Muraviev's demand for his resig­
nation, sent a report to st. Petersburg in which he depicted in se1f­
14Barsukov, Ope cit., pp. 185-186. 
13rhe Oecembrists had not, evidently, been as isolated a~ Barsukov 
implies. A leading Oecembrist's memoirs mention that his brother was 
accepted in Governor-General Rupert's home as one of the family and was 
also a frequent visitor of Piatnitskii·s. See N. A. Bestuzhev, Zapiski, 
g. 1800-1871, Russkaia Starina, Vol. 32, p. 650. 
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righteous terms the tlreprehensib1enesslt of the close relations of Mura­
.. 
viev and his officials with the Decembrists. The report was sent from 
• the Chief of Gendarmes through the Minister of the, Interior, Perovskii, 
to Muraviev for appropriate comment. Muraviev's reply was to the effect 
that the Decembrists had expiated the errors of their youth by under­
going heavy punishment and that they were among the best subjects of the 
Tsar. He held that no punishment should be for life, inasmuch as punish­
.. 
ment was for the purpose of reforming the individual and that this had 
been fully achieve~ with regard to the Decembrists. There was no basis, 
he wrote, for leaving them isolated forever from society in th~ makeup of 
which they had t~e right to be included by reason of their education, 
moral qualities and present political convictions.14 On the margin of 
Muraviev's letter, the Emperor Nicholas wrote, "My thanks", and added, 
itA man has been found who understands me, who understands that I seek no 
personal vengeance on these people, but am only carrying out the require­
ments of the State and, having removed the culprits from here, have no 
desire to poison their destiny there.u15 
Piatnitskii's reward for his inept informing activities was invo1­
untary separation from the service. This incident, as well as similar 
ones, prompted Perovskii to write Muraviev in the summer of 1848, as fo1­
lows: 
You without doubt are sure of my friendly disposition toward 
you and know that 1 sincerely wish you well and eesire your 
success. It seems to me that complete frankness must be an es· 
sentia1 condition in our mutual relations. In this conviction 
I shall always tell you what is on my mind and I call upon you 
l4Russki Vestnik, 1888, pp. 169-173, cited by Barsukov, Ope cit., p.l77. 
150razhdanin, 1888, No. 301, cited in ~., p. 178 • 
..:t.i.~. 
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to do the same with me. 
• 
Tales are being spread here regarding your impetuosity. which 
allegedly often exceeds acceptable limits; of the haste with
• you judge people before you have had time to know them or even 
to hear them out, and so forth: There is no doubt that offici­
als unfit for the service, from which you have separated them, 
are the main source of these remours, but don't lose sight! also of the fact that those who have been dismissed always have, ~ 
~" ~' more or less, supporters who are prepared to chime in with their 
! ( clients, l.e., loudly to sympathize over imagined sacrifices 
and to complain and create a commotion about them. 
I completely understand your position. You dislike wrong­
doing which is rife in the area entrusted to you and take it
• to heart. At your age, I combated every irregularity and 
every injustice and wrongdoing with heat and perseverence •• 
I have retained the same perseverence but no longer ha~e the 
heat, and it can hardly be said that the latter method is not 
better than the former. This leads me to give you a friendly 
piece of advice, act as far as possible with more careful 
observation" more calmly and quietly, and avoid any pretext 
for reproaches or complaints.16 
Perovskii then went on to urge Muraviev to keep him fully informed of 
any untoward events or intrigues and stressed that timely information would 
make it possible to scotch any libelous rumours. Fortunate indeed was 
Nicholas Muraviev; the early stages of his career had been advanced by the 
guidance of the paternal General Golovin and now he was receiving the 
mature counsel of the avuncular Perovskii. 
A little later in the year Perovskii wrote to Muraviev concerning his 
proposals for various economic reforms. One of these entailed dissolution 
of the ~odka distilling monopolies through institution of a new system of 
licensing designed to encourage competition. Perovskii predicted that the 
distillers would assure the Minister of Finance that Muraviev's proposals 
would have ruinous results, with drastically reduced revenues for the Gov­
ernment. He pointed out that it would be difficult to prove otherwise, 
16sarsukov, Ope cit., p. 189. 
..-...~~ 
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• 
since Muraviev would probably be unable to gain access to the distiller's 
• 
true accounts. He urged Muraviev, nevertheless, to buttress his propo­
• 
sals with convincing figures and assured him that his reports would be 
read by the Emperor and that the matter might thereby be given "the de­
s ired turn".17 
II. LAYIt¥3 THE GROUNDWORK 
.. If questions of trade regulations, gold mining practices, oppres­
sion of the native.s and elimination of corruption were very much on Mura- .. 
viev's mind, they were nevertheless but the background to the.geo-politi­
cal goals that he had constantly before him, and which had as their pre­
condition the "return of the Russian River Amur". The disappointing re­
sult of the Gavrilov expedition had not convinced everyone interested in 
the Amur question that there was nothing to be gained by exploring the 
river's mouth. Muraviev had been told by the Emperor that, according to 
the Russian-American Company, the Amur was only three feet deep at its 
mouth, but he was skeptical. He found that his skepticism was shared by 
Captain-Lieutenant Gennadi Nevelskoi, whom he met in St. Petersburg short­
ly before proceeding to Irkutsk. Nevelskoi was on duty in the capital in 
connection with the construction of the transport -Baikal", which was to 
deliver naval cargoes and supplies to Kamchatka. He enthusiastically 
agreed with Muraviev that the Amur estuary should be further investigated. 
At Muravievts suggestion, he undertook to have himself designated as com­
mander of the "Baikal" when it sailed to Kamchatka.1S 
17 ~., pp. 190-191. 
lSaarsukov, op. cit., p. 174; G. I. Nevelskoi, in Podvigi Russkikh 
Morskikh Ofitserov na Dal'nom Vostoke (2nd Ed., St. Petersburg, 1897,p. 61, 
,.....&t... 
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" When Muraviev departed for Siberia, he was well aware that the pro­
•blem of the Amur and the Russo-Chinese frontier, to which the Emperor had 
• pointedly referred, was a most difficult one. He ~new that it would be 
in connection with that problem that he would be facing the most deter­
mined opposition in St. Petersburg, where there were two diametrically 
opposed schools. One of these was the Western-oriented group, preoccu­
pied with the maintenance of the status quo and anxious to avoid any action 
tending to upset the established balance of power. The leader of this 
" 
faction was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count K. V. Nesselrode, who 
was strongly supported by the Minister of Finance, T. R. Vronchenko. 
~ 
The other group, to which Muraviev attached himself, was that which held 
to a "strong Russian policy", advocating avoidance of unduly provocative 
acts while at the same time positively asserting Russian national inter­
ests. Among thi9 group were the Naval Minister, Prince A. S. Menshikov, 
and the Minister of the Interior, L. A. Perovskii. The War Ministry, un­
der Prince A. I. Chernyshev"and subsequently under Prince V. A. Dolo­
goruki, tended to stand aside, limiting itself to its own administrative 
field and eschewing both internal and external politics. Struve commentsl 
Between these two currents the Emperor sailed his vessel with 
a powerful hand, with extraordinary firmness, rare ability and 
discernment•••• Between these two currents Muraviev, too, 
had to maneuver. What saved him was the confidence reposed in 
him by the Autocrat, the sponsorship of the Grand Duchess Helena 
Pavlovna and the sincerely favorable disposition toward him of 
the then Minister of the Interior, L. A. Perovskii. 19 . 
While Struve's references to the, Emperor's rare ability and discern-
cited by Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 126, contends that it was he who had stress­
ed the need to,'explore the mouth of the Amur and that Muraviev agreed. 
19sarsukov, Ope cit., I, pp. 173-174. 
, ....~~.:....". 
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ment may be debatable, it will be seen that insofar as the Amur question 
•was concerned, Nicholas I did indeed "sail his vessel by a powerful hand", 
by setting aside, 'pending personal discussion with Muraviev, a number of 
recommendations of his Ministers which, if approved, would have spelt 
ruin to Muraviev's cause. And if in the early period of Muraviev's tenure 
in Irkutsk, the Emperor temporized, this can be easily understood. It was 
inevitable that his attention should be focused away from, not toward, 
Siberia, at a time when revolution was in the air in Europe. After the 
suppression of the uprisings in Berlin, Prague and Lombardy in 1848, it 
was the Balkan question that claimed priority in Russian foreign policy. 
The turmoil of European affairs overshadowed everything taking place in 
the Far East, and so Nesselrode's cautious views regarding Russia's tradi­
tional policy toward China prevailed. And yet, ironically for Nesselrode, 
it was just the. developments in the Near East, when they exploded into 
the Crimean War, that provided the impetus to bring Muraviev's plans to 
fruition. 
Following Muraviev's departure for Siberia, Nevelskoi succeeded in 
being assigned as commander of the transport "Baikal", and pressed for 
early completion of construction of that vessel, so that he could bring'it 
to Petropavlovsk in the spring of 1849, unload his cargo there, and spend 
the rest of the navigational season cruising in and exploring the south­
eastern shores of Siberia and the Amur estuary. At the same time, he wrote 
to Muraviev to tell him that except for his solicitations, there was no 
one in St. Petersburg "who even wished to think about the Amur", and that 
without instructions, he himself did not dare to act. Muraviev lost no 
time in obtaining an agreement from the Naval Ministry that Nevelskoi 
should be instructed to explore the southeastern shores of the Sea of 
",...x.­
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• 
Okhotsk without, however t making any mention of the Amur estuary. At 
• 
the same time, he saw to it that orders were issued to alert. the four 
• 
infantry battalions deployed in Eastern Siberia for movement to the 

Transbaikal area. Here was the first step towards achievement of the 

first of Muraviev's basic objectives t to break out into the Pacific with 

a broad place d'armes. 20 

Muraviev well appreciated that the Transbaikal was the stepping 

stone to the acquisition of additional great expanses to the east and

• 
south. By the time,he had arrived in Eastern Siberia, it was a flourish· 
ing granary with an industrious, if still sparse, Russian populption. As 
early as in the reign of Catherine II, it had been recognized that if 
Russia was to seize the Amur region, it would be necessary first to streng­
then the Russian element in the. contiguous Transbaikal and to improve 
economic conditions there in order to create a solid base for further pro­
gress. During Catherine's reign, the Transbaikal was populated by the 
undesirables: Poles, Old Believers, schismatics and others; under Paul, 
Russian peasants were sent there to settle in lieu of performing their 
military service, and under Alexander I, the area's population was further 
increased by the arrival of Ukrainians. The Transbaikal had been devel­
oped slowly but steadily through Russian agriculture and animal husbandry, 
road building, a postal service and other elements of methodical coloni­
zation. 21 It was to figure largely in Muraviev's future plans and he gave 
priority to becoming acquainted with it, as soon as he had obtained a firm 
grasp of the problems of his administration in Irkutsk. 
20Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 100. 
21uAmurskoe Delo i Vlianie ego na Vostochnoyou Sibir i Gosudarstvo", 
in Russkaya Starina, 1881, Vol. 32, pp. 75-91. 
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At the end of 1848, Muraviev was on an 
• 
inspection trip through the 
.. 
gubernias of Eniseisk and Irkutsk, devoting the majority of his time to 
• the Transbaikal, and was gathering data needed to.support a proposal that 
he visit Kamchatka, where no other governor of Siberia had ever been. 
While on his way back from Tsurukhaita, on the line of Cossack stations 
through Kiakhta to Verkhneudinsk, he learned that an Englishman named Aus­
tin, ostensibly pursuing geological investigations, had crossed Lake 
• 
Baikal and proceeded by way of Verkhneudinsk and Chita to NerchinskJ there 
he had arranged tO,have a large raft built on which he planned to sail 
down the Shilka and the Amur to the mouth of that river, hoping to find
• 
a whaler or oth~r vessel on which he could cross the Pacific, or which 
'. 
! would take him straight to Europe. Muraviev was highly suspicious of 
foreigners in his area, particularly of Englishmen, and, convinced that 
Austin was a spy; ordered one of his officers back to Nerchinsk to catch 
up with Austin and to bring him back to Irkutsk, "dead or allve".22 The 
officer brought Austin back to Irkutsk within ten days. Muraviev imme­
diately reported on this incident to St. Petersburg, and in a personal 
letter to Perovskii, he held forth on the jeopardy in which the project 
of occupying the Amur was placed by uninvited guests who were spying for 
the English government.23 Muraviev seems to have been obsessed with the 
idea that the British might suddenly seize Sakhalin, or the mouth of the 
Amur, an idea to which he clung for years. 
Muraviev's fears, it is true, were shared by others.24 Thus, 
22V. Struve, in Russki Vestnik, cited by Barsukov, Ope cit.,I, p. 192. 
23Ibid., I, p. 190. 
24Quested, Ope cit., p. 43, points out, "The only grounds for them 
which have come to light in published Russian sources is the fact that 
Count E•.V. Putiatin saw some gun-boats assembled at Cherbourg in 1855, 
and thought they might be intended for an Amur expedition". 
--
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PerovskH, in his reply wrote: "It is not without foundation that you 
• 
consider it necessary to warn the English, and that the time has cane 
• 
when this should not be postponed. I fully share your view, but Count 
Nesselrode is not thinking along these lines.,,25 He went on to point out 
that Nesselrode would oppose any decisive measure at the mouth of the 
Amur, and would be supported by the Minister of Finance; Nesselrode, he 
said, feared any possible rupture of friendly relations with England, 
.. 	 while Vronchencko would point to the unfavorable consequences for Russian 
commerce and:industry, if there should be a break with China. He warned 
Muraviev that those "upon whom this matter most depends" woul,d accuse 
him of being hasty, hairbrained, presumptous and unacquainted with the 
area he was administering. They would say that he had not considered 
either the difficulties or the consequences of what he was proposing. Ac­
cordingly, Perovskii advised Muraviev to keep the Emperor personally in­
formed on the Amur question, stressing the need for action and the unfor­
tunate consequences of immobility, and to assemble information to demon­
strate that if action was carefully taken, Russia's trade with China would 
not suffer; he also advised him to calculate the expenses that his propo­
sals would entail, to keep them as moderate as possible, and to, seek to 
26budget them from local resources.
Constant reminder from Perovskii of the need to economize and of the 
Russian government's difficult financial situation, spurred Muraviev to 
seek out all local potential and to proceed energetically to develop the 
economy of the area, as well as to reduce the cost of his own administration. 
~ Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 192. 
26Ibi d., I, p. 193. 
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As soon as he took over command of troops in Eastern Siberia, he suspen­
• 
ded the thoroughly corrupt senior quarter-master, hailing him before the 
• 
court's despite the fact that the rascal had influential support in St. 
Petersburg. When it came time to contract for delivery of provisions for 
the troops and of grain for the Alexandrovsk distillery, some 60 versts 
from Irkutsk, he turned over the responsibility for these activities to 
reliable officers of his own choosing. He knew that if he was to have 
more troops - - and he was planning on that - - their costs could not be
• 
escalated through d.ishonesty and bribery. 27 
Gold, Muraviev knew, would help further his Amur enterpr~se, even 
though it of course had all to be shipped to St. Petersburg. He there­
fore maintained a lively interest in producing more of it. He was also 
continuously concerned with finding other new mineral deposits, as well 
as precious stones; for Siberia itself, he looked for iron. He modernized 
the old Petrovskii Zavod ironworks and began to build engines there for 
28the steamers he planned to use on the Amur. 
Sometimes Muraviev·s energetic efforts to exploit the area's poten­
tial cost human sacrifices, largely because, try as he would, he could 
I;·
I not obtain enough capable subordinates to carry out his projects as he 
If would have them carried out. Thus, for example, the matter of opening up 
t! 	 the rich deposits of gold along the Kara river had unfortunate conse­
quences not foreseen by him. In 1849, he ordered an engineer officer, Ivan 
Rasgildeev, to develop production there to the full. 
himself to produce 100 poods29 of gold there in the 
27.Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 193. 

28
Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 266. 
290ne pood equals approximately 37 pounds • 
Rasgildeev committed 
summer of 1850. He 
.~~.~. 	 'j.JS~_. 
f 
.30 .
requisitioned 4,500 workers from the Nerchinsk mines. On Muraviev's 
.l 
orders, this number of convicts ,and other laborers set out on foot for 
82 
• 
• Kara. They marched without provisions and without any vehicles, spend-. 
ing the nights in the open, subjected to the cold and pouring rains. 
At Kara, under Rasgildeev's iron hand, in two l2-hour shifts, they worked 
over 25,000 poods of sand a day, out of which they extracted about a pood 
of gold. In the following winter, over 3,000 miners fell ill of typhus 
• 
and 568 diedJ over 1,500 suffered from scurvy and 45 of them died. From 
October, 1850, to February, 1851, over 1,000 men died. 3l Production re­
sults were excellent, with .quotas being exceed,ed handily each year. In 
•
terms of serving his masters, the "Rasgildeevschina" was a decided person­
al triumph for Muraviev, but it also provided ammunitlon for his detractors. 
II I. THE OPENING WErGE 
While Muraviev was diligently following Perovskii's advice regard­
ing development of Eastern Siberian resources, Perovskii was evidently 
quietly but effectively supporting Muraviev's views on the Amur situation I 
on January 29, 1849, Nicholas ordered the establishment of a committee 
charged with considering the Amur problem.32 The first item of its agenda 
• 30Semeevskii, Rabochie na Sibirskikh Solotikh Promishlakh (St. Peters- . 
burg, 1898) pp. 315-324, cited in B. V. Danilovskii, Russkoe Zoloto (Mos­
cow, 1959) p. 353. 
31Nerchinskaya Katorga (Izdatelstvo Politkatorzhan, Moscow, 1933), 
p. 56, cited by Danilovskii, Ope cit., p. 353, and Semyonov, Ope cit.,p.265. 
32p. V. Schumacher, "Kistorii priobretenia Amura. Snoshenia s 
Kitaem s 1848 po 1860 goda." He fails to enumerate the committee's member­
ship, as, unaccountably, do Barsukov, Kabanov and Quested. It seems clear, 
however, from various references they make to ~e committee's work, that 
the members must have been Foreign Minister Nesselrode, Finance Minister 
Vronchenko, Interior Minister pcrovskii, Naval Minister Menshikov, War 
Minister Chernyshev, and, probably, Privy Counselor Seniavin• 
.. ~;... ~... c 
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• 
was the question of a naval expedition to explore the mouth of the Amur. 
•The Tsar confirmed the committee's position that for fear of alarming and 
provoking the Chinese, exploration and navigation,of the Amur should not 
take place. It was agreed, however, that relations should be established 
with the Giliaks inhabiting the northern portion of the mouth of the Arnur, 
and that the left bank of the Amur and the part of Sakhalin opposite to it 
should be denied to any foreign power. On Nesselrode's proposal it was 
agreed that in order to prevent any foreign invasions, while at the same 
t. 
time avoiding any strain on Russo~hinese relations, a small naval expe­
dition should be sent to the area. Sailing under some plausible pretext, 
under a rel~able officer of good judgment and discretion, the expedition 
would carry various articles for trade with the Giliaks and would seek to 
bring them under Russian influence. The Committee also agreed that Rus· 
sian naval units should cruise about the area in order to observe any 
foreign vessels that might be navigating there; such units would also coop­
erate in the maintenance of trade and cementing of relations with the 
native population. 
In the event of any intrusion by the English or others into-the is­
land of Sakhalin, or areas contiguous to the mouth of the Amur, Muraviev 
was ordered immediately and without prior clearance with higher I govern­
mental authorities to report such developments to the Chinese frontier 
authorities at Urga, in order to alert the Chinese government and to clear 
the Russians themselves of any suspicion. 
Nevelskoi, who had sailed from Kronstadt three months before the 
establishment of the Amur Committee, was sent instructions to explore the 
shores of the Shantarski Islands to the mouth of the Amur, and also to 
investigate the northern coast of Sakhalin; he was to seek a location in 
~
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that area, prefe~ably near the river', mouth, which it might be conven~ 

lent and useful ~ occupy, should the necessity tod. 60 arlle. All thl. • 

• 	 was to be done wlthout excitlng the suspiclons of the Chinese. The f'for~ 
mation thus gathered would indlcate the further plan of action to be 
pursued. It wae alto decided that the Russlan-Amerlcan Company should 
••ndattrading expedition overland from Ayan to make contact with the Gill­
aka and to ascertain the state of their relations with the Chinese. The 
33Company·4 expenses for this were to be defrayed by government funds • 
.. 
Instructions for Nav.lek01 were mailed to "tropavlovsk, hil first 
port of call on the Sea of Okhotsk, but they would be a long time comlng, 
4 
sinc. the only winter mall run of the year from Okhotsk hed already de­
parted when the.courier arrived there. Thls circumstance turned out to be 
en insignlficant fe~tor. since Nevelskol, who had only a general notion of 
what those inlt~ction$ contained. had made up hi' minds he wrote to Muta­
viev from Rio de Janeiro that he intended to explore the mouth of the Amur 
whether or not he received insteuctlonl, and sought Muravlev·, tupport 1n 
case this should later cause him trouble with the authorltles. 34 
Nevelskol was pressed for time, slnce he wal anxious to have plenty 
of leewey before the onset of freezino 1n the Sea of Okhotsk. and he made 
the trip from Kronstadt to Petropavlovsk 1n eight months and twenty.three 
days, although this had never before b.e~ accomplished 1n under eleven 
month8.3~ He unloaded his cargo, and on May 31, sail.d from Petropavlovak 
along the eastern coast of Sakhalin. Rounding the northern tlp of the i •• 
I 
330. Romanov. 1n RUG.koe ~12vo. July, ~, pp. l03-1OB,cclted by 
Barsukov. Ope ci\., I. p. 197. 
~abanov, op. clt •• p. 129. 
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•land, Nevelskoi sailed down the sound between the continental shore and 
•the island, until he reached the Amur lagoon at the mouth of the ~iver. 
The Amur lagoon consists of the expanse of ~ater between the entrance 
to the river and the island of Sakhalin, a little inland sea with an area 
of about twelve hundred square miles. Nevelskoi and his officers ex­
plored it for six weeks. Then, though he had good reason to believe 
that his action would be in direct defiance of the orders that were on 
their way to him, he entered the mouth of the Amur and sailed twelve
.. 
miles up river; from there he proceeded south, and on July 22 arrived at 
the spot where the continental shore approaches the western coast of Sak­
<I 
halin. Here at the capes, named by him Cape Lazarez and Cape Muraviev, 
instead of the isthmus imagined by Laperouse, Broughton, Krusenstern and 
Gavrilov, he found a channel five miles wide and nearly thirty feet deep 
~6 
at the shallowest spot. w By this time the little expedition's food sup­
plies were very low, so that Nevelskoi set a northerly course. Sailing 
along the coast he discovered a bay hidden by a sandbank. This he named 
the Bay of Fortune. 
In the meantime, the Russian-American Company had sent a young of­
ficer with two baidarkas (small sealskin-covered boats similar to Eskimo 
kayak~) from Ayan to the south; he met Nevelskoi at Cape Moukhtel and in­
formed him that Muraviev was anxiously awaiting him at Ayan. Nevelskoi 
and his crew, exhausted and nearly starving, headed for Ayan. 
While Nevelskoi was pursuing his explorations, without benefit of 
instructions, Muraviev was making preparations for his inspection trip 
to Kamchatka, in order to "see with his own eyes" what he had heard and 
3gearsukov, op. cit., I, pp. 196-198. 
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•
read about that land which, he believed, would one day mean much to Rus­
•sia. Prior to setting out, he drew up a report to the Emperor seeking 
• possible instructions regarding his forthcoming inspection visit to the' 
Iakutsk oblast, to Okhotsk and Kamchatka. and appending a note again in­
viting the Emperor's attention to the gold-mining situation, the Kiakhta 
trade and the likelihood 	of its diminution because of English competition 
37in Chinese coastal ports. In this connection, he also brought up the 
possibility that "these foreigners" might occupy the mouth of the Amur, 
'" 
build a fortress there and send their steamers up the Amur to Nerchinsk 
or even to Chita. One of the consequences of this, he suggested, might 
" 
be that Siberia would detach itself from Russia. He offered the follow­
ing observations in his reporta 
I have more than once heard the fear expressed in St. Peters­
burg that Siberia might sooner or later secede from Russia. Be­
fore my arrival here, I considered such fears to be groundless, 
since I could not imagine to myself what might be the source of 
such a danger; here, Sire, I have become convinced that such a 
fear is quite natural and because of reasons quite unrelated to 
the concerns of the desk officers (in St. Petersburg). 
I have found the entire population here to be under the in­
fluence of, and, so to speak, in the hands of the rich mer­
chants, manufacturers and distillers, and I have discovered 
the governmental officials, almost without exception, to be 
in the pay of those same wealthy people. I have undertaken, 
firmly and sternly to act against this tendency, at first alone, 
then with the help of a few colleagues brought into service 
here by me. But all our efforts, possibly not entirely fruit­
less, have, however, stirred up a struggle with the gold inter­I· 	
ests dangerous for us; dangerous not in the interior of the 
l 
I 
region, where my sternness instills fear and respect for the 
37The English advantage in ocean trade was enormous. They delivered 
f their products to China at a fraction of what it cost the Russians to do so. 
~ As for tea imports - - the major Chinese commodity brought in through 

Kiakhta; 'one pound delivered from the interior of China to Moscow cost
f 
40 kopeks, while from Shanghai to London it cost 3 to 5 kopeks, accord-f ; ing to Kabanov's citation of Vestnik Promishlenosti, No.7, 1859. 
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gold itself, but in the capital where it is a rare department 
that is not aligned against the present administration cI East­ • 
ern Siberia • 
• 
I have dared to say this only in order to demonstrate how 
faint is the hope of eliminating the influence of the wealthy 
industrial and commercial class upon the entire population, 
and it is within this context that I fear the concentration' 
of wealth in a few hands under the present system of gold 
production. The wealthy and educated class here, owing to its 
origins and remoteness from the center of the Empire, has by 
no means the feelings of loyalty to the Sovereign and the 
Fatherland that in the interior of the Empire Is absorbed with 
the mother's milk. It is indifferent to everything except its 
• own benefit and, with few exceptions, there is hardly any 
hope of stirring up in them those noble sentiments i.n which 
every Russian glories and takes pride. At the same time, they 
are not only not lacking in the good sense and spirit of enter­
prise natural to Russians inhabiting the interior gubernias, 
but excel .in it, which is entirely natural because of the very 
nature of their making a living in these enormous and wild 
expanses. This good sense and enterprise makes it clear to 
them that the present source of Siberian production, that all 
the future prosperity of Eastern Siberia, is tied up with 
assured convenient communication with the Eastern Ocean, and 
that Kiakhta sooner or later will lose its meaning for them 
because of English competition, and that any other trade is 
insignificant and cannot assume desirable proportions without 
navigation on the Amur. Outwardly, many of them express their 
fears and regrets concerning this; inwardly, it is all the same 
to them who opens up the Amur. 
But what power and resources will be required of the government 
to prevent Eastern Siberia from becoming English, when an English 
fortress stands at the mouth of the Amur and English steamers 
ply the Amur up to Nerchinsk and even to Chita? It follows natur­
ally that without the mouth of the Amur, the English cannot carry 
out their designs against China, since large navigable rivers 
flow into the Amur from its right bank, flowing a thousand versts 
through populated provinces of northeast China. 
Of the fact that the eastern extreme of Siberia has of late 
been occupying the British, there can be no doubt. Ifl instead of 
an English fortress, a Russian one should stand there,~S just as 
one does In Petropavlovsk, and if a flotilla sailed between them 
and, for the sake of greater security, in those fortresses and 
the flotilla there were garrisons, crews, and commanders supplied 
from the interior of Russia, then with such moderate resources 
there would be assured forever the rule of Russia over Siberia and 
3Si •ee , on the coast of the eastern Siberian mainland. 
,";'.-";:".,;,.­
88 

all its inexhaustible riches, 	 " in particular the gold, which 
has already become indispensable for her, and the even richer 
•veins which are 	to be found on the left bank of the Amur, 
judging from the surest indications that 1 personally have 
• observed last year in t~e Nerchinsk okrug and along the 
border river Gorbitsa. 8 
"In presenting this picture to the Emperor". writes Struve, ttMuraviev did 
not of course contemplate for a moment any thought of the possibility of 
Siberia's 	secession from Russia; his object in the first place was to ex­
plain within what context and under what circumstances it might be nat­
" 
ural for this idea to occur within certaindrcles, and secondly, he 
wished palpably to portray the urgent necessity of occupying the mouth 
• 
of the Amur, in 	support of all the measures he was taking in preparation 
40for such action. 
Struve's comment on Muraviev's typically long-winded dissertation 
to the Tsar pro~ides a revealing insight into Muraviev's modus operandi. 
In one sense Muraviev had many masters to whom he had to report in proper 
, bureaucratic fashion. on external relations, to the Foreign Minister; on 
I 	 general administrative and judicial questions, to the Minister of the 1n­
teriorJ on trade and finance, to the Minister of Finance; on military and 
naval problems, to the Minister of War and the Naval Minister. But he 
could go over their heads, for he had the ear of the Tsar. He was making 
the most of it, while preparing to confront his opponents with a !!!i 
accompli. Struve's comment is particularly interesting in conjunction 
with Zavalishints quotation of Muraviev to the effect thats 
39Arkhiv Kniaza Volkonskogo, cited in Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 207. 
4Os. V. Struve, Vospominania 0 Sibiri, 1848-1854, (St. Petersburg, 
1889) p. 55. 
':l'~~.~ 
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Nicholas! is a despot at heart and by inclination; unlimited 
authority, with the consciousness of which he is filled, attests 
to his insignificance. Any minister can lead him by the nose, 
assuring him that he is carrying out hts wishes. They take 
advantage of his conviction that nobody can hoodwink him and 
in such fashion, make of the Tsar their weapon, assuring him 
that everything done by them originated with him.41 
Whether Muraviev ever did express himself so openly and dangerous­
1y, in conversation with some of his Decembrist friends in Irkutsk, is a 
matter of conjecture. At any rate, Muraviev was obviously painting a 
rather lurid canves, with the object of making the Tsar his "waaponll • 
Despite the decorations showered upon him, his rapid promotions, and 
.the direct access to the Emperor that he enjoyed, Muraviev was never 
reassured that sufficient confidence was accorded him. He unburdened him­
self on this score in a letter to Valerian in the spring of 1849, in which 
he complained of the hostility b~ing encountered in St. Petersburg by his 
proposals for reform of the gold mining industry. All he sought, he de­
c1ared, was an expression of confidence in him, in the form of approval of 
his views and proposals. He could not be of usc without that, anG lacking 
it, would resign. 42 Here was a variation on a familiar theme that he had 
been sounding since his early days in the Caucasus. 
That lbJraviev did have dad icated enemies in the capital is unques­
tionable. Onp. evidence of this was "a little intrigue" reported by Struve. 
He relates that Perovskii had suggested, and the Tsar had 'agreed, that. 
it was 'lima to promote Muraviev to the rank of Lieutenant General. On 
4lKabanov, ~it., p. 90, citing Otdel Rukopisei Vsesoyuznoi 

Bibliot~fd 1m. l.entlE_~_J.1oskv~2. f. Ko!'sakovich, d. 7534 , 1.37, referred 

to hereinafter bi' the abbreviation OP.BL. Zavalizhin concluded that 

Muraviev 1:3:; "two-faced". 

42susukov, 9p. cit. f I, p. Xl9. 
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• 
April 3, 1849, the regular promotion list was published, but Muraviev's 
• 
name was missing. PerovskH was indignant and made inquir.1es of the
- . Ministry of War. No clear explanation was forthcoming, but on April 12; 
a supplementary order was issued containing Muraviev's promotion, but 
without confirming his re~ention of his position as Governor-General, 
which would have been normal procedure. In writing to PerovskH concern­
ing this matter, Muraviev disclaimed any personal concern regarding his 
promotion, but stated that it was necessary for the support of his author­
• 
ity, "as a mark of. confidence from the Throne". 43 The technicality of his. 
confirmation as Governor-General was attended to shortly afterward • 
• 
Other evidences of official hostility to Muraviev are to be found 
in some of the communications of his opponents. Thus, at the time when 
Muraviev was preparing to go to Kamchatka, the Minister of Finance, 
Vronchenko, wrote Nesselrode, the Foreign Minister, that a colleague had 
written him that Muraviev's pressure to open the Amur to navigation had 
aroused the displeasure of the Chinese government. 44 This had been re­
ported to the Emperor who, it appears, gave It little notice. At this 
time, too, Prince Gordhakov, Governor·General of Western Siberia, was 
expressing his fears regarding the future of Siberia. He confidentially 
informed Prince Chernyshev, Minister of War, of his view that the Amur 
was superflous to Russia. He contended that the boundless wastes from 
43Struve, Ope cit., pp. 55-56. 
44Quested, Ope cit., p. 31, referring to Nevelskoi's expedition in 
1849 and subsequent establishment of Nikolaevsk, states, "There is no 
evidence in the Chinese archives that any of these events reached the 
ears of the Emperor in Peking. Nicholas I and Muraviev obviously did 
well ti discount Count Zakrevskii's claim that the Chinese at Maimachen 
had told some Russian merchants that Muraviev's efforts to open naviga­
tion on the Amur had caused murmuring and dissatisfaction in the Chinese 
government. II 
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•Iakutsk to Kamchatka and the Okhotsk coast in themselves constituted a 
•frontier needing no defense. What was more important, these wastes iso­
lated the inhabitants of Siberia from direct contact with foreigners 
which could easily generate "harmful propaganda leading to disorders". 
Prince Gorchakov considered the situation to be the more dangerous in 
that the inhabitants of Siberia by no means felt the same attachment to 
Russia that General Muraviev "flattered himself that they did". What 
would happen, he asked, if the population developed close relations with 
A 
the English or Americans, who might undertake the easy task of persuading 

the people that it would be more convenient for them to buy English or 

American merchandise with their gold, rather than to look to Russia as 

their supplier? The English or Americans, he warned, might be prepared 

to support such an arrangement with force of arms. Gorchakov was ob­
viously unaware that Muraviev, too, recognized the relatively independent 

attitude of the Russian settlers of Siberia - - which Muraviev used, how­
ever, to buttress his recommendation that Russia strengthen, not relin­
quish, her hold on the area. Chernyshev submitted Gorchakov's letter to 

the Emperor, who marginally noted on it that, "We shall keep this in mind 

when Muraviev arrives for consultations".45 

, 
. I 
In early May of 1849, before departing for Kamchatka, Muraviev sent 
a further report to the Emperor, reiterating that decline of the Kiakhta 
trade was evidence that English activities in China were contrary to 
Russia's interests. He urged the necessity of maintaining Russian influ­
ence over the Chinese by making a military demonstration, both as' an indi­
cation of the presence of "friendly forces", and also to strike a! little 
45earsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 204. 
...--4;.~ -~.. 
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•
wholesome fear into his neighbors. He suggested that the logical place. 
•for this would be in the Transbaikal • 
• 
, Muraviev stressed his conviction to the Emperor that England needed 
access to the mouth of the Amur and the right to navigate that river for 
~. optimum expansion of her China trade. Were the Amur not the only river 
[' connection with the, Pacific, he observed, Russia might take an accommo­
f 
~ dating view of England's aspirations. As matters were, however, the 
Power controlling the mouth of the Amur would hold dominion over Siberia •
.. 
-- at least to La~e Baikal, which would amount to the same, since that 
would suffice to isolate the more thickly pOpulated Siberian hinterland, 
~ 
"flowering with agriculture and industrial production, an isolated realm 
subject to the Power holding the key to the river".46 
Other letters despatched before Muraviev's departure for Kamchatka 
included one to "the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requesting it to instruct 
the Orthodox mission in Peking to keep him informed of events in China and 
urging that the mission be given no special contacts with the Chinese 
Government until "major questions" became clarified. In a latter to Fi­
nance Minister Vronchenko, he pointed out the unsatisfactory condition of 
the Kiakhta trade which, he said, would continue to deteriorate with each 
year ~nless Russia moved in new directions and with new undertakings. The 
centuries old immobility of China, he pointed out, which in the past had 
benefitted Russia, had received such a jolt from England that it nOW be­
hooved Russia to adopt a mobile course. He served notice on Vronchenko 
that he intended to develop measures required to bring about the necessary 
changes in the order of things, "with all due caution and protection of the 
~' 
-Barsukov, op. cit., I, p. 211. 
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• 
Government's finaneial interests".47 
• 
On May 15, 1849, Muraviev, accompanied by his wife,. his ADC, Vasil i 
Mikhailovich Muraviev (a young relative) and one,of his key officials, 
B. V. Struve, left Irkutsk for his unprecedented visit to Kamchatka. When 
one considers the arduous journey undertaken by Muraviev and his small 
retinue, it becomes easier to understand why none of his predecessors had 
shown any inclination to inspect the administration of Kamchatka. The 
.. 	 route, over 7,000 kilometers, traversed vast expanses almost devoid of 
roads. In variou.s states it had to be covered on horseback, in crude 
48 
wagons and sometimes mounted on elks domesticated by the Gil\aks. 
When Muraviev reached Iakutsk he learned of the despatch of a secret 
expedition to his area concerning which he had not been consulted. The 
initiative for this expedition had evidently arisen within the Russian 
General Staff 1n 1849, when it realized that topographic data on the area 
,from the Gorbitsa River flowing into the Shilka and the Sea of Okhotsk 
were practically non-existent, and that maps depicting that area were com­
pletely unreliable. Some rather uncertain Information~ concerning this 
shadowy border, vaguely referred to in Russo-Chinese treaties, had been 
47B. V. Struve, "Graf N. N. Muraviev-AmurskH. lz vospominanii iz 
ego deiatelnosti". Russkaia Starina, Vol. 48, p. 340. 
48In "Graf N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii Epizod is ego zhizni (1849 g.), 
Russkaia Starina, Vol. 40, p. 511, Struve recalls that had it not been 
for the intrepid nature of the young Governor-General, the voyage might 
have had to be abandoned at one point where the route was barred by a 
torrential stream that had been swollen by the spring thaw. Muraviev's 
companions and his native retainers were terrified at the thought of 
attempting to ford it, but he unhesitatingly plunged into it on horse­
back and led his group across. Afterwards, when the members of the 
little band were recovering from the chilling crossing and drying them­
selves out, Struve, resting on the bank of the stream with Muraviev's 
wife, remarked to her: "Savez-vous, Madame, que je n'ambitionne qu'une 
chose, c'est d'ecrire un jour la biographie du general" • 
..... 
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reported by A. von Middendorf49 folle.wing his visit to Siberia in 1843­
45. Returning from the Udsk area, he had seen four stone pillars placed 
by the Chinese and had taken them for frontier markers set up on the basis 
of the last article of the Treaty of Nerchinsk. 
General Aide-de-Camp Prince Dolgoruki set the expedition in motion 
by informing Quartermaster-General Berg that the Emperor had in mind ttthe 
somewhat inaccurate delineation of the Russo-Chinese frontier", and deemed 
it necessary to establish a commission of five officers of the Corps of 
Engineers and the Topographic Corps to carry out a detailed survey. The 
expedition was to Itsurvey the frontier area", without, however, approaching 
the Amur and was to prospect fOl' rare metals and minerals and prec).ous 
stones in the Transbaikal. 50 Lieutenant Colonel Akhte of the General Staff 
was put in command of the expedition. 
Muraviev ilTJllediately issued orders that the Akhtr; expedition should 
be stopped upon its arrival in Irkutsk and wrote the Emperor, pointing out 
that nothing like this should be attempted while the mouth of the Amur 
was being discreetly explored.5l Prince Chc::rnyshev and Count Vronchc:nko 
were stung by thih action and bitterly complained about Muraviev's 
49An eminent scholar who led an expedition ·to Siberia sponsored by 
the famous naturalist, K. E. von Baer. The expedition's primary task 
was to explor0 the Taimyr peninsula and Uakutia and then to investigate 
the flora and fauna of the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk. (Semyonov, ~ 
clt.~ pp. 246-247. 
50sch~~acher, 00. cit •• III, pp. 269-270. He points out that the 
prohibition on approaching the Amur deprived the expedition of any signi­
ficance. 
5lBarsukov, pe. cit., I, p. 215. An interesting ?dmission on 
Muravicv's part, considerin9 that no official sanction had been given for 
such activities. Sullivan in his biography speculates on the possibility 
that the Tsar and Muraviev had a tacit agreement diametrically opposed to 
Nessclrode's cautious position. 
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Warbitrary action", but Nicholas ordered that the matter be left pending 
until Muraviev should visit St. Petersburg for consultations. The frus­ • 
• trated Lieutenant Colonel and his fellow officers ,were obliged to cool 
their heels in Irkutsk until Muraviev's return from Kamchatka, when he 
set them to surveying portions of the Transbaikal well removed from the 
Amur and prospecting for minerals, tasks which appear not to have dif­
fered markedly from their original assignment - - except that they 
• 
were laid down by Muraviev's, not st. Petersburg's, directive • 
Muraviev reached Petropavlovsk on July 25, 1849, and proceeded to 
an mspection of the port and its fortifications. One of his first acts 
was to direct a realignment of the artillery batteries set up for the de­
fense of the harbor. He then familiarized himself with the administra­
tive organization of the peninsula and decided on recommendations for a 
number of changes. 
While in Petropavlovsk, Muraviev met Bishop ynnokentii of the 
Aleutians and Kamchatka, and, after probing that eminent cleric's mind, 
decided on his choice for Governor-General of Kamchatka, V. C. Zavoiko. 
Local administration of the peninsula up to this time had been organized 
on a lower bureaucratic level and more directly controlled from the main~ 
land. Muraviev's decision to up-grade the administrative organization 
reflected his conviction that since the Amur estuary was denied him, 
Petropavlovsk, because of its geographic location and fine harbor, should 
be the main strong point of Russia in the Far East, and that Kamchatka 
I 
should be built up into a well populated agricultural oblast,.52 
On his return trip, Muraviev prepared a report to Perovskii. stating 
5~abanov, op. cit., p. 95. Innokentii later became Metropoli­
tan of Moscow. 
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that he had decided that the port of okhotsk should be abandoned and its 
installations moved to Avachi Bay (Petropavlovsk) without delay because 
scurvy was nBedlcssly decimating the okhotsk garrison, and because the 
English had already shown ttfar too mlJch interest in the advantages of­
fered by Avachi Bat'. He proposed setting up warehouses for supplies to 
be delivered to Ayan (the other Russian port on the mainland), where the 
Russ ian-.I\,merican Company had its installations, and reccrr·.mended other 
changes in line with his contemplated build-up of Kamchatka, including 
reorganization of judicial districts and tn,rasier of the American diocese 
to Petropavlovsk. He also urged institution of steamer service connecting 
Kamchatka with the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk (there was coal to be had 
at Ayan and other locations on the coast) and he emphasized that attention 
should be paid to thtz matter of whaling in "our Sea of Okhotsk". He con­
tended that this would offer mill ions to the nati(;nal treasury and sub­
stantiated his opinion with information he had gleaned from foreign whal­
ing ship skippers he had met during his voyage.53 Only two years earlil3r, 
he pointed out, foreign whalers had first entered the Sea of Okhotsk and 
there were now ~Jnjreds of them; In another five years, he warned, these 
foreigners would have exhausted the Russian waters, having extracted hun­
dreds of millions of rubles' worth from them, with no profit whatever to 
Russia. 
MlJraviev then WGnt on to reCOnlrnend annual transport of settlers to 
Kamchatka. As for the whole of Avaehi Bay (as distinct from the inlet 00­
cupied by Petropavlovsk), it would have to be fortified, or el$e it would 
be easy prey to any hostile squadron, even of insignificant proportions. 
~') 
o'"'Barcukov, 9p. cit., I, p. 217. 
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Two English ships had i1ready been there, he reported; under the guise 
of seeking a lost scientific expedition. He extolled the virtues of • 
Avachi Bay, which he considered superior to any port he had seen in Rus-· 
sia or western Europe. All England would need, he speculated, would be 
to force a two-week break with Russia in which to take possession of it, 
then to make peace; but she would not return the Bay and even were she to 
pay Russia a million pounds for it, she would get it back in no time from 
the profits of whaling in the Sea of Okhotsk and in the Bering Sea. And 
~ 
England would not permit anybody into those waters without paying. 
The balance of Muraviev's report was an impassioned plea for a dras­
.. 
tic change from what he considered to be inert Russian policy in the Kam­
chatka area. He wrote: 
In st. Petersburg, they adjudge the question of Kamchatka and 
Avachi Bay in terms of times long past. But from the time of the 
establishment of the French and the English in the Sandwich Is­
lands, then the Chinese War, then the gold strike in California 
and the whaling in the Sea of Okhotsk, not one of our strong 
voiced politicians has been here, and they have even been assert­
ing that I am mad to be going off to Kamchatka! 
All of the affairs of Kamchatka and the Sea of Okhotsk, parti­
cularly after the all-European peace settlement of 1815, posi­
tively attest to the fact that during the past thirty-five years, 
a hostile spirit has directed all of our activities in this 
area. It would be unjust to blame my predecessors, that is, 
the Governors~eneral of Eastern Siberia, but Speranskii was 
the sinner, for he who was preparing to rule over the tempo­
rary administration could not have failed to understand the 
importance of the Eastern Ocean. To keep silent on this before 
his Sovereign, knowing the spirit and resources of Siberia, 
was a crime, natural of course, to Speranskii,.who loved his' 
~ more than his Sovereigns and Fatherland.04 
54sarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 222. The reasons for Muraviev's ani­
mus toward Speranskii are obscure, but would seem to be at variance with 
the facts. Speranskii was aware of the "importance of the Eastern Ocean" 
and made his views known; he was also aware that foreign whalers and 
seal hunters might make ever increasing incursions into "Russian waters", 
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Muravlev returned from Kamchatka via Ayan, rather than Okhotsk, in 
.. 
order to inspect that port. He awaited Nevelskol for some days, almost 
giving him up for lost, when the "Baikal" appeared off the port on Sep­
tember 3. Muraviev was delighted to receive Neve1skoi's report that sea­
going vessels could enter the Amur estuary from both north and south, and 
that Sakhalin was an island, not a peninsula. Entering from the Gulf of 
Tartary, ships drawing 15 feet, and from the sea of Okhotsk, drawing 12 
feet, could sail up the river.55 This was news that needed the most in­
tense exploitation in St. Petersburg. 
On the following day, Karsakov was sent to st. Petersburg to deliver 
Nevelskoi's and Muraviev's recommendations on Kamchatka to Prince Menshi­
kov. Menshikov submitted these to the Bnperor, who ordered establishment 
of a special committee, under Nesselrode, to examine the question of the 
Amur estuary; Muraviev's proposals he warmly approved, he was worried 
about costs but noted Muraviev's assurances that his projects could be 
56carried out in large part with local resources.
and that this could eventually become a threat to the power and security 
of the Russian Empire in Siberia; he made no secret of his apprehensions, 
as is made clear in Marc Raeff's, Speransky and the Siberian Reforms of 
~, (Seattle, 1959) pp. 42-43. 
5~, .
" -~abanov, Ope cit., p. 131. 
56aarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 237. Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 133, cites 
Neve1skoi, p. 102, as pointing out that Petropavlovsk was far from ideal 
as a naval base because it was extremely isolated and difficult to sup­
ply, while Kamchatka itself was a barren land, difficult to settle. The 
road from Iakutsk to Ayan t furthermore, would be very difficult to im­
prove and Ayan itself, Neve1skoi believed, was useless as a port. Nev­
elskoi deemed it far preferable to devote the scarce resources available 
to occupying the mouth of the Amur, investigating the surrounding area 
and surveying and settling routes from the Transbaikal to the Amur es­
tuary. Nevelskoi states that Muraviev fully shared these views, but felt 
that in view of Nesselrode's obdurate opposition, the Kamchatka build-up 
was the only alternative. 
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In December, 1849, Mur~l'Jiev received oIders to transfer the port of 
Okhotsk to Petl'opavlovsk, which was to be the main fortified Russi.an port 
on the Pacific. Troops, materials and armament were to be delivered frem 
Kronstadt. Zavoiko was named govornor of Kamchatka, which was to be a 
separate oblas'l!.. Twenty-five peasant famities were to be sent there each 
year in order t.o dev€!lop an agricul tur,ll base. The Ayan road was to be 
completed and the Ayan trading post of the Russian-American Company was to 
bo transformed into a goverrunent port. Agricultural settlements would be 
made along the river Maiai and betwoen Nelkan and Ayan, in order to supply 
the port. All Russian naval vasscls in Okhotsk and K~mchatka were placed 
under Muravicv's command, as the Siberian flot illa. Naval c]1Jisers to 
police the Sea of Okhotsk \~re to be despatched from Kronstadt and placed 
under M'Jraviev's command. 57 
In January, l8~')O, Muraviev sent Nevelskoi to St. Peter-sburg in order 
to present all his logs and maps to Menshikov, to submit his, Muraviev's, 
urgent reco~mendations for i~~ediate occupation of the mouth of the Amu~ 
with a detail of seventy men, and to deliver a letter to Perovskli. 
In his laUe::- to Perovskii, Muraviev expressed the view that had not 
"poor Tf€skinlt been removed, Eastern Siberia would already have reached 
the degree of development that was needed in Russia's interests. With 
each passing day Murdviev was convinced of the good that Treskin had 
wrought in Eastern Siberia and of the ill done by rperanskii "with his in­
stitutions". More than once he had had occasion to deplorQ the unfortu­
nate effects on the area caused by Speranskii' s "umJise law-making exploits 
5719~d. 
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based solely on theory".58 In this letter Muraviev also reported on the 
•
creation of an advisory board for Eastern Siberian development. The weal­
• 
thy 'merchant Kuznetsov had donated two and a half. million rubles Dr this 
cause and was pledged to underwrite steamship construction for navigation 
on the Amur. Others, too, were offering material support for the economic 
59growth of the area. Further in his letter Muraviev pointed to various 
significant economies he had effected in his administration; he pressed 
.. 	 for more stations on the Iakutsk post road and proposed measures to pre­
vent the flow of gold to china, since smuggled gold was displacing ex­
port of Russian goods and was thus draining rather than feeding Russia's
• 
economy. 
During the winter of 1850, Nevelskoi's report and Muraviev's recom­
mendations concerning the Amur estuary were taken up by Nesselrode's 
committee. The·committee by majority vote reprimanded Nevelskoi for hav­
ing surveyed the Amur's mouth without imperial sanction, and expressed 
doubt regarding his data since they were at "variance with the opinions 
of European authorities". They also scoffed at the idea of occupying the 
mouth of the Amur with such an insignific'ant mrce as was proposed by 
Muraviev, when it was "known" from reports of the Russian ecclesiastical 
mission in Peking that the river "was protected by Chinese military forces". 
58earsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 240. 
59Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 241. Muraviev fought the privileges of 
the merchant class and made many enemies among them, but some of the more 
enlightened ones perceived that it might be in their self-interest to sup­
port the reforming Governor-General; Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 92, points out 
that the middle layer and comparatively few among the upper layer (Kuz­
netsov in Irkutsk, Belogolovy in Kaikhta), were drawn to him despite his 
haughty ,ways and disdain for money-grubbing, but the rest, who had de­
pended on Rupert, were his bitter enemies. 
-...-~.. '~:". 
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•The Committee did agree to establishing permanent quarters for trade on 
•the southeast coast of the Sea of Okhotsk, but not in the,Amur estuary. 
Tlhe 'Emperor approved the sending of twenty-five ~ailors and cossacks to' 
the area for this purpose, under Nevelskoi's command. Prince Menshikov, 
the Naval Minister, and Count Perovskii, the Minister of the Interior, 
were the two staunchest supporters of this plan and even urged initiation 
of cruising the Afflur estuary and in the Gulf of Tartary, but the majority 
demurred.60 
.. 
While Nevelskoi was pursuing his commander's objectives in St. 
Petersburg, Muraviev continued writing to Perovskii and others in the gov­
• 
ernment regarding the needs of his area. He put forth initial plans for 
raising troops from among the local population and stressed what he con­
sidered to be the continuing English threat, reporting on movements in 
the Amur estuary area of the British sloop "Herald", the schooner, 
"Nancy" and the steamers "Investigator" and "Enterprise". He argued that 
Kamchatka and the Sea of Okhotsk could be held under Russian dominion 
only if they were supplied via the Amur. The only way to assure securi­
ty of Russian interests, he argued, was to send frigates and transports 
from Kronstadt to the Sea of Okhotsk, to raise a military force in the 
Transbaikal, sending it arms and artIllery, to order two steam engines 
from Ekaterinburg for ships on the Shilka - - and to occupy the mouth of 
the Amur with as little delay as possible.6l 
Muraviev also reported to Nesselrode on the favorable development 
of Russian relations with the Giliaks and stated that he had ordered the 
66 2Kabanov, op. cit., p. 13 • 

, 61
Barsukov, op. cit., I, p. 259. 
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• 
expulsion from their area of foreign traders (Manchurians?) who were un­
•duly exploiting them. As for the Foreign Ministry's oft-repeated exhor­
• 
tat ions to caution and discretion, he observed that the ~ea of Okhotsk was 
so full of whaling ships of all nations, as well as of British men-of-war, 
that the modest Russian dealings with the Giliaks could hardly be expected 
to attract any Chinese attention - - unless the English should arouse the 
Chinese, as they had done at Shanghai, where a vessel of the Russian-Ameri­
.. can Company had been forbidden to put in.62 
On March 11,,1850, Muraviev wrote Perovskii regarding reports of the, 
death of the Chinese Emperor, whose heir was an eighteen year old youth. 
He remarked regretfully that the personnel of the Orthodox Mission in Pe­
king was disreputable and incompetent, which was particularly unfortunate 
at this time, when it was important to have reliable people there. If 
the report of the Emperor's death was true, then this was the time to 
clear up the matter of the Russo-Chinese frontier. He expressed the view 
that he should have authority to deal with the Chinese on the spot, and 
that this problem should not be entrusted solely to the Foreign Ministry, 
62sarsukov, OR. cit., I, pp. 260-261. It appears that Muraviev and 
the Russian authorities in general were mistaken about this incident. 
Quested, op. cit., pp. 32-33, cites Chinese and British archives regard­
ing the visit to Shanghai of the 'tKniaz' Menshikov", a vessel of the 
Russian-American Company, in the summer of 1848. These state that the 
ship came there and renewed the request to trade that had been made 
there forty years earlier by the "Nadezhda" and the "Neva". A memorial 
from Chinese officials in Shanghai reached the Chinese Emperor onSep­
tember 17, 1848, reporting that the Russians had been introduced by the 
British Consul, but that the Shanghai Commissioner had ordered them to 
leave the port under military escort, although their cargoes consisted 
only of fox skins and wheat, both unprohibited items. The Foreign Office 
archives reveal that the British consul had explained the Russians' 
request to the Commts5.ioner and that as a result the Commissioner had al­
lowed the Russians to unload their cargo and Iteven after the Viceroy of 
Kiangsu and Kiangsi had ordered the ship to leave, would have been will­
ing to let him sell the cargo, could buyers have been found". 
,.~" 
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• 
but should be considered by the Asia Committee of the Government. This 
• 
was the time, he argued, to take measures that would bring ,the most bene­
• ficial results; on the other hand, the eventual outcome could bepreju- ' 
diced for a long time if Russia was too cautious and lacked determination. 
He concluded this letter with recommendations for creation of a separate 
Transbaikal oblastI, establishment there of a Cossack Force and the desig­
nation for the Transbaikal of a military-governor-ataman.63 Two weeks 
'later he wrote a "Most Secret" letter for the eyes of the Emperor regard­
• 
ing his concern over the English in China and the need for the Russians 
to look to their frontiers on thcAmur. He reported on this to Perovsk1i
• 
and pointed out that tea passing through Kiakhta amounted to one-third of 
what it had been, thanks to British competition. The British threat, he 
wrote, was increasing, since in order to expand their trade throughout 
northern China, they would need to navigate the Amur; he complained that 
it was impossible to convince Nesselrode, Seniavin or Chernyshev of 
this.64 
Nevelskoi returned to Eastern Siberia in the spring of 1850 and 
gathering his 25-man command in Ayan, sailed to the Bay of Fortune. Here 
he and Lieutenant Orlov, who had preceded him, chose a location on the Bay 
for the setting up of permanent quarters, named Petrovskii Post, in honor 
of Peter the Great. 65 
The Petrovskii Post met the requirements laid down by the governmen­
tal directive but in no wise provided the advantages sought by Nevelskoi 
63Barsukov, op. cit., I, pp. 261-262. An ataman is a Cossack chief­
tain or hetman. 
64Ibid., I, p. 264. 
6~abanov, op. cit., p. 132. 
"'~. 
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•
and his commander, Muraviev, for the achievement of their objectives. It 
•was impossible to keep watch on the mouth of the Amur from the Post, or on 
.~~ 	 the'coastal territory leading up to it from the ~outh, whence foreign fn­
truders could make their way into the river before any effective action 
could be mounted by the Russians. The Bay of Fortune, moreover, was iced 
in until the month of July. These were the deficiencies of location that 
Nevelskoi later submitted as justification for the action on which he was 
now to embark - - action which, irrespective of the characteristics of 
.. 
the Petrovskii Post, he was in any case determined to take. 66 On this 
score, he had made his intentions clear while still in Ayan, whence he 
wrote to Korsakov on June 7, 1850, stating that Itlf permission from the 
general (Muraviev) does not catch up with me, then we will issue our own 
orders in the name of Allah himself· - boldness, speed and movement".67 
On July 12, 1850, Nevelskoi, with a half dozen armed sailors and 
two interpreters, entered the mouth of the Amur in a little sloop armed 
with a one-pound falconet and sailed up the river to a distance of 120 
kilometers, reaching a native settlement named Tyr. Here he encountered 
a group of Manchurian traders, one of whom attempted to incite the native 
Giliaks to attack the Russians. Nevelskoi drew a double barreled pistol 
and pointed it at the Manchurian, while his sailors jumped out of the 
sloop with their arms at the ready. The Manchurians' truculence vanished 
and with many apologies they explained that they had entered the area on 
their own responsibility, that no Chinese officials were to be found there 
66 	 iKabanov, Ope ct., p. 134. 
670rbl ., s. Korsakovykh, d. 41/42, 124, cited by Kabanov, Ope cit., 
p. 135. 	 . 
, .. 'd'!;:.;;,... 
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• 
and that the native inhabitants rendered no iassak to, nor were subjects 
•
of, the Chinese government. Nevelskoi thereupon announced.to the Manchur­
- . ians ·that the coastline of the Gulf of Tartary and, the entire coastal re: 
gion down to the Korean frontier, as well as the island of Sakhalin, were 
Russian possessions. He instructed the natives so to inform the crews of 
any foreign vessels which, the natives reported, often visited the area, 
and announced that a series of military posts would be established to de­
fend these Russian possessions.68 
.. 
Control of the Amur estuary was Nevelskoi's first concern. Accord­
ingly, on August 1, 1850, at Kouegda Bay, commanding an excellent view of 
the river's mouth, amid salutes fired by the one-pounder falconet and his 
sailors' rifles, he raised the Russian military banner on the site of the 
post he named Nikolaevsk. Huts were built for barracks and a small ware­
house for trading supplies. Then, in defiance of the directive issued to 
him, he detailed a ten-man garrison and one officer to hold the post and 
hastened back to Ayan, whence he sent a report on his action to Muraviev 
and proceeded to Irkutsk in order personally to confer with him. Mura­
viev, however, having received Nevelskoi's report, had already departed for 
consultations in St. Petersburg, leaving instructions for Nevelskoi to 
follow him there.69 
In November, 1850, Muraviev arrived in St. Petersburg and was re­
ceived at Tsarskoe Selo by the Emperor, who listened with interest.and 
approval to his report on Nevelskoi's actions and ordered him to. prepare 
a memorandum setting forth his views concerning the Amur. Muraviev 
6Bsarsukov, op. cit., II, pp. 72-75. 
69Kabanov, op. cit., p. 137. 
-"- ~~~:. 
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completed this on November 20. The Emperor thereupon ordered the estab­
•lishment of the "Gi1iak Committee", composed of Nesse1rode as Chairman; 
• 	 Prince Chernyshev,'Minister of War; Vronchenko, the Finance Minister, 

Prince Menshikov, the Naval Minister; Count Perovskii, Minister of the 

Interior, Count Berg, Quartermaster-General; Privy Counselor Seniavin; 

70
and Muraviev. At this time, too, Nicholas I conferred on Muraviev the 
Order of St. Ann, First Class, and the Order of St. George, Fourth Class, 
a mark of imperial favor that might perhaps have been meant to give a hint 
.. 
to Muraviev's opponents regarding the direction of the Tsar's sympathies. 
in the matter of Eastern Siberian policy. 
• 
Nesselrode's ruling objective wi thin the "Giliak Committee" was to 
prevent the occupation of the mouth of the Amur. He argued that to under­
take construction of Russian posts in Giliak territory was premature and 
dangerous. As ~o Nikolaevsk, he believed its establishment would alarm 
the Chinese and that it should be vacated. Who could give assurances, he 
asked, that the Chinese would not arrive there in force, dislodge the lit­
t1e Russian detachment and, before the eyes of the Giliaks, destroy the 
Russian barracks and trample on the imperial flag171 Muraviev insisted on 
maintaining Nikolaevsk in order to prevent occupation of the Amur's mouth 
by foreigners. Seniavin and Chernyshev stoutly supported Nesselrode; 
Chernyshev, unwittingly by way of being a prophet, went so far as to 
70 ' 
I 
Russki Arkhiv, 1878. Bk. II, pp. 262-264. 
71 iBarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 281, Quested, Ope cit., p. 32, comments, 
"This showed him (Nesse1rode) to be living a century or two in the past, 
for he apparently did not envisage that such an attack would come as a 
result of British influence - - the only remotely possible bogey - ~ but 
,.~} genuinely believed the Manchus to be still capable of independent vigorous 
action on the Amur. 1I r 
r, 
I 
i 
f 
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accuse Muraviev of wishing "to erect a monument to him;elf t•• 72 A major­
•ity 	of the committee, furthermore, adjudged Nevelskoi's conduct as 
• 	 insubordinate and meriting reduction to the ranks. His action, they con~ 
tended, flouted the Imperial will and carried potentially dangerous conse­
quences. They recommended that Nikolaevsk be abandoned, while trade with 
the Giliaks sho~ld be continued from the Petrovskii Post and that the Amur 
and areas adjacent to it should be avoided.73 
The meeting broke up with no formal decision, but Perovskii remarked 
.. 
to Muraviev, on leaving, that the minutes would probably not be favorable 
to occupation of the Amur. Nor were they, but when a copy was delivered to 
.. 

Muraviev in the evening for his signature, he declined and wrote a dis­
sent. Prince Chernishev was indignant and so indicated to Muravlev, but 

the minutes, nevertheless, were submitted, with Muraviev's dissent, to 

the Emperor. 74 N,icholas thereupon ttinvited" the committee to reconvene 

but, this time, under the chairmanship of the heir to the throne, the 

Grand Duke Alexander, in orde,r to reconsider the problem. At the same 
 i." 
time, he observed that "where once the Russian flag has been raised it 

must never be 10wered".75 

Muraviev thoroughly briefed the Grand Duke Alexander who, at the 

next meeting of the committee, on January 19, 1851, overruled Nesselrode, 

72earsukov, op.cit., It p. 281. 
7~abanov, Ope cit., p. 137. 
7~
'Harsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 282; Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 137,I states, 
without citing his source, that Muraviev also obtained an audience with 
the Tsar and eloquently defended Nevelskoi's action, as well as his own 
position regarding the need to occupy the Amur. 
75Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 137. 
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Chernyshev, Seniavin and Vronchenko. It was •agreed that the post of 
Nikolaevsk should be maintained but with the proviso that it should take • 
• the guise of a trading post of the Russian-American Company. It was also 
stipulated that no new localities within the lower reaches of the:\Amur 
should be occupied. At this meeting, too, the Committee established the 
\ 
"Amur Expedition" headed by Captain First Class Nevelskoi. Its responsi­
bility was defined as building appropriate quarters, guarding outposts 
.. 
and maintaining surveillance over the coastline. A seagoing ¥essel was 
to be attached to it during the summer season. On February 5, the Senate 
sent the Chinese Tribunal a communication announcing this action and des.­
• 
cribing it as a precaution against intrusion by foreigners, "which could 
not be permitted without approval of the Chinese and Russian governments".76 
Muraviev;had won his first formal skirmish with Nesselrode. The 
opening wedge had-been made; it was to serve as an exceedingly signifi­
cant support for subsequent actions by Muraviev and his lieutenants. 
76.earsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 283. 
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CHAPTER IV 

UNTYING THE AMUR KNOT 
I. WAR IN THE WEST SHAPES POLICY IN THE EAST 
Muravlev attended to a number of other matters during his period 
" 
of consultation in St. Petersburg. The first of these was the passage 
of regulations governing the sale of spirits, an aspect of internal ad­
• 
ministration that Muraviev had found to be particularly vexing. This was 
now placed on a more competitive basis and henceforth could be only in 
the form of bottled liquor to be taken home, thus eliminating the evil 
gin mills that ate up all of the workers' wages. l 
A development with significant implications for further external 
policy that Muravlev pursued during his sojourn in the capital was his 
project for a Transbaikal Cossack Force. The four line battalions in 
Eastern Siberia, all that Muraviev had at his disposal, were manifestly 
inadequate as a military prop for imperial expansion, but they were all 
the regular forces that he could expect to receive from a government sore­
ly preoccupied with politico-military problems in western Europe and the 
Near East. Always mindful of the exhortation of his wise advisor, Perov­
skii, to mobilize local resources for the pursuit of his objectives, Mura­
viev determined upon raising a substantial force from the manpower existing 
in his own area. He met much opposition, running into the familiar argu­
lBarsukov, op. cit., I, p. 284 • 
.,,:i.~. .-±:~~" 
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ment about alarming the chinese. He countered this by pointing out that 
the Chinese had long been used to seeing the Russian military in the • 
• border areas; he observed that the Russian frontier chief at Kaikhta was 
always referred to by the Chinese as "Major", and that when that offi­
cial visited them at Miamachen he was always accompanied by a military 
escort. He also argued, perhaps with tongue in cheek, that the Chinese 
would welcome the security offered by strong friendly forces in the vici­
nity. He pointed to the 2,OOO-~ frontier with China and insisted 
.. 
that such a force would be even more necessary if the Amur question was 
not satisfactorily resolved. His proposal was to include in the Trans­
baikal Cossack Force: 1) all existing frontier Cossacks; 2) the Trans­
baikal city regiment; 3) all native levies - - Tungus and Buryat regi­
ments; 4) all Cossacks of the military-agricultural settlements in the 
Transbaikal; and, 5) all the peasants of the Nerchinsk Mining Adminis­
tration. Those in the first four categories would form cavalry units, 
while the fifth would be infantry. The people in this last_ category 
numbered well over 20,000 and Muraviev envisioned transforming them in­
to twelve battalions of Cossack settlers. Their transformation would 
constitute a veritable emancipation, greatly improving their lot. Their 
condition, in the mines, was actually worse than that of the Siberian 
convicts, for even the most criminal of the latter, having served the 
maximum term of twenty years, became free men, as did their children. 
The mine ~rkers, however, people guilty of no crime, were put to work, 
starting at the age of twelve, at the same level as the convic~s, and, 
no matter how many years they worked, never received more than twenty­
five days a year of free time. And for this they received, in bread 
and money, less than two rubles a month. Since this did not suffice to 
~~,. 
III 
•live, they were constantly in debt, either to their employer, the Govern­
•ment, or the tradesmen who exploited them. Under these circumstances a 
• good many of them eventually did commit crimes of, one sort or another, of­
ten for the sole purpose of attaining the status of convict, which, after 
a given number of years gave them and their progeny the position of free 
settlers. 2 
The Transbaikal Cossack proposal was the subject of long debates 
within the government, but finally on April 27, 1851, a special committee 
... 
consented to all aspects of it, including the most controversial one con­
cerning the Nerchinsk peasants, which was one of some sensitivity, since 
it affected mines that were the personal property of the Imperial family. 
The Emperor approved the minutes of the committee; Muraviev had convinced 
him of the need to establish respectable forces contiguous to China, a 
significant step toward ruling the Amur. 
Now the bureaucratic brakes in st. Petersburg were weakening and 
Nesselrode·s opposition was faltering, if only temporarily. Developments 
in Eastern Siberia were accelerating in the direction desired by Mura­
viev. Following authorization of the Transbaikal Cossack Force, .the 
Transbaikal and Iakutsk oblast were separated from Irkutsk and these 
forgotten borderlands were given autonomous status as gubernias. Reor­
ganization of Kiakhta followed, with the appointment of a single head of 
muniCipal administration which, ih addition to bringing order into what 
had been a somewhat chaotic situation, also served to impress the Chi­
nese with Russian intentions.3 A further step, of real importance to 
2sarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 286. 

3 
~., I, p. 288. 
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MUl'aviev, was the opening of a branch of the Imperial Geographic Society 
in Irkutsk. The Society was under the presidency of the Grand Duke Con­
stantine, who now began to exhlbit a lively and increasingly influential 
interest in Muraviev' s work. 4 In October, 1851, on the eve of the young 
Grand Duke's departure for a long stay in Venice, he wrote Muraviev in 
Irkutsk, asking that he be kept regularly informed regarding events in 
Eastern 5 iberia and the unfolding of Muravievts plans. 5 Thus was begun 
a regulaI' exchange of views between the two regarding the Amur question; 
henceforth Muravia" found in Constantine an invaluable supporter of the 
development of his grand design. 
Soon after Muraviev's return from St. Petersburg, he toured the 
Transbaikal, inspecting the civil administration, the Cossack Force 1n 
the process of formation, and the gold mines. At the same time, he formed 
his estimate of the area's logistical capabilities fur organizing an expe­
dition that might proceed down the AmUl'. Following this tour, ha wrotE) 
to Perovskii, decrying the inefficiency of the Mining Administration and 
remarking that the loss of some 2D,OOO employees, who were being absorbed 
in the Transbaikal C05!:iack FOl'ce t would simply result in substantial cuts 
6in the bureaucracy which had nothing to do in any case.
In a further letter to Perovskli, Muraviev reported that the Chlr.ese 
authorities were delighted with the new administrative arrangements in 
Kiakhta, see ing in them the possi.bili ty of closer ccoperation with the 
Russians at a higher official level. He also stated that he had complained 
4Struvc, pp. cit., pp. 114-116. 

5aarsukov, .£'20 cit.., r, p. 292. 

6Ibid ., I, p. 293. 
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to Nesselrode that messages from the Chinese Tribunal·passed through his 
office sealed and went on to St. Petersburg, so that he learned of their • 
--. 	 contents only some "three or four months later. He would not try further 
to communicate with Nesselrode for fear of "being misinterpreted", but 
pointed out that disorders in China might result in a Chinese request for 
Russian assistance. He wondered what course to take were the Chinese 
authorities to address themselves to him or his officials and surmised 
that his reply should be that Russia was prepared to support the legal 
.. 
Chinese government. He suggested that the Foreign Ministry should provide. 
him with guidance.7 
Meanwhile, in November, 1851, Muraviev reported to the Grand Duke 
Constantine that the four regular line battalions of Eastern Siberia had 
been transferred to the Transbaikal and that 20,000 Nerchinsk miners were 
being transformed into Cossacks, thus providing twelve additional infantry 
battalions. He pointed out that, "contrary to reports in foreign news" 
papers", the strengthening of Russian forces in the border area were making 
no inroads on Russia's military posture in the west, furthermore, it was 
putting Russia in position to be of assistance, if need be, to "the 
friendly Chinese Court". In this connection, he mentioned that the Chin­
ese with whom his officials dealt were not at all upset at the news of the 
founding of Nikolaevsk. At this time, too, Muraviev wrote Menshikov, the 
Naval Minister, that the Manchu Emperor would welcome the arrival of Rus" 
sian forces as a bulwark against the insurgents. 8 Whether this was a tac­
7Sarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 296. There is no available evidence that 
such guidance was provided. 
8Ibid., 	I, p. 299l 
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f tic designed to advance his own plans or whether he actually believed that 
the Chinese were eager for closer political ties with Russia would be .. 
: - difficul t to determine. Russo-Chinese relations on the local plane were' 
quite friendly and this may have influenced his judgment.9 
During the first half of 1851, Muraviev had prepared measures to 
strengthen the Amur Expedition under Nevelskoi. The proposals included 
detailing additional naval personnel to it, as well as a priest, doctor, 
medical aides from the Kamchatka hospital and fifty cossacks. He urged
.. 
that this be given priority. He also recommended that the Russian-American 
Company be relieved of any responslblli~y for the expedition and that its 
status as an official governmental enterprise be openly acknowledged. 
Nesselrode had his way this time, however, and the only element of the pro­
gram that was approved was that entailing the priest. lO This was a dis­
piriting setback. for Muraviev, who wrote a discouraged letter to his 
kinsman, General Muraviev-Karskii, who replied sympathetically and urged 
llhim to "keep up the good fight... 
In early February, 1852, Muraviev wrote again to the Grand Duke 
Constantine, reporting that the situation in China was going from bad to 
worse. By this time he was receiving useful information f rom the 
. 9Quested, Ope cit., p. 32, comments: "The hope was always at the 
back of his mind that the Chinese Government could be brought under some 
sort of general Russian influence •••struve describes how at that time 
(at Kiakhta) the old suspicion between the races had largely gone, and 
although the Chinese normally did not leave their own town, in early 
January, Russians, chinese, and Mongols circulated freely and jointly 
celebrated the Mongol· festival of Tsagansara (called by the Russians 
'Bely Mesiats'). Even at other times Chinese entertained Russians in 
the Chinese town." 
lORusski Arkhiv, Vol. III, 1878, pp. 264-266. 
llSarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 304. 
.,"""-,, 
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Orthodox Mission in Peking, the new head of which was an outstanding 
Sinologist, N. N. Kafarov, the Archimandrite Pa11adii. Palladii had 
earlier spent ten years in China as a member of the Mission, and unlike 
his colleagues who at best were indolent, and at worst, debauched drunk­
ards, he had put his tim(> to good use. He was the inventol' of the system 
of translating Chines"'.! into Cyrillic letters, still used by the Russians 
today and bearing his name. Under his direction the Mislion published an 
12
annual volufIl0 of articles, some of which were translated into Germun. 
Palladii was fluent not only in Chinese, but alsc spoke English and 
French. He was thus well qualified for the role of offici~l observer, 
and, in fact, so indll~trious was he in this sphere t.hat he was criti­
cized, by implication, in the official hostory of the Mission for th~ 
great volume of his political reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
13and the paucity of his purely pastoral reports. Thus Palladii kept 
Muravie'l reasonably au courant regarding events ir. Chir,u, both with l'e­
gard to trade matters and the political situation, including the progr~s3 
of the T a iping rebe11 ion. Early in the year he had reported on mountin9 
disorders in the south, where armed bands of insurgents were organizing 
under the slogan "salvation to the poor, plunder the rich": The movement 
had originated in Hunan but had quickly spread to the south and south­
east; in Palladii's opinion, depending upon the developmen~ of their or­
ganization and coordination, there was no telling how far it would go.14 
l~uested, op. clt., p. 28. 
13.i\.ratkuia isotria l'usskol pravo3J.aynoi mi.ss it v Pp.kin.a, cited by 
Quested, OPe cit., p. 29. 
14Russk.i Arkh.l.y, 1914, Vol. 2, pp. 41)6 - ~99. 
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• 
The spreading rebellion was taking on an anti-dynastic hue. Pirates 
were menacing the coast and there was pillage even in the, Peking region, • 
• 
while tribes on the western borders were taking advantage of the govern~ 
ment's disarray to press attacks on remote regions of the Middle Kingdom.15 
On these matters - - and regarding his bete-noire, the English, "prowl­
ing around the coast" - - Muravlev expounded at length to the Grand Duke 
and stressed ~at for the good of the country the Gov~rnor-General of 
.. 
Eastern Siberia should enjoy greater confidence of the authorities, in­
cluding the Foreign Ministry.l6 
Muraviev wrote once again to constantine at the end of February, 
~ 
1852. He pointed out that initially his main concern in Eastern Siberia 
had been the welfare of the people which had so long been neglected. 
Now, however, his basic concern was with the natural frontiers of the 
Enpire, something to which, he contended, neither Speranskii nor his 
predecessors and successors had given any serious attention. True, st. 
Petersburg was now giving some consideration to Kamchatka, the Pacific, 
the Sea of Okhotsk, the mouth of the Amur and the entire river and the 
contiguous Transbaikal oblast as well - - but not to the degree necessary, 
in view of the interest in these waters manifested by foreign powers. 
He hijd already mentioned England's intentions; soon, judging from what he 
had been reading, the Americans would be mounting a political and commer­
cial offensive in the islands of the North Pacific and in Manchuria, nego­
tiating with "independent rulers of Sakhalin", angling for navigation 
rights on the Amur, etc.. Forty years earlier, one of Russia's most 
15sarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 306. 
l6t.oc. cit. 
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17 •distinguished navigators had drawn the Russian's attention to Japan 
but that country was now lost to the Russians. There was no doubt, • 
• however, that if Russia should control navigation ~n the Amur, she could' 
yet salvage a secondary position on the Pacific. But, given the distur­
bances in China and the rapidity of current events, there was no telling 
who would be controlling that navigation within a few months. 18 
At the beginning of the summer, 1852, Muraviev again visited the 
• 
Transbaikal, inspecting its factories, mines and agriculture and pro­
ceeded up the Shilka as far as Gorbitsa. On the return trip, he left one 
of his assistants, M. S. Volkonskii,19 at the Nerchinsk factory, naming 
him a member of an investigative commission looking into irregularities 
in the mining administration - - and, in the process, creating new 
enemies for himself. At Petrovskii Zavod, he observed progress in the 
construction of the steamer 'lArgun", destined to ply the as yet unauth­
orized Amur route. He also looked into Buryat affairs and issued in­
structions for improvements .in their schools and for support in their ag­
ricultural enterprises. He appointed three trusted assistants ,to insure 
the carrying out of these orders. 20 
At the end of his inspection trip, Muraviev wrote the Grand Duke 
Constantine reporting on the highly satisfactory state of training of the 
Transbaikal Cossack Force. Constantine replied on August 14, expressing 
his gratification and reporting that he was now serving on the intra­
17Krusenstern. 
ISsarsukov, op. cit., 1, p. 309. 
19Son of the Decembrist 
20sarsukov, op. cit., 1, p. 311. 
~, ..»­
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governmental Siberian Committee.2l • 
•Al though Muraviev had failed in hi.s attempt to improve the status 
of Nevelskoi's little band, the "Amur Expedition'~, it continued its 
highly useful activities. Life at Petrovskii Post and at Nikolaevsk, 
tiny settlements bounded on one side by the icy seas and on the other by 
the limitless bleak wastes of the taiga, was rigorous indeed; yet these 
hardy people doggedly carried out wide-ranging investigations and surveys 
in pursuit of two main objectives. The first of these was to become 
& 
fairly familiar with the territory which, in accordance with Article I 
of the Treaty of Nerchinsk was undemarcated - • and to determine what 
4 
territory adjacent to the lower reaches of the Amur and to the coastline 
did not come under Chinese sovereignty and could, by right of prior dis. 
covery and settlement, be annexed to Russia. The second objective was 
to obtain a detailed knowledge of the entire coastline, including the 
most convenient harbors, their degree of accessibility, navigational 
periods at various points on the coast, characteristics of the terrain, 
natural resources, lines of communication and the like. The expedition 
pursued its investigations throughout the years 1851 and 1852. As a 
result of its findings, Nevelskoi concluded that "for the further survey· 
ing of the area, with a view to a definitive solution of the maritime 
problem" • • • it would be necessary to establish posts at a number of 
addItional points. These included the village of Kizi, at the mouth of 
the Ussuri, Sakhalin and the continental coastline at de Castries Bay; 
in addition, at the very least, two harbors to the south of the Bay should 
2l~., I, p. 313. 
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be occupied. 22 
Muraviev proposed to St. Petersburg that Kizl and de-Castries Bay, 
providing good bases for maintaining surveillance over foreign shipping 
when the Amur estuary was frozen over, be occupied by Russian forces .. 
Nessclrode's cautious counsels prevailed again, however. and Muraviev's 
proposal was rejected. He was instructed to pl'o~eed with extremg dis­
cretion and without haste. 23 During this period, the fall and winter of 
1852, Muraviev lea:rucd from Perovskii, his staunch supportsl in St. 
Petersburg, that the latter was giving up his post as Minister of the In­
terior in order to take up less demanding tasks in the Department of 
Impedal Domaines. This news, on top of his latest frustration adminis­
tered by Nesselrode's clique, plunged Muravlev into deep gloom, relieved 
only by the knowledge that he had ~other highly placed defender in St. 
Peter:";buI'g in the person of the Grand Duke Constantine. Muraviev felt, 
too, that he could look for support from the Heir, the Grand D;Jke Alf.'x­
ander. His disc~lJragement, nevertheless, was profound. 
At a period when it seem~d once again that Muravievrs plans v'IOuld 
come to naught, politico-military developments thousands of miles away 
provided him with a reprieve. As early as 1n the beginning of 1852, 
relations botween Russia and Turkey had become so strained that war was 
momentarily expected. This situation undoubtedly accounted in large 
measure for the negative reaction In St. Petersburg to Muraviev's ad­
venturesome proposals. Now, however, since it was clear that England 
and France were backing Turkey, the prospect of an Anglo-French attack 
22Ncvelskoi, .Q..Q.:cit., p. 176, cib~d by Kabanov, 9p. ctt., p. 142. 
23sal'SlJkov, .£2.0 cit., I, p. 315. 
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• 
on Kamchatka or the Amur estuary, of which Muraviev had repeatedly 
•
warned, became a real possibility. Thus, In February, 1853" Muraviev 
. , ' 
was recalled to St. Petersburg for consultations. When he left Irkutsk, 
he told his faithful assistant, Struve, that since he (Muraviev) appar­
ently did not enjoy the confidence of the government, he would probably 
not return,24 a threat which anyone who had known him since his early 
days in the Caucasus would have found tiresomely familiar. 
Muraviev arrived in St. Petersburg in March, 1853, and submitted
• 
a memorandum to the Tsar in which he outlined the strategic significance 

of the Amur, with particular reference to the war that was on the hori­
• 
zone In his characteristically prolix style, Muraviev set forth a geo­
political concept that subsequently proved to be realistic, and essentially 

accurate. As one writer has put it, albeit with some oversimplification, 

this concept formed the basis of Russian policy in the Far East until the 

25fall of the Tsarist regime and, indeed, right up to the present. Anoth­
er points to tithe hand of the dead RaguzinskU" as being plainly visible 

26
in the shaping of this policy. 
Muraviev, in his memorandum,27 warned of British incursions ,into the 

Far East and urged that the time had come to abandon Russia's Itimmobility" 

in that, area, where "nothing had been done since 1812". He pointed out 

24Struve, Ope cit., p. 152. 
25Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 261. 
26W• Gurian, Soviet Imperialism, Its Origins and Tactics, (Notre 

Dame, Ind., 1953) p. 116. 

27The exact official text of this memorandum has not been available 

to any of the sources consulted; the substance, as summarized on the fol­

lowing pages, has been taken from B. v. Struve's Vospominania 0 Sibiri 

1848 - 1854, (St. Petersburg, 1889) pp. 152-156. 
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• 
that it would not be enough to limit Russian action to seeking to estab­
•lish the near-west western communications with China, "leaving the entire 
• 
eastern frontier of some 6,000 versts •• to that political orientation 
and order that has obtained for the last 150 years". Unless Russia now 
took "special measures" on the Pacific, he warned, the result of England's 
war with China and the spreading of her naval power in neighboring waters 
would have irreversibly bad effects, not only for Russian trade with China, 
.. 
. but for Russia's very position in the far off lands of East Asia, which 
could "finish all ~ussian prospects there foreve~'. It was a matter of 
Imperial importance, Muraviev insisted, that there should be a settlement 
~ 
of the border with China in the Far East. This, he pointed out, because 
of the great distance from the area involved to St. Petersburg, could 
hardly be settled in all details by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He 
recommended, the:refore, that the "commander-in-chief" in Eastern Siberia 
be authorized independently to enter into contact regarding this question 
with the Chinese Tribunal and with the Russian Orthodox Mission in Peking_ 
Muraviev then went on to expound his recommended policy; 
, 
Twenty-five years ago, the Russian-American Company requested 
the Government to authorize the occupation of California, which 
at that time was controlled by hardly anyone, expressing at that 
time its apprehension that this region would soon become a 
possession of the United States of America. This apprehension 
was not shared in St. Petersburg, where it was asserted that 
this could happen only in a hundred years. The Company maintained 
that it would happen in twenty-five years, and now it has al- . 
ready been over a year that California constitutes one of the 
North American States. One could not help foresee the rapid 
extension of the North American states' dominion in North Am­
erica, nor could one help foresee that these States, once 
established on the Pacific Ocean, would soon take precedence 
over all other naval powers there, and that they would require 
the whole northwestern shore of America. The sovereignty of 
the North American States in all of North America is so 
natural that we should not regret very much that we did not 
~',:.£~ 
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.. 
consolidate't>ur pos! tion in California twenty-five' years ago ­
- sooneror1iater we would have had to yield it; but, yielding 
•it peacefully, we could have received from the Americans other 
benefits in exchange. Now, furthermore, with the invention and 
• 	 development of railroads, one must become convinced, even more 
than before, that the North American states will, without fail, 
spread over all of North America, and we cannot fail to keep in 
mind that sooner or later we shall have to yield them our Nor~h 
American possessions. Neither, however, can one fail to bear 
in mind, in this connection, that it is highly natural also 
for Russia, if not to possess all of Eastern Asia, then to 
rule over the entire Asian littoral of the Pacific Ocean. 28 
Owing to various circumstances, we allowed the intrusion into 
this part of Asia by the English, who, very naturally to the 
detriment and reproach of all of Europe, disturbing the peace
.. and well-being of other nations, prescribe from their little 
island their own laws in other parts of the world, including 
America; laws not in the least aimed at the benefit of man­
kind, but only at the satisfaction of,the commercial interests 
6f Great Britain. But this situation can still be saved by a 
close tie on our part with the North American States. Eng­
land exerts all efforts not. to permit this bond; her agents 
everywhere try with all means to estrange America from Russia. 
In this connection, England·s most essential conditions must 
include, gaining possession of Kamchatka, or leaving it 
waste, and ruling over the Pacific shores of China and Japan. 
thus, so to speak, cutting off Russia from the Pacific Ocean. 
There is no doubt that this system must also include the 
acquisition of Sakhalin and the Amur estuary. In order to 
prepare, in view of the above-mentioned considerations, a 
firm and convenient domain for our American Company, in place 
of the North American shore on one hand, and, on the other 
hand, in order to develop more quickly and certainly our sway 
over the shore of the Pacific Ocean belonging to us, it is 
essential to permit the Russian-American Company immediately 
to establish itself on Sakhalin, whence her trade will inevit­
ably develop with Japan and Korea. 
Muraviev·s memorandum convinced Nicholas 1 that the Amur Expedition. 
heretofore under the cloak of the Russian-American Company, should be­
come an 	official governmental enterprise. The next step, warmly supported 
by Grand Duke Constantine, was to authorize the Company to occupy Sakhalin. 
28If·taken literally, and discarding a presumption that what Mura­
viev meant was the north Asian littoral, this would imply the eventual 
conquest of a good deal more than Manchuria. 
123 

•denying it to any foreign intruders. The Sakhalin expedition was to re­
port directly to Muraviev. These decisions were taken on April 11, 1853. • 
Eleven days later, Muraviev presented his report to Nicholas I, in the 
presence of the heir to the throne, Alexander, the Grand Duke Constantine, 
Nesselrode, and the other ministers who had consistently opposed him. 
With maps and survey data prepared by Colonel Akhte, Muraviev illustrated 
the impreciseness of the Treaty of Nerchinsk and pointed out that Chi­
nese sovereignty did not exist on the left bank of the lower Amur, nor on 
" 
either bank at the estuary. It was then decided to occupy de Castries 

29
Bay and Kizi. The Emperor, pointing to the map and referring to the 
maritime area stretching from the Bureia River to the sea, thereupon ex­
claimed, "So that belongs to us!" Turning to the Minister of War, he 
said, "Inform the Chinese accordingly." Then, in reply to Muraviev's ob­
servations about'fortifying the mouth of the Amur, he commented, "That is 
all very well," and, pointing to the mouth of the Amur, remarked, "but I 
shall have to defend this from Kronstadt." Muraviev replied, lilt would 
not se.em to be necessary, Sire, to do that from such a distance. 1I Point­
ing to the course of the Amur from the Transbaikal, he said, "reinforce­
ments can be sent from here". The Tsar put his hand on Muraviev's head 
I 
and exclaimed, "Ekh, Muraviev, truly one of these days you will lose 
your reason over the Amur!" Then, slapping him on the shoulder, he said, 
"Well, then, let circumstances lead to that; we shall wait.,,30 
On the following day, Muraviev received a citation "for his exem­
plary and untiring efforts for the development and well-being of the vast 
29Struve, Ope cit., p. 157. 
3OSarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 325. 
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area within his responsibility", and was made a Knight of the Imperial 
Order of the White Eagle. He was then granted leave to go ,abroad on • 
• holid'ay and for medical treatment. 
It was not until Muraviev had left the country that the Foreign Min­
istry proceeded, in its own way, to carry out the Tsar's orders regarding 
notification to the Chinese of the decisions taken on April 22. The Note 
that was despatched was couched in such language as to create difficulties 
.. 
for Muraviev later on (see below).3l At the same time, a special commis­
sion was established to examine Muraviev's proposals for building up 
supplies, munitions, troop formations, and making various other logisti­
• 
cal preparations for sailing down the Amur. 
Meanwhile, Nevelskoi had continued to act according to h~s motto, 
"daring, speed and movement'·, and to make his way, as he put it, "without 
instructions". Thus, though aware of the governmental position against 
occupying any additional points on the Gulf of Tartary, he proceeded to 
put into effect the government's new decisions - - some time before they 
had been made. In February, 1853, he sent out Lieutenant N. K. Boshniak 
with orders to establish a post at de Castries Bay. On March 15, he re­
ceived confirmation from the young officer that the Russian flag had been 
raised. there; the local inhabitants had been put on notice that this was 
now Russian territory, and a building was under construction. At the same 
time, one of Boshniak's assistants had set up a post at 32Kizi. 
At de Castries Bay, Boshniak learned from the Giliaks that to the 
south there was a big bay. Boshniak proceeded there on May 2, w th three 
31Russki Arkhiv, 1878, bk. III, p. 274., 
34Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 147. 
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men in a Gi1iak boat and at the 49th parallel arrived at the bay, which he 
•
named 	 the Bay of Emperor Nicholas I. The local inhabitants here told him 
• that twelve days' journey to the south, a large ~iver'emptied into that' 
bay, while its headwaters were near the Ussuri, and that there were good 
harbors down the coast. The natives also told Boshniak that they were 
free men owing no allegiance to the Chinese. He thereupon gathered them 
together at Imperatorskaia Gavan33 and proclaimed that this whole country 
& 	
down to the Korean frontier was Russian, and that its inhabitants now 
came under the protection of Russia. He then put up a cross bearing the 
legend "Discovered and named Bay of Emperor Nicholas I, May 23, 1853, N. K • 
. 
Boshniak". At the same time, he gave the local inhabitants a written 
proclamation to this effect in the Russian, German and French languages, 
with instructions that they display it to any visiting foreigners. 34 
Then, his provisions being exhausted, he returned to de Castries Bay, 
where on July 12, the transport "Baikal" delivered him orders to occupy 
Sakhalin as well as de Castries and Kizi, the latter two of which were a1­
ready flying the Russian flag. 
In the late. summer of 1853, Nevelskoi proceeded to Sakhalin and on 
September 22, landed at Anniwa Bay where, in addition to the native in­
habitants, he encountered a number of Japanese, who periodically visited 
this point and maintained a small supply depot there. The natives warmly 
welcomed the Russians, but the Japanese appeared frightened until Nevelskoi 
assured them that he would not interfere with their trade on the island 
33ftImperial Harbor", on the newly discovered bay. It is now 

Sovetskaia Gavant. 

34Kabanov, op. cit., p. 148. 
~~>t,"._ 
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nor with tbeir fishing, and that their Itjustlf interests would be protect­
ed. The Russian flag was raised, cannon were }anded on the beach, and 
Nevelskoi explained that they would be permanently emplaced in order to 
~~ protect the people and the land, which were Russian.~o 
Thus was established the Muravievskii Post, the main Russian settle­
ment on Sakhalin. Major Busse was put in command, a mistake, cOIJ'Jn<:mts 
Kabanov, on Nevelskoi's part. According to Kabanov, this officer was in­
decisive, lacked initiative, was fearful of a possible invasion by the 
Japanese and was simply not. up to the task of mt:int<lining this Russian post 
at a time when war was approaching. And, in truth, follo·tJjng the outbreak 
of the Crimean ~ar and the attendant increased Japanese activity in the 
adjacsllt ~aters, he managed to persuade Admiral Putiatin, visiting him en 
route to Japan, to agree to evacuation of the pvst. 36 
Putiatin, evidently, did not need ~uch persuading in the matter of 
Russia's giving up her foothold on the sDuther~ co~st of Sakhalin. When 
Nevelskoi returned to winter quarters at Petrovskii in October, 1852, he 
learned that Captain Rimski-Korsakov, commander of the ~.choontJr "Vostok", 
had visited Petroyskii and had reported that Vice-Admiral Puliatin was 
resolutely opposed to any occupation of the area and to any designs on 
the Amur: he had forbidden Rim~ki-Korsakov to enter the river, since tlit 
belongQd to China", and he had protested against the occupation of Sakha­
lin, insisting that this would prejudice negotiations he was about to 
undel'take 't'iith the Japanese. "Ness(,lrode's influence was obvious", com­
ments Barsukov. 37 
35yoenno-Morskoi Arkhiv f. kanz.1..elik!'9c KniazL1_Konst.:.ntina Niko­
1aev,5.,cp:;" d. 154, cited by K<lbar.ov, 22. d:,., p. 148. 
36Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 150. 
37 •Barsukov, £2~., I, p. 332. 
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•Nevelskoi was unperturbed by Putiatin's antagonism. With singleminded­
•ness as firm as that of his master, Muraviev, he had in two short years 
• obtained a firm grip on the mouth of the Amur an~ had discovered that the 
river, 300 versts above its mouth, came very near to de Castries Bay 
which was why he had occupied Kizi and obtained what might be termed a 
second mouth of the Amur. a way station essential for ships entering the 
Amur from the south. At the same time, he had found a fine harbor, the 
Bay of Emperor Nicholas I. He had, moreover. obtained useful informa­
• 
tion regarding the autonomous status of the natives of the continental 
coastline and of Sakhalin. as well as data regarding the connection of the 
Ussuri River to ice-free harbors on the Manchurian coast. 
Nevelskoi's achievements, carried out with Muraviev' s:"encouragement 
and support. prepared the way for the important events of the next three 
38years. They ~rovided Muraviev with a plausible pretext for large-scale 
Russian military expeditions down the Amur, and for establishment of Rus­
sian settlements along its .left bank. By 1856. the discomfited Chinese 
3~abanov makes an eloquent argument that Nevelskoi was never ac­
corded the degree of recognition that was due him, and that he .was over­
shadowed by Muraviev. In this connection, incidentai1y, those who con­
demned Muraviev for "using" people had a plausible example in the case 
of the relationship between these two. By 1854, Muraviev was reprimand­
ing Neve1skoi for the latter's discourtesy to the managers of the Russian­
American Company, and in the following year he was complaining to Karsakov 
about Neve1skoi's failing to follow his instructions in the matter of 
battery emplacements at Nikolaevesk. At this time, Muraviev recalled 
Neve1skoi to Irkutsk to serve as his chief of staff, but under such condi­
tions that he would have little or nothing to do. Muraviev also wrote the 
Grand Duke Constantine that "Neve1skoi is now needed neither on the Amur 
nor in Irkutsk, and I therefore take the liberty of recommending that he 
be relieved". It would be difficult to decide now whether Nevelskoi's 
long service under hard conditions had had It an unfavorable effect" on him, 
as Muraviev put it, or whether, being as independent and self-opinionated 
as Muraviev, he was doomed to clash with his commander. (See Kabanov, ~ 
cit., pp. 120-128, and Barsukov, Ope cit., Vol. I, p. 396. 
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would thereby be placed in a position from which they could not extri­
•
cate themselves and Muraviev would accomplish de facto what it would 
• take another several years to regularize de jure. 
II. THE INITIAL CAMPAIGN "WITH NO SMELL OF GUNPOWDER" 
After a four-month vacation in Marienbad, Paris, Valencia, Tou­
louse and Brussels, Muraviev returned to St. Petersburg near the end of 
1853, for a two-month period of consultation. While there, he wrote the
• 
39 
new Minister of Finance, P. F. Brok, on the subject of the Kiakhta trade.
He urged that it be opened to all in the same manner as the rest of the 
, 
Empire's commerce, i.e., with payment to be made in coin rather than on 
the basis of barter; he recommended the exclusion of bank-notes, gold 
dust or ingots. Only by doing away with the archaic ,barter system, he 
believed, would ~muggling and the draining of Russian gold be put to an 
40
end. A special commission composed of representatives of the Ministries 
of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Interior, was set up to study Asian com­
merce in general and Muraviev's recommendation on the Kiakhta trade in 
particular. Struve comments that the Minister of Finance, however, "was 
in no hurry to deal with this matter".41 
Once again, in St. Petersburg, Muraviev was plunged into a fit of 
depression. It seemed to him that highly placed bureaucrats were deter­
39vronchenko, previous Minister of Finance, who had been a leading 
exponent of the policy of rigidly controlled barter trade at Kiakhta, 
had recently died, and Muraviev hoped for a more sympathetic hearing from 
his successor. 
40a. B. Struve,nGraf N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii. Iz Vospominanii 0 ego 
deiatolnoste," Russkaka Starina, Vol. 48, pp. 341-2. 
41B• V. Struve, Vospominaniia 0 Sibiri, 1848-1854, p. 161. 
" 
,_~l:..
-;.,;;.-",. 
129 

.. 
mined to frustrate his every attempt to advance Russian interests in 
.. 
Eastern Siberia. He did not lack evidence of hostility directed at him 
• •personally, at any rate, since this was unmistakably confirmed to him 
while he was in the capital. 
When Muraviev returned to st. Petersburg, he hastened to the Foreign 
Ministry and asked Seniavin, Head of the Asiatic Department, whether he 
should return to Siberia immediately in order to deal with the Chinese. 
• 
Senlavin's reply was that there were no particular dealings with~the Chi­
nese in view, and that from the standpoint of his department there was no 
need whatever for Muraviev to hurry back to Irkutsk. Thus reas~ured, Mura­
viev took his time, since he had other matters, such as the Kiakhta trade, 
to pursue, and was content to remain until they were settled. Suddenly, 
in December, an urgent courier from Irkutsk brought him startling news. 
In response to a note from the Russian Government, Chinese plenipoten~ 
tiaries were gathering in Urga, and would soon be in Maimachen, near 
Kiakhta, for negotiations on Amur matters. Muraviev indignantly confront­
ed Seniavin, who acknowledged that there had been a note, to which a reply 
had already been received from Peking, and that he, the Governor-General, 
would be responsible for the negotiations.42 
Muraviev had learned to maintain a certain sang-froid in the face 
of the continuing opposition offered him by the Ministry of Foreign Af­
fairs; this latest ploy, however, he regarded as intolerable. It threat~ 
ened completely to undermine his position, since it proposed the placing of 
frontier markers on the ~ bank of the Amur. As for delimiting the bor­
der to the east, the Note treated that of secondary importance. And this 
42Russki Arkhiv, 1878, III, p. 275• 
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• 
• 
was the Note that had been sent allegedly in accordance with the deci­
sions of April 22, 1853, when Muraviev had found himself in the ascen­
dancy over Nesselrode and the anti-Amur faction •. Its despatch had been' 
• 
delayed until June 16, when Muraviev had departed for his four-months' 
43leave in Europe. 
The Chinese received the Russian Note at the end of August, and 
took action with unaccustomed speed. Ying-lung, General of Heilung­
.. 
chiang, was ordered to review the text of the Treaties of Nerchinsk and 
Kiakhta, and to proceed immediately to an investigation of the frontier. 
He reported that there should be no objection to the delimitation, and 
the Emperor, I-ting, decreed that procedures should be discussed with the 
Russians in the following spring.44 In the meantime, officials were sent 
out to place boundary markers on the left bank of the Amur, beginning at 
the Gorbitsa, and the Tribunal sent an invitation to the Russian Ministry 
45
of Foreign Affairs to send officials to join them.. At the same time, 
the Chinese sent a commission to Kiakhta, which arrived there in November, 
1853. Rehbinder, Russian city-governor of Kiakhta, having had no advance 
notice of these developments, immediately reported on this to Irkutsk, re­
questing full information, plans, documents, and other pertinent data. 
Muraviev would have none of this. He immediately wrote ~ehbinder 
sternly enjoining him to abstain from any negotiations, and to tell the 
43Ibid., 1878, Bk. III, p. 276. 
44Ch -ou Pan I Wu Shih Mo, 7, p. lB, cited by Quested, op.: cit., 
p. 39. This, the Chinese archive published in the 193:)'s, is the source 
drawn upon most extensively by Quested. Hereinafter it is referred to 
by the abbreviation, IWSM. 
4~usski Arkhiv, 1878, Bk. III, p. 276. 
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•Chinese that he could do nothing, having received no instructions from 
his superiors, and to fix no date for any meeting. He further instructed • 
--. Rehbinder to let the Chinese know through unofficial channels that in 
order to proceed with any discussions about the border, it would be necess­
ary for them to address themselves to General Muraviev, who was prepared 
to consider a proposal for a meeting at Irkutsk, or some other place in 
the Transbaikal. Rehbinder was to make clear to his Chinese counterparts 
that there was a Governor-General in command of all land and sea forces in 
• 
the area, from the distant western frontier to the Pacific, and that mat­
46ters of high moment had to be referred to him. 
Available sources offer no explanation for the fact that Muraviev's 
action, which could be construed as countermanding the Tsar's orders (for 
Nesselrode had talked the Tsar into agreeing to the content of the Note to 
the Chinese) apparently elicited no rebuke whatever. It is possible, of 
course, that he had consulted one of his highly placed supporters, perhaps 
even the heir to the throne, before issuing his orders to Rehbinderl that, 
however, is speculation. It is a fact, however, that he did write the 
Emperor himself, pointing out what he considered to be the Foreign Minis­
try's double dealing and reporting the counteraction that he had already 
taken.47 
While Nesselrode's plans were being foiled by the resolute Governor-
General, activities in the Transbaikal, on the River shilka, and the 
Petrovskii iron works were proceeding apace. At Muraviev's insistance, 
P. V. Kazakevich was engaged in constructing a flat-bottomed steamer, 
46Ibid • 
47Ib1d., p. 277. 
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•
financed by a donation from the millionaire merchant, E. A. Kuznetsov, 
• 
to be called the "Argun ll This was in anticipation of the,Imperial per­• 
• mission to sail down the Amur. A steam engine for, the "Argunlt was being' 
built at Petrovskii Zavod.48 Muraviev had earlier initiated this in St. 
Petersburg, and had succeeded in having all necessary materials and equip­
ment for such construction sent to Ekaterinburg. Thus began a ship­
building industry in Eastern Siberia which later withered away for lack 
of support • 
• 
Muraviey, adjudging the Amur question to be one of Imperial import­
ance, had hoped that central governmental resources would be allocated to 
, 
support its resolution. He awaited the eventual allocation for this pur­
pose of some percentage of the gold being mined in his area. He was se­
verely disappointed, however. The maritime authorities made it plain 
that he would have to continue this type of development solely on the 
basis of local resources. He resigned himself to this, realizing that it 
would temporarily have an unfavorable effect on other sectors of the econo­
my, but rationalizing this within the context of the great goals to be 
49
achieved later. 
With the onset of the Crimean War, Muraviev became increasingly 
concerned over Russian defenses on the Pacific coast. In St. Petersburg, 
this initially was given no heed, understandably enough, since the govern­
ment was facing a conflict in the west with powerful enemies. English and 
48A year later, officers of the frigate, "Diana", which had put in 
at Nikolaevsk, were amazed to see this steamboat, which had been built 
entirely, It even to the engine", at the headwaters of the Amur. (See N. 
G. Shilling, "Iz Vospomiananii Starogo Moriaka", Russki Arkhiv (1880), 

III, p. 145). 

49Barsukov, 9.p. cit., p. 344. 
~~1&_ .
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•French naval forces were perilously close to Eastern Siberia, however, 
and the defense of the coastline and Kamchatka, Muraviev knew, depended 
entirely on navigation of the Amur. Only thus could the military estab-' 
• 
1ishment on the Okhotsk coast and in Kamchatka be provided with reinforce­
ments, supplies and munitions; overland communications would be fatally 
slow, if not utterly impossible. Even before first departing for Siberia, 
during Muraviev's final imperial audience, the Tsar had remarked to him, 
• 
!tWe1l, they'll take Kamchatka away from you and you will learn of it only 
six months later".50 
This was the historic moment for Russia to move in the East. Mura­
viev grasped it. In a long letter, on November 29, he urged on the Grand 
Duke constantine the immediate necessity to send troops via the Amur for 
the defense of the mouth of the river and of Kamchatka. Since the central 
government's resources could not be diverted for this task, he requested 
permission to draw on all remaining balances of government revenues gen­
erated in Eastern Siberia. He pointed to the parlous condition of the 
Chinese Government, which had expended its strength and "no longer ruled 
over half of its realm", and urged that it be informed that it should 
"address itself to, and deal with the Chief administrator and commander 
of troops in Eastern Siberia, to whom the Government has given appropriate 
instructions for all contingenciestt • 51 
EVen as Muraviev was writing his letter to Constantine, the Special 
Amur Committee that had been studying proposals earlier submitted by 
5OSarsukov, op. cit., I, p. 344. 
5l~., II, pp. 104-109. 
Appendix III. 
My translation of this letter is at 
6 
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j -. • 
Muraviev, made a favorable report to the Tsar. On Ja~uary 11, he con­
•firmed that Muraviev should be authorized to deal directly with the 
Chinese Tribunal on all matters concerning the fr~ntier of Eastern 
Siberia and China. The Chinese were duly notified, and a diplomatic 
secretary and an interpreter were assigned to Muraviev. His request re­
garding allocation of revenue balances for support of activities on the 
Amur was also approved: he would be accountable for these only to the 
Tsar. Finally, after a number of heated debates, it was decided to navi­
gate the Amur. This was to take place even in the absence of any reply 
to a note that would be sent to the Chinese Government proposing despatch 
of military reinforcements and supplies via the Amur to the coast and 
Kamchatka. In confirming this decision, the Tsar added the caution that 
"there must be no smell of gunpowder". 52 
The Tsar's. approval of the establishment of Nikolaevsk on the Amur 
had been Muraviev's first victory over the Nesselrode faction; here was 
his second. His repeated warnings of hostile British intentions had 
taken on added significance, now that war was erupting; the Tsar was as 
loathe to leave the mouth of the Amur to the British as was his Eastern 
Siberian proconsul. The Tsar had not yet acceded to Muraviev's desire 
to force a showdown on the frontier problem, but he had gone a long way' 
in that direction. Implicit in the decision to navigate the Amur and to 
delegate powers to Muraviev regarding frontier questions, was a willing­
ness to fling down the gauntlet before the distraught Chinese govern­
mente 
Following his triumph in St. Petersburg, Muraviev arrived in 
52Russki Arkhiv, 1878, Bk. III, p. 277. 
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, ':l~
"'''''oJ 
Krasnoiarsk at the end of February, 1854. From there he wrote to Con­
stantine regarding the success of Nevelskoi's occupation of Sakhalin, 
and requested promotions and decorations for him and his men. He also 
reported his receipt of a letter from Putiatin in Nagasaki. The admiral, 
who had been echoing Nesselrodels line, had now reversed himself. His 
observation of the Americans in Japan had convinced him that "it would be 
prudent to concentrate Russian influence in Sakhalin and on the Amur". 53 
At Krasnoiarsk, too, Muraviev received a progress report from Lieutenant 
Colonel Karsakov, indicating that the expedition down the Amur could takef 
I place as soon as the spring thaw set in. 54 
I News of the forthcoming Amur expedition stirred great enthusiasm 
throughout Eastern Siberia. The wealthy merchants, who were well aware 
of Muraviev's poor opinion of most of them, nevertheless now saw in him 
the champion of their own material interests, and pledged substantial 
sums for the expedition. And for the first time since his arrival in 
Siberia, Muraviev dined with the Merchant SOCiety of Irkutsk. 55 
Muraviev proceeded to Kiakhta on April 26, planning to stay there 
until May, in anticipaHon of a communication from the Chinese, whether 
or not it was received, he would set out on the Amur. The Chinese sent 
no word and on May 7, he was at Shilkinskii Zavod, where the steamer 
"Argun" was at anchor, together with a flotilla of river boats, barges 
and rafts. Here, too, was fue bivouac of a composite battalion with 
53sarsukov, gp. cit., Vol. I, p. 350. He had not yet learned of 
Nevelskoi's occupation of Anniwa Bay. 
54Ibid • 
50Struve, 2p. ci~., p. 174. 
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•
artillery that had been mustered for the expedition. Muraviev's mili­
tary commanders from outlying areas and civil notables were gathered to • 
• see him off in gala' manner. May 9 was a holiday marked by the bread and' 
salt ceremony and fireworks, grandiloquent speeches, versifying, and 
symbolic statues. On May 14, the expedition was blessed with the Madonna 
of Albazin, and amid shouts of "ourah" from the population on the banks, 
the expedition moved out with Muraviev's craft in the lead. 56 On the 
• 
evening of May 17, the expedition approached Ust'-Strelka, where the 
Shllka joins the Amur, and on the following day, with bands playing "God 
Save the Tsar", the expedition entered the Amur. On May 20, they were at 
.. 
Albazin, and on the 28th, they reached the mouth of the Zeia. 
Muraviev had sent messengers overland to inform the Chinese governor 
of Aigun of the expedition's impending arrival. That official was para­
lyzed with fright. He had had no word from his government concerning the 
expedition, and no instructions of any sort, but he attempted to explain 
to Muraviev why it would be impossible to permit him to proceed down the 
river. The sight of the steamer, which they had never before beheld, and 
of the rest of the flotilla and the soldiery, so frightened the Manchurian 
officials that they wished for nothing but the departure of the Russians 
who, to their relief, did not tarry.57 
The passage through Aigun had been the critical point of the expe­
dition, for Aigun was the only Chinese strongpoint of any significance 
on the Arnur; if there had been any intention on the part of the Chinese to 
offer armed resistance to the Russians, it would have taken place there. 
5~arsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 368. 
57J..Q1Q.., I, p. 370. 
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That such resistance was out of the question must have been abundantly 
•
clear to Muraviev when he saw the ludicrous Aigum garrison ,drawn up on 
• the ~hore of the river. It consisted of some 1,000 shabbily clad pea­
sants, "armed" with sharp ended poles and bows and arrows, with here and 
there among them an occasional antiquated matchlock. 58 There is 900d 
reason to believe, however, that the Chinese Government was taken com­
pletely by surprise. It will be recalled that Muraviev was authorized 
in 3anuary of 1854, to deal directly with the Chinese Government on all 
" 
matters concerning the Amur. At that time, when the decision to go ahead 
with the expedition was taken, it was decided to communicate that deci­
sion to the Chinese Government. Muraviev waited until April to send the 
Government of China a Note from Irkutsk, informing it that he proposed 
to take troops down the Amur to the Pacific coast, as a preventive mea­
59sure against hostile powers. The Chinese did not receive this mes­
sage until 3uly, so that the first that the Manchu Emperor, I-Ting, 
learned of the expedition was when the Generals of Heilungchiang and 
Kirin memorialized that it had passed Aigun. 60 I-Ting, in reply to his 
generals, observed that the Russian claim that their expedition was meant 
to counter the British threat "cannot entirely be believed", but that if 
the Russians really created no disturbances, "it seems unworthy to put 
obstacles in their way". The commander at Aigun was ordered to alert his 
61troops - - but no mention was made of sending him any reinforcements. 
5~avensteint oR. cit., p. 119. 

59sarsukov, oR. cit., Vol. II, pp. 114-115. 

60IWSM, 8, p. 4 B, cited by Quested, oR. cit., p. 46. 

61Quested, op. cit., p. 46. 
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Only on July 24, 1854, did Archimandrite Pa11adi! complete a trans­
,. 
1ation of Muraviev's note that had been passed to him by the Secretariat • 
of the Chinese Grand Council. It is possible that Muraviev had de1iber-, 
ate1y dispatched it so late that it would be impossible for the Chinese 
to prepare to take measures to oppose him; or it may simply have been de­
layed by the vagaries of the postal service in Mongolia. 62 
From Aigun onwards the banks of the river were deserted, with the 

exception of occasional sparse settlements of a few huts. The inhabi­
" 
tants of these little villages as far down the river as its confluence 
with the Ussuri, fled at the approach of the Russians, for they had been 
instructed by the Chinese authorities at Tstitsigar to avoid encounters 
with the Russians, not to hire themselves out as guides and, signifi­
cantly, to avoid the left bank of the Amur. 63 
Murav:1:ev's .expedition proceeded serenely down the river to the 
Bureia confluence and past the mouths of the Sungari and the Ussuri, with 
no untoward incident. Two hundred versts below the Ussuri, a storm came 
up that was so violent as to result in the foundering of a barge laden 
with supplies. These were recovered and dried out on an island in the 
river. It was at this point in its progress that the expedition, on 
June 10, met with a small boat carrying a Russian naval officer, Ensign 
Zagradskii, who informed them that they were still some 500 versts from 
Marinskii Post. Neve1skoi had sent a message with him requesting a de­
62IWSM, p. 25A, cited by Quested, who also cites Russki Arkhiv, 

Vol. 2, 1914, recording that some new instructions awaited by Pa11adii 

took from March 18 to July 5 to go from Kiakhta to Peking in that same 

year. 

63~aeiski Sibiri, otd. RGO, t. III, (Irkutsk, 1857), pp. 63-64, 

cited by Kabanov, 0e. cit., p. 162. 
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tachment of a hundred cossacks from the expedition for stationing at 
the mouth of the Khutari River, for maintenance of communications with • 
• 	 Imperatorskaia Gavan' ,-Emperor's Harbor_7. Muraviev complied with this 
request, and on June 14, arrived at Marinskii Post at the mouth of the 
Amur. 
From Marinskii, Muraviev sent 350 troops to Petropavlovsk on the 

transports, tlDvina", and tI Irtysh", and sent the rest via the Amur to 

Nikolaevsk. He also detailed a sub-lieutenant and two hundred men to 

.. 
build a road through a virgin forest of lOO-year old trees from Marinskii 
Post to de Castries Bay, as a line of communication and supply for Russian 
" 
vessels at de Castries. It was a brutal task for the detachment, with 

inadequate equipment and short rations. The young officer and his ex­
hausted men were more than once tempted to give up and return, but the 

knowledge that Muravievts wrath would face them if they did so spurred 

64them 	on to the completion of their task. 
Muraviev sent Karsakov to st. Petersburg to report on the success­
ful conclusion of the expedition, and then proceeded to de Castries Bay. 
Here he took the scooner, "Vostok", to Imperatorskaia Gavan', where 
Admiral Putiatin was awaiting him to confer on orders from St. Peters­
burg to bring Russian shipping from Japan to safe haven at the mouth 
of the Amur. Muraviev then reconnoitered the adjacent posts and other 
points on the Amur estuary, and issued orders for defensive deployments 
and fortifications. 
When Karsakov arrived in St. Petersburg with the tidings of the 
first expedition down the Amur, he was met by an emissary of the Officer 
64Istoricheskii Vestnik, t. XXXVI, 1889, pp. 647-648, cited by 

Ibid., p. 164. 
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of the Day at General Headquarters, who •insisted that there was no time 
for him to take a brief rest, to bathe and m change from his shabby • 
• traveling clothes; Dolgoruki, the Minister of War" was impatiently await':' 
ing an immediate briefing. Accordingly, Karsakov proceeded directly to 
the Ministry of War and there delivered Muraviev's written report to 
Dolgoruki, who thereupon sent Karsakov to report to the Grand Duke Alex­
ander at Tsarskoe selo, and to the Grand Duke Constantine in Strelna. 65 
.. 
ttso now", said the Tsarevich, reading the end of Muraviev's report, 
ttwe have a firm foothold on the Amur!" And then, reading Muraviev's 
comment that all the credit belonged to Nevelskoi, Kazakevich and Karsa­
kov, he exclaimed, !tDid Muraviev forget himself? He should have all the 
credit: Tomorrow morning I shall present you to the Emperor. n66 On the 
following morning, he Tsar greeted Karsakov with an enthusiastic em­
brace, and issued' orders that all members of the expedition be promoted, 
decorated, or otherwise rewarded. Karsakov was promoted to colonel, 
Nevelskoi to rear admiral, and Kazakevich to captain first class. Simi­
lar promotions went to lower-ranking officers, and the troops received 
three silver rubles per man. 67 In a happy letter to his brother, Valer­
ian, Muraviev wrote that everything was finally on the right track, but 
that the way would still be hard, because there were many in St. Peters­
burg who were against him. He also wrote Karsakov to tell him that there 
was so much to be attended to in Irkutsk that he could not spare the time 
to go to st. Petersburg personally to receive citations, etc••• for the 
Amur exploit. He added that his presence in Siberia would probably be 
65sarsu'kov, Ope cit., I, p. 384. 
66Ibid. 
O~arsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 386. 
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required for another six years, and that he was prepared to make this 
sacrifice for Russia. 68 
III. PAHALYS!S OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM 
Muraviev had evidently taken the measure of the Chinese Government 
much more accurately than had Nesselrode. This might have been due, in 
part, to the useful intelligence being provided by Archimandrite Palladii 
of the Orthodox Mission in Peking, though why it did not equally impress 
the nervous Nesselrode, to whom it was also available, is not clear. 
Some of Palladiifs earlier reporting has already been noted. Now, 
on July 9, 1854, this priest-turned-political-analyst and agent, report­
ed that there had been a meeting of the Grand Council to consider rela­
tions with Russia. At this meeting, the Emperor's younger brother had 
taken a pro-Russian stance, pointing to the peace that had existed with 
Russia since 1689, and to the fact that the Tsar had placed a ban on the 
export of opium to China. Palladii expressed the opinion that the Chi­
nese would maintain a passive attitude in the face of Russiats designs 
69 
on the Amur. 
The Archimandrite was also not above indulging in a little psycho­
10cical warfare on his own. During the su~mer of 1854, he worked hard at 
spreading the belief - - which already existed in some Chinese governmen­
tal quarters - - that the British were supporting the Taiping rebels, 
while the Russian Gover~~ent stood behind the Manchus. There was a mea­
sure of truth in the latter part of this contention, at least insofar as 
68Barsukov, op_ cit., I, pp. 386-387. 

69R!:ls~Js,i...6.rkptv, Vol. 3, 1914, p. 16. 
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Muraviev was concerned, for 1n the spring of the year he ,had formed a 

project to offer Russian military assistance against the rebels. In pur­
• 
• suit of.this idea, he had attempted to send a staff officer, Colonel A. 
I. Zaborinskii via the Amur and Sungari across Manchuria to Peking for the 

purpose of initiating negotiations, as well as for the purpose of re­

connoitering the Sungari area. 70 ..He had sent a Note to the Tribunal re­
questing it to accept his emissary, and Palladii had followed this up, 

but to no avail. In one of his reports to Muraviev concerning his ef­
.. 
forts, Palladii added that foreign relations in Peking were being conduct­
ed so secretively that even the Tribunal, the normal agency for the con­
duct of foreign affairs, was being kept in the dark by the Grand Council. 

He also reported that Shanghai and the entire southern portion of the 

Middle Kingdom was in the hands of the insurgents. The position of the 

Manchu regime was ,clearly rapidly deteriorating. At the same time, the 

Chinese Government, so ignorant of the outside world, was fearfully 

handicapped by its attempts to assess the degree of the Russian threat 

and of Russian capabilities. Thus, Palladii reported, in the summer of 

1854, a rumor had spread throughout the capital that a Russian flotilla 

of 120 (:) vessels had smashed the British naval forces in the China 

Sea. 71 

While the Russians had hardly any naval forces worth mentioning, 

either in the China Sea or elsewhere, they did have their defenses at 

Petropav10vsk, organized and reinforced by Muraviev. These were to provide 

70A. 1. ZaborinskH, "Graf Muraviev-AmurskH, v. 1849-1856~ g.1t 

Russkaia Starina, v. 38, p. 626. 

71'Russki Arkhiv, Vol. 3, 1914, p. 17. 
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a Russian victory in this remote theater of the Crimean·War. An Ang10­
French squadron of seven vessels anchored on August 18, 1854, at the •! 
" f - • 	 entranee to the Gulf 'of Avacha. Following a four-day bombardment by the • 
ships' 204 guns against 57 Russian ones, the allies disembarked some 100 
men. The Russian coastal batteries had been silenced, but their field 
pieces supported a garrison, including temporarily enlisted civilians, of 
something under a thousand men. A fierce battle ensued culminating in a 
bayonet charge by Muraviev's newly created Transbaika1 Cossacks, which 
.. 

drove the enemy back to the sea. Under cover of their ships' guns, the 

British and French escaped in their landing boats, leaving four officers 

and thirty-four enlisted men dead on the field. Four men and a British 

flag were captured; the Russians had lost thirty-one dead and eighty-

four wounded. The Anglo-French force made no further attempt to land, 

72

and three days 1at.er sailed for the open sea. 
Shortly after the victory, Muraviev learned from St. Petersburg 
that there was a popular outcry in England and France, demanding that 
another attempt be made to take the port. He thereupon ordered the evac­
uation of Petropav10vsk, presumably because there was no prospect of 
quickly replacing the destroyed coastal batteries and of sending suffi­
cient munitions and supplies there.73 
On October 30, 1854, Muraviev sent a Note to the Chinese Government 
72Semyonov, Ope cit., p. 279. Ravenstein gives a good description 
of the battle and detailed accounts are to be found in A. P. Arbuzovts 
"0borona Petropav10vskago Port' a v godu 1854 protiv Anglo-Frantsuzkoi 
eskadry", Russkaia Starin.!, Vol. I, pp. 298-313, and in P. V. Shumacher's 
"0borona Kamchatki i Vostochnoi Sibiri protiv Anglo-Frantsuzov v 1854 
i 1855 godakh", in Russki Arkhiv (1878), Vol. II, pp. 393-425. 
73aarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 387. 
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informing it of the successful conclusion of the firs~ Russian expedi­
tion down the Amur. In an edict of January, 1855, the Manchu Emperor • 
I
- commented that "This note lacked sincerity", and expressed his conviction 
that "the Russian barbarians have some intentions of which they do not 
speak open1y".74 In that month, too, the Li-fan-yuan sent a Note denying 
Muraviev's request to send Zaborinskii to Peking, whereupon Muraviev 
75dropped the matter. In this same note, the Chinese requested that Rus· 
sian representatives be sent to Urga to undertake a delimitation of the 
.. 
frontier. A month later, the Chinese Governor at Urga, Prince Te-1e-k'e­
tuo-er-chi, unaware of the Note, informed Rehbinder, the Russian city-
governor of Kiakhta, that Chinese representatives wished to meet the Rus­
sians on the Gorbitsa River for the de1imitation. 76 
At this point, Muraviev obviously decided to take advantage of the 
confusion and hesitancy within the Chinese Government evinced by these 
conflicting communications. Of primary concern to him now was the fur­
ther consolidation of the Russian position on the AmurJ negotiations 
could wait upon a stronger fait accompli. He thereupon sent a Note on 
February 18, 1855, as follows: 
The English in the summer of the past year descended with 
six (sic) vessels on our Kamchatka, but were repulsed and sent 
away. Our great Lord and Emperor, concerned not only with 
his realms and his people, but desirous of preserving the 
welfare of the neighboring Dai-Tsing power, with whom we 
have had friendly relations for over 200 years, in a recent­
ly issued ukaz, has ordered me, as Governor-General of 
Eastern Siberia, to take a 'sufficient number of troops, 
74IWSM, p. 12 B, cited by Quested, ob. cit., p. 49. 

75Ibid., p. 13 A. 
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heavy and light artillery and other supplies and munitions and, 
as soon as the River opens, to proceed to the sea and destroy 
the crafty, selfish English. Fulfilling the will of my Sover· 
eign, I am obliged to undertake an expedition to the mouth 
of the Amur; if it suits the Tribunal to send a reply to this 
communication to the mouth of the Amur, I s9al1'be happy to 
take up delimitation of the frontier there. 7 
• 
On March 16, Muraviev's Note reached the Manchu Emperor, who replied with 
a note in early April, asking Muraviev to go to Urga and from there, with 
the Chinese delegates, to proceed to the Gorbitsa. 78 
.. The Chinese made no preparations to offer resistance to Muraviev's 
second expedition. "Indeed, the enfeebled Chinese regime could do nothing 
to oppose it - - but it could not quite bring itself to lose face even 
with its own officials. Thus, when the new General of Heilungchiang, 
I-ko, reported on the first Russian expedition down the Amur and sought 
instructions for dealing with any repetition, the Emperor gave him the 
following edict: 
Russia in its communications with other nations, should, of 
course, take the outer sea route and cannot be permitted to go 
through the interior of our country. But during the ,fifth 
month of the year, (1854), the vessels of the said country 
were given passage. If their return should be blocked, they 
would have a pretext for raising further complications. I-ko 
is hereby ordered to keep a constant inspection and watch. 
Should those vessels of the said country, which lately made 
the passage, sail back along the Heilung River, they are to 
be allowed to return without hindrance, provided no distur­
bance is created in the regions they pass through. If there 
should be more vessels coming down and they are not those 
which made the passage previously, they should be told that 
the rivers in the interior of our country cannot be used for 
passage of foreign vessels, and that they decidedly shall not j 
navigate on the Heilung River, so as not to engender misunder­
standings. 79 
77Barsukov, Ope cit., Vol. II, pp. 123-124. 
78Quested, Ope cit., p. 50. 
79Ibid • 
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•Quested points out the meagreness of the resources at the disposal 
of the Chinese in the area of Muraviev·s activities, by citing a memorial • 
• from ,the General of Kirin, Ching-shun, which reached the throne in the 
spring of 1855. It reported that the total force to be put out for the 
frontier delimitation from Heilungchiang and Kirin provinces, and from 
Urga, would consist of some 400 men, but that their food, equipment, and 
pay would have to be covered by borrowing from reserve funds; otherwise, 
.. 
it would be impossible to keep them in field conditions.80 Muraviev was 
undoubtedly aware of the general situation that this reflected. In a 
letter of Mareh 23, 1855, Palladi! had informed him that the Taiping 
rebels were tightening their hold in the south, that Hankow, Nanking, 
and Shanghai were in their hands and that they had cut the government's 
line of communications in central China. He had also reported the Chi­
nese Governmentts continuing and mounting financial distress.8l 
Muraviev replied to the Chinese Note of April with one on ~,~ay 8, 
stating that because of the military situation, he would prefer to meet 
the Chinese representatives for preliminary discussions at the mouth of 
the Amur, where he would be until September. He expressed agreement as 
to the undesirability of delaying the matter. 82 
.80IWSM 10, p. 24 B, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 51. 
81Russki Arkhiv, 1914, p. 22. 
82aarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 420. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE ACTIVATION OF RUSSIAN POLICY 
I. THE ROUT OF NESSELRODE 
.. 
As Muraviev set out on the second expedition down the Amur, the 
Chinese Government sent out a protest against his activities. It was 
couched in cautious terms similar to those employed in the Emperorts 
~ 
edict to the General of Heilungchiang, and avoided any threatening 
statements. At the end of May, 1855, the Chinese Emperor, having re­
ceived Muravievts Note sent on the eve of his second expedition, replied 
with a further and even more cautious protest. This one stated that 
Russian navigation of the Amur could be allowed only by mutual arrange­
ment with the Russian Senate,and the Li-fan-yuan - - an important con­
cession of principle. l I-ting also sent instructions to the Generals of 
Kirin and Heilungchiang ordering them not to resist the Russian vessels, 
but Umerely to instruct them not to cause a disturbance". 2 In a letter 
to Muraviev at this time, Palladii hastened to point out the progress­
ively milder tone of the Chinese Notes which, in any case, could not 
have been lost on Muraviev. 3 Matters were now proceeding entirely to 
his satisfaction. 
1IWSM, 10, p. 37 B, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 52. 
2IWSM, 10, p. 37 A, cited in IQ1£., p. 52. 
Snusski Arkhiv, 1914, p. 504. 
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•The second Amur expedition was organized in three echelons. The 
•first consisted of twenty-six vessels under Muraviev's personal command • 
• 	 The second included sixty-four barges under Colonel Nazimov, with the 
15th line battalion of infantry_ The third was made up of thirty-five 
barges under the command of Colonel Korsakov. It included additional 
regular infantry and cossacks, as well as 'heavy fortress artillery for 
the strengthening of the Nikolaevsk defenses. These guns, brought fY.em 
Ekaterinburg, had presented a tremendous overland transportation problem, 
to 
requiring up to sixty horses each. Their weight occasionally broke 

through the bottoms of the barges, causing them to sink; in portions of 

.. 

the river where there were no trees on the banks, the problem of raising 

them presented agonizing difficulties. 

These three echelons represented a military force of some 2,500 

4
men. The third ~chelon of the expedition also contained the first group 
of 	scientists on the Amur, made up of members of the Siberian branch of 
the 	Imperial Geographic Society, whose expenses were being financed by:' 
18 pounds of gold contributed by the merchant, Stepan Soloviev. In­
cluded too, under the care of Muraviev's special assistant, Volkonskii, 
were the first settlers from Irkutsk and the Transbaikal, peasants who 
would be making their homes in Mariinsk and Nikolaevsk. Muraviev had 

arranged for their recruitment by offering them a number of privileges. 

These included freedom from obligatory military service, movement of their 
household goods at government expense, provision of free government ra­
tions for two years and "6f fifty rubles' worth of tools and agricultural 
4Quested, Ope cit., p. 51, citing Nevelskoi. 
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5 	 •implements per family. 
•The settlers, four hundred and eighty-one men, women and children, 
• 	 traveled on twelve barges, with accompanying barges carrying their cat- . 
tle. Additional barges were loaded with fodder, needed because there 
was to be no stopping for pasturage. 
The Amur pioneers suffered considerable hardship. The rapid cur­

rent of the Shilka made it impossible to tranfer fodder to the barges 

transporting the cattle, with the result that by the time Albazin was 

.. 
reached almost three hundred of them had died. A greater misery then at­
tacked the unfortunate peasants 7 ••typhus spread among them despite 

.: 
the "most favorable hygienic conditions, mild spring weather, covered 
barges, hot meals with meat, fresh vegetables, tea and a daily ration of 
vodka".6 Despite these tribulations, on arrival at Marinskii Post there 
were only two dead, while there had been four births en route. Nevelskoi 
had 	 picked out a number of locations for settlement, but Volkonskii in­
sisted on inspecting them first, together with some of the peasant el­
ders. Only one of the initially chosen sites turned out to be satisfac­
tory, and eventually five locations were picked: Irkutskoe, Bogorodskoe, 
Mihailovskoe, Nov-Mihailovskoe and Sergeivskoe. Of these, four were on 
the 	right bank of the Amur. Despite ample food supplies and decent living 
conditions in general, typhUS raged through these settlements throughout 
the 	following winter, abating only with the onset of spring weather. 
This, ramarks Barsukov, illustrated the widely held contention, "even in 
England", that the first generation of settlers always suffers casualties 
5sarsukov, Ope cit., I, pp. 417-418. 

6Ibid., I, p. 419. 
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' j
and it is only the second that obtains the full benefits of colonisation. 
•While proceeding by the Kumarskii ,Post on the Amuron May 12, the 
• expedition encountered four junks bearing the Chinese officials who had' 
been sent to Gorbitsa for the setting up of boundary markers and frontier 
negotiations. Muraviev explained to them that it was essential for him 
to reach the mouth of the river without delay and suggested that they 
return to their base at Sakhalin-Ula-Khoton and await further instructions 
from Peking. They replied that they dared not fail to carry out the 
.. 
orders of their Emperor. Muraviev thereupon gave them protective passes 
8to be shown to his military commanders and proceeded down the river • 
• 
On May 15, Muravievts officials sent a Note to the Chinese gover­
nor of Sakhalin-Ula announcing that Governor-General Muraviev was on his 
way to the Eastern Ocean in order to defend the mouth of the Amur against 
the English'f that accompanying him were one hundred and four9 vessels, 
including a steamerJ that three steamers would shortly be sailing back up 
the Amur; and that the expedition was comprised of over 8,000 men, wo­
men and children. The vessels, the Note stated, bore cannon, other arms, 
gunpowder and all manner of war materials. It was requested that they 
10
not be held up. 
Muraviev, following his meeting with the Chinese officials at Kumar~ 
skU Post, stopped at Aigun to call on the Chinese commander there. In 
a subsequent report to Emperor Alexander II, he communicated his impress­
ion that the Chinese Government had obviously ordered the commander at 
7Barsukov, op.cit., I, p. 419. 

~usski Arkhiv, 1878, Vol. III, p. 280. 

9sarsukov's account, supra, indicated a total of one hundred and 

twenty-five; the reason for the discr~pancy is not clear. 

10 

Barsukov, Ope cit., Vol. 1, p. 423. 
~_,t4",~ 
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\ 
Aigun to permit free passage for the Russian vessels. The commander 
•had also intimated that future navigation on the Amur "would not be al­
• lowed without special permission from the Chinese. Emperor". Muraviev 
further reported that he had parted from the Aigun commander on the 
friendliest terms and had assured him that nothing would be um ertaken 
without the consent of the Chinese Emperor, toward whom the Russian Em­
peror's friendship remained unchanged. On leaving, Muraviev had given 
valuable presents to the Aigun commander and his officials. ll 
.. 
Count Nesselrode now saw that the Amur question was passing beyond 
his control. He nevertheless made one last effort. On May 31, he wrote 
., 
Grand Duke Constantine that he doubted that the Chinese would give up 
the left bank of the Amur without going to war12•••this in the face 
of the abundant evidence of Chinese impotence! Muraviev, however, had 
made a firm decision that if the Chinese, on the basis of the Foreign 
Ministry's Note of June 16, 1853, should demand the setting up of the 
boundary markers from the Gorbitsa, he would refuse. He would state 
that he had no orders to this &fect from the Tsar, that there was no 
point in doing so, since the Amur constituted a natural boundary and 
that he had so reported to the Tsar. He would then tell the Chinese that 
he was awaiting orders to undertake such negotiations as might prove pos­
sible and convenient to both parties, keeping particularly in mind the 
13defense of the river from the enemy. 
Muravievts unremitting arguments and efforts were finally bearing 
11Barsukov, Ope cit., II, p. 130. 

12aarsukov, op_ cit., I, p. 424. 

13Schumacher, in Russki Arkhiv, 1878, Vol. III, p. 280. 
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•fruit. In July, Grand Duke Constantine wrote him that the Tsar had 
•reached the decision that in the interests of the development of Siberia, 
Russia must have the entire left bank of the Amur',as well as the right' 
to free trade in the northern regions of the Chinese Empire. 14 Mura­
viev was to be entrusted with negotiating a treaty with China. 
II. THE PRIAMUR IS TAKEN 
The Emperor I-ting, having learned that Muraviev had gone on to
• 
Marinskii Post without carrying out the frontier delimitation from the 
Gorbitsa, ordered his officials to hasten down the river after him.15 On 
.. 
the following day the lfirst negotiations on the Amur commenced. Muraviev, 
who was not well, delegated responsibility to Rear-Admiral Zavoiko, who 
informed the Chinese delegates ~at the Russian Government was determin­
ed to organize the defense of the Amur against foreigners, in order to 
insure the security of the Eastern Siberian hinterland. The lower rea­
ches of the Amur, he announced, were occupied by the Russians and were 
Russian possessions, while the lands lying east of the Amur were still 
unde! imi ted. 
Zavoiko went on to say that the Russian Emperor had ordered Mura­
vied to establish a force of upwards of 100,000 troops16 in the region 
entrusted to him, in view, on the one hand, of the necessity of preserv­
ing and defending the Amur, and, on the other, of the disorders that had. 
recently arisen in the Chinese Empire. He also served notice that the 
14Ibid., p. 281. 

15IWSM , 11, p. 1 B et seg., cited by Quested, 0p. cit., p. 53. 

16Muraviev was obviously convinced of the gullibility of the Chi­

nese and of the non-existence of their intelligence services. 
~_2.0~. 
• 
153 
• 
defense of the Amur, entailing enormous outlays by Russia, could not be 
merely a temporary measure. 17 
On the following day, Muraviev spelled out Zavoiko's initially 
• 
stated position by stating that all places occupied by the Russians for 
the purpose of defending the mouth of the Amur - - and the entire Amur, 
maritime area, should remain permanently in Russiats possession and that 
the Russians would need permanent settlements all along the .:river' s left 
• 
bank. He demanded, too, that the Chinese recognize the'lright of the 
Russians to naviga~e the Amur and suggested that the Fei-ya-ha and cer­
tain other tribes owing allegiance to the chinese and inhabiting the
• 
18area claimed by Russia could be re-settled elsewhere in China. The 
Chinese representatives replied on September 11 that they had no author­
ity to negotiate these points; they then read out the contents of the 
Russian Note of ~une 16, 1853, which, they pointed out, clearly indica­
ted that the Russian Government wished to preserve the frontier of 1689. 
Muraviev's rejoinder was that similtaneously with the sending of that 
communication, the Tsar had ordered him first to hold discussions on the 
undelimited areas and only a fterwards to proceed to the actual boundary 
demarcations. 19 He concluded by asking the Chinese delegation to inform 
its Government that the main purpose of the RUssian Government was the 
preservation of peace between Russia and China for all time. He then 
17Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 428. 
l~bW. 
19Ibid • There is no available record to indicate that Muraviev in 
fact had received such instructionsJ it seems that he resorted to this 
line as the most convenient way to counter the effect of the Note of 
June 16, 1853, which, as has been noted, was sent by the Foreign Minis­
try during his absence abroad. 
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•put the Chines~.representatives on notice that since it was wartime, he 
was obliged to send a third expedition down the Amur in the following • 
• spring, in order further to strengthen the Russia,n defenses and to 1m­ ' 
prove communications with the interior. 20 Following this meeting, Mura­
viev sent a Note to the Tribunal covering these points. At the same time, 
he wrote the Grand Duke Constantine, requesting him to have the Russian 
senate address the Tribunal in similar terms, so that it would be quite 
• 
plain that he was acting on orders from the highest authority; otherwise, 
in view of the Note of June 16, 1853, the Chinese might conclude that the 
Russian Senate saw things differently from the way Muraviev did. 21 
The Emperor I-ting, having received a report of the abortive dis­
cuss ions at Marinskii Post, sent instructions to his representatives to 
refuse Moraviev's demands, with the exception that they might consent to 
temporary continuation of Russian operations at Marinskii Post while the 
Russians defended the area against the English. At the same time, he 
expressed the opinion that the "Russians' hearts are unfathomable and 
we fear that their nature is like that of dogs and sheep (bestial), so 
that it will be difficult to talk reasonably with them".22 Shortly after­
wards, the Chinese Emperor received a report from the Kirin General, 
Ching-shun, to the effect that the Russians had erected "nearly a hun­
dred" buildings at Marinskii Post, and that earthworks, palisades and 
gun emplacements had been built; Ching-shun concluded his report by 
stating that it was obvious that the Russians intended to seize the 
201.lli,., p. 429. 
21 Ib i d., p. 43:). 
22 iIWSM, 12, p. 9 B, cited by Quested, op. ct., p. 53. 
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23area. In early December, 1855, the Emperor repeated that the left 
bank of the Amur could not be yielded to Russia, and ordered his three • 
Northern Frontier generals, Te-le-kte-tuo-er-chi, I-ko, and Ching-shun, , 
to send Muraviev a joint Note so stating, for transmission to the Russian 
Senate. The generals were instructed to state in this Note that they 
dared not transmit Muraviev's claims to the Emperor in Peking, apparent­
ly a ploy meant to impress the Russian Government that China might react 
24violently "if such claims were presented to the Emperortt • 
" 
Ouring the fall of 1855, Muraviev had been continuing to take mea­
sures to strengthen the Russian position at the mouth of the Amur. 25 He 
had buildings constructed for the 47th Fleet Equipage, had additional 
batteries set up at several locations, and expanded his troops' winter 
quarters. Nikolaevsk, which two years earlier had been little more than 
an empty space in the wilderness, was now the center of Russian forces 
on the Pacific. Three separate forts were being constructed there, with 
26fifty-three pieces of artillery. The need for these precautions was 
23quested, op. cit., p. 54. 
24Ibid • 
25At this time, too, Russo-Chinese relations were furthercompli­
cated by an incident in Sinkiang. Some five to six hundred "vagrants", 
subje"cts of the Chinese Emperor, plundered and burnt down a Russian 
warehouse in the town of Tarbagatai. Six hundred Chinese and Manchu 
troops were sent to the area and later reported that the ringleaders 
had been captured and sentenced to 100 strokes of the heavy bamboo 
cane, followed by exile It if they survived". The Russian Government 
demanded compensation for the losses suffered by its subjects, but the 
nearly bankrupt chinese Government refused to pay. Correspondence be­
tween the two governments continued for almost five years on this matter, 
which became a factor of some importance in eventual treaty negotiations 
between them. (See Quested, op. cit., p. 55). 
26Barsukov, op. cit., I, p. 433. 
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evinced by the presence in the Sea of Okhotsk of some twenty-two 
French and thirty-four English vessels. These, however, failed to deal 
any serious blow to the Russians during this period, beyond capturing the 
Russian-American Company's mail ship, the "Sitka tl , and setting fire to a 
fish warehouse in Petropavlovsk. 27 The Chinese were now aware of the im­
pressive Russian build-up, bJt could do nothing, as Muraviev learned 
from Palladii, who reported that one of the Emperor's ministers had 
stated that Russian fortifications on the Amur would be intolerable 
but that at the same time, it would be impossible to enter into active 
hostilities with Russia on such a pretext. 28 
On October 30, 1855, while en route back from Ayan to Irkutsk, Mura­
vlev wrote to his commander in the Transbaikal, Colonel Zaborinskii, tell-
Ing him to commence preparations for the third expedition down the Amur. 
He added that should the Chinese object to the expedition, it would be 
necessary to demonstrate Russian power and readiness to move into Mongol­
ia and Manchuria. 29 What probably prompted this observation - - in the 
face of Palladii's reports from Peking - - was the continuing rumor, 
being spread by Chinese merchants, that the Chinese Government was deter­
mined to resist another Russian expedition and was sending troops for that 
30 purpose from the south to the Amur region. As a countermove in this 
psychological warfare, Muraviev sent his assistant, Volkonskii, to Urga 
ostensibly as a "couriertl , but in fact to bring an oral message to the 
27Ibid ., p. 436. 

2~usski .\rkhiv, t-Jo. 10, 1914. 

29Barsukov, op. cit.• , I, p. 438. 

30Jbi1., I, p. 441. 
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<) 
~ there, expressing Muraviev's appreciation for the cooperation of 
the Aigun commander during the passage of the second Amur expedition. He • 
• 
was to state, if the conversation gave him an appropriate opening, that 
Muraviev was calling in enormous forces from all parts of Eastern Siber­
ia, since he considered that the enemy would be strengthening his own; 
VolkonskH was then to deliver expressions of the highest este'em and 
sentiments of friendliness for the Chinese Government. He was also to 
.. 
remark that Muraviev was prepared to help China against anyone, English 
or French, should the Chinese Government request such help from his Gov­
ernment. Volkonskii was instructed, furthermore, to sound out the Chi­
nese on their opinion and understandings about the current war, about the 
Russians and Russia1s enemies, and to instill suspicion of the English, 
who had seized India, Ita land no less great than China". He was also to 
inform the amban that Muraviev was departing briefly from Eastern Siber­
ia, for a personal meeting with the Tsar in st. Petersburg, where Vol­
konskii was shortly to join him. Finally, he was to determine the accur­
acy of the rumours that China intended to oppose the third Amur expedi­
tion and was concentrating military forces to that end. He was to carry 
out these instructions jwith the utmost speed, n even at the cost of ignor­
ing established rules of Chinese etiquette", and then to travel directly 
to st. Petersburg, where Muraviev was 31 now proceeding. 
VolkonskiPs mission to Urga, where he was assisted by extremely 
friendly Mongolian and Manchurian officials, revealed that no Chinese 
military preparations were being made to resist another Russian move down 
31!Q1£., p. 442-443. 
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32 	 •
the Amur. How correct his information was 1s revealed by a memorial to 
the throne by the Kirin General, Ching-shun, received by the Chinese Em­ • 
• 	 peror on February "2, 1856. Ching-shun reported that he could not as- , 
certain whether the British and French had been attacking the Russians 
on the coast, since the area in question was "too far away from"our 
military posts". Except for the Lower Amur, where the Fei-ya-ha and 
He-che tribes lived, the area was a remote wilderness, with "places where 
no one has been". Apart from the Marinskii Post, he was not certain 
.. 
what 	points were occupied by the Russians. On the military situation, 
Ching-shun reported that "the troops in Heilungchiang Province are cer­
tainly not many and provisions are scarce lt Kirin, too, had few provi­• 
sions and the soldiers there were few. There were 800 soldiers at San­
hsing, Ninguta and Hunchun respectively; the allotted number of troops fer 
Kirin Province was 10,105, but 7,000 had been transferred to other parts 
of China, and of these only 800 had returned. Ching-shun urgently re­
quested 2,000 men to reinforce the garrisons at sanhsing, Ninguta and 
Hunchun, but the Emperor, preoccupied with the rebellion in the south, 
declined to send them. 33 
Shortly before Muravievts arrival in St. Petersburg, the Russian 
Foreign Ministry received the Note from the Governors of Kirin, Heil­
ungchiang, and Urga that the Emperor, I-Ting, had ordered them to send. 
(See above, p. 155). Referring to the Foreign Ministry's Note of June 16, 
1853, (the one to which Muraviev had taken such violent exception), the 
Note stated: "We sent out officials, but your Governor-General, for 
34sarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 444. 
33 8IWSM, 12, p. 24 A, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 5 • 
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• 
purposes of defense against attacks by the English fleet, occupied sev­
•
eral 	towns and settlements on the Sungari River which have been paying 
• 	 tribute to our Emperor. Muraviev is definitely nO,t concerned with main-' 
taining the friendly agreement and peace of two h~ndred years' standing, 
and we therefore request that you explain matters to Muraviev.H34 The 
Note also contained the statement (in accordance with the instructions of 
the Chinese Emperor) that the Governors "did not dare" memorialize Mura­
viev's demands to the Emperor. This evidently did succeed in causing 
.. 
some concern within the Foreign Ministry, which decided that Russian 
claims should be limited to free navigation on the Amur only.35 Alex­
• 
ander II ordered postponement of any reply to the Chinese Note until re­
ceipt of a reply to a Russian Note claiming compensation for the Tarbagatai 
ware-house that had been sent on December 14, 1855. Muraviev, however, on 
arriving in st. Retersburg, convinced the Tsar that the Foreign Minis-
try's decision should be rejected irrespective of the Chinese position on 
the Tarbagatai incident. He ,obtained full authority to negotiate a 
treaty with the Chinese Government. 
The Tsar ordered that navigation on the Amur be continued, and that 
artillery and arms be offered the Chinese as compensation. He cautioned 
that resort to force be avoided, or at least that it be employed only 
in order to free any Russian prisoners who might be seized by the Chi­
nese, he pointed out that under such circumstances, "rapid and decisive 
measures" would be preferable to becoming involved in lengthy correspon­
36dence which, by Chinese custom, would be dragged out for years. 
34nusski Arkhiv, 1878, Vol. III, p. 284. 
35~. 
3~v~arsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 446. 
I 
f 
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•MUraviev immediately sent instructions to Irkutsk to organize for 
•the next expedition. Following detailed instructions concerning various 
aspects of the preparations, including the use of a small steamer de­
livered from America, he clearly spelled out the need for firmness in 
the face of any objections that might be voiced by Chinese officials, 
and instructed his staff to explain to them that the Russian Senate had 
sent a written communication regarding the expedition to the Tribunal. 
They were, furthermore, to point out that Russian navigation on the Amur
• 
37
would 	 be an annual event, despite the conclusion of the Crimean War. 
Muraviev prolonged his stay in st. Petersburg in order to obtain 
• 
full particulars on the peace settlement, and to gather information on the 
important changes in the upper echelons of the Government that were ex­
pected following the end of the war. He knew that Nesselrode, Oolgo­
rouki and Brok would be replaced, and was anxious to learn with whom he 
would be dealing in the future. The third expedition, therefore, would 
be proceeding down the Amur.without him, under the command of Lieuten~nt 
Colonel Busse, while Muraviev would depart for Marienbad to take the 
waters, since his health was again failing him. Before leaving st. 
Petersburg, he ordered the despatch from Irkutsk of two Notes to the 
Chinese. The first, which reached I-Ting on February 26, asserted that 
if Russian troops remained in the Amur area they would be "very strict­
ly controlled"; the second firmly announced that a new expedition was to 
take place.38 Upon receipt of Muraviev's second Note, I-Ting issued two 
edicts, one stating that the Russian expedition could not be permitted, 
37Ibid., pp. 447-448. 

38IWSM 12, p. 27 Band IWSM 13, p. 7 B, cited by Quested, Ope cit., 

p. 59. 
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•
the other ordering Te-l-k'e-tuo-er-chi to take "strict precautionary 
•measures", and not to allow the Russians "to cause trouble", if they did 
• 
come again in force. 39 
Prior to embarkation of the third expedition, Karsakov came to 

Aigun and was met by Chinese officials, who offered him their hospitali­
ty, but said they had no instructions regarding permission for navigation 

of the river. They said they would nevertheless interpose no objection, 

even though this might cause trouble with their Government. They asked, 

however, that there. be no stations established on the way. Karsakov re­
plied that he had to establish such stations on Muravievts orders, and n 

suggested that for their self-protection, they inform the Chinese Govern­

ment of this.40 
The communications from Muraviev preparing the Chinese for the 

third Amur expedition, the Chinese Emperor's edicts and the bearing of 

the Chinese officials at Aigun were all clearly the components of an 

elaborate little play in which the Russians were asserting their will, 

while at the same time discreetly helping the tottering Chinese regime 
to save face. Muraviev must have been reasonably certain that the Chi­
nese Emperor's resistance to his policy was that of a "paper tiger", 
and that, in fact, if the Russians did not actually invade Chinese ter­
ritory south of the Amur, they would run into no physical opposition. 
It was shortly before Busse took the third Russian expedition down 

the Amur that Palladii reported to Muraviev on the replacement of I-ko, 

the General of Heilungchiang, who was ill, by I-Shan, a member of the 

39IWSM, 13, p. 8 A, cited by Quested, OPe cit., p. 59. 
40Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 452. 
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Imperial family. I-Shan had been unsuccessful in resisting the English 
•in Kwantung in 1842. Failing to lift the seige of Canton in 1843, he 
--. 	 had been sentenced to death, then pardoned and made General of Ili in 
1845. There, he had concluded the Kul-dja Treaty, excluding the Russians 
from Kashgar, and had redeemed himself before his Government.4l Palladii, 
on April 22, 1856, reported to Muraviev that he knew that I-shan had 
accepted his new appointment very unwillingly, and had delayed his de­
parture from Peking for some time, hoping that the new Russian ~pedition 
• 

down the Amur would go by before he assumed his new post. In the same 

report, Palladii expressed the opinion that the Peking Cabinet was vaci­
llating in its policy on the Amur and was, furthermore, much concerned 

over the Tarbagatai incident which, it feared, might give the Russians 

a pretext for drastic action. His analysis was that the Chinese were in 

a quandary, they,feared the collapse of the regime and wished to avoid 

any action that would speed the dissolution of the Empire, but they also 

dreaded retaliation by the English, should they take steps favorable to 

Russia. Under the circumstances, Palladii concluded, the Chinese Govern­
ment fervently wished that its domestic disorders and its difficulties 

with the Russians on the Amur could be hidden from the outside world. 42 

Muraviev's confidence, which permitted him to go to Europe, I leaving 

the third Amur expedition in the hands of a lieutenant colonel, was amply 

justified. The expedition, including 1,660 troops, arrived off Aigun on 

May 21, 1856, and was well received by the Chinese officials. They stated 

41A• W. Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Dynasty (Wash­
ington, 1943-1944), cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 60. 
42Russki Arkhiv, Vol. 3, 1914. 
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.. 
that they had no authority to let the Russians pass, but would do so. 
•
"because of the friendship between their two countriestr. They also 
·made some pro forma objections to Bussests declared intention to estab­
lish additional bases and stockpiles on the lower Amur, and requested 
him not to let his troops do injury to Chinese subjects; they also asked 
to be kept informed of the numbers of Russian troops in the re~ion.. Busse 
told them there were some 10,000 on the Arnur estuary, and that 5,000 
more would be added. 43 
As the Russians.proceeded down the river, they set up stations at 
Kamarskii Post (at the mouth of the Kamar River), Zeiskii Post (at the 
mouth of the River Zeia) and Khinganskii Post (near the little Katin Ri­
ver). The triumvirate of Chinese frontier governors were left nonplussed, 
and the expedition triumphantly proceeded to the mouth of the Amur, se­
cure in the knowledge that the Chinese Government was powerless.44 Dur­
ing the summer and early fall of 1856, Russians sailed up and down the 
Amur, and traveled on the left bank as it suited them, while the Chinese 
authorities merely sent in reports on estimated numbers of Russian troops 
and ships that they observed.45 
One of the Russian troop movements during this period ended in 
disaster, and was seized upon by Muraviev's detractors as "evidence" of 
his incompetence. Upon confirmation of the Peace of Paris, Muraviev, be­
fore going abroad on leave, ordered a large number of his troops to re­
'turn up the Amur from its mouth. The movement was poorly planned and 
43Ibid ., pp. 285-286. 
44garsukov, Ope cit., p. 452. 

45
IWSM 13 and 14, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 62. 
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initiated too late in the season. Insufficient supplies, anQ ice 1n the 
river which immobilized their boats, resulted in the death of some two 
hundred unfortunate soldiers who were returning to be demobilized. With 
Muraviev in Europe, his deputy, Karsakov, was of course responsible, but 
individuals like Zavalishin preferred to write in outraged towns about 
Muraviev's Itbungling".46 
Muraviev returned to Russia at the end of the summer of 1856, going 
to Moscow for the coronation of Alexander II. He wrote to Karsakov from 
there, mentioning that his sight and hearing were beginning to fail him 
and telling him to prepare for a visit to Irkutsk by Americans interested 
in trade with Eastern Siberia.47 
During the coronation, political prisoners in Siberia, including the 
Decembrists, weI'e pardoned and allowed to return from exile, and Muraviev 
sent Prince volkonskii, who had joined him in Moscow, to Siberia to bear 
these glad tidings. It was at the coronation, too, that Muraviev re­
ceived yet another decoration, the Order of Alexander Nevskii. His morale, 
nevertheless, was low. He was piqued at what he regarded as the insigni­
ficant role he was assigned in the coronation ceremonies, and was con~ 
vinced that he had enemies close to the throne who were doing everything 
possible ,to deprecate the importance of his achievements in Eastern Si­
beria.48 What particularly wounded his pride was the elevation of Prince 
Bariatinskii to the rank of full general, though that close confident of 
46Zapiski Priamura, otd. ROO, t.V, b. III, p. 26, cited by Kaba­
nov, and Russki Arkhiv, Vol. 16, 1878, pp. 420-425. ' 
47Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 469. 
48Ibid., p. 470. 
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• 
the Tsar was junior to him in terms of military service. He and Prince 
• 
Suvorov, also senior to Bariatinskii, went so far as to submit their 
• 49resignations from the army, but these were not accepted by Alexander II. 
During his stay in St. Petersburg, during the fall and iwinter of 

1856, Muraviev vigorously pursued tmur matters. What particularly pre­
occupied him now was the need to settle the Amur area, to provision the 

troops at the mouth of the river, and to deploy detachments of "hunter­
cossacks" at stragegic points at the mouths of the Zeia, at Ust-Stre1ka,

• 
the mouth of the Bureia, opposite the Sungari and the Ussuri, and one 

near Marinskii Post, the Amur Regiment. He also hoped for assignment 

of additional regular infantry and cavalry, and of cossack artillery, 

'tfortt , he wrote to Karsakov, "the Chinese Government is by no means sta­
b1e, and it might easily happen that we shall have to move into China 

• 50
vati he land route." 
In another letter to Karsakov on December 1, 1856, Muraviev wrote 

that finally, not only the Emperor and the Grand Duke Constantine, but 

all the Ministers (including Prince A. M. Gorchakov, Nesse1rode's able 

successor), had been won over to his view regarding the Amur question, 

which, he said, would be henceforth "handled in such a way as to recom­
51pense Russia for all that she had suffered at the hands of the west". 
Thanks to the unanimous support that Muraviev now enjoyed, he was 

able to bring about an administrative reorganization in keeping with 

the progress made in occupying and settling the Amur. He obtained the 

49Russkaia Starina, 1882, p. 525. 

5OSarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 475. 

51 Ibid., I, p. 479. 
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Tsar's approval of the establishment of the Maritime Region of Eastern 
Siberia, encompassing Kamchatka, and the Ud and Priamur districts. 
Headquarters for the region were established in Nikolaevsk, by that 
time a flourishing little town. Its streets were full of shops, in-
eluding those of Americans and other foreign traders. Everything was 
available there, at a price. A shipyard was turning out sloops built 
of fine virgin oak from the surrounding forests, and "better than any­
thing made in Kronstadt". A handsome church was nearing completion, 
and the town already boasted a clubhouse as a center for the social life 
of the local merchants, officials and visiting sea captains. 52 
Thus, by the end of the year, 1856, official action had been taken 
to confirm that the mouth of the Amur was a Russian dependency, and that 
the Priamur was a part of Russia's possessions in Asia. Muraviev's 
exertions in pursuit of his obsession, assisted by the British threat 
occasioned by the Crimean War, had finally made the annexation of the 
AmuI' region an accomplished fact. 
III. THE ARROi'] WAR SPEEDS FINAL SOLUIIONS 
The Crimean War had been a significant factor in untying Mura­
viev's hands and permitting him to reach a de facto solution of the Amur 
52Arkhiv Bestuzhevich, f. 6:)4, cited by Kabanov, OPe cit., p. 174. 
See also, Pisma ob Amurskom Kraye, Russki Arkhiv (1895), Vol. I, p. 374, 
an article attribu-l;.ed to Engineer-Colonel Dmitri Ivanovich Romanov, in 
which Admiral Putiatin, en route to Japan, is depicted as being enthus­
iastic at the changes wrought in the two years that had passed since 
his initial visit there - - dinners of a quality "hard to exceed in 
Paris", fine buildings, an excellent ship yard, etc •••Putiatin, in a 
report from there, urged the Government to provide at least 600 pieces 
of artillery for the area's defense, twenty river steamers and a tele­
graph line. He pressed the Government to repose unlimited confidence 
in Muraviev, and to make generous prOVision of funds at his disposal. 
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• 
question. His successful expeditions down the river, his annexation of 
the Amur delta, and the defense of Petropavlovsk, contrasted with Rus­
siat's defeat in the crimea, moreover, forced the authorities in St. 
• 
Petersburg to give greater weight to Far Eastern matters and to take more 
account of Muraviev's activities and plans. England, furthermore, whose 
actions had smoothed the way for Russian occupation of the Amur, was now 
taking further action in china that would give Muraviev a splendid oppor­
• 
tunity to obtain legal sanction of that occupation • 
The treaty extracted from China by England in 1842, had become all 
53but inoperative by the early l850 t s. That treaty, as well as a,imilar
• 
ones obtained in subsequent years by the French, the Americans, Belgians 
and Swedes, was unsatisfactory to both the Chinese and to the foreigners. 
The five open ports, Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai, were 
the only locations in which the foreigners were allowed to reside; they 
were not allowed·to travel in the interior and had no diplomatic access 
to the Government in Peking. The Chinese had promised to undertake re­
vision of the treaties within twelve years (with the implication that 
restrictions would be relaxed), but they had no desire to do so; the 
treaties had been forced on them, and they were determined to comply with 
them only to the extent that they were compelled to do so. The British, 
moreover, continued to ply their trade in opium, a circumstance that 
heightened the tension between the sullen Chinese and their unwelcome 
"barbarian" guests. Thus, following conclusion of the Crimean War, Eng­
land prepared to send her envoy, Lord Elgin, supported by strong armed 
53A detailed analysis of the factors contributing to the break­
down of the Treaty System is contained in John K. Fairbank, Trade and 
Diplomacy on the China Coast, 1842-1854 (Harvard University Press, 
1953), pp. 267-368 • 
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•forces, to China to wring new concessions from the hapless Celestial 
•Empire. In this venture, she was being joined by her junior partner, 
France. 
Muraviev sensed that the time had come to consolidate his gains. In 
January, 1857, he wrote the Foreign Ministry requesting speedy permission 
to transport cossack settlers down the Amur. On February 9, Prince A. M. 
Gorchakov, the Foreign Minister, wrote Muraviev that no time should be 
lost in settling outstanding questions between Russia and China, but he 
" 
demurred at Muraviev's proposal to move substantial numbers of cossacks ' 
to the left bank of the Amur. Grand Duke Constantine overrode Gorcha­
kov, however, and at the end of that month, permission to settle three 
hundred men of the Amur Cossack Regiment was granted by Alexander 11.54 
In the following spring, these men and their families, as well as two 
hundred families from Ust f -Stre1ka and Gorbitsa, some twenty-four hun­
dred people in all, were sent down the Amur. 55 By the end of the year 
1857, there were approximately three thousand Russian settlers and sol­
diers at fifteen stations along the left bank of the Amur, eKc1usive of 
the estuary itse1f. 56 
Even while the English were making final preparations for sending 
Lord Elgin to china, they were presented with a pretext for forcible 
intervention. On October 8, Chinese authorities in Canton seized the 
vessel "Arrow", under the British flag, that was carrying "contraband" 
(opium?). The Governor-General of canton refused to return the ship, 
54sarsukov, Ope cit., II, pp. 148-150. 
55zapiski Priamura, ots. ROO, V, v. III, p. 31, cited by Kabanov, 
Ope cit., p. 173. 
56Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 173. 
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•
and on October 28, the English bombarded Canton. Chinese reprisals took 
•the form of a boycott of English goods, destruction of English mer­
• chants' warehouses~ and murder of BriUsh subject,s by gangs rioting in ' 
the streets of the city. The English thereupon seized Shanghai. Thus 
began the "Arrow War", and another defeat of China. 
Prince Gorchakov quickly perceived that the new turn of events in 
China opened the way for "activation" of Russian policy in the East. 
This was the time to put pressure on the Chinese and to obtain their 
.. 
formal agreement to Muraviev's actions on the Amur. 57 Admiral Putiatin, 
the old ~a-dog turned diplomat, set forth Gorchakov's views in a meet­
ing with Grand Duke Constantine, who was traveling abroad at the end of 
the year 1856. The new Foreign Minister urged early negotiations with 
the Chinese before the English, French and Pmericans took Peking, and 
"included the Amur among the rivers on which they would have free navi­
gationlt 58 A few weeks later, E. P. Kovaleskii, a Mongolian expert• 
and Director of the Foreign Ministry's Asiatic Department, wrote Gorcha­
kov, stating that while he considered it impossible for Russia to join 
the Anglo-French expedition against China, it was also impossible for 
Russia to remain entirely aloof from the developing situation. For, wrote 
he, 
The taking of Peking by the Europeans, just as the ,taking of 
Herat by the English, would be a matter of equal sensitivity 
to us, and one to which we could under no circumstances re­
main indifferent. The former would paralyze all that we are 
undertaking on the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Amur, 
57Krasny Arkhiv, Vol. ,XXI, 1926, p. 189. 
58VMA, f. 410, d. 1159, 1.370, cited by Kabanov, op. cit., 
p. 178. Putiatin was Naval Attache in London at this time. 
- . 
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• 59the latter would bring the English to power in Central Asia. 
• 
•Gorc,hakov concurred in Kovalcvskii 'fs analysis, and sent it to the Tsar on 
January 22, 1857. In this month, too, Grand Duke Constantine wrote Gor­
chakov from Hanover, endorsing the view that no time should be lost in 
sending a Russian plenipotentiary to China in order to reach formal agree­
ment on the frontier question, and to preclude, if possible, the pre­
sence in Peking of English and French Residents. He subsequently wrote 
to Muraviev concerning British and French plans to send additional 
naval forces into Chinese waters, and informed him that Putiatin would 
60probably be sent to negotiate with the Chinese. 
Putiatin was designated as Russia's envoy to china in February, 
1857. A Note from St. Petersburg was sent to Peking to inform the Em­
peror I-ting tha,t the admiral held plenipotentiary powers to negotiate 
on all matters outstanding between Russia and China. The Note added 
that Russia did not wish that China's external and internal difficul­
ties should lead to trouble on her own frontiers. 6l The ~ at Urga, 
through which town the Note was despatched, wrote in a covering memo­
rial to the throne that, "unless we first receive written authorization 
from the Li-fan-yuan, it will be impossible to allow them to cross the 
frontier'·. On this memorial I-ting simply wrote, "Noted".62 
Putiatin's mission was not at all to Muraviev's liking. He feared 
59Krasny Arkhiv, vol. XXI, 1926, pp. 188-189. 
60sarsukov, op. cit., I, p. 483. 
61Schumacher, op. cit., pp. 286-287, and Krasny Arkhiv, Vol. 
XXI, 1926, p. 189. 
62 .IVJSM, 15, p. 7 A, cited by Quested, op. cit., p. 72. 
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•that it would hobble his own progress just at the time that the Chinese 
•government was showing signs of giving in to Russian pressure. He had 
-. 	become increasingly convinced that there was nothing to be gained from' 
lengthy discussions with the Chinese, and that the time had come br 
imposing Russia's will in the matter of "recovering" the "Russian River 
Amur". He was mindful of the late Emperor Nicholas' remark to him in 
1853 that "the Chinese must accede to our just demands, and if they 
don't wish to do so, you now have the troops and we can force them to.,,63 
'" 
Having returned to Irkutsk in early 1857, Muraviev proceeded to 
take precautions to deal with the situation, should Putiatin's mission 
~ 
fail. He wrote the Ministry of War requesting the bringing up to strength 
of three of his line battalions of regular troops. He also wrote Karsa­
kov, in the Transbaika1, of his detailed plans to move in the fall, 
should the need arise, with the line battalions and with cavalry, against 
the Chinese •. For at this point, Muraviev was envisioning the eventual 
separation of Manchuria and Mongolia from China, as two princedoms under 
64Russian 	protectorate. 
In March, 1857, Muraviev wrote Grand Duke Constantine expressing 
his reservations about Putiatin's mission. He pointed out that there was 
a good chance that the Chinese would refuse to make any formal concess­
ion regarding the frontier, not only because of "their well-known stub­
bornness", but also out of fear of having then to make similar concess­
ions to the British and French. He informed him, too, of his preparations 
to take the field, should developments indicate that to be necessary; he 
63Schumacher, Ope cit., p. 288. 
64Barsukov, Ope cit., I, pp. 485-486. 
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added that the Russian position at the mouth of the Amur was now very 
solid, indeed, no less so than at Kronstadt, in comparison with the 
forces that the enemy could direct at either p1ace. 65 
Muraviev made impressive preparations for meeting Putiatin, and 
for escorting him with pomp and elaborate protocol to Kiakhta with Cos­
sack cavalry, artillery, etc••"The more noise and showy ceremony there 
is for the meeting with Putiatin, the more will our silly neighbors be 
impressed", he wrote to Karsakov. 66 "On the day of his arrival in 
Kiakhta, the town must be illuminated. He will be received at his quar­
ters by an infantry company with the flag, music and two batteries of 
artillery; at the customs house there must be a sotni~ of Cossacks, also 
with two batteries." In another letter to Karsakov, Muraviev remarked 
that "Putiatin is not a bad sort, but it is unfortunate that he is be­
coming involved in the Amur question, which he may harm.,,67 
65 .Ibid., I, p. 488. 
66Ibid ., I, p. 493. 
67lli.Q.., Muraviev was obviously chagl'ined at Putiatin's assignment 
to the resolution of a problem for which he, Muraviev, had earlier had 
full responsibility. And, in truth, this procedure could have led to 
all sorts of malcoordination and confusion. As for Putiatin's qualifi­
cations, however, Muraviev's objectivity could be questioned. Born in 
1803, Putiatin had begun his naval career by sailing around the world 
under M. P. Lazarez, from 1822 to 1825. He h ad continued on active 
service for seventeen more years, participating in many naval engage­
ments, including the battle of Kavarino. Then, in 1842, he had headed 
an armed diplomatic mission to Persia, establishing diplomatic rela­
tions and trade cocnlllunications between Persia and Russia. In the fol­
lowing year, he had proposed that the Russian Governr.1ent equip an 
exped ition for the establishment of maritime trade with China, as well 
as for demarcation of the Russo-Chinese frontier and for the location 
of new ports on the coast of northeast Aiia. This had been SUCCQSS­
fully opposed by the Minister of Finance, Kantrin, who feared unfav­
orable repercussions on the Kiakhta trade. Between 1852 and 1855, 
Puti~tin again circumnavigated the globe and concluded the Treaty of 
Shlmoda, establishing dip10m3tic and commercial relations between 
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• 
•Putiatin's primary task was to obtain recognition of Russia's po­
session of the left bank of the Amur, and, her right to free navigation 
on the river. He was also ~arged with securing agreement to establish-' 
• 
ment of a diplomatic mission in Peking, to obtain the right for Russia 
to trade in the five treaty ports, and to send caravans to Peking, as 
had been done in the past, and to maintain warehouses .at various loca­
tions in western china, together with a courier service connecting them 
.. 
through Mongolia with Russian territory. In return, he could offer 
withdrawal of Russian claims for compensation for the Tarbagatai inci­
dent, as well as of Russian claims for tax payments by the nomads of the 
Urianghai-Dvoedants area of Mongolia and Sinkiang, contiguous to Ieni­
seisk and Tomsk provinces. He could also offer Russian cooperation in 
assuring that these tribes paid tribute to china. Russia would also 
agree that caravans proceeding to western areas of China would not go 
beyond Urga, if other caravans were allowed to go to Peking. Putiatin 
was empowered, furthermore, to offer Russian arms and military instruc­
tors to help China defend Manchuria, if Peking requested such help, and 
on the prior condition that the Amur question and other problems 
satisfactorily resolved. 68 
were 
Russia and Japan. It was during this expedition, too, that he surveyed 
the eastern shores of Korea and the islands adjacent to it. For his 
success in opening up Japan to Russian diplomacy and commerce, he was 
made a count in December, 1855. (See Entsiklopedicheski Slovar, Vol. 50, 
pp. 817-818. 
68 ' Krasny Arkhi v, Vol. XXI, p. 191, and VMA f .410, d. 1159,: 11, 
400-410, cited by Kabanov, who points out that the arms offer was mean­
ingless, since, if the Taiping rebels got to Manchuria, the Ch'ing 
regime would be finished. (Kabanov, op. cit., p.l80) 
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• 
Putiatin's instructions made it clear that Russia would intervene 
.. 
militarily in inhabited areas of the Chinese Empire only with great 
reluctance and as a last resort. As for cooperation with the Western 
Powers, he was told that, "If the course of your negotiations shows defi­
nitely that they can be expected to succeed, you may undertake coopera­
tion with the western Powers, as an extreme measure, extending, however, 
moral influence only and never promising material support".69 
Strict secrecy surrounded the objectives of Putiatin's mission; 

the public, as well as foreign diplomatic missions in st. Petersburg, 

were informed that he was departing to "seek a harbor in the Amur re­

gion".70 

When it became apparent that no Chinese answer to the Note an­
nouncing Putiatin's appointment would be forthcoming, Muraviev sent 
two of his officers and an interpreter to Urga to explain the reasons 
for Putiatin's mission. A Note was also sent to the amban of Urga, Te-le­
k'e-tuo-er-chi, announcing that Putiatin's arrival in Kiakhta was ~i-
mente The ~ sent a memorial to the Emperor reporting that: 
t. 
Through Tatarinov (the interpreter), I questioned the Rus­
sian adjutant in detail as to what business he had to trans-: 
mit. He said that they had heard that the English, in league 
with the French barbarians, were proceeding from Shanghai to 
Tientsin to invade our territory, and that they were consid­
ering how the defenses of our two countries could be carried 
out. That is why they are sending an envoy to meet the 
princes and high officials in our capital, and to confer with 
them. 7l 
69Krasny Arkhiv, Vol. XXI, p. 192. 
7OSarsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 484. 
7l IWSM , 15, p. llA, cited by Quested, OPe cit., p. 73. 
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• 
He expressed suspicion of the Russians, as well as his opinion that 
•Putiatin should be refused entry. The Emperor I-ting's COmment on this,
.• 
in an' edict to his Grand Councillors, was as follows: 
The Russians' nature is very crafty. As for their state­
ment that the English barbarians are banding together with 
all the nations and want to come to Tientsin, and they 
therefore wish to send someone to the capital for secret 
talks, it cannot be but that they are seizing the oppor­
tunity to inspire us with panic. They want to seize the 
territory beyond the Hei1ungchiang. Also, they intend 72 
to demand compansation for the Tarbagatai warehouse goods. . 
0\ I 
I-ting ordered the Li-fan-yuan to send a Note to Russia stating that 
there was no pUI'pose in sending a high official to his capital: The 
Note added that, "WhEm:the English barbarians caused trouble before, 
China undertook to defend herself and did not ask help from other coun­
tries. When other countries quarreled amongst themselves, China never 
paid any attention. Moreover, there are no secret and important mat­
ters to be discussed with Russia, since Russia is very sincere in main­
73
taining good relations". I-ting's officials were instructed to stop 

the Russians from sending an ambassador "by reasoning", if they snll 

persisted after receiving the Li-fan-yuan's Note. Further exchanges of 

Notes, in which Putiatin and Muraviev both participated, brought no 

satisfaction to Putiatin, who thereupon served notice on the Chi~ese 

that if they did not agree by May 10 to his passage to Peking through 

Mongolia, he would proceed to China via the Amur and the sea. Putia­
tin received an unsatisfactory reply from the ~ of Urga, and on 

72 
. IWSM, 15, p. 12 B, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 74. 
73Ibid., 15, p. 13 B, cited in ibid. 
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May 16, he and Mu~aviev left Kiahkta and with two battalions of infan­
..74try 	and a division of artillery, sailed down the Amur • 
• 
Before leaving Kiakhta, Putiatin wrote Gorchakov, proposing that 

in view of China's intransigence regarding his mission, Russian forces 

should seize the town of Aigun. He expressed the view to Muraviev that 

75this should be done even without permission from St. Petersburg. d~ura-
viev did not agree, although he had earlier been contemplating the even­
~ 	 tual invasion of Manchuria and Mongolia. He was, however, prepared to 
undertake other, less agressive, measures. Gorchakov had earlier writ­
ten him that no time should be lost in resolving outstanding differences 
with China, and that if efforts to achieve this by agreement ran into 
76
obstacles, "decisive measures of some sort should be undertaken. 

Muraviev had proposed large-scale settlement of cossacks on the left 

bank of the Amur; 'Gorchakov had deemed this to be premature, but he had 

been overriden by Grand Duke Constantine. Thus, while Putiatin took 

ship from Nikolaevsk for the Gulf of Peche1ii, Muraviev remained in 

Ust-Zeisk, directing resumption of further settlement of the left bank 

of the.·.Amul'. Four hundred and fifty cossack families were deployed 

from Ust'-Strelka to the foothills of the Lesser Hingan, while a bat­
talion ·of regular infantry, and a division of light artillery made camp 

at Ust-Zeisk. In writing to Kova1evskii regarding his action, Muraviev 

commented that since the Chinese had refused Putiatin passage through 

Mongolia, such settlement should proceed, not only for political reasons, 

74garsukov, op. cit., I, p. 493. 

75 
~., I, p. 494. 

7~rasny Arkhiv, Vol. XXI, 1926, p. 189. 
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.. 
but in order to establish winter communications between the detachment 
• 
at Ust-Zeya and the Transbaika1. "Thus", wrote he, "we shall have 
• 
turned Chinese stubborness to our advantage and will build a fortifi­
cation directly opposite 1\19un.77 Muraviev also took care, at this time, 
of ~e dearth of women in Niko1aevski •. He ordered the despatch there 
of sixty female convicts, who were married en masse to male settlers 
going there on barges down the Amur. This practice he followed for 
78 
.. 
some years after, which naturally earned him the shocked disapproval of 
individuals dedicated to besmirching his reputation. 
Concerning the expanded settlement ~tivities, one of Muravievts 
~ 
staff officers wrote Karsakov that: 
the (Chinese) people know nothing of our ambassadorial 
mission and the Chinese refusal to receive it has been kept 
secret. The people know nothing of it, and all are aston­
ished that the Russians have dared to move along the Amur t 
and that .they are settling and building towns. The Chinese 
dare not oppose it because they are weak and afraid. The 
government is on the brink of bankruptcy. They fear Mura­
viev like fire, and say that the General will do anything 
he jwishes and that if he should get the idea of doing them 
harm it will be difficult for them to save themselves. 
The state of their morale 1s much 1n our favor. 79 
Clearly, Muraviev was assessing the situation accurately. The Chinese 
authorities, confronted with a fait accompli, could do nothing, but des­
perately evaded any formal agreement, fearing the reaction of their own 
people. Muraviev felt free to proceed as he had planned, since he had 
the forces to back him up. He instructed his officers to maintain 
i 
I 
friendly relations with the Chinese authorities in the vicinity 'and with 
77Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 495. 

78Ibid • 

79Ibid • 

","·:-:.~w~ , 
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the population in general. However, they were to • warn those who did not 
wish to live under Russian rule to move to the right bank,of the Amur; • 
• in the event of any hostile demonstrations by the, Chinese at Aigun, Rus~ 
sian forces were immediately to cross the river, disarm the Chinese and 
occupy the town. 80 
The deployment of settlers proceeded without incident, and on July 
7, 1857, Muraviev wrote to Gorchakov that a member of the Orthodox mis­
.. 
sion in Peking delivering letters to him had recommended that, "with 
the present Chinese Government we should not negotiate about anything, 
and, in particular, not correspond about anyt~ing". Muraviev commented 
.. 
that this was precisely the basis on which he was operating. He was 
"preserving all friendship", and declaring only to the nearest Chinese 
authorities what he was doing or what he needed. They lIin just as 
friendly a way" .fulfilled his suggestions, "themselves fearing all cor­
respondence,,~8l He reported that he sought free trade with the local 
inhabitants and that "this wish has already been fulfilled in part in 
the villages and will gradually be fulfilled in the town (Aigun)". He 
added that the people here love and respect us and believe every word 
I say like law. For this reason I do not consider it necessary to oc­
cupy the town, nor even emplace a battery opposite it".82 Quested ob­
serves that this picture is largely confirmed by the Chinese archives, 
although they understandably do not report positive friendliness with the 
80Schumacher, Ope cit., p. 290. 
81Barsukov, Ope cit., II, p. 155. 
82Ibid • 
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•83Russians. 
•
At the end of June, 1857, the Emperor I-ting recieved a memorial 

from I-shan reporting that the Russians had six cannon at Hailanpao 

(Ust'-Zeisk), four of them directed against the Chinese military post 

of Heilungchiang. It stated that a Manchu captain had been sent to see 

Muraviev at Ustf-Zeisk and had been well received and offered presents. 

Muraviev had informed him that more Russians were coming, but that they 

.. would keep the peace and had asked that the Russians be allowed to trade 
on the same terms as at Kiakhta. This memorial reported 6,000 Russians 
84to be at Ust'-Zeisk~ I-ting received two more memorials from I-shan 
~ 
in mid-August, reporting the extensive Russian settlements on the lower 

Amur, as well as the despatch of an officer to Muraviev to deliver 

China's refusal of his request for trade, and to protest against Rus­
sian settlement or Ust'-Zeisk. Muraviev had refused to remove any 

Russian buildings, and had suggested that the Cninese settlements on 

the left bank of the Amur be ·transferred to the right bank. 85 

Muraviev's attitude elicited a written protest to him from I-shan, 

and a subsequent one from the Tribunal to the Russian Senate. I-shan's 

83Quested, Ope cit., p. 84. 
84IWSM , 15, p. 34 A, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 84. This would 
appear to be an exaggeration. It is not known just how many Russians 
were there prior to the encampment of an infantry battalion and a divi­
sion of artillery, but it could not have been much more than a detachment 
of one or two sotnia's, which, added to the newcomers, could hardly have 
totaled 6,000, even allowing also for agroup of settlers. Admittedly 
in the realm of speculation is the possibility that I-shan was deliber­
ately inflating this figure, in order to discourage his Emperor from 
ordering any resolute action on his part. I-shan and the local ambans 
clearly had no stomach for anything approaching open hostilities. 
85IWSM , 16, p. 16 A, cited by Quested, OPe cit., p. 84. 
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• 
protest pointed out that although Muravievts navigation of the Amur was 
allegedly for the purpose of repulsing the English invaders" his people • 
• 
were settling along the banks of the river, constructing buildings, etc •• 
and that this was obviously not for the purpose of defense against the 
English. I-shan observed that there did not appear to be any order from 
the Russian Emperor to seize places belonging to the Middle Kingdom.86 
Muraviev replied, with what must have been restrained mirth, that the 
.. 
local ambans evidently were unaware of the mrrespondence that had been 
going on between him, and Peking and about Pekingts position to the effect 
that there was nothing of moment to discuss with the Russians 
4 
in view 
of which they could not admit Putiatin via Mongolia to Peking. Mura­
viev returned I-shan's note with this reply and with many protestations 
of friendship, asking that the Chinese frontier authorities maintain 
contact on official matters with their Russian opposite numbers. The 
Tribunal thereupon sent a Note to the Russian senate asking that Mura­
viev's "arbitrary acts" be brought to the attention of the Tsar.87 
Protests were obviously just about all that the Chinese felt they 
could permit themselves. During the summer of 1857, the only military 
measures they were able to undertake were the increasing of the Sanhsing 
garrison by 100 men and that of Aigun by 400. This left the total Chi­
nese forces in Northern Manchuria and Aigun at a level of about one-
third of the 22,000 well-disciplined Russian troops on the borders of 
. Mongolia and Manchuria, with an additional 1,000 poised for deployment 
there.88 One other measure, now adopted by the Chinese Emperor was 
86Schumacher, Ope cit., p. 294. 
87Ibid • 
88aarsukov, Vol. II, p. 152. 
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.. 
permission for the establishment of new agricultural settlements in the 
•uninhabited Manchurian lands with people already resident in Manchuria,89 
obviously a belated attempt to counter the Hussian claim that China 
exercised no sovereignty there. 
Muraviev remained in Ustt-Zeya until August, 1857, when he returned 
via Irkutsk to st. Petersburg, whence, being in poor health, he went 
90abroad for treatment.
.. 
IV. NERCHINSK FORMALLY AVENGED 
Putiatin's dealings with the Chinese and with the English, French,
• 
and Americans need only be summarized in sufficient detail to provide 
the necessary background to Muraviev's activities following his return 
to Eastern Siberia.91 
The Admiral arrived in Tientsin on July 24, 1857, and was received 
courteously by Chinese officials, whose instructions were to effect his 
departure as early as possible. To this end, the Emperor allowed them to 
accept a Note from him with the proviso that the answer should be sent 
to Kaikhta, or Muraviev at Ust'-Zeya. Putiatin, however, refused to 
leave Tientsin without an official reply to his Note, which cited the 
precedent of six Russian envoys who had been admitted to Peking in earl­
ier times, then expressed fear that China was not strong enough to deal 
89Ta Ch'ing Li Ch'ao Shih Lu, ch. 229, p. 12 B et seg., cited 

by Quested, OR. cit., p. 85. 

9~arsukov, Vol. I., p. 502. 
9l Quested's valuable work recounts and analyzes Putiatin's acti­

vities in China in depth. 
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•with the English, although she was tlgood at strategy, administration, 
and literature". The Note also stated that the time had come to settle • 
• the question 0 f the undelimited frontier area. 92 
I-ting gave in, agreeing that an answer could be given to Putiatin 
at Tientsin on condition that he leave and then return when it was ready. 
On August r3, Putiatin sailed for Shanghai. On September 2, he was back 
in Tientsin, and three days later received the Chinese reply. This was 
to the effect that the frontier question was to be decided with I-shan 
on the Amur, that no other points could be discussed with Putiatin, and 
that if he returned to Tientsin or to any other port in China, no fur­
ther correspondence could be undertaken with him. To avoid giving of­
fense, Putiatin was offered a ceremonial farewell and was also given 
the following explanation as to why his reception in Peking would cause 
difficulties: 
All your country's tribute-bearing envoys, when they come 
to the capital, carry out the rite of the three kneelings 
and nine prostrations, when they present their memorials to 
the throne. Then the great Ch'ing Emperor rewards them with 
foodstuffs and ceremoniously sends them back to their country. 
There is a different treatment for those who escort the stu­
dents and lamas to the capital. Now Putiatin is not present­
ing a memorial to the throne, so it is not convenient to treat 
him like a tribute-bearing envoy. However, he styles him­
self with the rank of nobleman, so it is impossible to treat 
him like an ordinary person. It is to be feared that to do 
so would be impolite and cause harm to our friendship. China 
has good intentions and is in no way suspicious. 93 
This oblique statement is susceptible of d!ffering interpretations. Ques­
ted points out that in later conversations with Lord Elgin and. with Baron 
92IWSM, 16, p. 12 B, cited by Quested, ob. cit., p. 86. 
93IWSM , 16, p. 26 A, cited by Quested, OPe cit., p. 89. 
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•Gros, Putiatin claimed that it insisted on the kowtow and on tribute, 
•
whereas in fact it could have been regarded as an invitation to Putiatin 
to go to Peking in a modest way, something he was unwilling to do. 94 
Putiatin told the Chinese that he must return to Russia to consult 
with his Emperor, declined the proffered ceremonial farewell and sailed 
for Japan. There he concluded a commercial treaty confirming the first 
Russo-Japanese agreement of 1855, and providing substantial benefits for 
Russia.95 In November, he returned to Shanghai. Here he met with Baron 
11\ 
Gros, who told him of the allied plans to take Canton. This, Putiatin 
told him, would be "absolutely useless"; he urged, instead, that pres­
• 
sure be brought directly on Peking. 96 At this time, and indeed, almost 
until the conclusion of his activities in China, Putiatin made no men­
tion of the Amur. He had been doing his best to convey to his English 
and French colleagues the impression that his mission was for the pur­
pose of urging on the Chinese Goverrunent "the necessity of a less ex­
clusive policy,,97 i.e., that the Russians were seeking the same trading 
rights in Chinese ports as were being pursued by the English, French and 
Americans. Thus, he embarked upon a course of intrigue which he was to 
conduct until the negotiation of the Treaty of Tientsin. 
Putiatin, while hoping for more aggressive allied action" also 
urged more pointed measures on the part of his Government. He wrote 
94l£id., p. 88. 

95G• A. Lensen, The Russian Push Towards Japan, (Princeton, 1959), 

p. 350. 
96Quai d'orsay archives, Gros-Walewski, 26/11/57, cited by Quested, 
Ope cit., p. 91. 
97Foreign Office, 17/276, Robertson-Elgin, 1/9/57, cited by Ques­
ted, Ope cit., p. 88. 
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Gorchakov suggesting that Russia terminate trading operations at 
•Kiakhta, his theory being that the, Chinese Government was convinced of 
• 	 the great value that the Russians placed on that trade, and regarded it 

as a lever; breaking off of the Kiakhta commerce, he believed, would dis­
abuse the Chinese of that notion. In the same letter, he deplored the 

fact that he had not at his disposal some three to five million rubles 

with which to bribe chinese officials to smooth his way to Peking. 98 

A month later, he wrote Gorchakov recommending a blockade of the Pei-ho 

" 
to prevent food supply deliveries to Peking until the Chinese sent a 
plenipotentiary to Tientsin to negotiate frontier matters, concessions 
to Russia and the same advantages as granted to other nations. He sug­
gested, further, that should the Anglo-French forces carry their war 
99to 	the north, Russia should offer the assistance of her naval force. 
Putiatin's bellicose views were evidently too much for Gorchakov, 
for in late December, 1857, Muraviev was ordered to cut short his leave 
abroad in order to attend a conference in st. Petersburg. ,The upshot of 
this exercise was the despatch, on December 24, of new instructions to 
Putiatin. He was informed that Russian occupation of the left bank of 
the Amur would continue, but that relations with China must not be broken 
off, since their renewal uwould be most difficult and perhaps even im­
possible on the basis on which they now exist, and would threaten des­
truction of our mission (in Peking) and abolition of the Kiakhta trade". 
Putiatin was to relinquish his ambassadorial status and assume the title 
of Commander of the Russian naval squadron and Imperial Commissioner to 
9~rasny Arkhiv, Vol. XXI, 1926, pp. 

99 6
Schumacher, op. cit., p. 29 • 
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o 
China. His function would be to observe the activities of the Western 
•Powers vis-a-vis China. He was told that Muraviev alone would be res­
- . ponsible for Amur negotiations and was instructed. to obtain from the 
100Chinese only those concessions being given to the other nations. 
Following Muravievts consultations in St. Petersburg, he was ap­
pointed General Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor. At this time, too, the Amur 
Company formed for trade in the Priamur was established by two merchants, 
101Bernardaki and Rukavishnikov. 
'. 
In January, 1858, the Russian Senate despatched a Note to the Tri­
bunal expressing regret that this body had seen fit to insist on negotia­
tion only at the frontier. It announced that Muraviev had been recalled 
to st. Petersburg for personal conferences with the Emperor and for re­
102
ceipt of instructions on negotiating. 
During the winter of 1857-58, the Russian Government approved 
Muraviev's recommendation to settle the Amur in much more substantial 
numbers, through the transfer of an entire infantry brigade - - some 
12,000 people, including families. Uncertain relations 'with the Chinese 
had delayed this project but by the end of the year, as a preparatory 
measure, a winter road was opened from Nikolaevsk along the left bank of 
the Amur to Ust'-Strelka. A post road from the port to Marinskii Post 
was also built, with milestones bearing the double eagle, and with station 
100Nevelskoi, Ope cit., p. 388, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 94, 
who points out that Barsukov, Vol. I, Ch. 38, does not say that Putiatin 
was forbidden to deal with the Amur. 
101Barsukov, Vol. I, p. 505. 
102Schumacher, Ope cit., p. 296. 
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•houses along the way. These new lines of communication covered 2,000 
103 •versts. 
. 
, Meanwhile, in China, events were beginning to accelerate. Fo1­
lowing the Anglo-French seizure of Canton, Elgin and Gros wrote to 
Putiatin and the American representative Reed, at the end of January, 
1858, inviting them to join in sending similar Notes to the Chinese Gov­
ernment, requesting it to send plenipotentiaries to Shanghai to negotiate 
on the entry of diplomatic representatives to Peking, commercial facl1i­
• 
ties in the treaty ports, and freedom of worship for Chinese and foreign­
104 
ers a1ike. This was agreed upon but, without informing his British, 
'" 
French and American colleagues, Putiatin attached to his note a supple­
mentary document concerning the Amur. That portion of it specifically 
setting forth the Russian position on the frontier question follows: 
• • • on the maps the frontier between our two countries 
starts at the Lesser Pin1ing Range, and stops at the A-er­
kuan-shi-1e-ke River, and beyond this, the terrain is un­
known. It had always been considered that the country from 
the Hsingan to the Eastern Sea would be investigated at some 
later date and that then the frontier would be delimited. 
Now we know that the Hsingan do not reach all the way to the 
Eastern Sea. This range divides into two not far from that 
place. One arm passes through our Huo-ssu-k'e region and 
already belonged to us before the Treaty of Kaikhta. Moreover, 
this branch does not pass beyond the Amur to the Sungari. It 
only reaches to the Amur area. The other arm of the range 
reaches into Manchuria along the right bank of the Amur. That 
is why the Hsingan cannot be considered as the frontier of our 
two countries. The Amur should be taken as the frontier. Since 
Russia already has people living on the left bank, the left 
bank of the P~ur should be taken as the Russian frontier. As 
for the Manchu homesteads near the town of Heilungchiang 
(Aigun), no matter how many they may be, let them all be 
101Barsukov, Ope cit., I, p. 205. 
104Correspondence Relating to the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China, 
1859-60, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 97. 
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• 
moved to the right bank. Apart from the cost of their re­
moval, which will be paid by Rus~ia, there can be compensation 
in money or kind. It is important that this matter shall be 
cleared up. Further, since there are no Machu or Chinese 
people living on the lower Ussuri, and no vessels go there, 
the right bank of the Ussuri should be taken as the frontier. 
Moreover, not far from the source of this river, there are 
rivers and creeks flowing into the sea which may be used to 
divide up the sea coast. Russia already has people setting 
up military posts and building towns in the empty places on 
this coast. All the area from the Lesser Pinling to A-er­
kuan-shih-le-k'e should be mapped and de!b~ited and the 
frontier in the Ili area also delimited • 
• 
.. 
Putiatin's Note was the first formal declaration to the Chinese of com­
plete Russian territorial claims in Mongolia and Manchuria. It was 
submitted under the 
4 
f our-Power covering Note accompanying the other 
separate but similar notes of each envoy. Such an action, Quested ob­
serves, was an invocation of English, French, rod American backing for 
Russia's territorial claims - - of which the Western representatives 
were ignorant.. The Russian Note, together with the supplement parti­
ally quoted above, was enclosed in the same envelope as the American 
one and was delivered to the Chinese at Soochow, on February 13, 1858, 
by Lord Elgin's secretary. It had been examined by none of the other 
ambassadors. 106 
Following despatch of his Note, Putiatin traveled to Canton, 
. 
Amoy, Foochow and Ningpo before proceeding to Shanghai, where he ar~ 
rived on March 11.107 There he received his new instructions from St. 
105IWSM 18, pp. 32 A - 33 B, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p.i98. 
106Quested, Ope cit., p. 99. 
107W• B. Reed, The Private Diary of, ( 2 Vols., Mss. Dept., Li­
bnary of Congress, unpublished, diary entry of 25/3/58. Cited by 
Quested, OPe cit., p. 102. 
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Petersburg, whereupon he sent all but two vessels in his squadron to 
Japan and the Amur; he also informed the other three representativos of 
his new orders. 
The four envoys received replies to their Notes in Shanghai at 
the end of March. Putiatin's communication, having been sent under the 
same cover as .heedts, was not replied to separately; the Chinese reply 
to Reed included the statement that, "Russia has never had any commerCial 
relations in the five ports, and last year an Imperial decree ordered 
a high official to go to the tvnur to discuss the frontier question with 
Putiatintt .108 This mention of the Amur evidently did not particularly 
excite the American representative's interest. Reed was also requested 
to tell Putiatin that a letter would be sent to him by the Li-fan-yuan 
and that all the problems the Russians wished to discuss should be 
dealt with in writing. 
The four representatives proce~ded to Tientsin in April, and for 
the next seven weeks engaged in continuous negotiations with representa­
tives of the Peking Government. The Chinese temporized on the occasion 
of each meeting and attempted to persuade the Russians and the Americans 
to moderate the demands of the B)ritish, and the Americans to reduce Russian 
demands. Quested gives a succinct summary of Putiatin's policy during 
this period: 109 to make the Chinese accept all his demands and such of 
108Senate Executive Document 30 (36.1), cited by Quested, Ope cit., 
p. 102. 
109Quested, op. cit., p. 106, added that, "His success in this 
peri10uE game was, however, not wholly due to his personal skill; for 
the Chinese would seek no help from the English, whom they chiefly de­
tested; Lord Elgin ~as preoccupied with his own problems and made no 
great effort to probe Putiatin's activities, whilst the attitude of 
Baron Gros and Reed was complacent••• Under these circumstances, the 
Russians were able to keep Putiatin's Arnur negotiations at Tientsin a 
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the other Ministers' as would not result in the Peking Government's 
•falling under British influence. He pressed for rapid granting of the 

allied requests for more treaty ports and occasional diplomatic repre­
sentation in Peking, and he endeavored to win the goodwill of the Chinese 

by mediating for them, so that they might cede the Amur and Maritime 

territory as a reward. Russian territorial claims on the Northeast 

frontier he pressed upon the Chinese in complete secrecy, concealing 

to 
from Elgin and Gros, and apparently from Reed, that he had ever serious­
ly raised this issue. 
Although Putiatin hoped, by playing his double game,110 to attain 
all of Russia's objectives, while limiting the realization of allied, 
particularly British, aims, he placed his ultimate hope in an attack, 
if necessary, by the British and French expeditionary forces to bring 
about China's general capitulation. 
At the beginning of April, a Note from the Tribunal was received 
in St. Petersburg. It complained that Putiatin had not gone to the Amur 
for frontier negotiations, but instead was proceeding to Shanghai and 
becoming 'involved in the affairs of other governments and thereby viola­
ting the rules of mutual good relations. It stated that the only matter 
requiring negotiation between Russia and China was the question of delimi­
tat ion of the Amur frontier, and that for that purpose a Chinese pleni­
potentiary had been sent to the Amur. It requested the Russian Government 
secret from the western world for many years, and indeed this appears 

to be the first time, to date, that they have been mentioned in print 

in a Western European language." 

llothe details of this game are set forth in Quested, 0p. cit., 

pp. 106-112. 

100 

•to instruct Putiatin not to tarry in Shanghai at the cost of the friend­
ship of the two Empires. 111 • 
'While events in China were mOl ing toward a crisis, Muraviev was 
taking his own steps for a final solution of the Amur problem. During the 
spring of 1858, he made preparations for a fourth expedition down the Amur, 
which would transport more settlers, troops and fortress artillery to the 
delta. In early March, he sent the Kiakhta frontier commissar, A. I. 
Despot-Zenovich, to Urga with a Note to the Tribunal. Despot-Zenovich 
~ 
told the amban, Te-le-k'e-tuo-er-chi of the fall of Canton and asked that 
the unsettled areas on the tight bank of the Amur be ceded to Russia. He 
~ought a guarantee that the new Orthodox mission would be able to live 
unmolested in Peking, and suggested that Te-le-k'e-tuo-er-chi should deco­
rate Muraviev with the Peacock feather ard receive some Russian decoration 
112in return. Despot-Zenovich then went on to stress Putiatin's readi; 

ness to act as an intermediary between the Chinese, and the English and 

French, and concluded by announcing that the Russians would continue to 
establish settlements on the Amur and the Ussuri, but that this activity 
had no hostile aspect, but, on the contrary, was for the mutual benefit 
of both governments. 113 The amban's retort was to the effect that China 
had never needed help from foreign countries, that he could receive no 
decoration without Imperial permission and that, as for the mission, "We 
already informed them last year that for a long time past there has not 
111Schumacher, Ope cit., p. 296. 

112IWSM , 19, p. 25 B, cited by Quested, Ope cit., p. 96, who points 

out that neither Barsukov nor Schumacher mention the Peacock Feather. 

l13Schumacher, loco cit. 
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been the slighte incident concerning the students in the capital, but 
whether they now proceed there vias up to them to decide". Peking ap­
proved the p.mban's reply and informed him that, "we have never decorated 
a (Russian) Governor-General with the Peacock Feather and even if one of 
our officials were to receive a row of decorations from them (the Rus­
sians), it would be impossible to give it to him.114 
Before going dovm the Amur, Muraviev sent another emissary to the 
Chinese at Aigun with the news that he would be on the river as soon as 
the thaw set in, but that if the amban wished to discuss boundary mat­
ters with him, it wou~d be more convenient to do so when Muraviev was 
on the return trip. Muraviev's purpose in sending such a message was 
twofold: he hoped that news from Putiatin would b~ awaiting him at 
~ikolaevsk, and he also wished to make it plain to the Chinese that he 
was in no p3rticular hurry to undertake negotiations. 115 
As far as Muraviev was concerned, the Amur question, irrespective 
of the niceties of international formalities which were still pending, 
was in fact resolved. At the same time, he was very much aware of the 
related question of logistics and financing for development of Russia's 
newly acquired territory. Before taking the fourth expedition down the 
river, he wrote his brother Valerian as follows: "In a few days I shall 
depart for the Amur for some four months ••• my sole concern now con­
sists of 'settling the Amur, developing na'J>igation and trade on it, es­
tablis~ing towns and an archepiscopal cathedral, and discovering gold, 
which is essential for all this, the more so since at the mouth of the 
11 4IVlSrv: , 19, p. 25 B, cited by ~uested, OPe cit., p. 96. 
11"
"'Barsukov, Vol. I, p. '::JJ7. 
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Amur and on the adjacent coast, it is necessary to build fortified ports 
and railroad communications with them.,,1l6 At this time, too, in a 
letter to Karsakov, he observed that establishment of a postal service on 
the Amur would be costly - - 80,000 silver roubles a year, "which no one 
will furnish".ll? 
Muraviev's lofty tone in his message to Aigun galvanized the Chi­
nese. Before he reached the confluence of the Zeya, he was met by a junk 
carryin;! Chinese officials who urged him to await their cornmander-in­
chief, I-shan, who was arriving from Tsitsigar. hluraviev continued on to 
Ust'-Zeya where, on May 6, Chi-la-ming-a, amban of Aigun, came to tell 
him that I-shan was requesting Muraviev to delay if only for a few days 
in order to discuss demarcation of the frontier. Chi-la-ming-a hinted 
1l8that he would ttmanage everything and do everything lt • 
En route to Aigun, Muraviev stopped at Ust'Zcisk, where he dedi­
cated a cathedral and renamed the town Blagoveschensk. 119 He then went 
on to Aigun where he and his suite were received as honored guests on 
May 9. Mural/iev declined to enter into negotiations on that day, and 
the Russian delegation was given dinner by I-shan at Chi-la-ming-a's 
house, with "gay, polite conversation".120 
l16Ibid ., p. 508. 

l1?Ibid., p. 509. 

118Nevelskoi, op. cit., Ch. 31, cited by Q1.lested, op. cit., p. 146. 

Chi-la-ming-a's cooperative policy was to cost him dear. 
119l1Good Tidings". Curiously enough, despite the religious conno­
tation, the Soviet Government has not changed the name. 
l20Nevelskoi, 92. cit., Ch. 31, cited by Quested, op. cit., p. 146. 
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121On May 10, negotiations began at chi-la-ming-a's house. Mura­
viev opened the proceedings with an historical survey, including a 
justification of Russian actions on the Amur, and asserted that the AmuT 
should be the frontier "in the interests of both nations". Later in the 
day, I-shan and his numerous subordinates boarded Muraviev's ship, were 
given refI'eshments and entertained by the Irkutsk Cavalry Choir. On the 
following day, the Chinese delegation was presented with a draft treaty 
consisting of the following points: 1) The border between the two em­
pires to be the Amur River, with the left bank belonging to Russia, and 
the right bank to the Ussuri belonging to China, whose border would 
then follow the Ussuri to its sources and thence to the Korean peninsula; 
2) Navigation on the rivers constituting the boundary would be permitted 
only to vessels of the two empires; 3) Free trade would be permitted 
along these rivers; 4) Chinese subjects living on the left bank of the 
Arnur to be re-settled within three years;122 5) Previous treatjes to be 
reviewed for establishment of new regulations regarding all questions 
affecting the welfare and reputation of both empires, this to be accom­
plished by individuals specially designated by both parties, who would 
deal with details concerning trade and commerce at Peking, despatch of 
missions, envoys and couriers, "for the greater benefit and glory of 
the two friendly countries". The Chinese delegation refusad to accept 
the draft; Ai-shen-t-ai, I-shan's principal deputy, particularly objected 
l2l0n this same day, Quested, p. 116, mentions that in Shanghai 
the Chinese were imploring the Americans to int~rcede with the Russians 
about the Amur frontier. 
1 arsukov, Vol. I, pp. 510-511; Nevelskoits version says ·one 
year' • 
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to the concluding phrase of the last item, pointing out t-hat the Ch ring 
123Empire h3d so much glory that it could wish for no more. 
On May 13, Muraviev's r·.:anchu interpreter, Shishmarev, presented a 
revised draft to I-shan's assistants. This omitted point 5; the Chinese 
agreed to point 4. In the evening, Ai-shen-t'ai boarded Muraviev's ves­
sel and with tears in his eyes begged Shishmarev to abandon claim to the 
Ussuri area, threatening that otherwise he would drown himself imme­
diately.124 He then implored Muraviev in the same vein. Muraviev de­
cided that it was time to "give a definite and firm turn to eve:ntstt, 
and on the next day, May 14, went ashore and presented his demands as an 
125
ultimatum. He pointed out that the Chinese were obliged to the mag­
nanimity of the Russian Emperor for the preservation of friendly rela­
tions between the two Empires at a time when Chinese actions over the 
past few years had giver. the Russians every right to act differently. 
It was fruitless for them to fall back on the previous treaties for 
determination of frontiers to the east from the Gorbitsa and in places 
year the Ud, since during the conclusion of the treaty of 1689, they 
had acted in bad faith; Peking had written at that time that their 
plenipotentiaries would be few, but in fact they had sent a whole army 
to the negotiation site, whereas the Russian representative had limited 
himself to the smallest necessary entourage. Finally, the Chinese 
l23que s ted, 012. cit., p. 147. 
l24]bid., Quested remarks that actually Ai-shen-t'ai was still 
alive at the end of 1860. 
l25Barsukov has it that Piotr Perovskii, Muraviev's chief aide and 
a Councilor of the Foreign Ministry presented the ultimatum. See pp. 
510-511. 
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themselves had violated the treaty first, by exacting tribute from the 
inhabitants of the undemarcated areas to which they had no right, and 
secondly, by refusing to receive the ambassador sent by the Russian Em­
peror with greetings to their Bogdikhan; such circumstances between en­
lightened nations generally resulted in a rputure of relaUons and hos",: 
tilities. The Chinese, furthermore, had instigated yet another un­
pleasant affair, the burning and looting of the Russian warehouse at 
Tarbagatai. 
The Chinese attempted to rebut Muravievts declaration by assert­
ing their right to the Amur and Ussuri areas, contending that they col­
lected tribute from those areas, where they had always had watch-posts 
indicative of their rights there, and that the country from the Ussuri 
to the sea was the homeland of the ruling dynasty, so that it would be 
treachery to cede it to Russia. Muraviev hotly denied these arguments, 
declaring that the aborigines of the Amur and Ussuri regions had never 
rendered iassak to China, that Russia had defended the area from the 
English in 1854-55 with no help from China, and that the homeland of the 
Ch'ing dynasty was in the Ninguta region. Following further brief de­
bate, Muraviev put on a shm'i of anger and gave the Chinese till next 
morning to accept his demands. Of this final scene I-shan reported: 
"Muraviev suddenly fell into a great rage and behaved like a madman, 
shouting tremendously to his deputy (actually, the interpreter, Shish­
marev). ~uraviev then left for his ship, glaring angrily at the 
Manchu crol",ds." I-shan sent an official to him later in the day to 
inquire as to the reason for his anger, and to promise that "in future 
they (th~ Chinese) ~ould behave so that the General would not be 
·".­~';I{) 
angry" .126 
During the night of May 15, I-shan reported, "lights burnt bright­
lyon board Muraviev's ship, and there were incessant reports of guns and 
canno~'. Chi-la-ming-a was sent early in the morning to investigate, and 
informed I-shan that Muraviev had ordered the firing to alarm the Manchus. 
He added that two other ships accompanying Muraviev had on board tlLDO or 
3JO barbarians fully armed with guns and cannonll ; he feared there were 
more men and ships nearby and that a Russian attack would create a 
"difficult situatio~t. Inhabitants of the left bank of the river came to 
Chi-la-ming-a to beg protection against the Russians. Ai-shen-tai was 
sent to Muraviev on the following morning and was told by Mm that un­
less the treaty was signed the next day, he would not allow the settle­
ments and homesteads on the left bank to remain. 127 The Chinese gave way, 
and on 1.~ay 16, 1854, the Treaty of Aigun was concluded. It gave the left 
bank of the Arnur from the River Argun to the mouth, to 'the Russian Em­
pire, and stated that the right bank of the Amur to the mouth of the Us­
suri belonged to the Chinese Empire. The land between the Ussuri and 
the sea was to be the co~~on property of both empires, until the estab­
lisment of the border there. In addition, it stipulated that only Rus­
sian and Chinese vessels should be allowed to navigate the rivers Amur, 
Sungar-i and Ussuri. It also provided that subjects of both empires should 
be permitted to trade, and that both governments should protect merchants 
and precisely observe all the provisions of the treaty forever. 128 
"..I.l26ques t ed , po. Cl~., p. 148• 
l27Ibid ., p. 149. 
l28My translation of th€ text is at Appendix 
r 
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CHli.PTER VI 
TRIUMPH'S AFTEHWATH 
I. EXPANDIKG THE COK~UEST 
The news of Muraviev
' 
s success was greeted with tremendous en­
thusiasm in Siberia, particularly among the merchant class in Irkutsk 
and Kiakhta, where the "unexpected and extraordinarily advantageous" 
resolution of the Amur question waE the occasion for widespread cele­
bration. The area's leading tycoons donated large SUlllS for develop­
mental projects in the newly acquired territory. Kuznetsov contributed 
3 million rubles, Rukavishnikov, 2 hundred thousand silver rubles, 
toward construction of a hoped-for Amur railway.l 
St. Petersburg, too, reacted to the news with great satisfaction, 
as well as relief. E. K. Biutsov, sent to the capital by :--;uraviev with 
a copy of the Treaty, reported that Alexander II, who received him in 
his study, 1t'Jas visibly overjoyed. The Bnperor said to him, "Here we 
believed that the Chinese were at war with us; the papers have been re­
porting that they attacked and defeated us, and to think that they have 
now sent us this treaty on the !.mur!"2 
Nmv Muravie'/ turned to devoting his full attention to exploiting 
what he hoped would be the concrete benefits of the Treaty. The first 
lKabanov, Ope cit., p. 190. 

2Ibid ., p. 191. 
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step would be to colonize the Priarnur region on a large scale and to make 
of the Amur a great trade route for E:astern Siberia. On May 22, he pro­
ceeded down the river to select locations for settlement of the 13th In­
fantry Battalion, which had been occupying the left bank with its sta­
tions from the lesser Khingan to the mouth of the Ussuri. At that 
ri vel" s conn uence with the Amur, this unit founded a settlement named 
OJ 
Khabarovsk.~ 
During the month following conclusion of the Aigun negotiations, 
Muraviev sought to reach agreement with the Chinese on new trade regu­
lations. The Chinese strove to limit trading, as in the past, to a 
single location, to provide for officially set prices, and to place all 
trade unci er the strict control of off ic ial s of both governments. /.\uraviev 
opposed this, pointi~g out that for trade to flourish, there should be 
a free market, that the merchants should not be subjected to all manner 
of constraints and supervision. It was finally agreed that fo).: an 
initial period, at eight-day intervals, there should be a seven-day 
fair at Blagoveschensk and Aigun, while the inhabitants of both banks of 
the Amur would be free to conduct unobstructed trade at all times along 
the entire course of the river. 4 
Meanwhile, Putiatin was continuing his efforts to capitalize on 
the Anglo-French threat to china in order to obtain concessions for Rus­
sia. Having made no satisfactory headway with the Chinese during pro­
tracted negotiations, the English and French decided to resort to armed 
force. In the morr.ing of May 8, 1858, the comman:::.ler of the British 
1aarsukov, Ope cit., p. SIS. 

4Ibid ., p. 516. 
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naval forces delivered a two-hour ultimatum to the ~ommander of the Chi­
nese forts at Taku and when this expired English and French troops cap­
tured the forts within a few hours. 5 Now it was the turn of the dis­
traught Chinese to seek negotiations with the English, French, Americans 
and 	 Russians. Separate treaties were concluded with each of the Western 
Powers in early Junes 1858. 
The essential provisions of the Russian Treaty of Tientsin were 
the 	following: 
1. 	 Diplomatic correspondence between Russia and China to be 
conducted between the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the senior member of the Grand Councilor the Chief 
Minister in Peking, on the basis of complete equality. 
Russian envoys to be received in Peking, via Kiakhta, 
Urga, Taku or any other open port in China. 
2. 	 Russia to have the right to trade at seven named sea­
ports, on the same terms as other countries and to have 
consuls there. 
3. 	 No limit to be placed on the number of traders and captains 
employed in com,mGrce. 6 
4. 	 Parts of the Russo-Chinese frontier not yet determined 
to be examined without delay in the frontier areas 
themselves. 
5. 	 Members of the Orthodox Mission in Peking to be replaced 
at any time, at the wish of the Russian Government, which 
would bear all costs of maintaining the hlission. 
6. 	 Regular monthly postal service to be established between 
Peking and ~iakhta. 
It will be seen from the foregoing that Muraviev was not justified 
5Questedt op. cit., p. 121. 
6'~'.lested, OPe cit., p. 129, summarizes this article as providing 
that there should no longer be any restrictions on overlar;d trade; this 
is inaccurate. 
2:0 
in fearing that Putiatin's involvement in the Amur question might prove 
counterproductive. 7 As ~ested points out, the hio treaties were to some 
extent overlapping, "for the latter, dated June 13, could be interpreted 
as cancelling the provisions of the former one of May 28 (Article 9 of 
the Tientsin Treaty provided that the 'undefined parts of the frontier 
should be inspected by plenipotentiaries, vhose findings should be incor­
porated in an additional clause t .) As it transpired, the Peking Govern­
ment soon availed itself of this opportunity". 8 
The conclusion of the Treaty of Tientsin was duly reported to ~t. 
Petersburg by Putiatin, who added that the Chinese negotiators at Tientsin 
had been aware of the Treaty of higun and on June 3 had informed him that 
the Emperor had confirmed the agreement between Muraviev and I-Shan re­
garding the demarcation of the border from the Ussuri to the seaports 
and the establishment of trade on the Amur. 9 
Muraviev obviously meant to lose no time in the matter of "the 
demarcation of the border from the Ussuri to the seaports". After 
presiding over the founding of Khabarovsk in early June, he led the 
next Amur expedition downriver, with more troops and 200 families of cos­
~) 
sack settlers. FrOQ the mouth of the Amur he took a reconnaissance 
party of 100 officers and men up the Ussuri River for surveying and for 
the construction of the first of a series of strongpoints that would 
constitute a line of communications. Upon his return down the Ussuri and 
in the face of protests by the Chinese military, he sent another party up 
7~upra, pp. 179. 

8-~ues t ed , op. Cl...:..,.... p. 15~"". 

9Barsukov, Opt ~it., I, p. 520. 
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that river. He then led a small force up the Sungari River and sent one 
man as far up as Sanhsing to explore possibilities of establishing trade 
relations. The General of Kirin memorialized these activities to I-ting, 
who ordered the ambans of Kirin and Heilungchiang to "investigate the 
Russians' movements and prevent their further extension".lO Characteris­
tically, the Emperor did not specify the measures to be used for such 
prevention. 
Having made his initial moves for establishing the Russian pre­
sence in the Ussuri maritime area, Muraviev returned to Blagoveschensk 
where he and I-Shan exchanged entertainment and where Chi-la-ming-a 
(who had promised to "arrange everything and do everything" at Aigun) , 
met him with expansive embraces. Muraviev's relations wit.h these offici­
als, he reported, were of the warmest friendliness. 11 A formal ~vritten 
agreement was signed on July 8 permitting Manchu settlements on the left 
bank of the .~ur to remain there. On that same day in st. Pet~rsburg, 
the Tsar privately ratified the Treaty of Aigun. No public announcemen~ 
was made, for it was deemed prudent to keep the British and French in 
ignorance of Russian aspirations and intentions in the Far East. 12 I-Shan 
also pressed for agreement on a proposal for regulation of border trade 
but this Muraviev declined to discuss, saying that he could do nothing 
until he was notified of the Tsar's ratification of the Treaty of Aigun, 
which he expected within two months. 
On August 26, 1858, Alexander II addressed a glowing citation to 

lOn-iSM 20, p. 3i" cited by ~uested, op. cit., p. 155. 

IlBarsukov, £E. cii., I, pp. 519-520. 

12p., V. SChUi;13cher, ItKistol'rii priobretenia Amur3. (snoshenia s 

Kitaem s 1848 po 1860 g.)", Russki Arkhiv, III, 1878, p. 331. 
202 
Muraviev, conferring upon him the title of count Muraviev-Amurskii. 
At the same time he was promoted to the rank of General of Infantry.13 
He had accomplished the basic task embarked upon ten years earlier, but 
he was to remain in Eastern Siberia for almost two additionJl years. As 
he saw it, his histrirical achievement would count for little unless he 
could persuade st. Petersburg to adopt measures to solve the great pro­
blems of food, transportation and communications that were essential 
if large-scale colonization and economic development were to become a 
reality. Much, too, remained to be done in the way of reform of internal 
institutions and administrative practices in Eastern Siberia. 
Also of continuing concern to Muraviev was the actual implementation 
of the Treaty of Aigun an::! the opening of all of northern China, Mongolia 
and Manchuria to Russian trade.14 The Treaty of Aigun ceded the left 
bank of the Arnur to Russia but provided in rather vague terms for a con­
dominium over the area between the Ussuri and the sea until such time as 
the frontier there should be determined. This situation was complicated 
by the fact th3t initially there were apparently conflicting versions of 
the Treaty. Quested points out that the text cited in ~evelskoics ac­
count makes no mention of any condominium, simply designating the Ussuri 
as the border bGtween the two empires. She suggests that either Nevel­
skoifs memory failed him or else that uMuraviev deliberately drew up a 
Russian text which gave the Ussuri maritime area to 3ussia and fobbed 
the Manchus off with a Manchu text which made confused reference to some 
12Barsukov, ~it., I J pp. 527-528. 
14Th! Treaty of Tientsin permitted limitless numbers of Russian 
traders at the ports but said nothing about opening all the Chinese 
borderlands to Russian merchants. 
4:>3 

sort of condominium". She points out that this would have been perfect­
ly possible because the Manchu negotiators at Aigun had no Russian in­
terpreter and that, indeed, "it is extremely doubtful whether there 
was anyone in the whole Chting Empire capable of reading Russian fluently 
in 185&'. She goes on to suggest that when Gorchakov and Alexander II 
eventually examined the Russian and Manchu versions of the Treaty they 
may havG decided that Eur'aviev had gone too far, and had a new Russian 
text prepared which follo,,"Jed the Manchu one more closely.15 If~uested' s 
conjecture is correct than tt.u1'8viev was quite disingenuous when, in a 
letter of ~eptember 25 to the Grand Duke Constantine, he remarked, tilt 
is strange that whereas in Peking recognition is given to the Ussuri 
River as the border, in accordance with ~he Treaty of Aigun, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, in its article in the Journal de St. Petersbourq, 
gives Rusda only the left bank of the Aillur. 16 In this same lett8r, he 
added that he had received no instructions and no interpretations of the 
lreaty of Tientsin and he considered that no time should be lost in im­
plementing it, lest the French and the English should undertake intrigues 
to u~ermine its provisions. He regretted, in this connection, that 
Russia had no alliance with the United States. 17 
Shortly after writing Constantine, ~ura~iev learned that the Grand 
Duke was proceeding abroad for an extended period. This was dispiriting 
news, for ~.luraviev was now counting heavily on Constantine's support of 
his proposals for generously subsidizing colonization, constructing tele­
15Q t dO... le::...­ues e , op. C1L>, p. ~~. 
1f.... k . °t...;:: "'4 
•~Barsu ov, .2£.!...£!..•• , .L, p. ;J~ 

17Ihid • 
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graph lines, increasing shipping on the Amur and developing the region's 
industry and commerce. He wrote again to the Gr.Jl1d Duke on October 1, 
pointing out that his plans could be realized only if reviewed by Con­
stantine and the Tsar. \lAny examination of these proposalstt , he "VI'ote, 
"in cOiwrrittces 01' in the Council or the ~t.inistries and any report to his 
Majesty not coming from you, will inevitably distort my conceptions and 
can vitiate the return to Russia of her Amur domains. II18 Muraviev's 
letters did not reach Constantine in st. Petersburg and were forwarded 
to him in Nice, whence he replied to Muraviev in courteous and encouraging 
terms. 
Viith Constantine out of the country, Muraviev despaired of success 
in his future work in the Ar:1Ur region. He was convinced that he could 
not count on sympathetic reception of his ideas in any of the ministries 
where, he believed, he was regarded with suspicion. He feared that he 
was being kept out of the ma~nstream of policy development - - perhaps 
Putiatinfs appointment seemed to him to be an evidencG of this - - and 
for this reason he pressed for a governmental commitment to establish­
ment of telegraph lines from the capital to Irkutsk, or even to Niko­
laevsk. Only thus, he believed, in view of rapidly unfolding events in 
China, could St. Petersburg receive timely reco~nendations from him and 
also give him instructions regarding the course of European affairs. For, 
if Nesselroda was gone, he wrote to Karsakov, whom he had sent to st. 
Petersburg v;ith his recommendations, many HNesselrodians" were still 
serving in St. Petersburg and they would be sure to underf:1ine his position. 
He stressed that frontier questions with Japan (Sakhalin) and China were 
18Ib1do, p. 536. 
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now taking on major dimensions and that under these circumstances he 
needed the unreserved confidence of the Russian Government. He asked 
Karsakov to say "to each and all who will listen that for the good of 
the affair I endure all ••• remaining in grievous separation from my 
family, perhaps for another year, being convinced that my presence here 
l9is essential. But if I see that they do not have enough confidence 
in me to make it possible to insure that good, then, of course, I shall 
cease to sacrifice my health and my marital happiness to carry out ordel's 
•• u 20 contrary to my convlctlons. 
Muraviev's discouragement at the prolonged absence from the capi­
tal of his most powerful supporter did not prevent him from continuing 
his efforts at least to bring the political results of his years in 
Eastern Siberia to fruition. Piotr Perovskii, Councilor of the Minis­
try of Foreign Affairs, who had assisted 1,:uraviev d'Jring the Aigun oe90­
tiations, had been designated as the escort officer for the ne~ Orthodox 
Mission sent to Peking to replace the one under Archimandrite Pdlladii. 
The Russian Governffient decided to appoint Perovskii at the same time as 
its agent fox exchange of ratifications of the treaty of Tientsin. In 
late October, 1858~ hluraviev wrote to him in Peking regarding the desir­
ability of obtaining agreement to free trade along the entire Russo-
Chinese border ~ something "which had been forgotten in the Treaty of 
19w.uraviev
' 
s wife had found it imposs ible , evidently for reasons 
of health, to remain for long in Siberia. 
20Ibid ., p. 537. 
::dJ6 
Tientsi~I.21 He also asked him to arrange for a Chinese commission to 
proceed in April, 1859, to cooperate with the Russians in demarcating 
the frontier from the headwaters of the Ussuri to the sea. He was anx­
ious that this be accomplished before the arrival in Peking of the British 
22
and French ambassadors. 
Shortly after writing Perovskii Muraviev learned from the amb'!!} of 
Aigun that Chinese officials would be sent to the mouth of the Ussuri 
and the mouth of the Suifen, which emptied into the Pacific. :Jhat Mura­
viev sought, however, was a frontier to Posset Bay, some 100 versts south 
of the Suifen delta. Such a frontier would assure Russian rule over 
the entire Primoria to Korea. In order to demarcate this frontier, he 
set in motion a sizeable expedition under a Lieutenant Colonel Budogos­
kii, composed of General Staff officers, topographers and supporting 
personnel, some of whom were to proceed with the boundary marking while 
others would carry out surveys, map the coastline and assemble other data 
on the entire Ussuri maritime area. He was anxious to proceed quickly 
2lMarked expansion of Russo-Chinese trade could be achieved only 
by the overland route. Russia had practically no merchant marine, so 
that the most favored nation treatment guarantee1 to Russia in the Treaty 
Ports was an empty concession. Muraviev had been concerned over this 
question from the beginning of his assignment to Eastern Siberia. In 
1849 he had reported to st. Petersburg' "I consider that the only way 
to support our trade in China is to alter it from a local to an export 
trade and by navigating the Amur River to deliver the products of our 
industries to all the northeastern provinces of China, which are more 
remote from the present location of English economic activities and 
therefore from their annihilating competition with us. 1I (Barsukov, QQ..
£11., II, pp. 47-48.) The economic advantages of seaborne vs. over­
land trade brought Uuraviev's aspirations to naught. 
22sarsukov, og. cit., I, p. 538 and II, p. 205. Quested refers to 
this caustic 1y, commenting that in this and in his expectations as to 
other favorable developments he IIseemed to have lost .::11 sense of reali­
ty". This appears to be unduly harsh. It is hardly surpirsing that the 
situt;tion t'hrough the eyes of a commander in the field at the time should 
have looked different from what it appears to have been to a scholar over 
a century 12ter. 
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"lest tho English meddle with this", and he hoped also to conclu:1e dis­
cussions with the Japanese regarding Sakhalin, so that "the English could 
not interfere there". 23 
While preoccupied with the p!oblems of trade and border demarcation, 
Muraviev was also worrying about the basic needs of the Priamur. He was 
only too well aware that if this new territorial acquisition was to be 
of benefit to Russia it would need people - - a rapidly growing popula­
tion th8t could build up overland cornmunications, food pI'oduction and the 
secOrity of the area. Accordingly, in a report of December 15, 1858, he 
urged the Siberian Committee in £t. Petersburg to adopt measures to en­
courage large-scale immigration to Eastern Siberia. 24 His appeal elicited 
little concrete action. 
At the end of the year, Muraviev informed the Chinese Tribunal 
that his expedition to the Ussuri would reach Aigun in February or the 
beginning of March, 1859, to consult with the Chinese authorities there 
and to prepare to begin their investigation of the frontier before the 
spring. Chi-la-ming-a, Deputy Commander of Heilungchiang, had seen the 
courier bearing Muraviev's Note and had agreed to this procedure. 25 
Muraviev's actions reflected his diminishing faith in Perovskiits 
effectiveness. And, indeed, the latter was experiencing considerable 
frustration in Peking where, b-:cause he did not enjoy ambassadorial rank, 
he was accorded scant attention by the Chinese. His task was further 
complicated by the fact that, as in the case of the TI'eaty of Aigun, the 
2;3.- I Cl• t I ,p . .j.5~8.oarsucov, op. _, 

24Ibid ., II, pp. 220-224. 

25~uested, op. cit., p. 163. 
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Treaty of Tientsin also existed in differing Russian and Machu versions, 
26 
a factor that caused considerable delay in its ratification.
In January, 1859, the Russian Government decided to appoint Count 
N. P. Ignatiev as "pol itical Agent" in Peking to succee~i Perovskii. 
Although ohly twenty-seven years of age, he was excellently qualified for 
his appointment. Born into the nobility, he had served in the Corps of 
Pages and the Life Guards, subsequently graduating from the Imperial Staff 
Academy in 1851. He then served in the Baltic provinces and as military 
attache in London. He had played an important role in the Paris Confer­
ence of 1856 and had later led a mission to Khiva and Bukhara, success­
fully concluding a trade treaty and freeing Russian prisoners held in 
Bukhara. 27 hluraviev was pleased to learn of Ignatiev's appointment, since 
by now he had become thoroughly disillusioned with Perovskii, who was not 
only having difficulty in obtaining ratification of the Treaty of Tient­
sin, but was also failing to gather intelligence that would have been of 
~' . 28va1ue t0 j"uraVlev. Ignatiev was not to arrive in Peking until mid-
June of 1859, however, and in the meantime Gordhakov sent Perovskii new 
instructions, in early Uarch, to conclude a treaty with China in eight 
articles, giving Russia the Manchurian coast down to the Korean border, 
freedom of trade at any point on the Chinese frontier, the right to have 
consuls in many towns and providing for the delimitation of the frontier 
WiUI China both in the east and the west. 29 Gorchakov did not know that 
I f"'\' an, t .. 'I­26!!,,,asa,,aKO Danno, -I- C) vll1na ::l t'ne ','\',65, ln~Q0:)0-...;lQ6l , ""\...Lle CrlqlnS 0 f 1:lle 
TSMngli Yamen (H5rvard University Press, 1964), P?' 132-132. 
27EntsiklopedJchEski Slovar, Vol. 24, pp. 784-786. 
28~uest'?d, 0Q. ciL, p. 164. 
29 Ibid., p. 167. 
,..,,..,... 
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at this time China was preparing obliquely to repudiate the Treaty of 
Aigun. 
On April 7, 1859, the Tribunal addressed a Note to the Russian 
Senate without Perovskii's knowledge. It complained about Muraviev l s 
intentions regarding a survey of the Ussuri area, stating that it was 
"not adjacent to the Russian frontier" and about the conduct of Russian 
merchants sent by Muraviev to Sanhsing in the previous year. It stated 
that Muraviev was apparently "making pretexts to stir up trouble and 
that the ruler of your country cannot have heard about it". It expressed 
the hope that Lieutenant Colonel Budogoskii's survey party would soon be 
sent ho~e and added that, "Apart from the left bank of the Heilungchiang •• 
•• you ought in general not to travel or settle anywhere". It also con­
tained a reminder that no reply had been sent to a previcu5 Note requesting 
that the weapons offered by Russia be sent to Urga. 30 
Muraviev intercepted the Chinese Note protesting his actions and 
re-addressed it to Perovskii, at the same time sending a Note to the Chi­
nese expressing surprise that the Government of China was sending Notes 
over the head of the Russian envoy in Peking. He asked that Chinese re­
presentatives be sent to meet Budogoskii on the Ussuri. 31 The Emperor 
I-ting had no intention of falling in with Muraviev's plans. At the end 
of April, when he received a me;norial from I-Shan urging acceptance of 
free trade along the Amur, he agreed, but he ordered I-Shan to meet ~ura-
Iliev and argue hif:l out of his plans for the Ussuri area. 32 Some t\~O weeks 
h 30~30c ~c humac er, 22. Cl~.,.~ p. ~. 

311.lli., p. 307. 

321;"/,,,1 ~""6 , p.... C1 db""y ',,,ues d , o~. . t ., p.
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later I-ting ordered Chi-la-ming-a to prevent the Russians from navi­
gating the Ussuri or going up the Sungari to Sanhsing; he also instructed 
the Acting General of Kirin to send an officer to the border of Kirin and 
Heilungchiang to watch for barbarian ships and "stop them by straight talk" 
from entering Kirin. 33 At that time, too, Perovskii was informed by the 
Grand Council that China considered effective the boundaries as delimited 
by the Treaty of Rerchinsk and by implication denied the validity of the 
Treaty of Aigun by stating that the Russians in Mariinsk and "other 
coastal places on the Amur River were only temporarily allowed to live in 
the wastelands".34 An edict pubUshed a month later announced that I-shan 
and Chi-la-ming-a, who had been responsible for the signing of the Treaty 
of Aigun, were to be punished. 35 
There now ensued a complicated series of further inconclusive ex­
changes of Notes between Perovskii and the Chinese Government, during 
which the latter continued to insist that the Russians had no right to 
penetrate into any part of the Ussuri maritime area. Muraviev continued 
to send his officials and military units up the Ussuri to badger the Chi­
nese there into joining them in delimiting the new frontier. His men 
established a number of defense posts in the area and indicated that if 
the Chinese refused to undertake joint demarcation they would simply 
seize the area for themselves. 36 In late May of 1859, ~uraviev himself 
went to Aigun and announced that he was on his way to inspect the Ussuri 
33n.SM 37, p. 14A, cited by :)uested, op. cit., p. 178. 
348anno, op. cit., p. 148. 
351b1d • 
361",<:,>; 37,......HlI, p. 183, cited by Quested, op. cl!., p. 181. 
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and Suifen Eivers. He told the Chinese that he was afraid the English 
would seize the area and showed them on a map the location (Possiet Bay) 
'.vhere he would meet officinls from Kirin; he would wait there and if, 
after a month, they did not appear, he would go on to Tientsin. 37 Then, 
ignoring their entreaties not to do so, he proceeded down the Amur to 
Nikolaevsk and thence down to the sea, sailing down the coast of Manchur­
ia to the mouth of thenumen River, on the Korean border. Lieutenant 
Colonel Budogoskii, who had completed his survey of the land frontier 
up to the Tiumen, met him at Possiet Bay. Budogoskii reported to Uura­
vie v that between the mouth of the Ussuri and the Tiumcn he had seen no 
Chinese or Manchus. The two men then sailed for Tientsin, arriving at 
the mouth of the Pei-Ho on July 2. 38 
~uraviev was anxious to keep the Chinese in ignorance of Russian 
naval weakness in the Far East; he tried to keep his presence aboard 
his ship, the "Amerika", a secret and ordered the rest of his small 
squadron to keep out of sight of land. The Chinese, however, did learn 
that he was there, whereupon Muraviev requested permission to send Budo­
goskii to Peking with maps and letters for Ignatiev. After some delay 
this request was granted.39 Muraviev then sailed for Japan where he 
attempted to negotiate a treaty recognizing Russian soverieghty over the 
entire island of Sakhalin. In mid-August of 1859, he arrived at the Bay 
of Kanagav.:a with a squadron of seven assorted steam-powered warships, 
37rwSM 38, p. 11, cited by ~uested, op. cit., p. 186. 

38SchumachH, op. cit., pp. 305-309. 

39r"'s~: C;i"\n...;, p. lA et. seg., and 41, p. 25A, cited by~uested,.Q.l2..
III ill 
cit., p. 200. 
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a force which, though modest, far exceeded the puny array of Japanese 
naval vessels in the vicinity.40 
Muraviev went ashore with a retinue of some forty officers and an 
honor guard of three hundred al'med sailors, acconpanied by a drum and 
bugle corps. He opened negotiations with the Japanese plenipotentiaries 
by delivering a statement claiming that since the ancient name of the Amur 
River was the Sakhalin-Ula, the island of Sakhalin was homogeneous with 
that river, which was now "again" under Russian rule, lias it hud been 
one hundred and seventy years before". It follo~ed, therefore, he as­
serted, that the island must be recognize1 as Russian. 41 The Japanese 
pointed out that, according to the Treaty of Shimoda, conclu1ed with 
Putiatin, Stikhal in remained "unpartitioned between Russia and Japanll. 
They initially refusEd even to draw a line of demarcation to the south of 
the island. Muraviev then resorted to a blustering claim that Putiatin 
had not been enpowered to discuss Sakhalin, as this island was within 
his own jurisdiction as Governor-General of Eastern Siberia. He subse­
quently rejected a Japanese compromise offer to divide the island at 
latitude 50 and the negotiations came to an end. 42 
Muraviev's uncompromising stand on Sakhalin reflected his fear that 
if he settled for something less than Russian possession of the entire 
island, that portion that might be assigned to Japan would eventually be 
seized hy England. 43 In reporting to Prince Gorchakov on his unsuccessful 
~7440L ensen, OPe Cl"t ., p. ~ • 
41 " Barsukov, ~ CIt., II, pp. 278-279. 

42Lensen, Ope cit., p. 376. 

42Barsukov, ~cii., p. 217. 
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meetings, he explained: "Considering that the rights of tho Japanese 
are just as indeterminate as ours ••• I could nct agree to any division 
(of the island) between Japan and us, particularly in consideration of 
the fact of Japants weakness, any foreign power can easily take possess­
ion of that part which will be recognized as Japanese, consolidate its 
position there and inflict considerable damzge on us for all time to come, 
especL:llly in relation to La Perouse strait, which constitutes the nearest 
and, indeed, only exit for our vessels from the Tatar Strait into the 
Pacific Ocean."44 
Muravievfs unsuccessful attempt to browbeat the Japanese was pro­
bably not so much the result of his having failed to realize that they 
were of a tougher breed than the Chinese as it was a reflection of his 
anxiety to return to the Amur as soon as possible. In a letter to Karsa­
kov written before the start of his negotiations, he had remarked, "I 
fear the slowness of the Japanese and that I shall have to return to the 
Amur very late".45 The prescience and insight into the psychology of 
exotic peoples that had stood him so well in the Caucasus and in the 
Chinese borderlands had not, in fact, deserted him. Putiatin had spo­
ken to him of the Japanese in enthusiastic and admiring terms and had 
urged the desirability of training them in modern technology; in a 
letter to Kovalevskii, reporting on his fruitless negotiations, Mura­
vie..., referred to this rather sardonically, commenting, "They will learn 
everything without us, particularly navigation; we had better learn 
n46
ourselves, rather than teach people who will soon surpass us. 
44Ibid ., pp. 276-277. 

45sarsukov, oQ. cit., I, pp. 557-558. 

46Ibid ., p. 559. 
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By the summer of 1859 the main arena for the final resolution of 
the ."'-mur question was shift in9 to T nts in and Peking. In June, 18:')9, 
the British and French plenipotentiaries prepared to complete ratifica­
tion of the Tientsin treaties and to take up their residence in Peking. 
The Chinese, however, proposed reconsideration of the treaties, whereupon 
the allies attempted to force their way past the Taku forts, but were de­
feated. They withdrew, to await the arrival of reinforcements. Ignatiev 
arrived in Peking two days after this surprising coup by the Chinese 
forces which made his task of enforcing Russian demands considerably 
more difficult than it would have been otherwise. He submitted a draft 
treaty designed to bring the treaties of Aigun and Tientsin into align­
ment and providing for a settlement of the Russo-Chinese frontier from 
the confluence of the Ussuri and the lunur along the Ussuri upstream to 
its confluence with the River Sung-a-cha, then up the latter to Lake 
Hsing-kai, or Hanka, and the River Hun-ch'un, then along that river to the 
47Tiumen and along the Tiuffi~n to t~e sea. All his efforts to obtain 
serious consideration of his proposals were rejected throughout the sum­
mer and fall of 18:')9, when he broke off negotiations until the Kew Year. 
During the period of Ignatievfs initial frustrations in Peking, Mura­
viev, who had returned to the Amur from Japan in the fall of 18:')9, con­
tinued to expand his settlef:\ents on t.he Amur and on the Ussuri. He '.vas 
47IWS;'.1 39, p. 273, cited by~uested, 92. cit., p. 196, who points 
out that there is no mention in this draft treaty of Sanhsing, claimed 
earlier by Perovskii, a~d that this might suggest that Muraviev, not 
Gorchakov, had origin2ted this claim, and that earlier Russian incursions 
might have been instigated by him. In this connection she points out 
that Ignatiev in his ~aterlaly records a letter Muraviev had sent him 
from Yeddo stating his intention to occupy the mouth of the Sungari ani 
to send vessels of all sizes up it as far as Kirin. 
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evidently doing his best to place Ignatiev in a position of negotiating 
from strength. On October 8, as he was approaching the confluence of 
the Amur with the Ussuri, Fu-ni-yang-a, Deputy Commander in charge of 
barbarian affairs, intercepted his vessel and was allowed to come aboard. 
The Chinese memorial to the Emperor, reporting on this meeting, stated, 
in part, that Muraviev was "arrogant and overbearing and wrathful of 
speech. He asked why the General of Kirin had not come to delimit the 
frontier". The response given by FUfni-yang-a had been that Kirin, the 
Ussuri and Suifen were not contiguous to RU3sian territory and there was 
no need to investigate them. Fu-ni-yang-a had asked Muraviev to order 
back his men and ships from the Ussuri but ~uravievts reply had been that 
the Russian envoy was now in Peking to manage this matter and that if he 
could not bring it to a conclusion, he, Muraviev, would have to negotiate 
with the General of Kirin.48 
Shortly after Muraviev's confrontation with Fu-ni-yang-a, 3 Manchu 
officer had met lv)uraviev as he was passing along the left bank of the i\ffiur 
in a carriage and they had stopped at a wayside building to talk. Mura­
viev refused to discuss the frontier and indicated that the Chinese could 
send representatives to Blagoveshchensk for that purpose. At the end of 
October, 1859, the Chinese did just that. Ai-shen-tai came to Blagov­
eschenck and repeate:1 to Muraviev substantially what Fu-ni-yang-a had 
earlier said, and in effect proposing only that there should be delimita­
tion of the land "to be permitted to the Russians" around the points 
they occupied on the left bank of the ,\mur and at Marinskii Post and Kizi. 
The Chinese records describe Muraviev's reaction as follows: 
48I i'iSM, 44, 17.60., cited by Quested, 02 • cit., p. 213. 
r.., t. 
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When Muraviev heard this he became extremely angry and 
shouted. He told the lama int8rpreter Father Avvakum to 
tell Ai-shen-t'ai he was an insolent liar. These places 
had always belonged to Russiu and he not merely would not 
move those already theI'a, but more men and ships were coming. 
He.would also build gun emplacements and houses at Lake 
Hanka and at Tiumenshan. Our officer replied as before. 
Muraviev becalne still angrier and his appearance was alarm­
ing. He told the priest to say that without the use of gun 
and cannon against them they would never be moved, and he 
ordered the buildings of the (Chinese) Ussuri defense post 
on the left bank of the Heilungchiang to be removed. Our 
officer replied thdt that would be very hard to permit. 
Muraviev replied that if it was not removed he must order 
his men to destroy it, and next year he must set up a gun 
emplacement and buildings opposite Heilungchiang town 
(Aigun). Having said this he told Ai-shen-tlal to talk 
to his artillery officer, a man of evil aspect. Our offi­
cer saw that he looked extremely vain and haughty, and told 
him that if it came to war, how could he suppose that China 
would not defend herself? Then Ai-shen-t'ai introduced 
his Major ~o-men-te-leh-ho-er. Since he was powerfully 
built they all stood up and gathered round to look at 
him. Even Muraviev looked round and laughed and no1ded 
his head endlessly. Then ~uraviev gave them wine with 
his own hands and told them all to drink'a glass with the 
barbarians and get to know one another. It seemed as if 
his former talk had been only play-acting. 
Our officer . asked the lama to tell him that all the mat­

ters mentioned should be cleared up, and he should arrange 

to go to the town for a meeting. The chief (Muraviev) said 

he himself had no business to discuss in Heilungchiang 

town, but if our General had authority to hand over the Us­

suri and Suifen he would meet him, otherwise not.49 

&:urav1ev remained at Blagoveschensk in October-r:ovember and had repeated 
meetings with the Deputy-Commander of Aigun, during which he refused to 
modify his stand on the Ussuri frontier. 50 He was adopting as obdurate 
a stand with his counterparts as Ignatiev was encountering on the part 
of the officials in Peking with whom he was attempt ion to negotiate. 
He even went so far as to forbid the Chinese to navigate the Amur below 
49n:SM ~4, p. 36.3, cited by Quested, Ope elt., pp. 214-216. 
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During the period when matters appeared to have reached an impasse, 
Muraviey continued his Cossack settlement activities along the Arnur, as 
well as his occupation of the right bank of the Ussuri, which included 
the establishment of the hlo best harbors on the coast, Novgorodsk and 
Vladivostok. 5'"' L 
Throughout the fall of 1859, Ignatiev continued to be rebuffed in 
Peking and on November 17, Gorchakov sent Mural/iev the following ins'bruc­
tions: "If you become convinced on the basis of future reports from our 
plenipotentiary in Peking that the Chinese will never agree to the de­
marcatiDn of the border ••• your Excellency will proceed to occupy 
those frontiers on the right bank of the Ussuri and the Manchurian ports 
with our ships as soon as the time of yeal' and local considerations make 
this possible." Until he became EO convinced, however, Muraviev was to 
adbpt a strictly neutral posture with regard to the hostile acu'ons of 
the Engl ish and French and was to undertake no aggressive troop move­
ments, guarding only Russian interests. 53 These instructions were large­
ly in accord with Muraviev·s own views, as contrasted to Igna~ievts, who 
by this time, exasperated at being denied access to the highest levels 
of Government in Peking, was suggesting that Russ ian troops move on Urga, 
Aigun, Sanhsing and Tsitsihar. 54 t.~uraviev alerted all his troops along the 
Amur and the Ussuri and ordered construction of two additional gunboats, 
all of this being done in plain view of the Chinese on the opposite banks. 
5l~uested, op. cit., p. 217. 

52garsukov, op_ cit., I, pp. 560-561. 

53Ibid • , pp. 562-4. 

54Ibid ., and Schumacher, op. cit., pp. 312-313. 
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During the fall and winter of 1859-60, he removed a number of Chinese 
military posts on the right banks of the rivers, accomplishing this with 
no bloodshed, since the Chinese offered only passive resistance. He also 
spread rumors amongst the Chinese that large Russian forces would cross 
the Chinese frontier2 in the spring, and that at that time sixty English 
and French vessels would be arriving at Tientsin~55 
Just how effective l,;iuraviev· s attempts to strengthen Ignatiev's 
hand in Peking were must be a matter of conjecture. The young envoy had 
achieved little during his negotiations during the winter of 1859 though 
at the end of that year he had elicited a ticit admission in writing from 
two senior Chinese officials, Su-Shun and Jui-ch'ang, that Russia's poss­
ession of the left bank of the Amur was at least an indisputable fait. 
~ccompli.~6 But Muraviev's maneuvers had also stung the Chinese into 
undertaking a certain amount of defense preparations in Manchuria. An 
ambush par~y fo~ the Amur-Sungari confluence was despatched in the spring 
of 1860 and LOO men were sent to the Niman-Ussuri confluence; eight small 
observation posts were set up on the Ussuri itself and 200 men had been 
sent to the Pacific coast. The Plao-fu tribes, moreover, had been or­
ganized in twelve posts in the area of the Lesser Suifen River and 
eighty-four posts in the Su-cheng and hlat'ingho areas near the sea. 
57These irregular forces may have totaled 10,000 men. How accurate Rus­
sian intelligence was on these activities is not known, though in April 
55Schumacher, op. cit., p. 214 and IViSH, 45, p. 178, cited by 
Quested, op. cit., p. L17. 
56aanno, P12' elt., p. 154. 
57n~3t;; :0, p. lOA, dted by Que3ted, Ope ..£it., p. 223. 
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they had received various rumors of Chinese mobilization and reports that 
2,000 muskets and five cart-loads of cannon had been sent to Aigun. 58 
Muraviev was clearly tinpertuI'bed, in any event, being confident that he 
had sufficiently superior forces to deal with any eventuality. He recom­
mended to Gorchakov that Ignatiev collaborate with the English and the 
French and that in t~e event that the Chfing regime should collapse, Mon­
golia and Manchuria should be taken under Russian protectorate. 59 
In January of 1860 the Russian Government, in agreement with Mura­
viev's view, decided that Ignatiev should join the English, French and 
American envoys or. the coast and attempt to play the role that had been 
filled by Putiatin. The Anglo-French teinforcements were arriving in 
Chinese waters and it was evident that the decisive campaign of the "Ar­
row 'ilar" was approaching. 
Muraviev's role in the Russo-Chinese confrontation was new largely 
one of consolidating his hold on both thE: Ahrur and Ussuri areas without 
resorting to any large-scale hostile action, ar.d of encournging the local 
inhabi tants to enter into expan::!ed trade relations ,iwi th the Russians. 
The ultimate success of the Anglo-French military operations wae a fore­
gone conclusion, though he mistakenly believed that t~ose operations and 
the continuing Tai~ing Rebellion might bring about the collapse of the 
Chting dynasty as early as in r:.ay, 18CC. 60 
As for Ignatiev, ~uested sUfi:..rnarizes the policy he was follovlling, 
as set forth in his own report: He was to exacerbate the Anglo-Chinese 
58schumacher, op.cit., pp. 324-326. 

59Barsukov, QP~ cit., I, p. 571. 
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quanel sufficiently for the English and Chinese not to come to terms 
before China had been thoroughly defeated, even to the extent of letting 
the British actually overthrow th~ Ch'ing dynasty, for no other regime 
could be worse disposed tOAards the RUEsians than were the high Manchu 
dignitaries. He WeE to make himself an indispensable adviser to the 
allies, but induce the Chinese, too, to regard him as a friend and to 
grant Russia everything she demanded. With regard to the French, 19na­
tiev's task was to irritate their relati6ns with the British and gain 
their support in defending Russian interests in the Far East against the 
latter. Finally, the attention of all the Western ministers had to be 
distracted from Russia's "unfinished business with China, and they must 
be prevented from meddling in it even indirectly".6l 
WhilE a'lIIaiting the denouement, Muraviev continued his efforts at 
administrative improvements in Eastern Siberia. In the spring of 1860, 
he recommended to st. Petersburg that his domain be divided into three 
parts, the Primoria, the Irkutsk Gubernia and the Eniseisk Gubernia. 
The latter he proposed transferring to Western Siberia. 62 As for cor­
rupt bureaucrats and grasping exploiters, his efforts of twelve years 
.had not succeeded in entirely eliminating them from the scene. In July 
of 18EO, he was writing to Karsakov, on leave in Russia, complaining 
about the "intrigues" of the Ministry of Finance. Although, as a re­
sult of his recomm€ndations, the government monopoly on gold mining 
(and its attendant evils) tad been substantially diminished by 1egis­
lation in 1851, that portion of it which had been relin~uished to the 
61Ques t d , r··t p. "140 •e illL~" ~ 

6?Barsukov, OPe cit., I, pp. 576-581. 
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private sector had soon become yet another field for bribery, collu­
sion and injustice. Thus it appeared that the Ministry of Finance was 
now planning to relieve a private operator of his fields in Novomariinsk 
63in order to turn them over to another, more favored, private operator.
In another letter to Karsakov in the summer of 1860, Muraviev re­
ported that all vIas well on the Amur and the Ussuri. The Russians 'were 
doing as they saw f it and, although some of his firebrand officers were 
all for a little shooting to encourage the Chinese to legalize what they 
had agreed to, he had forbidden it, "not only because of official in­
structions" (which he was not loathe to disregard or exceed on occa­
sion) but out of his personal conviction •• here our guns would killtI 
only the common people who are not our enemies, while the mandarins would 
escape." In any case, he pointed out, the Chinese authorities were con­
tenting themselves with issuing "absurd proclamations and making empty 
threats, to which no one paid any attention".64 
Even while marking time, Muraviev continued to press the Chinese to 
agree to demal'cation of the frontier. During the sun:mer he sent an offi­
cer to Aigun for that purpose - - as well as to state that the Russian 
military alert that was everywhere so evident was only in preparation for 
occupying territories ceded to Russia by treaty; he also warned the affi0an 
that any disorders created by Chinese subjects, or any attempt to send 
Chinese troops down the Sungari would be met by force. 65 
The English and French, having failed to obtain the concessions they 
63Ibid ., p. 594. 

64I bid., p. 597. 

65Schu~acher, Ope cit., p. 327. 
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sought by negotiation, mounted a successful assault on the Taku forts 
and proceeded to fight their way to Peking. In 1ete September, they 
sacked the Swr.mer Palace and laid siege to the capital. On October 7, 
1860, the Manchus capitulated to the allies t ultimatum, thus averting 
the sacking of Peking, largely as a result of Ignatiev's mediation. 
The British and French Conventions with China were concluded on 
October 10 and 11 and the Russian Treaty of Peking was finally negotia­
ted by Ignatiev and ratified on t!ovember 2. It unconditionally ceded all 
territory on the left bank of the Amur to Russia, as well as the entire 
Ussuri maritime area to the Korean frontier. Final legal confirmation 
was thu~ accorded to Muraviev's historic achievement of acquiring for 
Russia some 360,000 square miles of new territory in the Far East. 
II. SHELVING OF AN EMPIHE BUILDER 
Muraviev's twelve years in Eastern Siberia had worn down his health 
and energy. ~:ith his major task accomplished, he prepared to turn over 
his responsibil ities to Karsakov, whom he was recomnlencl ing as his suc" 
cessor. In the meantime he worked at the unceasing problem of popula­
ting the new territories at a sufficient rate to create a base for pro­
fitable economic development out of an area that he realized was as yet 
only a drain on ilussia itself. By the end of 1860 there were some 100 
settlements along the Amur, totaling a population of approximately 
15,000. Such, cornments Kabano'!, were the results of Muraviev's pol icy of 
colonization, results of very little significance which, however, had 
placed a considerable strain on the resources of Eastern Siberia. The 
movement of these colonists, moreover, was accompanied by much hardship 
and suffering, which could have been avoided had f.luraviev been in a 
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66position to provide them with adequate financial and logistical support. 
In February, 1861, Muraviev, having returned to St. Petersburg, was 
decorated with the Order of St. Vladimir, First Class, granted a per-sion 
of 15,000 roubles annually, and made a member of the Imperial Council. 67 
The Emperor upheld his recoli~endation of Karsakov as his successor - ­
over the votes of all 6f the members of the Council (which had also 
voted by a large majority against emancipation of the serfs, only to be 
overruled by their sovereign).68 At this time, too, in response to Mura­
viev's pleas, the Kerchinsk miners were finally granted the same rights 
that were enjoyed by all factory ,.'Vorkers. 69 His reco(mnendations for re­
organization of the Eastern Siberian administration, however, were 
shelved - - whether for reasons of economy or other considerations is not 
clear. 
Muraviev, at the relatively early age of fifty-two, found that his 
departure from the scene of his triumph had effectively terminated his 
career. Ir. St. Petersburg he participated in meetings of the Imperial 
Council, particularly when they concerned matters affecting the adminis­
tration of his old dOffiJin. Here, he succeeded in putting through one of 
his projects, the transfer of the Kiakhta custom? to Irkutsk, the junction 
70
of the most important cOmfllunication routes in Eastern Siberia. Such 
66,. b ...........1"1 "'"'I
Ka anov, Ope Cl~., pp. ~-~ • 
67Barsukov, OPe cit., I, p. 618. 
68Ibid ., p. 619. The majority in the Council had supported Putiatin 
as Muraviev's successor. 
69B~rsukov, o~. cit., I, p. 624. 
70Ibid ., p. 623. 
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occasional work sessions, however, compared to the activities that had 
engrossed him when he was at the peak of his boiling energy in Irkutsk 
or on extended travels throughout his vast territory, were a frustrating 
anti-climax. 
For a time there were rumors in the capital that he was to be namej 
Viceroy of the Caucasus, or of Poland. It appears that he was in fact 
seriously considered for eppointment to one or another of these posts 
but, as had happened 2.t a much earlier stage in his c3reer, those who 
opposed him prevail A contemporary of (,turavievts relates that in 
discussing with some of his intimates the possibility of his becoming 
ViCGIOY of Poland, r,:uravi8v said, "Let thcm first tell me, what does the 
Govermlent desire in 'Narsaw; sincere peace or police-imposed calm and 
order? Concessions to the Poles or their pacification?" The writer 
points out thJt at the time the Government was vacillating in its poli­
cy, but , "Thank God that this question was resolved ard that 
when it became evident that the views of Nicholas iakolaevich and the 
Government were completely at vari~nce, he escaped that fate.,,7l 
Prince Bal'iatir:skii, former intimate of ~acholJs I and high in the 
counsels of Alexander II, advised the EmpGror ins{ appointing ~uravi€v 
to the Caucasus. He acknowledged Muraviev's outstanding qualifications 
but urged the Emperor to fill such a high position with an individual 
who, even if mediocre in comparison with the Count of the Amur, was more 
"loyal" to the throne. 72 
71M• I. Veniukov, ~Graf Nikolai ~ikolaevich Muraviev-Amurskii", 
~~~~~~~~) Vol. 33, p. 525. 
7~usski Arkhiv, 1289, Vol. 6, pp. 282-283. 
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A new period of reaction, after the brief ntha~' following the 
death of Nicholas I, was setting in at high govern~ental levels. The 
liberation of the serfs, which Muraviev had advocated while in Tula, 
had earned Alexander II criticism and hostility both from vested interests 
that had opposed the measure and from many others who were disappointed 
by its compromising aspects. The beginning of freer conditions had 
whetted the appetites of liberals, reformers and radicals who proceeded 
to demand more relaxation of governmental controls. Student disorders 
began to assume serious proportions after the Liberation. From London, 
Alexander Herzen was urging fraternization between Russian radicals and 
Polish patriots. Socialist propaganda was "flooding the military schools, 
from the Corps of Pages to the Artillery Academy, where Professor Lavrov 
combined mathematical instruction with the advocacy of social revolu­
tion".73 Clandestine pub1 ications, such as Velikorus, Ko10kol and 
lstorichesski Alman?ch, were widely circulated and, in May, 1862, the 
most violent of them all, Molodaia Rossia, demanded measures Uto change 
radically and without exception all the foundations of contemporary 
society". Following its publ ication, a wave of arson spread over the 
country. In St. Petersburg alone, a conflagration destroyed two thousand 
shops and warehouses. The insecurity and alarm created by the unrest 
of 1861-2 ended the liberalizing trend that had begun with the accession 
of Alexander II and profoundly altered his outlook. Political trials 
and other repressive measures, discarded at the end of the reign of 
Nicholas I, were resumed. tlIt was the beginning of the duel to the death 
73v:. E. Mosse, Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia (Collier 
Books, New York, 1962), pp. 106-7. \ 
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between Alexander II and the Russian revolutionary movement.,,74 At 
such a time, Count Muraviev-Amurskii, a man known to be independent of 
mind and ready to act on his own responsibility, was bound to be re­
garded askance. 
Those who were anxious to brand lv!uraviev as disloyal were not 
wanting for pretexts. His predilection for the Decembrists was well 
known. Moreover, the famous anarchist, Michael Bakunin, a relative of 
Muravievts from the maternal branch, had escaped to America from Eastern 
Siberia while Muraviev had still been Governor-General there. 75 It was 
widely assumed, evidently with justification that this had been accom­
plished with Muraviev's connivance. Certainly, there can be no doubt of 
the w~rmly sympathetic relationship that existed between these two men. 
Bakunin wrote to Alexander Herzen that "Muraviev is the only man among 
those who have power and influence in Russia who can and must fully and 
76
without the least reservations be considered one of us ll Peter Kro­• 
potkin, who came to Irkutsk shortly after Muraviev's departure, observed 
that "Muraviev held advanced views and a democratic republic would not 
quite have satisfied him. In his study, the young officers and Bakunin 
would discuss the possibility of establishing a United States of Siber­
77ia, federated across the Pacific with the United States of America tl • 
What Kropotkin was referring to was not as outlandish and incongruous 
74Ibid., pp. 180-212. 
75Russkaia Starina, Vol. 88, p. 607. 
76Alexander Herzen, Polnce SObraniye Sochinenii, Vol. XIV, p. 426. 
77p• Kropotkin, Memoirs of a Revolutionist, (Houghton Mifflin Co~, 
1899) p. 169. ­
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an idea in Muraviev's time as it might appear today. Concurrent with the 
development of Russian Populism was the rise of "federalism", the yearn­
ing for establishment of autonomous, or even independent, regions within 
the Russian multi-national imperial state. And in only one "historical 
region" Cas contrasted to Poland) of what can rightly be called Russia, 
Franco Venturi points out, was there an attempt to found a movement of 
independence. This was Siberia, the most important field of Russian 
"federalismlt. While Muraviev was still in Irkutsk, his kinsman, Bakunin, 
helped two young Siberian patriots, Nicholas Yadrintsev and Grigori Po­
tanin, to become university students in St. Petersburg, where they found­
ed a regional political group by collecting together the Siberians scat­
tered among the various institutions of higher education in the capital. 
Their aim was separation of Siberia and creation of a republic like that 
of the United States of America. Their efforts came to naught and within 
a few years they were arrested. But, Venturi points out, Siberian separa­
tism was not merely firing the imagination of a couple of young students. 
Even in official Siberian Circles, "such as the Corrmlittes of the Geo­
graphical Society, inspired by Muraviev-Amurskii, there was talk in 1861 
of Siberia's colonial status and suggestions for the separation of Siberia 
from the metropolis, fas the history of all colonies teaches' ".78 
Kropotkin's revelations of the conversations in the study of the 
7~ranco Venturi, Roots of Revolution (New York, 1960), pp. 317­
319. This concept persisted among Russian liberals and revolutionaries. 
A journal published in Gen~va by "Popu1ists-Bakuninists" pleaded for the 
break-up of the Empire, pointing out, among other separatist tendencies, 
that Eastern Siberia, because of its economic interests, might in time 
gravitate toward the United States. (See AVran Yarmolinsky, Road to 
Fevo~ution (London, 1957), p. 246. The reader will note, incidentally, 
that Muraviev was aware of some such possibility as early as in 1849. 
(See supia, pp. 78-79.) 
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Governbr-Gcncxal ~ere made years after ~ur2viev's death but others were 
seizing upon reports of this sort even while Muraviev was preparing to 
leave Irkutsk to seek a new appointment worthy of his accomplishments. 
One such was a certain A. P. Shchapov, Siberian patriot and inspirer 
of Yadrintsev and Potanin. In prison as a politic;.>l suspect, he wrote 
the Tsar, much as had the disgruntled Piatnitzkii, years earlier, alleg­
ing that Muravie\! vilas quietly contemplating the possibility of becoming 
Tsar of Siberia. Shchapov's letter reached the Emperor just at the time 
that hluraviev was being considered as his possible viceroy in the Cauca­
sus or in Poland. 79 Piatnizkii's letter had been ignored by Nicholas I, 
the tall martinet and friend of l/iuraviev t s father; ShchClpov's exercise 
in poison-per..manship was perhaps taken mOl'e seriously by the harel-pressed 
Alexander II. Other evidences of i,~uravie·.Jts "unreliability" included the 
fact that while Feodor Dostoevskii, a minor political offender, was en­
during the rigors of a strict prison regime in ~estern Siberia, another 
more important subversive, Nicholas Petrashevskii, exiled to Muraviev's 
realm, had enjoyed the freedoms of any ordinary Russian inhabitant of 
Easterr, Sibel'ia. Another sinister indication was that I.:uraviev had freed 
the numerous Polish prisoners in his charge, following the amnesty pro­
claimed upon the coronation of Alexander 11.80 
The many manifestations of Muraviev's fundamental liberalism clear­
ly did not escape the notice of his opponents in St. Petersburg who, by 
exploiting them, succeeded in foiling any attempt to appoint him to a 
79semyonov, gp. cit., p. 278. 
80semyonov, p. 279: It vias claimed that this had been done "against 
the secret wishe!:. of the government in st. Petersburg". 
':)")Q 
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vice-regal position and managed to bring his career to a premature close. 
A contemporary of Muraviev's who had known him from the early days h the 
Caucasus - - and whose impressions of him were by no means those of undi­
luted admiration - - met him in Europe and commented thus after reminis­
cing with the soldier-statesman: "~nat obstacles blocked his way I 
knew not, nor did I wish to ask him. It was said of him that he was a 
'red t • All I can say of those who talked thus is that they distinguish 
between colors very poorly.1I8l 
Count Muraviev-Amurskii, Far Eastern pro-consul of the "third Rome ll , 
had not only added hundreds of thousands of square miles of territory to 
the Russian Empire; he had also reformed the administration of Eastern 
Siberia - - at least for a brief period. Kropotkin records in his mem­
oirs that, "In 1862, the senior members of the Siberian bureaucracy were 
far more educated and in general far better than those of any province 
of European Russia".82 And a quarter of a century later, colo~ists in 
Eastern Siberia told the deported writer, V. G. Korolenko, that there 
had been no bribery in Muraviev's time. 83 Such a purge of the tradi­
tionally corrupt regime of Eastern Siberia was a direct result of the 
paradoxical mixture of Muravievts humane outlook and his sternly authori­
tarian tendencies. This combination did not endear him to those who 
were influencing the decisions of the nervous and ailing Emperor. 
Following a protracted visit to France, Muraviev returned to St. 
Petersburg in 1863, at the time of the mounting unrest in Poland, when 
8l~ski Arkhiv, 1883, p. 352. 

82Kropotkin, ~cit., p. 171. 

83semyonov, pp. cit., p. 280. 
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he thought that his services might be needed. He was given no special 
appointment and, when his wife rejoined him from Paris, took up residence 
in Tsarskoe Selo. It was a sterile existence, affording him no satis­
faction. Apart from occasional meetings of the Imperial Council, he 
was never offered any suitable new role either in the government or the 
army. In 1868, he and his Countess left st. Petersburg to live in Paris. 
From his apartment on the Rue Miromesnil, Russiats discarded empire-
builder followed events in Europe and in his homeland and maintained a 
lively correspondence with his successors in Irkutsk, the Priamur and 
the Primoria. Only once, in 1878, did he return to St. Petersburg to of­
fer his services in the Russo-Turkish war, but these were declined. In 
1881, he died in Paris of what was reported to be "a gangrenous infec­
tion". He was buried in the plot of his Lotharingian wife's family in 
the Pere Lachaise cemetery in Montmartre. 84 
II1. GREAT EXPECT AT IONS DASHED AND REVIVED 
The annexation and settlement of the Amur region became the subject 
of debate and polemics even before "~uraviev's departure from Eastern Si­
beria and the controversy continued for many years. It was initiated by 
Zavalishin's articles in ~orskoi Sbornik which depicted the state of af­
fairs in Mur~vievts domain as being far different from what was alleged 
in some official reports attesting to the growing progress and well-being 
of the population thera. 85 M~ch of what Zavalishin and similar articles 
on Muraviev related regarding the hardships of the settlers, inadequate 
8%arsukov, gp. cit., I, p. 671­
85 . . 196Kabanov, QlL'!.....fll., p. • 
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preparation for their reception, poorly chosen locations, etc ••• , was 
ohly too true. They erred, however, in ascribing all the ills that 
afflicted the pioneers of Eastern Siberia to sordid motives of personal 
gain which could not be imputed to Muraviev, certainly, or even to the 
corruption or incompetence of some of the officials working for him. The 
mediocrity and even venality of the Eastern Siberian bureaucracy no doubt 
contributed to the unhappy history of the early years following the Treaty 
of Aigun. But the slow rate of development of the area for three de­
cades following Muraviev
' 
s departure were the result, in far greater de­
gree, of a number of other, more deep seated factors. 
The Amur and Ussuri settlements in Muraviev's day were similar in 
principle to the military settlements that had been instituted by Count 
A. A. Arakcheev in European Russia after the Napoleonic Wars, and that, 
it should be noted, were being phased out of existence there by the mid­
nineteenth century. As Kabanov points out, military or para-military 
colonization by its very nature stifles the sort of enterprise that is 
86necessary to steady rapid growth of a newly settled area. It was a 
poor alternative to filling the land with free, private civilians spurred 
on by the kind of incentives that enticed the ~uccessive waves of pioneers 
westward in Ar:l.erica. Under the circumstances facing him at the time, Mura­
viev had no other choice. His task, considering Eastern Siberia's limi­
ted resources - - which were all he could draw upon - - was formidable. 
Communications along the 3000-verst course of the Amur had to be under­
taken simultaneously••• The same was true of the 800-verst line of the 
86Kabanov, OPe ci~., p. 197. 
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87Ussuri to the Korean border. 
Muraviev recognized the deficiencies of the mode of colonization 
that he was obliged to adopt. Many years later, Governor-General Unter­
berger of the Priamur called on Muraviev, living in retirement in Paris, 
and discussed the reproaches and criticisms that had been directed at 
his colonization methods. Muraviev explained that, "At that time, it was 
necessary first and foremost to establish reliable communications along 
the deserted bank of the Amur and Ussuri with Vladivostok; for that 
reason, contrary to our desire, it was necessary to sacrifice the other 
needs posed by colonizing the area, calculating that these could be at­
tended to in the future. 1I88 And just when that future would begin to 
materialize could hardly have been clearly discernible either to Muraviev 
or to the policy makers in St. Petersburg at the time of the signing of 
the Treaty of Peking. Though the Treaty was to some extent a stabili­
zing factor in Russo-Chinese relations, the Taiping Rebellion had yet 
to be suppressed. Were the Ch'ing dynasty to collapse under its pres­
sure, the whole picture would be radically changed. ~ruxaviev, as has 
been seen, envisaged an eventual Russian protectorate over all of Man­
churia and Mongolia. He was undoubtedly not the sole Russian official 
to be aware of such a possibility. Certainly, outside observers were. 
Ravenstein, writing immediately after the Treaty of Peking, predicted 
that when the Chinese Empire fell to pieces, Russia would "possess her­
self of the whole of Manchuria, including the Lia-tung Peninsula".89 
87, &l':cABarsukov, OQ. cit., I, p. ~4. 

8~abanov, pp. cit., p. 198. 

89Ravenstein, op. cit., p. 154. 
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Such a contingency, involving potential large-scale troop movements and 
various imponderables with regard to British and French reactions, 
clearly could not have created a psychological climate favorable to vol­
untary migration to the Amur or heavy investment there by such industri­
alists as existed in European Russia. 
In the immediate post-Aigun period, voluntary colonization of the 
Amur by private individuals was at an insignificant level: 8 persons in 
1858; 227 in 1859. In 1860 the figure rose to 2,395 new settlers on the 
Amur and the Ussuri. As an historian of the Amur has sardonically pointed 
out, "Voluntary settlement of the Amur region was on a small scale in­
deedl it was only the government official who proceeded eagerly and gaily 
to the Priamur".90 Both the unsettled political situation in the area 
and bureaucratic rule there made life in Eastern Siberia unattractive 
and unprofitable for ®st private individuals who, though theoretically 
free persons, found their activities circumscribed by red-tape and under­
mined by corruption.9l 
If bureaucratic impediments and political uncertainties stifled 
free migration, the nature of the country, too, was such as to discourage 
it. The Priamur, an area much different from the rest of Siberia, pre­
sented unpleasant surprises for the early settlers. In this region, dry 
strong winds from the highlands of Iakutia meet the humid winds from the 
Pacific, creating what for the new arrivals from Siberia and European 
Russia was a climatic freak. The winter in the Priamur is consistently 
dry, sunny and mild, with only light snowfall. The rivers and streams 
90Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 199, citing Rededei, Jstotia Priamura 
(st. Petersburg, 19l3). 
91Kabanov, oe. cit., p. 202. 
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are shallow in the spring and at the beginning of sum~er are almost dried 
uPJ in the latter half of the surr~er, however, after heavy, sometimes 
torrential, rains, they reach flood stage, often cresting their banks. 
Many settlers, ignorant of climatic conditions, were ruined by unexpected 
floods that wiped out their crops and homes. But when they moved to 
higher ground for protection against such a calamity, they found stony 
soil and thick scrub and forests, which, after toilsome clearing, yield­
ed poor harvests.92 
Muraviev was well aware of the need to provide special inducements 
to encourage the rapid growth of settlement on the Amur and the Primoria. 
To this end, before leaving Eastern Siberia, he drafted a proposal pro­
viding that serfs coming to the Amur would become free men; it also con­
tained measures making it easier for peasants to receive permission to 
migrate there. The proposal was not approved by the Government. The 
regulations for migrating to Eastern Siberia, moreover, that wp,re adopted 
by the Siberian Committee, provided allowances far too meagre to encour· 
age such migration. 93 
The slow bUild-up of the population continued, perforce, along 
military lines, with conscripted peasants being sent as "cossacks" to 
the Amur and the Ussuri. By 1861 the Amur line of communication had 
94
sixty villages, with a population of 11,850. But this population, 
spread out over the tremendous distances of the area, was much too sparse 
92Ibid • 
93,bld., p. 2JO. 
94Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy~ 1881-1904 (Univer­
sity of California Press, 1958), p. 2. 
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and the conditions of life much too difficult to encourage additional 
larger nl~~ers of pioneers. This sparseness of population made it un­
warrantable to establish anything approaching a regular and convenient 
means of land transportation; at the same time, even had it been at­
tempted, the manpower to do so would have been insufficient. As for the 
natural main line of communication, the Amur river, this freezes over 
at Blagoveschensk by the end of October and does not thaw until late 
April. For some 17 to 27 days before the freeze, moreover, it is filled 
with ice floes and for an equal period during the thaw it is also danger­
ous. Such frail barges and river steamers as could operate in the shal­
low waters above Blagoveschensk could thus navigate on an average of 
only 140 days a year. The river also contained an unusually high pro­
portion of other natural hazards, such as shoals, snags, shifting and 
blind channels and bars. Downstream navigation was reasonably safe and 
rapid but the return trip was dangerous and slow. Scarcity of draft 
animals moreover, limited the Amur's use as a winter highway, in the 
traditional Siberian mode. All of these circumstances severely handi­
capped development of transportation on the river with the result that, 
in Malozemoff's words, "the Amur served less as a line of communication 
95than as a line of limitation for Russian expansionlt • 
Alexander Bestuzhev, after describing the perils of traveling by 
barge on the Amur, and the high proportion of sinkings with attendant 
heavy loss of life and supplies, recalled that in addition to such pri­
mitive craft, five small steamers plied the river in 1860. One of them, 
95}bid., p. 3. 
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the ttKazakevich" ran from Chita to Nikolaevsk; there were few who could 
afford to travel on it, however, since one individual's passage cost 
300 rubles, while freight was charged for at 3 rubles per 20od. These 
costs, he pointed out, were the equivalent of rates chaxged for sailing 
96from England to America. 
The well capitalized Amur Company had been established for the 
purpose of providing the Amur population with food and merchandise of 
good quality at reasonable prices. Its beginnings were elaborate, with 
stores and warehouses being established over a wide area and manned by 
an enormous staff of employees. Misfortune dogged the company from the 
outset. Operating expenses were high, cargoes from the seacoast some­
times failed to reach their destinations safely, some of the Company's 
ships sank at the river's estuary - - and employees went into trade for 
themselves on company time, buying up peltry from the natives for a song 
and selling it at tremendous personal profits. Within a year, the 
Company found itself selling waterlogged crusts and biscuits, rancid 
butter, maggoty sausage, etc., at prohibitive prices.97 
A correspondent of the periodical, "Amur", observed that, "Trade 
on the Amur despite its profitability at prices prevailing there (a 200d 
of meat, 8 rubles; pound of tea, 5 rubles, etc.), nevertheless poses much 
risk. Ignorance as to the population's requirements, sparse settlement 
over an enormous area, insufficient numbers of experienced boatmen, the 
high prices of labor, ••• these are the difficultirs that cool one's 
98
enthusiasm for going down the Amur". 
96 .Cited by Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 217. 
97Kabanov, ~clt., p. 218. 
98~mur, Nov. 20, 1860, cited by Kabanov, Ope cit., p. 218. 
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It had been Muraviev's hope to attract foreign capital into.trade 
and manufacturing in the Priamur. EVen before the Treaty of Aigun, while 
on consultation in St. Petersburg, he had "dazzled the American Minister, 
Seymour, with a list of vast improvements that were intended to develop 
Siberia and the foreign trade of the Amur".99 At a meeting in St. Peters­
burg in January, 1858, Muraviev told him that De Castries, Mariinsk and 
Nikolaevsk had just been opened to foreign trade. lOO In order to en­
courage foreign enterprise on the Amur, Muraviev established extremely 
favorable regulations for foreign commercial agents in those ports. This 
aroused the Siberian merchants, many of whom sent complaints to their 
friends in the capital. These complaints - - and the Russian Govern­
mentts fear of American economic and political penetration of its newly 
gained possessions in Eastern Siberia - - led to the prohibition of 
navigation of the Amur by foreign vessels beyond a point 300 versts ' 
above the estuary. This in turn excited the indignation of the Ameri­
cans, who had made sizeable inve$tments in river vessels, merchandise, 
and construction materials for the development of their enterprises on 
the river. lOl By May of 1860, they were thoroughly disillusioned. The 
young American businessman, W. W. Collins, who had envisioned railroad 
and telegraph projects in the area (which he had visited in 1857-8 with 
Muraviev's blessing) wrote to the State Department at that time decrying 
the Russian Government's commercial policy and enclosing the translation 
99perry McDonough Collins, ~ Voyage Down the Amoor, edited with 
introduction by Charles Vevier (University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), p. 27. 
lOOQuested, Ope cit., p. 100. 
101Kabanov, pp. cit., pp. 218-219. 
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of an article in the Journal de S~. P!'!tersbourg which said that only 
thirteen vessels had visited the Amur in 1859. He wrote of the "miser­
able stupidity of the management of the Amur Company both in St. Peters­
burg and Irkutsk" and commented that ••• "most undertakings of this 
nature are badly managed in Russia because of the want of alacrity in 
commercial undertakings and the great number of employees who succeed 
pretty surely in leeching the concern of nearly all vitality in a very 
short period".102 
As prospects of a flourishing commercial tie with the west coast 
of the United States receded, there occurred yet another development 
temporarily unfavorable to the growth of the Amur region and, indeed, 
of the entire Russian Far East. This was the sale of Alaska to the 
United States in 1867, something that had been foreseen and advocated 
by Muraviev, fourteen years earlier, when he had hoped that by so doing, 
Russia would obtain "compensating advantages" from the United states. 
The short-term result, however, was a reduction in the impbrtance of 
the area which had provided an indispensable if uneconomic line of com­
munications to Russian America. Such was the ironic effect of Mura­
viev's Amur obsession, which had undoubtedly exerted a contributory in­
fluence on the decision to relinquish Alaska. 
Muraviev's high hopes for overland trade with China also proved to 
be illusory. Inadequate transportation and competition of European sea­
borne merchandise were fatal to the marketing in China of products of 
Russian industry, which was still in an early stage of development. Even 
Russian textiles, which had earlier enjoyed wide acceptance there, proved 
lO~uested, Ope cit., pp. 239-240. 
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too costly in the face of this competition, which rose as China concluded 
a series of treaties with the European Powers, beginning with the Tien­
tsin conventions of 1860 with England and France and ending with the trade 
convention of 1869 with Austro-Hungary.103 Tea shipped from Shanghai to 
Nikolaevsk and thence via the Amur to Irkutsk and European Russia also 
proved to be too costly, particularly following the decree of 1862, which 
opened the frontiers of European Russia to the importation of tea; an 
additional serious blow to the Amur tea route came with the opening of the 
Suez Canel in 1869, when freight costs of tea sent to Russia by sea be­
104 
came seven to eight times cheaper than by the overland route.
More distressing from the standpoint of the economic development of 
the Amur basin was the failure of attempts to turn the area into a food 
producing base for Russia's Far East. Muraviev had held high hopes in 
this regard because of the abundant rainfall and luxurious vegetation 
along the banks of the river. The heavy rainfall, however, particularly 
in the summer, was unfavorable to agriculture. Cereals tended to run to 
straw, yielding poor grain, which sometimes did not ripen. Fogs and damp­
ness along the coast forced settlers to abandon their farms. Though 
vegetables and grains grew abundantly, they ~underwent some changes". 
Bread made of local grains had an unpeeasant taste and when eaten induced 
a state of dizziness or "intoxicationt which caused it to be called• 
"drunken bread" (ptianyi khleb). It took years of experimentation and 
research to overCOOle this; in 1889 a botanical expedition finally dis­
covered that this peculiar condition was caused by a microscopic parasite, 
lO::t­
-Malozemoff, 9p. cit •. , p. 6, and Note 42. 
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which was eventually eliminated. lOS Apparently abundant pasture lands 
proved to be a further disappointment. Their high-growing watery grass 
provided little nourishment for cattle, which also suffered from pests, 
so that herds were often decimated.106 
A brief growing season, poor climate and grain and cattle diseases 
thus turned the Amur into a food importing, rather than a food exporting, 
area. Large quantities of grain had to be imported from Europe and Ameri­
ca through Nikolaevsk and Vladivostok and from the Transbaikal. Until the 
end of the nineteenth century, beef cattle were imported from Korea, Man­
churia, Mongolia and the Transbaikal, both for Russian settlers and 
troops.10? 
Despite the discouraging agricultural and co~~ercial prospects of 
the region, efforts at populating it were continued after Muraviev's de­
parture from the scene. Following the liberation of the serfs, the first 
settlement law, on April 27, 1861, opened the Amur region to both Russian 
and foreign colonists. In effect until 1882, it offered up to 100 ~­
siatines (2~ acres) of land for each head of family on payment of 3 
rubles per dessiatine, as well as a ten-year exemption from conscription 
and a twenty-year exemption from taxes. Although 150,000 to 200,000 
peasants took advantage of this law in the 1860's, the majority of them 
settled at various locations en route and only a small proportion reached 
Eastern Siberia. Additional inducements were offered by the Government 
in 1866, and large numbers of religious sectarians including the Molokans, 
105Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 3. 
l06Kabanov, op. cit., p. 202. 
107Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 3. 
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and Dukhobors, settled in the Blagoveshchensk areaJ they kept to them­
selves, however, and made little contribution to the development of the 
Amur basin. Other measures to solve the problem of underpopulation of 
the Russian Far East included further settlement, beginning in 1869, of 
cossacks and of convicts, the latter mainly going to Sakhalin, but these 
attempts had meager results. 108 
In 1879, an important new step was taken. This was the formation 
of the Volunteer Fleet for the maintenance of regular communications be­
tween the Black Sea and the ports of the Far Ea~t. The Fleet was composed 
of five fast German merchant vessels bought by Russia during the Ang:1o­
Russian crisis at the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1878. It had been 
intended to convert these into cowmerce-raiding auxiliary cruisers, but 
with the passing of the ~hreat of war with England it was decided to use 
them for regular service to the Far East. The ships began their runs 
assisted by a subsidy of 36,000 rubles for each voyage, the gU,j,rantee of 
large government cargoes and the cooperation of Russian merchants in ex­
porting their tea to European Russia. In 1882, the Government experimen­
109tally shipped 250 settlers to Eastern Siberia at no cost to them. Sub­
sequently, the Government followed a regular policy of subsidizing immi­
grants to the Far East though charging them a portion of the costl 90 
rubles per adult and 45 rubles per child. The Volunteer Fleet operation, 
while enthusiastically welcomed by inhabitants of the Primoria, had some 
unfortunate effects; it weakened the transit facilities f6r settlers 
10~alozemoff, 2e. cit., p. 10. A detailed analysis of Russian 
policy on migration to Siberia during the thirty years following eman­
cipation of the serfs is contained in Donald Treadgoldfs The Great 
Siberian Migration (Princeton, 1957), pp. 67-104. 
109Malozemoff, oe. cit., pp. 11-14. 
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using the land route across Siberia while, because of the partial fare 
charged, it failed to attract many settlers. Over a period of seventeen 
years, only 16,000 settlers came via the Volunteer Fleet. A further re­
sult was the weakening of the Amur River as the main line of communication 
between the settled regions of Siberia and the Pacific; rather than serv­
ing as the essential link to Siberia, the river became merely a local 
artery for the Amur region itself.110 
Clearly, much more was needed by way of direct financial assistance 
to settlers undertaking a six-thousand mile journey toithe new lands, but 
until 1881, very little such assistance was forthcoming from a government 
beset with recurring financial crises. The Government's position then 
began to undergo a market change. No longer, now, was the Celestial Em­
pire menaced by English and French troops, or by a powerful insurgent 
movement in the southern provinces. The Ili crisis of 1881, moreover, 
had led to a truculent attitude on the part of the Chinese, in particu­
lar their military leaders. This circumstance awoke the authorities in 
St. Petersburg to the woeful weakness of the Russian Far East, resulting 
from the scanty population along the 3,800-verst frontier and the inade­
quate lines of communication. In addition, the influx of non-Russian 
immigrants, Chinese, Korean, Manchurian and others, into the Amur and 
Ussuri regions was exceeding that of Russians by a ratio of 1.43 to 1. 
The Oriental settlers, with their lower standard of living and indus­
trious habits, were bidding fair to take over the agriculture and com­
merce of the area. These alarming developments galvanized the Russian 
Government into adopting measures to stimulate Russian immigration and 
llO~bid. 
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to restrict that of Orientals. In 1881, regulations were put into ef­
fect to afford Russian settlers more generous assi~stanc't and in January 
1882, a law was passed prohibiting purchase by non-Russian subjects of 
land in the Russian Far East without special permission from the Governor-
General. Each Russian settler was granted fifteen dessiatines of land 
with payment deferred for three years. At the same time. settlers had 
to offer proof to the officials on the Siberian frontier that they had 
sufficient resources to get to their destination and ensure their sup­
port for the first year. These measures had significant effect; before 
1882, the average number of new settlers in each year was 601 persons, 
while the annual average for the years 1882-1899 was 4,076.111 
Two years after the Russian Government's adoption of the 'IRussia 
for Russians" policy reflected in the law of 1882, it was decided to 
divide Russian possessions east of Lake Baikal into two governor-general­
ships, those of Irkutsk and Priamur, the latter consisting of the Trans­
baikal, Amur and Prlmorsk districts and the island of Sakhalin. 112 Thus 
was vindicated Muraviev-Amurskii's contention that Eastern Siberia, in-
eluding the additional territories he had wrested from the Chinese, was 
too vast an area to be administered by one individual. From that time on, 
the needs of the Russian Far East received increasing attention by the 
authorities in St. Petersburg, particularly, comments, Malozemoff, "since 
the first governor-general of the new administrative division was the 
talented and energetic General A. N. Kork".113 It had been shortly after 
111Malozemoff, Ope cit., p. 11. In 1882, the Russian population on 
the Amur numbered 45,000; Oriental, 15,000. (Malozemoff, Note. 94). 
l12Ibid., p. 25. 
1l3Ibid • 
1:. 
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the departure of that other talented and energetic Governor-General, 
Nicholas Nikolaevich Muraviev-Amurskii, that a Russian official "close 
to the affairs of the Siberian Committee" had commented: "For a realm 
richly endowed by nature, space and good soil, but deficient in population 
and finding itself still in the beginning of its own development, the ac­
quisition through expenditure of precious blood and treasure, of immense 
new expanses, no matter how fertile they may be, particularly if they lie 
at great distances, would be imprudence in the highest degree".ll4 Now, 
the erstwhile Governor-General could observe with some satisfaction from 
his apartment on the Rue Miromesnil in Paris that the policy reflected in 
that statement was being modified. 
It is true, of course, that events taking place years after the 
retirement of Count Muraviev-Amurskii and certainly not clearly foreseen 
by him, were the cause for the shift in Russian policy in the Far East. 
For nearly a quarter of a century after the conclusion of the Treaties of 
Aigun, Tientsin and Peking, Russia's major interests remained in the West, 
the Near East and Central Asia. It was probably for that reason that most 
of Muraviev-Amurskii's successors were mediocre individuals. No governor-
general visited Kamchatka from 1871 to 1881; only one visited Sakhalin in 
115twenty-five years. That situation began to change, however, following 
the IIi crisis of 1881, which strained Russo-Chinese relations for the next 
decade.116 Now a policy of defense against the Chinese was becoming a 
necessity. 
114Kabanov, op. cit., p. 224. 
1l5Malozemoff, 9P' cit., p. 15. 
116Ibid ., p. 2.). 
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During the eighties many Russian officials and military figures 
considered that war with China was inevitable. Rising Chinese chau­
vinism was manifested in a new policy of colonization of Manchuria and 
increasing Chinese military preparedness there. In 1882-90, there were 
thirty times more Chinese colonists in northern Manchuria than there 
were Russian colonists in the Priamur and Primorsk. By 1885, Chinese 
troops in Manchuria numbered 85,000, 50,000 of them trained and reason­
ably well armed. At this time Russian land forces in the Far East, ex­
clusive of settled cossacks, numbered 15,000 men, 11,000 of ~om were 
quartered in the immediate vicinity of Vladivostok. Siberia had no 
other troops to spare, so that the nearest base for reinforcements was 
European Russia, 4,000 miles away. From there, officers of the Amur 
military district calculated, it would take eighteen months for troops, 
in route march, to reach the Primorsk. ll7 
These distulbing developments, coupled with the realization of 
Russian naval weakness in the Far East, stimulated widespread discussion 
in St. Petersburg of the need for building a trans-Siberian railroad. 
Baron Korff submitted numberous petitions to the Government in support 
of such a project. In the spring of 1886, Alexander III wrote: "I 
have read many reports of the governors-general of Siberia, and I must 
confess with sorrow and shame that the government has heretofore done 
practically nothing to satisfy the needs of this rich but neglected re­
gion. But it is time, it has long been time". In that year the Emperor 
decreed, "Let a railroad be built across Siberia on the shortest way 
possible.HU 8 
117Malozemoff, Ope cit., pp. 20-24. 

118Ipi~., p. 27. 
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At the same time that Russia's concern over her position in the 
Far East. was rising, her differences with England in central Asia, in 
particular in regard to the RU5so-Afgan frontier, were being resolved. 
The protocol of July 10, 1887, put an end to further misunderstanding 
there, so that Russian foreign policy makers became much less preoccupied 
with central Asian affairs. In that same year, Russia gave up her 
attempts to insure the election of a pro-Russian king of Bulgaria and ac­
cepted the status quo there. These developments favored the transfer of 
Russian interest to the Far East. At this time, too, French reverses in 
the Tonkin war of 1884-5 led to the re-direction of certain French finan­
cial policies and led Fl'ench capital to seek profits in Russian ventures, 
including foundries, mines and even government bonds. This injection of 
new funds sped Russia's recovery from the financial crisis that had been 
chronic from the early l8E:O's to 1886. This led to a drastic drop in 
banker's commissions that enabled the Ministry of Finance to obtain the 
first large French loan, 500,000,000 gold francs, in 1887.119 The fi­
nancing of the Trans-Siberian railroad thus became possible. By 1891, 
Russia was irrevocably committed to the building of the railroad. Thus 
was assured the creation of the most important single factor in the be­
lated economic and strategic build-up of the Russian Far East, including 
the Priamur and Primorsk. The necessary measures to realize Muraviev's 
vision of Russia's imperial integration were finally being put into ef­
fect. 
119Malozemoff, OPe cit., p. 38. 
CHAPTEH VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUS IONS 
Muravlev's family provided a typical background for a young man 
entering the service of the Autocrat of Russia. His father had been 
secretary of the Emperor's personal chancellery, his mother, the daugh­
ter of a prominent admiral. In his early years Muraviev had profited 
from the influential connections provided by this background. The 
intercession of Nicholas I gave him entree to the Corps of Pages; the 
family friendship of a senior general served to initiate him into high­
levEll staff vrork at a time when many of his contemporaries were still 
proving themselves as junior line officers. Muraviev made the most of 
his opportunities, graduating at the top of his class from the elite 
school for sons of the Russian aristocracy, then carrying out his as­
sig~lents in Bulgaria, Poland and the Caucasus with verve and marked 
effectiveness. His soldierly virtues and his adaptability to tasks of 
a diplomatic nature made it easy for those interested in his advancement 
to obtain ~mpressive decoratior.s and rapid promotion for him. His stint 
at governing the province of luls helped to round out his administrative 
experience and gave him added opportunity to demonstrate his imagination 
and versatility. It seems clear, too, that the interest of another 
famB y friend, Minister of the Interior Perovskii J as well as the bene­
volent inclination of the Grand uuchess Elena, had a good deal to do 
with l:.uraviev's appointment to the post in which he earned the title of 
,~Qni. Arnllrskli .. '~ 
...... Art
"''''0 
When Muraviev was named to succeed the discredited Rupert, Nicholas 
I was already sufficiently impressed by the young general to agree to 
a personal channel of communication with him on all matters of high im­
portance. This, considering the weight of opposition to Muraviev in 
st. Petersburg, was a precious advantage. Perovskii's constant encour­
agement and mature counsel were also invaluable to him during the first 
phase of his activities in Eastern Sib~ria. 
From the start of his administration, Muraviev labored under the 
handicaps of a corrupt local bureaucracy and the implacable suspicion 
of policy makers in'St. Petersburg. His attempts at internal reforms 
were often frustrated, his strategic concepts sometimes scorned. Yet, 
though he fulminated against his opponents and occasionally contemplated 
resignation, he persevered out of his tremendous sense of mission, 
which finally brought about the Chinese capitUlation at Aigun, the 
apogee of his career. 
It is true that two years were to pass before the provisions of 
the Treaty of :i9un receivEd juridical confirmation by the Treaty of 
Peking but that circumstance, despite disparaging com~ents by some of 
Muraviev's detractors, does not reduce the essential significance of his 
achievement. Zavalishin, probably Uuraviev's most vindictive critic, 
derided the Treaty of Aigun as "nothing more than an agreement on a 
dem~rcation line of the sort that is customarily negotiated for the sus­
pension or prevention of military operations".l This is peevish be­
littlement. The Treaty was r,luraviev's personal triumph, a dikt:'!.!. im­
posed through his energy and determination. T~e fact that the 
IKabanov, 9p. cit., p. 190. 
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vaciJlating Emperor I-ting attempted to nullify it serves only to under­
line its importance. Muraviev had seized the occasion fully to exploit 
the pressures of the Taiping rebellion and the menace of the Aog10­
French expeditionary forces in 0 rder to acquire the AInur basin. His 
subsequent activities contributed to Igoatiev's success in obtaining 
China's cession to Russia of the maritime area of Manchuria down to 
the Korean border. The Treaty of Peking complemented Muraviev's d~eds, 
without which it might well have assumed a less sweeping character. 
R. K. I. Quested, in her excellent study, based largely on Chinese 
archives, comments that, "From first to last, the attitude of Britain 
was completely, though unintentionally, conducive to the success of Rus­
sian aggrandisement. There is a kind of fatality about the way in which 
Her Majesty's Government, knowing little and caring scarcely more about 
the Amur and Ussuri region, conveniently did everything at the right rno':" 
ment to facilitate the occupation and legal acquisition of the territory 
by Russia." There "was indeed a fatalityll) she goes on to say, "about 
the whole Amur saga, for it was an oddity of history that this country 
should have lain for so many millenia, uncolonized by the numerous nations 
of the Far East, waiting century upon century f01' 11;uraviev". 2 
It is certainly true that British foreign policy, first in the Near 
East, then in the Far East, was of great help to Muraviev in achieving 
the goal he had before him from the day he first set foot in Siberia. But, 
as Dr. Quested says, the Amur and Ussuri region waited for Muraviev. He 
was not only quick to recognize the opportunity for Russials imperial ex-
pans ion but, when that opportunity was not sufficiently clear to the 
~~estEd, £2. cit., pp. 282-3. 
~ 
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decision makers in St. Petersburg, he created the conditions to bring 
it hOfile to them. 
During the first phase of his administration in Irkutsk, Muraviev 
was concerned with improving the government of Eastern Siberia, in right­
ing injustices and in purging the administration of officials who were 
lining their pockets, at the expense of the local population or of the 
Government. But even then, he was laying the groundwork for bringing 
about the "return of the Russian River Amur". The first step consisted 
of establishing the fact that the river was navigable throughout its 
length and could be entered by ships both from the Sea of Okhotsk and 
the Gulf (more properly Strait) of Tatary. The revelation that Eastern 
Siberia thus had a convenient con~ection to the Sea of Japan and the 
Padific Ocean offered a persuasive argument that possession of the Amur 
could be of great importance to R~ssia. The next step was to establish 
an effective r{ussian presence on the Amur estuary and to take steps to 
prevent its occupation by any other nation. This Muraviev accomplished 
in collusion with Nevelskoi, against the wishes of the more cautious 
Ministers in the Russian Gover~ment. The founding of Nikolaevsk and the 
occupation of de Castries Bay and Kizi, which gave Russia a firm foothold 
at the mouth of the Amur,were accomplished in defiance of Nesselrode's 
cl ique and with r.:uraviev I s full backing. The Governor-genera.! stood by 
his subcrdinate, whose career had been placed in jeopardy by these ac­
tions and obtained Eost factum authorization for his exploits. Nevel­
skoils fuzther incursions south along the Manchurian coast, though ex­
pressly forbidden by ~t. Petersburg, were undertaken under Muraviev's 
protection and, indeed, aubsequently extended by him personally. 
'I 
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Once the Russian settlements at the mouth of the Amur were estab­
lished, it was logical for Muraviev to urge the necessity of ~avigat-
iog the Amur as the most reliable and economical method of keeping those 
settlements supplied, particularly in view of the ambitions of rival 
Western Powers l.n the Far East. It took patience and constant argument. 
to persuade st. Petersburg of this. In this Muraviev displayed con­
siderable statesmanlike vision, as reflected, for example, in his memo­
randum of MaTch, 1853, to Alexander II. 3 In this he stressed his con­
viction of the danger of Russia's being cut off from the Pacific Ocean 
by British seizure of Sakhalin and the hrur estuary and advocated relin­
quishment of Russian possessions in Forth America for the sake of forming 
a close tie with the United states as a counter to British power in the 
Far East. He followed this up in November of the same year with his 
letter to the Grand Duke Constantine in which he set forth his view as to 
the irruned hte need to safeguard Siberia by firmly securing Sakhal in, 
Kamchatka and the mouth of the Amur, to navigate thdt river and thus to 
Itestablish a firm influence on neighboring China". 4 In that lllSffiori;Wdum 
he also pointed out that, as a result of five years' preparation, it 
would be possible to achieve all this with the local resources of East­
ern Siberia. That preparation had been made by Muraviev with little, 
if any, help from the central government. 
The resources at Muraviev's disposal had been pitifully meager 
but while often railing at the penuriousness of st. Petersburg, he pro­
fited from Perovskiits advice and made the best of a difficult situation. 
3supra, pp. 125-127. 

4§..!dp.!.e, pp. 138 and Appendix 
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A lesser man might have sat back in the comfort of the gubernatorial 
quarters in Irkutsk and served out his time with a minimum of exer­
tion - - while perhaps accumulating a tidy fortune to supplement his 
eventual pension. But jl,~uraviev was a different breed of careerist. 
While bringing about order out of the administrative chaos bequeathed 
to him by his predecessor, he journeyed far and wide, acquainting him­
self at first hand with the problems and the potential of his domains. 
His visit to Kamchatka, the first ever made by a Siberian governor­
general, assisted in improving the defense3 of Petropavlovsk, enab­
ling it to repulse the diversionary Anglo-French attack during the Cri­
mean War. He pushed gold production (admittedly at the cost of the 
"Hasgildeevschina lt ) and fostered expanded prospecting for other valua­
ble minerals and precious stones in order to enhance the v2.lu€ of his 
neglected territory in the eyes of the skeptical authorities in St. 
Petersburg. He sought iron for Siberian manufacturing and modernized 
the old Pebovskii Zavod irom'lorks for the building of engines to pO:'I}~r 
the vessels he planned to use on the Amur. And at an early stage, he 
recognized the importance of the Transbaikal as Cl base fOI' the build­
up of military forces that he would need when the time came for a 
critical confrontation with the Chinese. That time came shortly after 
the despatch of his memorandum to Constantine and the onset of the Cri­
mean War, which gave heightened significance to his warnings of British 
intentions with regard to the north Asian littoral of the Pacific. 
The first Russ n expedition down the Amur entailed a calculated 
risk. The decision to proceed could hardly have been taken had Muravie'! 
resigned himself to meeting his military requirements with the four line 
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battalions of regular txoops, which were all that a central government, 
sufferin9 recurring financial crises, would furnish him. The expedition 
needed the backing of armed forces in numbors sufficient to impress and 
intimidate the Chinese and to provide the necessary support, should 
active resistance be encountered. ~:uraviev had foreseen that need four 
years earlier, when he began raising his own army, the Transbaikal Force. 
When the opportunity offered by the Crimean War presented itself, he was 
fully prepared to exploit it, under the pretext of the need to supply and 
reinforce coastal defenses against England, the Western Power most hated 
and feared by China. By taking the tmur estuary, then by raising his 
o~m troops, Muraviev created the justification and the means for defy­
ing the Chinese ban on the use of the Amur. 
Of no little importance to the success of the first expedition 
down the Amur - - and of his subsequent feats on that river - - was 
MIJl'aviev's keen perception of the psychology and general state of mo­
rale of the Chinese officials with whom he was contending. The same 
intuitive understanding that had won him the friendship of Caucasian 
chieftains like Sharvashidze and Katso-Margani and had bent the Ubich 
tribesmen to his will enabled him to deal success fully with the ambans 
of Heilungchiang and Kirin and to secure Prince I-Shan's compliance with 
his demands. He could be suave and gracious with them when the occasion 
called for it or he could be stern, arrogant or truculent when Oriental 
impassivity seemed to need sh3king. His blusterin~ tactics did fall 
once, when he attempted to frighten the Japanese into cession of Sak­
halin but the time at his disposal had been short then and he had been 
anxious to return to the Amur. He had had insufficient opportunity to 
acquaint him3elf with the Japanese mentality and, trying a bluff, had 
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lost. Sakhalin, moreover, though important, yielded in r.;uraviev's 
priori ties to the Amur and Ussuri regions, always his foremost pre­
occupotion. 
It has been seen that Muraviev, while striving to build up Rus­
sian pov:er in the Far East, was com,tantly contending with attej';lpts 
from St. Petersburg to limit the scope and impact of his activities. 
One such incident marits singling out. ~';hi1c [,iuraviev was on leave 
abroad in June, 1853, the Foreign Ministry despatched a Note to the 
Chinese proposing that the Amur situation be "legularized ll through the 
placing of frontier maI'kers on the left bank of the river. Had Mura­
viev, on his return, not learned of this, with no time to spare, the 
Russian stance on the Amur question might have been inco~trovertibly 
prejudiced. Muraviev had countermanded orders from higher authority 
before and he did not h~sitate to do so now, by prohibiting the city­
governor of Kiakhta from carrying out st. Petersburg's instructions on 
the border demarcation, which was almost underway. 
Muravievts hand vis-a-vis his adversaries in the capital wa£ 
strengthened by the successful defense of Petropavlovsk, at a time when 
Russian arms ~€re being humiliated in the crimea, and by his cowing of 
the ChinesG by his first expedition down the Amur. It was also measur­
ably strengthened by Grand Duke constantine's support and by the re­
placement of ~esselrode by Gorchakov. Further expeditions were autho­
rized an1 Muraviev went about consolidating the Russian hold on the re­
gion ,.. ith such limited forces as he had been able to raise and by re­
course to calculated bluff and intimidation of the Chinese. Then, in 
the kno~·ilejge that the ~.:anchu regif.1G, beset with internal disorders and 
facing the Anglo-French military threat, could hardly oppose him, he 
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proceeded in May, 1858, to Aigun. There, following some preliminary 
psychological warfare, he forced the Treaty of Aigun upon his terri­
fied Chinese counterpart. 
The aftermath of the Treaty of Aigun was a bitter disappointment 
to -Eastern Siberian entrepreneurs and to "Muravievists" in general. 
With the departure of the once indefatigable Governor-General, the Pria­
mur and Pl'imorsk seemed doomed to return to the oblivion in which they 
had so long lain. The problems of immense distances, primitive communi­
cations and, above all, scanty population, that had worried Muraviev 
were not being solved. This was the result only in part of the in­
hospitability of some parts of the area involved. New agricultural 
methods, selection of crops better suited to the climate, remedies to 
eliminate parasites that spoiled grain and destroyed cattle, and simi­
lar improvements could have been introduced had the right people been 
sent there for that purpose. Improved transportation facilities and a 
respectable cOlnmunications network could have been developed, had the 
Government steeled itself to the necessary outlay of material and hu,'l1an 
resources. Eventually, the Government did in fact do so but only when 
impelled by political and strategic considerati?ns. 
The misfortunes attendant upon :,iuraviev's early colonizing ef­
forts were well nigh inevitable, considering the underlying circumstances. 
Military occupation, agricultural settlement, construction of defense in­
stallations, all had to be undertaken simultaneously. The central pro­
blem ~as to find the people for these purposes. 
There were insufficient incentiv2s for enterprising volunteers to 
come out to that little known lend to work toward an uncertain future. 
Near-draconian methods therefore haj to be employed to bring pioneers 
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out to the Amur Bnd Ussuri regions. Peasants were drafted as Ifcossacks" 
and sent there with their families to establish farmsteads in areas that 
had not been sufficiently reconnoitered and evaluated as to their agri­
cultural potential. Once there, these people were subjected to military 
and bureaucratic controls that stifled such initiative as they had. ~any 
of them, moreover, had to perform duties unrelated to their eSEential 
function of food production. They were obliged to serve as postal cour­
iers, to construct roads or to work on building projects in support of 
the army and the bureaucracy. These tasks took them away from their fields, 
thus compounding the already severe food shortage in an area where there 
were too many consumers in proportion to numbers of producers. 
Such were the results of the priorities Muraviev was obliged to ob­
serve. Without a secure line of communications over thousands of miles 
and without adequate coastal defenses at a time when attack by hostile 
forces seemed a real possibility, all else, Muraviev reasoned, would 
have been premature. He had sought allocation of funds for railroads, 
telegraph lines and other economic improvements. He had urged a more 
generous policy of subsidizing irrunigration. But he had been put on no­
tice that Eastern Siberia could look only to its own resources for the 
building of its future. True, he had been allo"ed in 1854 to retain 
any It 5u.!'plus govern.nent revenues" generated in Eastern Siberia but this 
minor concession had been made out of military considerations and contri­
buted little if anything to the general welfare of the people. 
Once the hmur and Ussuri r!gions were acquired and Russian sover­
eignty there ~as confirmed, the interest and enthusiasm of st. Petersburg 
subsided. The Gcvernment turnd back to its major interests in the V:est, 
the Near ~ast and central Asia. Development of the Priamur and Primorsk, 
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either for its own sake or fer the purpose of building a base for further 
expansion in the Far East, particularly considering thG enormous costs 
that would be involved, held no attraction for the authorities in the capt­
tal. That situation was to change, but only after the IIi crisis ind the 
military re-conqu8st of Chinese Turkestan by Marshal 7so-Tsung-tang. 
Following the Treaty of st. Petersburg on Febru3ry 2, 1881, Russo­
Chines! relations entered a strained period lasting more than a decade. 
Aggressive chauvinism in Peking, massive Chinese colonization of Man­
churia and an alarming concentration of Chinese troops there in 1385, 
aVloke the Russian Empire to the precarious situation of its F:u Eastern 
marches. But on the heels of these developments came a partial relaxation 
of Russian concerns else""IheI'e. At the time of the signature of the Rein­
surance Treaty with Germany in June, 1887, Russia learned of the secret 
Austro-German Alliance of 1879, ill in effEct. This convinced her of 
the hopelessness of attempting to put a pro-2ussian king upon t~e throne 
of Bulgaria and thereby relegated Near Eastern affai~s to a plane of 
secondc.ry importance. In that same summer of 1887, An9lo-Russian differ-­
ences over Afghanista~ ware reconciled by the signing of a protocol in 
st. Petersburg, '.:hus reI ieving the rtussian Government of any irr.tnediate 
problem in central Asia. 
Russia's diplomatic situation was now such that Alexander III was 
able to und€rtak€ to meet the pressing economic and strategic needs of 
Eastern Siberia and to decree in 1887 that a trans-Siberian railroad 
should be built. Some years were to pass before financing methods, basi­
cally those of great infusions of French capital, were devised. In the 
early spring of 1891, the Tsarevich, ~ichclas, inaugurated the construc­
tion of a railroad thst would h~ve more t~an met Muraviev's aspirations, 
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by per~onally emptying the first wheelbarrow of ballast for the embank­
ment of its eastern terminal at Vladivostok, "Ruler of the East". 
Muraviev had been called "a man ahead of his timel!, a cliche that 
often lacks precision. Was he, as implied by that term, such a man be­
cause of superior vision and wisdom not properly appreciated by his con­
temporaries? Or was he an impatient careerist oblivious to circum­
stances that, as a practical matter, simply made seme of his projects 
premature? 
Though Muraviev should be given credit for his early discernment of 
the need to relinquish Alaska, his more grandiose ideas of a Russian­
American 211iance against England, and its implications as to the balance 
of power in the Pacific, came to naught. Turning to considerations more 
irl1'nediately rdated to his work, one can point to the fact that other 
significant elements of the policy he urged were adopted only after his 
retirement and, some, indeed only after his death. These had to do with 
the necessary measures to be taken for the social and economic develop­
ment of Eastern Siberia. It is evident, however, that Muraviev's views 
as to the manner and pace of such development were unre2.1 istic, as were 
his hopes for greatly expanded trade with ChinQ. 
Muraviev apparently found it difficult to accept that the desirable 
is not always immediately attainable. As was not unnatural for an able 
and energetic imperial pro-consul, once installed in Irkutsk, he began 
to see all problems from a standpoint that was essentially parochial - ­
if that term may be used against the background of the vast area under 
his co~n2nd. To him, therefore, Nesselrode WdS not simply a mediocrity 
striving to preserve the overall national interest; he was practically 
a traitor. In J',turaviev f s view, Speranskii, too, had betrayed his 
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Sovereign by confinir.g himself to his assigned mission - - reform of the 
administrotion of Siberia - - znd "concealing" the potential there for 
imperial expansion. 
Muraviev's petulance over lack of confidence reposed in him re­
flects a rather unseemly degree of self-absorption; it also suggests 
inability or unwillingness objectively to recognize that some of his 
recornmendations were encountering a reserve only natural on the part of 
high policy makers ~vho faced an array of domestic and foreign problems 
requiring constant review and judicious allocation of governmental re­
sources. Clearly, there was some justification for the jocular remark 
of Nicholas I that Muraviev would !tlose his reason" over the .\mur. 
So much for Muravicov I s limitations. More important to remember 
is that it was the ve:.:y intensity with ,'ihlch ri~uraviev pursued his id'ee 
fixe th3t led Russia to seize the opportune occasion to nullify the 
Treaty of Nerchinsk. Certainly, the achievement was not Muraviev's 
alone. An important turning point in the affairs of E2stern Siberia was 
reached with the replacement of Nesselrode by Gorchakov, assisted by the 
able sinologist, Kovalevskii. Theirs were the decisions that per~itted 
Muraviev to proceed as he did during the climactic years of his adminis­
tration. But to say this is simply to say that the pORers in St. Peters~ 
burg, vieAing the confluence of events on the international scene, recog­
nized that in ~uraviev they had the right mon at the right place at the 
right time. 
If it is clear tod3.Y that some of i',~uravievr 5 concepts were somewhat 
premature, it is equally clear that without his imagination and ingenuity 
or his wi1lin tJness) when necessary, to flout authority, and without his 
dedication and extraordinary stamina, Russiats annexation of almost 400,000 
"",,
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square miles of territory might never have taken place. Russian cossack 
adventurers had reached the Sea of Okhotsk in the mid-seventeenth cen­
tury but Eastern Siberia continued in a relatively somnolent state for 
many generations after that event. Almost two centuries later, it took 
twelve years of persevering effort by ~uraviev to create the basis for 
establishing Russia as a Far Eastern Po~er. 
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Ferguson, A. D., and Levin, A. (eds.), Essays in Russiar History, 
Archon, Hamden, Conn., 1964. 
Contains a good essay on'Arakcheev's inst!tution of the Rus­
sian military settlements. 
Fisher, 	Raymond H., The Russian Fur Trade, 1550-1 700, Berkeley, 1943. 
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Kabanov, P. E., Amurskii VOQross, B1agoveschensk, 1959. 
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cy. Shows similarities and differences of Siberian migration 
and American westward movement, as interpreted by Turner. 
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APPENDIX B 
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT 
FROM GOVERNOR-GENERAL MURAVIEV TO THE GRAND DUKE OONSI'ANTINE 
November 29, 1853 
In the current uncertain state of our relations with the mari­
time powers it is necessary to devote some attention to the defense of 
our coast and ports on the Eastern Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk. 
Your Imperial Highness has already consented to take the basic 
measures for that purpose with the dispatch to the area of naval ves­
sels for which your permission was granted for the build-up of the 
46th fleet equipage and with the assignment to the mouth of the Amur 
of a cossack sotnyia from the Transbaikal forces. In addition, the 
transport "Dvinatt should already have del i vered armaments this autumn 
necessary in the first instance for Petropavlovsk, but in order that 
all these resources be in place in good time and put to good use, cer­
tain prior orders and authorizations from high levels of the government 
will be essential. 
The coming revolt in China, on the other hand, requires special 
attention. Eastern Siberia, thanks to the foresight of the Government, 
is now supplied with significant military resources. In the Transbaikal 
region, there are some 16,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry under armsJ 
of this number, 13,000 infantry and cavalry with twenty field pieces 
can easily and freely be moved across the frontier and, in case of need, 
the latter figure can be increased to 16,000. But with these forces 
we must defend our territory from Kamchatka to Charatsia (?) along a 
border extending on land and sea for 10,000 versts. 
May Your Highness diign to note to what degree these places and 
expanses, (important to) the future of Russia, deserve our attention 
and protection. I shall only take the liberty to state that no matter 
how important the events taking shape to the south and the west of 
our European borders, no matter how disquieting would appear to us the 
prospect of waging war with Turkey, England and Frence, Russia is so 
strong with her unity of thought and unconditional loyalty to the Em­
peror, that no danger can threaten her from that side - - and her 
internal material strength and resources are so stable and great that 
the more drawn out were the war, the more terrible she would become to 
her enemies, particularly England, even though they might be able to 
wreak some harm en our littoral cities in Europe: but in our Far East 
the situation is different: the Bay of Avachinsk in Kamchatka, the 
mouth of the Amur (Sungari) and navigation upon that river can be 
wrested away from Russia by force. Neighboring populous China, now 
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powerless through its ignorance, can easily become dangerous for us 
under the influence and direction of the English and French and then 
Siberia will cease to be Russian; but in Siberia, important to us, 
in addition to gold, are her expanses, sufficient for all of the 
surplus agricultural population of European Russia for a whole century; 
the loss of these expanses cannot be compensated for by any victories 
and conquests in Europe; and in order to safeguard Siberia it is essential 
to protect and firmly secure Kamchatka, Sakhalin, the mouth of and 
navigation upon the Amur and to establish a firm influence on neigh­
boring China. It is now possible for us to achieve all this with the 
local resources of Eastern Siberia, which in the course of five years, 
have gradually been built up; but it is necessary to permit and auth­
orize the chief administrator of Eastern Siberia to take appropriate 
action, taking into account local circumstances, for in such a remote 
land and over such distances it will be too late to give him his in­
structions in every particular event, and most of all there is the 
necessity for preliminary orders and decisions regarding the defense 
of the coast and ports against the English. Their sea communications 
with the most remote maritime stations makes it possible for them ex­
tremely rapidly to give their squadrons the orders to take action against 
us in the Eastern Ocean, following declaration of war in Europe, news of 
which, via the customary route through Siberia, will reach Kamchatka much 
later. In the light of all these considerations, I would propose that: 
Admiral Putiatin's squadron, now menaced by the English, should proceed 
without delay to the port newly discovered by Nevelskoi, which becomes 
ice-free in February, and, upon arriving there, come under the immediate 
command of the Siberian administration, to which can be entrusted at a 
convenient time the completion of the task assigned to Admiral Putiatin 
in Japan, if such task is not yet completed. For the Siberian ports 
and rapidity of communication among them under present conditions, it 
will be absolutely necessary to have the steam schooner uVostok" of the 
46th Fleet equipage. 
The Commander-in-Chief of Eastern Siberia, in pursuance of these 

measures, should open communications by the shortest route, with the 

mouth of the Amur and should send there a portion of the reinforcements 

designated for the 46th Fleet equipage; also both platoons of mountain 

artillery attached to the troops assigned to him and two or three engi­

neer officers from st. Petersburg for the fortification of the coast 

and ports at the mouth of the Amur and in Kamchatka. Only through the 

above indicated measures shall we be able in good time to prepare to 

repulse the English who can make their appearance there at the end of 

June or the beginning of July, and our squadron of three frigates and 

two corvettes prudently dispatched along our coasts and islands in the 

Sea of Okhotsk and Kamchatka will force the enemy, in no matter what 

strength, to conduct his attacking movements with great caution. 

Furthermore, for necessary rapid communications between the Trans­

baikal region and the mouth of the Amur and thence to Kamchatka, and 

for the necessary supplying of these points with troops, rations and 

other necessities, there should be instituted regular steamship communi­

cation throughout the suw~er between the mouth of the Amur and the port 

'of Petrpavlovsk by the schooner "Vostok" and for (such communication) 
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of Nerchinsk with the mouth of the Amur, by the ttArgun", newly built 
on the Shilka, and by fishing vessels. Keeping in mind that the Eng­
lish, even with the greatest effort, cannot bring many landing troops 
to such remote lands and that throughout the Chinese war they had, for 
crews and landing parties on their vessels and steamships only three 
thousand men; that in Kamchatka and the surrounding little-known area 
the difficulties of providing landing forces will be even greater, and 
that, finally, the English will not even deem it necessary to employ 
large forces against places which they believe to be unoccupied, ! 
consider that it should suffice for us in the first instance to have 
500 men in mobile order of battle, and on the shores of the Amur a 
flying detachment, with four mountain pieces,in the same strength, in 
case our ships should be unable successfully to resist their attack on sea 
and permitted them to make a landing but if, contrary to expectations, 
these forces were insufficient to repel them and if the land forces 
were obliged to retreat in Kamchatka to the interior of the peninsula 
and to Bolshoresk on the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk, and, at the mouth 
of the Amur t to the settlement of Kizi and the post of Nikolaevsk, then 
with the above mentioned steamship communication it would be possible 
in the same summer to send two battalions dow.n the Amur and several 
hundred mounted cossacks with attached artillery and to chase the enemy 
from the Amur coast and the Gulf of Tartary, and then, by those same 
steamer communications, to transfer enough forces over the Sea of 
Okhotsk to Bolsheretsk, without coming out into the Eastern Ocean, and 
to chase the enemy from the port of Petropavlovsk, too. 
Opening of navigation on the Amur in this imminent exigency is in 
any case necessary and justified; but the current civil war in China pre­
sents a completely favorable situation for it and the success and 
security of our three years of activity at the mouth of the Amur (Sun­
gari) serves as a sure guarantee of further successes. There is no 
doubt that when we sail on the Amur in considerable numbers and openly, 
there will be oral objections voiced by the Manchurian authorities and 
later, perhaps, written protests from the Tribunal to our Senate, but to 
the one and the other it is possible and necessary to give a firm reply, 
setting forth the necessity for such navigation not only for our bene­
fit and defense but for that of Manchpria itself, and there, I daresay 
with conviction, that will be the end of the matter. 
Moreover, in the current situation of the Chinese government, 
which has expended its strength and does not rule over half of its 
realm with which it can be said for this reason that the Kiakhta trade 
has stopped, and which cannot render us any cooperation for the restora­
tion of that trade, it behooves us to alter the very form of our rela­
tions and to inform the Tribunal; that it should address itself to and 
deal with the chief administrator and commander of troops in Eastern 
Siberia, to whom the government has given appropriate instructions for 
all contingencies. 
This arrangement will obviate many harmful misunderstandings in 
the current situation, which would inevitably arise by reason of the 
distances and slow co~~unications from this area to st. Petersburg, 
and at the same time will show the Chinese government that we are not 
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deluding ourselves about its position and are adopting appropriate 
measures. This form of relations will be the more correct and decent 
since it will probably soon become necessary to deal not with the 
Chinese Empire but with several separate provinces. This chief ad­
ministrator of Eastern Siberia should therefore have assigned to him 
a special official from the Ministry of~Foreign Affairs and he should 
be given instructions only on a general basis for every sort of contin­
gency. 
With regard to preliminary military measures on our frontier with 
Mongolia, the following should be done: two camps should be set up by 
the cossacks' mustering date (May 25 of next year), the first near 
Kiakhta, made up of the 12th and 13th line battalions, the requisite 
battery of artillery and the 1st, 5th and 6th horse regiments of the 
Transbaikal cossack forces; the second, between the settlement of 
Olegaya and the Vouronkhoiorievsky Fortress, of the 1st and 2nd bri­
gades of cossack infantry and three horse regiments with their light 
batteries. 
Mustering in these places will give the cossacks no great diffi­
culties in their economic affairs and will require very little expendi­
ture of government revenue; at the same time, with this demonstration 
and with negotiations, at the right time, directly with the chief ad­
ministrator of Eastern Siberia, we shall undoubtedly succeed in all 
those dispositions and demands that the government will deem it neces­
sary to lay down in connection with the i~minent changes in China. 
The 14th and 15th line battalions ~11 remain in their areas of 
deployment on the Ingod and Shilka Rivers whence, in case of need, they 
can easily be transported down the Amur; the 3rd Cossack Infantry Bri­
gade, deployed on those same rivers, would have summer mustering of 
its battalion staffs, also in case of need to strengthen our forces 
at the mouth of the Amur. 
During bivouac period a general reckoning of forces in the event 
of movement aCross the border will take place at the following levels: 
From the 6 Cossack horse regiments, 5 to be brought 
up to full strength. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4,400 
From the 12 Cossack infantry battalions, 6 to be 
brought up to full strength••••••••••••• 6,200 
From the 4 line battalions, 2 to be brought up 
to full strength. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••2,000 
Two batteries of artillery. • • • • • • • • • • •• 400 
Total 13,000 
Regarding financial means to meet all possible contingencies which 
might require extraordinary expenditures for the military and naval 
departments, it is necessary to permit the chief administrator of 
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Eastern Siberia to borrow from the various funds and capital of East- ~ 
ern Siberia, not excluding charities, with the understanding that pay­
ment of such loans is to be made at a time more convenient for the 
government, that is, after termination of the war in Europe, or from new 
sources of revenue that may be found in Eastern Siberia. The estimated 
allocation, including the right to alter the actual sums involved and 
of course with the requirement of reporting all such dispositions to the 
highest governmental levels. 
All of the above presents the possibility, with local resources 
of Eastern Siberia, with the addition only of vessels in the Eastern 
Ocean en route there, not only of defending our ancient territories 
there but of securing them and establishing the necessary influence over 
neighboring countries, and indicates at the same time the need now to 
assign to Eastern Siberia a chief administrator enjoying the special 
confidence of the Sovereign Emperor and the rights and authority cor­
responding to that confidence. 
Note on Treaty Texts 
The text of the Treaty of Nerchinsk is that contained in 
?bornik Dogovorov Rossi! s.Kitaem, 1689-1881 (Collection of Treaties 
of Russia with China, 1689-1881), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, St. 
Petersburg, 1889.. The translation from the Russian is by Dr. Basil 
Dmytryshyn and is included in his Medieval Russia. A Source Book, 
900-1700, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1967. The texts of the Treaties 
of Kiakhta and Tientsin are those used by Dr. J. L. Sullivan in his 
doctoral dissertation, Count N. N.. Muravlev-Amursky, Harvard University, 
1955, and are taken from Treaties Conventions etc ... Between China and 
Foreign States, 2 v. Shanghai, 1917. The texts of the Treatiea of 
Aigun and Peking are from the Sborni~. Dogovorov gtc••• cited above. 
Translation from the Russian is mine. Muraviev's Confidential Memoran­
dum to Grand Duke Constantine is contained in Barsukov, v. II, pp. 
104-109; translation is mine. 
E. E. O. 
APPENDIX C 
I. TREATY OF NERCHINSK 
Article 1 
A river called Gorbitsa, which near the Amur River joins the 
Shi1ka River from the left side, shall fOl~ a boundary for both states. 
This boundary shall then proceed from the headwaters of the Gorbitsa 
River along the peaks of the Kamennyi Mountains, which begin at the 
headwaters of said river, and which extend all the way to the Sea (of 
Okhotsk). All rivers, be they big or small, which flow sooth from 
these mountains and empty into the Amur River, shall be under the 
suzerainty of the Chinese state; all rivers which flow the opposite 
direction from these mountains shall be undar the suzerainty of the 
Russian state. 
All other rivers which are between the Rivr.r Ddi and said moun­
tains and are under Russian suzerainty, and those rivers which are close 
to the Amur and flow to the Sea (of Okhotsk) and are under Chinese 
suzerainty, as well as all territories which lie between the said River 
Udi and the mountains, shal.l continue undecided because the great 
plenipotentiary ambassadors are not empowered to settle their dispo­
sition; this condition will remain to until the plenipotentiary am­
bassadors of both China and Russia, upon their return home, shall 
receive from their sovereigns proper instructions to solve this problem 
through ambassadors or through correspondence. 
Then the fate of these undecided territories will be decided in 
a peaceful. dignified manner either by letters or ambassadors. 
Article :2 
Moreover. the River Argun, which empties into the Amur shall form 
a boundary (between China and Russia). All lands which are on its 
left bank, all the way to the mountains, shall be under Chinese suzer­
ainty. The right bank with all its territories ~ill be part of the 
Russian state. (The Russians) are to transfer all of their buildings 
from the southern bank of the Argun River to its northern side. 
Article 3 
The city of Albazin, which the Russians built, should be destroyed 
completely, and all the people who now dwell there, with all the military 
and other provisions, should be transferred to Russian territory. They 
should leave behind neither property no~ any of their small possessions. 
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Article 4 
All Russian fugitives, who at the conclusion of this peace treaty 
are in China, and all Chinese fugitives who are in Russia, shall re­
main w~ere they are. Those fugitives who, following the signing of 
this treaty, shall flee, each side shall return promptly to frontier 
official5. 
Article 5 
On the basis of the present treaty of friendship, all persons, 
regardless of their position, may COffie and go reciprocally, with full 
liberty, provided they have passports and buy and sell whatever they 
need. 
Article 6 
All former discords that have occurred between frontier inhabi­
tants {of both states} prior to the signing of this peace treaty, shall 
be forgotten and shall not be avenged. And should, following the 
signing of this peace, some hunters come and pillage or kill, such 
people, when apprehended, should be handed over to border officials 
of their native country. And such individuals should be punished 
severely. And should pillages (or other crimes) be committed by a 
group of individuals, those w11lful individuals, when appt'ehended, 
should be handed over to border officials to be executed for their 
crimes. Neithor side will either declare a war or shed blood on ac­
count of the actions of its frontier population. Each side will make 
a report of such discords to the respective governT.ents, and such dis­
agreements should be resolved peacefully through diplomatic correspon­
dence. 
Chinese authorities reserve for themselves the right to install 
along the frontiers, which have been outlined in the present treaty, 
markings of their choice in order to know the exact position (of the 
frontier). 
II. TREATY OF KHIAKTA (1727) 
Article 1 
The present treaty has been concluded for the eternal preserva­
tion of peace between the two empires. It is therefore agreed that 
from this day forth, each empire must govern and watch over its sub­
jects. In respect for the concluded peace, each shall maintain and 
guard rigorbusly its own subjects, in order to prevent whatever might 
give rise to disputes. 
Article 2 
This present treaty of peace, renewed and concluded between the 
two empires shall not be interpreted to apply to that which has hither­
to taken place between the two empires. 
Request for former fugitives shall not be made, and they shall 
remain in the empire where they are; but those who shall henceforth 
cross the frontier shall not, under any circumstance, be held. It shall 
be necessary, on the contrary, to seek them out ~ithout delaYt in order 
to tako them and return them to the authorities of the respective fron­
tiers. 
Articlo 3 
The high officials of the Middle Kingdom and the IllYlian Count 
Sava Vladislavich, ambassador of the Russian Empire, judged that the 
main object of their work was the fixing of the frontier of the two 
empires, but that it would be impossible to regulate it with accur­
acy, if it was not carefully inspected on the spot. For this purpose: 
The Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, ambassador of the Russian 
Empire, betook himself to the frontier in person, with Tserin, adju­
tant general of the Middle Kingdom, viceroy of several Mongolian tribes 
and son-in-law of the Emperor, Bosygoe, commander of the imperial 
guard, and Tuleshinym, vice president of the Ministry of War. 
They came to an agreement in the following way on the places 
where the frontier was to pass. The country situated between the out­
post of the Russian Empire near the Kiakhta River and the Obo (stone 
marker) of the Middle Kingdom, located on the summit of the mountain 
Orogoitu, should be equally divided, and that another Obo should be 
erected there which shall serve as the sign of the frontier. In the 
same spot, a co~~arcial depot shall also be established, and com­
missioners shall be sent there. 
From this place to the east, the frontier passes over the crest 
of Burgutei, as far as the outpost of Kiran. After the outpos~ of 
Kiran, there are Tsiktei, Ara-Khidou and Ara-Khadazen; the frontier pro­
ceeds by these four outposts in a straight line, along the River 
Chikolu. Ara-Khadazan, as far as the Mongol outpost Tsagan-Ula. The 
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desert, between the country inhabited by the subjects of the Russian 
Empire and between the frontier markers of the Mongol outposts of the 
Middle Kingdom will be shared equally as at Kiakhta. Where there are 
in the neighborhood of the country inhabited by the subjects of the 
Russian Empire t mountains, su~~its of mountains, and rivers, they shall 
serve to mark the frontier; and where the mountains and rivers are in 
the neighborhood of the Mongol outposts, they shall equally serve to 
mark the frontier. But where there are only vast plains without moun­
tains or rivers, the al'eas shall be divided equally, and sign posts to 
mark the frontier have been erected in the middle; the frontier has 
thus been established from the marker of the outpost of Tsagan-Ula to 
the banks of the Argun River. 
The envoys of the two empires in order to inspect the areas situa­
ted beyond the Mongol outpost of the Tsagan-Ula agreed to draw thefron·­
tier from the two markers of the middle, erected at Kiakhta and on the 
mountain Orogoitu on the west, Orogoitu, Tymen, etc. l 
The middle of this chain of mountains equally divided was ack­
nowledged as the frontier. Where there are mountains and rivers along 
the frontier line, they have been equally shared, in such a way that 
at prescnt, from the Shabina as far as the banks of the Argun River, 
all which is on the south side belongs to the Middle Kingdom and the 
farther side belongs to the Russian Empire. 
After having finished the division of the country and after 
having drawn up a description and an exact map, the two parties ex­
changed these descriptions. They submitted them to the high officials 
of the two empires. The subJ~cts of the two States who found them­
selves without permission beyond the determined frontier, and who had 
there cstablish~d their homes, were sought out and brought back to 
their own country. The same was done for vagabonds, in such a way that 
the frontier has been entirely cleaned up. 
The Uriankhl of the two sides, who paid five zlbelines of tri­
bute remained with their former masters; but those who up to theln had 
contributed only one zibel1ne, were exempted for the future and from 
the day of the conclusion of this Treaty. For 'conformity, a proces­
verbal was drawn up on both sides, which was mutually exchanged. 
Article 4 
Now that the determination of the frontier of the two empires is 
settled, and now that no fugitive may be admitted any more, it is agreed 
with the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavlch, ambassador of the Russian 
Empire, to establish a free corrmerce between the two States. 
The number of merchants who may go to Pekin every three years 
must not exceed 200, as was earlier determined. As long as they are 
lHere follows a considerable list of Manchu or Mongol place names, 
now largely obsolete. 
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only merchants: they shall not be treated as formerly; but no tax or 
impost shall be required either of the seller or of the buyer. 
rlhen these merchants arrive at the frontier, they-shall give 
written warning. After the reception of this warning, an officer shall 
be scnt to receive them and to accompany them 1n their business. If 
they purchase during the trip camels, horses, and victuals, or if they 
hire servants, they must pay for them at their own expense. The mer­
chants shall remain under the orders of a chief designated to supervise 
their affairs; and if there arise differences among them, this chief 
will rule on them. If this chief of the merchants is a man of high 
rank, he will be received and treated according to his rank. All types 
of merchandise may be sold, except those which the laws of the two em· 
pires forbid. No one shall be permitted to remain in secret and with­
out the permission of his chief in the foreign country. If anyone dies, 
all his goods, or whatever nature they may be, shall be returned to his 
fellow-countrymen, as was agreed with the Russian ambassador, the 
Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich. In addition to the trade carried on 
by the caravans of the two empires, there shall be erected also on the 
mutual frontiers near Kiakhta, Selengi, and Norchlnsk trading posts, 
which, as is judged necessary, shall be surrounded by hedges and pali­
sades. Those who betake themselves to these places to tarry on trade, 
must go by direct route. If anyone fails to follow the direct route, 
all his merchandise Ghall bo confiscated to the benefit of the govern­
ment. There shall be installed on each side an equal nurr~er of offi­
cers, placed under the orders of chiefs of equal rank,. and charged with 
protecting these places. Differences shall be arbitrated in the man­
ner agreed upon with the ambassador of the Russian Empire, the Illyri~n 
Count Sava Vladislavich. 
Article 5 
The dwelling of the Russians in the capital shall serve hence­
forth to lodge Russian travellers. On the request of the Illyrian Count 
Sava Vladislavich, ambassador of the Russian Empire, and with the agree­
ment of the high officials of the Middle Kingdom who are responsible 
for relations with the Russians, a temple has been constructed near this 
dwelling. The priest who resides in the capital shall dwall there with 
three other priests to assist him. ~fuen these latter shall arrive, 
they shall be received like their predecessors and employed at the said 
temple. It shall be permitted to the Russians to practice their cult 
with all its ceremonies and to recite their prayers. Four young Rus­
sians, knowing the Russian and Latin language and writing, and two 
others, older, that the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, ambassador of 
the Russian Empire has left in the capital to learn the Chinese lan­
guage, must remain in this same spot. Their upkeep shall be paid by the 
government; and when they have completed their studies, they shall 
return to their own country. 
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Article 6 
As to correspondence between the two empires, it is very es­
sential that letters be affixed with a seal. The tribunal of frontier 
provincial affairs is responsible for sending to the tribunal of the 
Russian senate letters from the Middle Kingdom for the Russian Empire, 
after the seal has been affixed. Letters of the Russian Empire for the 
Middle Kingdom must be sent to the tribunal of the frontier provinces, 
sealed with the seal of the Russian Empire or with the stamp of the 
governor of the city of Tobolsk. All papers relating to the frontier 
or to the trading posts, and conc~rning deserters or thieveries, must 
be signed and sealed by the Tushetukhan Ovan, dzhan torzhi and the Ovan 
tanzhin torzhiu if they come out of the Middle Kingdom, and by the com­
mandants of the frontier towns if they come from the Russian Emplre. 
The mutual correspondence between the Tushetukhan Ovan dzhan torzhi 
and the Ovan tanzhin torzhiu with the Russians must be done by men 
sent expressly and only by the Kiakhta route. However, it is permitted 
them to take the shortest route if it is a question of an affair of 
great importance. In cases of contravention of this rule, the Ovan 
of the frontier and the commander of the Russian towns must be immed­
iately informed, and after an investigation of the charge has been made, 
the guilty parties shall be punished by the appropriate official. 
Article 7 
As to the frontir.rs, near the River Ud and others, they have 
already been the object of negotiations ~tween the head cf the interior, 
Sungutou and Fodor Alexevich Golovin. These areas shall remain at 
present undetermined between the two parties; but they shall be regu­
lated ultimately by ambassadors or by correspondence. On this occasion, 
the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, a~bassador of the Russian Em­
pire, was told: "Since you have been sent as pler.ipotentiary of your 
Empress to regulate all affairs, we must also draw up somethir.g on 
this point. At the present tinlc, your subjects are passing across the 
frontier often to go into the country called Khimkon Tugurnik, and if, 
as a result, we do not make a decision thereupon during these talks, 
it is to be feared that tho situation may result in differences among 
the frontier subjects. Such differencos being'opposed to what is con­
tained 1n thG Treaty of Peace between the two empires, we must arrange 
this matter right now." The ambassador of the Russian Empire, the 
Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, replied, ItMy Empress has not empowered 
me to negotiate on the al'cas situated to the east. We do not have 
a precise enough knowledge of these countries,;' it is necessary therefore 
that all remain as has been heretofore agreed; but in order to pre­
vent anyone from among our subjects from crossing the frontier, I 
shall forbid it for the future." Our men replied: "If your Empress 
has not empo'Nel'ed you to discuss the areas of the east, we shall 
speak no more of that, and it will be necessary to leave things as 
they are. But, after your return, forbid your subjects to cross the 
frontier; for If anyone was seized by our men for coming onto our 
territory, we should punish him. In such a case, you could not say 
that we had violated the Treaty of Peace. If, on the other hand, on~ 
of our subjects crosses your frontier, you will have equally the right to 
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punish him; finally because nothing is decided about the River Ud and 
the cantons which abut upon it, they shall remain as heretofore; but 
your subjects are not to establish themselves any closer than they arc 
at present. 
~As soon as the ambassador of the Russian Empire, the Illyrian 
Count Sava Vladislavich, shall be home again, he will exphin all 
thl$ to his Empress. It will be necessary then to send men who have 
knowledge of local affairs in these areas to inspect them; for it would 
be well to be able to reach a decision thereupon, it being understood, 
that if this matter, of small importance in itself, was not decided, it 
might become harmful to the good understanding between the two empires. 
In addition, a proc~s-verbal on this subject was drawn up, and has been 
sent to your senate.1t 
Article 8 
The co~~andants of tho frontiers of the two empires must decide, 
according to tha laws of justice, and without delay, all disputes; and 
if they drag them out for their own interest" each empire must punish 
them according to its own laws. 
Article 9 
If from one side or the other, important or petty chargos 
!~affair~] are sent, they f,lust betake themselves first to the frontier. 
and give warning of their mission and of their rank. They must not be 
retained long on the frontier, and some ona must be sent to roceive them. 
After the reception of a letter of invitation, they shall be given re­
freshments at each stop, and they shall be received with respect. At 
their arrival, th~y shall be lodged and ~td for; if they come in a year 
when co~~erce is not permitted, they may not bring merchandise. 
If. for some important matters, one or two couriers are sent, 
they must present their papers to the frontier officers who shall fur­
nish them with horses in relays, guides. and food, without their having 
had to give advance warning; all this has been agreed with the Russian 
ambassador, the Illyrlan Count Sava Vladislavich. 
Correspondence by letter and messengers between the two empires, 
being of the highest importance, must not be allowed to suffer any 
delay_ If then, in the future, letters are not answered, and if mes­
sengers are detained unnecessarily, it shall be considered contrary to 
what is contained in the Treaty of Peace. In such cases, neither am­
bassadors nor nngotiators shall be received until such difficulties shall 
be terminated; then only will they be permitted passage. 
Article 10 
The subjects of the two empires who shall flee henceforth shall 
be punished with death at the very spot where they shall have been ar­
rested. 'Armed subjects who cross the frontier without committing assassi­
nations or brigandage, but without passports, shall likewise be punished 
in conformity with their crime. Soldiers \'1ho desert and steal from their 
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leadnrs shall have thoir heads cut off, if they are subjects of the 
Middle Kingdom: if they are of the HU$sian Empire, they shall be 
strangled, and the stolen things shall be returned to the commandant or 
to his government. Those who cross the frontier and steal camels or 
othgr beasts shall be returned to their natural judges, who shall con­
denm them to pay ten times the value of the stolen objects; 1n case of 
a second offense, twenty times as much; and at the third offense, they 
shall be punished with death. He who crosses the frontier to hunt 
for his own benefit in the environs shall be punished in conformity 
with the offense, and his booty returned to the government. Peasants 
who cross the frontier without pasSpolt shall be punished likewise, as 
has been agreed with the Russian ambassador, the Illyrian Count Sava 
Vladislavich. 
Article 11 
This Treaty of Peace concluded between the two empires has been 
exchanged in the following manner; The ambassador of the Russian Em­
pire, the Illyrian Count Sava Vladislavich, has remitted a copy in the 
Russian and Latin languages, furnishad and confirmed with a seal to the 
high officials of the Middle Kingdom; and the high officials of the 
Middle Kingdom have reu.itted to the Illyrian Count Sava Bladlsiavich, 
aIr.bassador of the Russian Empire, another copy in Manchu, Russian and 
latin. This Treaty has been accurately printed and distributed to all 
those engaged in frontier affairs, in order that its contents be 
generally known. 
The seventh day of the seventh moon of the fifth year of Perpe­
tual Rectitude. 
Supplement to the Treaty of Kiakhta (1768) 
Although the 11 Articles of the Treaty of Peace must be maintained 
eternally unchanged, it has been found necessary to remove the Russian 
frontier markers from the neighborhood of Mount Burgutei to Ubitsiktu, 
Khoshou, and other places, in order to draw the line of the frontier 
along the ridge of the mountains; but all shall remain as was formerly 
planned near the two corr~ercial depots of Kiakhta and Tsurukhaitou, 
where no fee for entry is required. Errors having slipped into the Rus­
sian and Latin texts of the Treaty of Peace, and several essential 
points having been forgotten, it has been judged desirable to correct 
and rectify them. Furthermore, any disagreenlents which have hereto­
fore taken place between the two powers shall be forgotten, and no re­
quest shall be made for fo~er fugitives. What was decreed by the tenth 
Article of the preceding Convention concerning the way to prevent 
stealing and desertion alnong the respective frontier subjects appeeIe1 
too equivocal and indeterminate. The tenth Article of the Convention 
has therefore been entirely rejected. and it has been drawn up again 
and elevated into law, which must be observed in place of the former 
one. According to the present Convention, each party must supervise 
henceforth its own subjects, in order that such things may happen no 
more. If, at the new assembly which is to take place on the frontier, 
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evidence is produced of tampering L~ith the markcr~7 or other such inci­
dents, the corr~andants of the frontier shall be required to examine it 
without delay and with loyalty. If, on the contrary, led on by their 
own interest, they neglect their duty, each party must punish them ac­
cording to its own laws. As to the search and arrest of brigands and 
as to the punishment of those who cross the frontier illegally, the 
following clauses have been drawn up and determined on. 
Article 10 
Armed men who cross the frontier near one of the outposts to en­
gage in brigandage, whether or not they have killed anyone, must be 
arrested and guarded rigorously until they have confessed from what 
outpost they came and if they were alone or with others. After they 
have undergone a rigorous interrogation at the outpost itself, the names 
of the still free brigands must be written down, and each outpost noti­
fied, and especially the first superior officer of the Chinese and the 
commandants of the Russians. lhesa officials must immediately betake 
themselves to the actual spot to look scrupulously into the affair with 
those concerned, and to make without delay a report, which must be sent 
to the place where frontier affairs are decided. From there it shall 
be required that a . distinguished loyal man be sent to the outpost, 
who shall meet with the officials there to look into the matter in ques­
tion; after which he shall send his report to the place where frontier 
questions are decided. The subjects of the Middle Kingdom who have 
committed brigandage shall be handed over, without distinction of per­
sons, to the tribunal which governs the frontier provinces, to be put 
to death, and the Russian subjects shall be handed over to the senate 
to sui fer the samG punishment. Murderers shall be conducted to the 
frontier to be publicly executed. The horse, saddle, arms, and all 
the equipment of the thief shall be given, as reward, to whoever ar­
rested him. Those who steal horses, animals, and other property, for 
the first time shall be condemned to pay ten times the value of the 
stolen articles. If the thief is not caught, the commandants of both 
outposts must meet together to look into the crime, to examine any 
wounds, the hody of any who have been killed, and a proces-verbal shall 
be drawn up. The comToandant of the outpost shall be expected to arrest 
the thieves, at the latest, within a month. If. the thief has not been 
apprehanded within this time, a report must be sent to both the frontier 
headquarters. Then the commandants of the outposts and the soldiers 
who have not done their duty in the search for the horses and the stolen 
articles shall be punish~d themselves by paying ten times the value of 
the stolen goods. If unarmed men are arrested who have crossed the 
frontier to commit robb~ry secretly, they shall be punished, according 
to the law, with one hundred lashes. The horse of the thief with the 
saddle shall be given, as reward, to those who arrested him. The stolen 
goods shall be returned. The first time, thn thief shall pay five times 
the value of the goods; the second, ten times; and the third time, he 
shall be treated as a brigand. If such thieves are not arrested, an 
authentic praces-verbal must be drawn up fOl' the outpost near which the 
cl'ime has been corruni tted and th~ cOlnmandant and the soldiers of the out­
post must be ordered to arrest the criminal within the space of one month. 
~ban he has been caught, he shall roceive publicly one hundred lashes, 
2SV 

and the horses and other goods stolen shall be restored without d~lay. 
If the commandants of the outposts and the soldiers do not find and 
within the prescribed time arrest the unarmed thieves, the vaue of the 
horses and of th~ stolen goods must be paid five times over by these 
cor.mandants and these soldiers who have not fulfilled their duty. 
When horses and other stray animals which have crossed the fron­
tier are found, they shall immediately be returned to the nearest out­
post; if they are not found, a proces-verbal shall be drawn up, in which 
they shall be precisely described. The horses and stray animals shall 
then be returned within the space of five days. This length of time 
having passed, if they have been found and not returned, or If they have 
been hidden anywhere and the place where any of these horses and stray 
animals are is known, the commandants of the mutual outposts must prepare 
a report about it and send it to ths frontier headquarters a In recom­
pense for these objects, double the number must be restored. 
Armed people, not furnished with passports, who cross the frontier 
wi thout committing either thieving or kill ings, must be arrested. Their 
horses, saddles and equipment shall be given as reward to those who ar­
rested them. If such persons have crossed the frontier to hunt, they 
shall, according to the law, be publicly punished with one hundr'ed lashes. 
The booty, their arms, horses and equipment shall be given, likewise, as 
reward to those who arrested them. If unarmed people, who have crossed 
the frontier, are arrested, the commandant of the outpost must interro­
gate them scrupulously. If they have mistaken the road, they must be 
released without delay and returned, as soon as possible to the outpost 
on the other side. If peoplo are founa hidden in the forests and in the 
inaccessible mountains, and if they are arrested, they shall, according 
to the law, be publicly punished with one hundred lashes; theiT horses, 
saddles and equipment shall be given, as a deserved reward to those who 
arrested them. 
All the criminals of the Middle Kingdom condemned to corporal 
punish~ent shall be whipped, and those of the Russian Empire shall be 
beaten with the knout. 
The convention herewith concludGd has been exchanged in the follow­
ing manner. the high officials of the Middle Kingdom handed over a copy 
in Manchu and Mongol languages furnished with a seal, to the Co~missioner 
Plenipotentiary of the Russians; and the latter handed over to the high 
officials of the Middle Kingdom another copy in the Russian language 
likewise furnished with a seal. ! . 
In order to see that it be generally known, printed copies of this 
agreement shall be distributed to the frontier subjects on both sides. 
The 33rd year of Khi9nglung, the 19th day of the 9th moon (18 
October, 1768). 
III. TREAIY OF AIGUN 
(Ceremonial Preamble Omitted) 
Article 1 
The left bank of the Amur River, from the Argun River southward 
to the mouth of the Amur, shall be under the sovereignty of the Russian 
Empire, while the right bank, as far as the Ussuxi River, shall be 
under the sovereignty of the Oai-Ising Empire; the lands and places 
situated between the Ussuri River and the sea shall, as heretofore, 
constitute a joint dominion of the Oai-Tsing and Russian Empires, until 
such time as the frontier between the two Empires in this area is de­
termined. Vessels only of the Oai-Ising and Russian Empires may navi­
gate the Amur, Sungari and Ussuri; navigation of those rivers is for­
bidden to vessels of any other states. Manchu inhabitants of the left 
bank of the Arnur River, from the Zeia River southward to the village 
of Khormoldzin shall be left in perpetuity in the prior locations of 
their residence, under the jurisdiction of the Manchu Government, in 
order that Russian inhabitants might not injure or oppress them. 
Article 2 
In the interest of mutual friendship of the subjects of both 
states, reciprocal trade is permitted to the subjects of both Empires 
who live along the Ussuri, Arnur and Sungari Rivers, and the authorities 
must reciprocally protect the trading people of both states on both 
banks. 
Article 3 
The stipulations laid down by mutual agreement of the plenipo­
tentiary cf the Russian Empire, Governor-Gen~ral Muraviev, and the 
plenipotentiary of the Oai-Ising Empire, Commander-in-Chief of the Amur, 
I-Shan, shall be carried out preCisely and inviolably in perpetuity; 
to this effect, Governor-General Muraviev, for the Russian Empire, has 
remitted a copy of the present treaty, written in the Russian and Mznchu 
languages, to the Cotr.mander-in-ChieI. I-Shan, for the Oai-Ising Empire, 
and the Cowmander-in-Chief, I-Shan, for the Dai-Tsing Empire, has re­
mitted a copy of the present treaty, written in the Manchu and Mongol 
languages, to Govcrnol'-Genel'al Muraviev, for the Russian Empire. All 
provisions contained herein shall bl) published for the information of 
the frontier inhabitants of both Empires. 
Signed, May 16, 1858, in the town of Aigun* 
Nikolai Muravlev 
Piotr Perovsld i 
I-Shan 
Dzlraminga 
*Ceremonial recitation of plenipotentiary cl'edentials omitted, as are 
counter-signatures. 
IV. TREATY OF TIENTSIN (June, 1858) 
His Majesty the Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias and His 
Majesty the Emperor of China judging it of prime necessity to outline 
clearly the mutual relations of Russia and China, and to draw up new 
rules for the interest of the two States, have appointed for this purpose 
their Plenipotentiaries, na~ely, 
His Majesty tne Emperor of All the Russias, his Aide-de-camp 
General, Vice-Admiral Count Evfimy Putiatin, Imperial Commissioner in 
China, and Commander-in-chief of the Russian squadron in the Pacific 
Ocean; 
And His Majesty the Emperor of China, from his Empire the 
Dakhilushi of the Eastern section, Director-in-chief of the Tribunal of 
Criminal Justice, the high functionary Kui-leang, and from his Empire 
the President of the Tribunal of Inspection, Chief of the Division of 
heavy lnfantry of the blue fringed flag, his high functionary Khurashan. 
The said Plenipotentiaries, in virtue of the powers which they 
have received from their respective Governments have a9re~d upon the 
following Articles, and have drawn them up as follows, 
Article 1 
Th~ prescnt Treaty confirms again the Peace and Friendship which 
have existed for many years between his Majesty the Emperor of All the 
Russlas and His Majesty the Emperor of China, and between their respec­
tive subjects. 
Russian subjects who reside in China and Chinese subjects who are 
in Russia shall continue to enjoy the prot~ction of the Gove~nments of 
the two empires, both for their persons and for their property. 
Article 2 
Henceforth communications between the Supreme Government of Russia 
and the Supreme Govarr~cnt of China, will not be effected as has been 
done heretofore by the Senate on the one side and the Tribunal Li-fan­
yuan on the other, but it shall be the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Russia who shall communicate with the Senior Member of the Council of 
State or with the chief Minister at Pekin. They shall communicate on 
terms of absolute equality_ 
l'he ordinary corre;spondence between the persons above-mentioned 
shall be transmitted by the frontier authorities. Cowmunications of 
high importance shall be brought by an emissary nominated AQ hQ£, who 
can make verbal ~xp1anations to the Members of th~ Council of state and 
th~ chi.ef Minister. At his arrival he shall present d!!spatches with the 
President of the Tribunal of Rites acting as intermediary. 
Equality shall be observed likewise in the correspondence and the 
interviews of Envoys and Ministers Plenipotentiary of Russia, with the 
Memb!rs of the Council of State, the Ministers of the Court of Pekin, 
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and the Governors-General of the frontier and maritime provinces; and 
in the relations among the Governors-General and other frontier authori­
ties of the two Stateso 
If the Russian Government should judge it necessary to name a 
Minister Plenipotentiary to reside in one of the open ports of China, 
he shall d3al in his personal relations and in his correspondence with 
the local Chinese authorities and with the Minizters at Pekin, according 
to the general rules agreed upon now by all foreign states. 
Envoys of Russia may go to Pekin, either by way of Kiakhta and 
Urga, or by Taku at the mouth of the Pei Ho, or by any other city or 
open port of China. After an advance notice, the Chinese goyernment 
shall see that tIle necessary arrangements are undertaken in order that 
the trip of the Envoy and of his suite may be prompt and convenient. 
The reception in the capital shall take place with the honors due his 
rank; appropriate lodging shall b~ prepared and he shall be provided 
with all n~cessities. 
All the expenses occasioned by the sending of Russian Diplomatic 
Missions into China shall be discharged by tho Russian Government, and 
shall in no case become the responsibility of the Chinese Government. 
Article 3 
Henceforth commerce betwGen Russia and China shall take place 
not only in the places determined along the frontiers, but also by sea. 
Russian merchant vessels shall be permitted to trad~ in ths following 
ports a Shanghai, Ning-po, Foo-chow-ioo, Canton, Taiwan foo, on the 
Island of Foro,ose, Kiung chow, ,on the Island of Hainan. 
Al'ticle 4 
In the future no limit shall be placed by either Government on the 
number of traders and captains employed in commerce. 
In maritime co~~erce and in all the details which concern it, 
namely the declarations on imported merchandise, the payment of rights 
of anchorage and of duties according to the present tariff, etc., Russian 
subjects shall conforrn to the g~neral rules established for foreign 
commerce in the Chinese ports. 
Any illegal coromerce carried on by Russians shall be punished by 
the confiscation, to the prof:t of the Chinese Gov~rnment, of any mer· 
chandise which has been unloaded. 
Article 5 
The Russian Government shall be freo to name Consuls in the ports 
open to commerce. 
The Russian Government may send out war ships to maintain order 
among the Russian subjects and to give support to the authority of the 
Consul. 
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Ihe relations between the Consul and local authorities, the con­
cession of a suitable area for the construction of churches, of houses 
and of stores, the purchase by the Russians of lands from the Chinese, 
and all the transactions which are under the jurisdiction of the Consul, 
shall take place according to the general rules observed by the Chinese 
GoveI'nment in its dealing with foreigners. 
Article 6 
If a Russian war vessel or merchant ship should be in trouble 
on the shore, the nearest Chinese authority should immediately bring aid 
to the ship, and take the necessary meCl.sures for the rescue of the ship 
and the cargo. It shall also assist in the transportation of the crew 
and the cargo to the nearest port where there is a Russian Consul or the 
agent of a nation friendly to Russia, or to the frontier, if the ship­
wreck has taken place near the frontier. The Russian Government shall 
cover the expenses resulting f~om the rescue of the crew and the cargo. 
In cases where Russian war vessels or merchant ships are in need 
of making repairs, or providing themselves with ,vater, and with fresh 
provisions, they shall be allowed to enter on their course into ports 
not open to cornmerce, and to buy what they need at prices agreed upon, 
and without the local 8Jthorities makin'3 objections. 
Article 7 
All disputes between Russian and Chinese fubjects in the ports 
and opon cities shall be examined by the Chinese authorities in concert 
with the aussian Consul or with the agent who represents the authority 
of ihef;usslan Government in that place. 
Russian subject.s guilty of any crime or misdemeanor shall be 
judged according to the Russian laws. Likewise, Chinese subjects, for 
any crime or attempt against the life or the property of a Russian 
shall be judged and punished according to the laws of their country. 
If Russian subjects should penetrate into the interior of China 
and there commit some crime or misdemeanor, they shall be conducted to 
the frontier, or into one of the open ports where a Russian Consul re­
sides in order to be judged and punished acccrdirig to Russian laws. 
Article 8 
The Chinese Government having recognized that the Christian 
doctrine facilitates the establishment of order and peace among men, 
promis~s ~ot to persecute its Christi~n subjects for the practicing of 
the duties of their religion; they shall enjoy the protection accorded 
to all tho~e who profess the other beliefs tolerated in the Empire. 
The Chinose Government considering the Christian missionaries 
men of good wUl who are not seeking material advantag~5, shall permit 
them to propogate the Christian faith among its subjects, anj shall not 
prevent them froro mOiling about freely in the interior of the Empire. 
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A fixed number of missionaries leaving the cities or open ports 
shall be furnished with passports signed by the Russian authorities. 
Article 9 
Those parts of the frontier between China and Russia not as yet 
determined shall be examined without delay 1n the frontier areas them­
selves. 
The two Gover~~ents shall name for this purpose delegates who 
shall fix the line of demarcation and shall conclude thereupon a Con­
vention, which shall be added as a Separate Article to the present 
Treaty. 
Maps and detailed descriptions of the frontier shall then be drawn 
up and shall serve as definitive documents for the future. 
Article 10 
There shall no longer be any fixed term for the stay of the Russian 
Ecclesiastical Mission in Pekin; the members of this mission may, with 
the authorization of their Gover~ment, return to their own country at 
any time. The vacant place may then be occupied by a new me~her. 
The Chinese Government shall no longer defray any expenses for the 
maintenance of the mission; all exp~nses shall be the responsibility of 
the Russian Government. 
The travelling expenses of the member of the mission, couriers, 
and other porsons whom the Russian Government shall send from Kiakhta 
and the open ports of China, and vice-versa, shall be paid by the Russian 
Goverrunent; the local Chin~se authorities shall be obliged, on their 
side, to take necessary measures to insure that the jouosy of all such 
above-mentioned persons shall be prompt and convenient. 
Article 11 
A regular postal service Ehall be established between Kiakhta and 
Pekin for communications between the two Governments, as well as for 
the needs of the Ecclosiastical Russian Mission at Pekin. 
The Chinese couriers shall be sent on an appointed day once a month 
from Pekin and from Kiakhta, and shall, in the time of 15 days or less, 
bring official packages and letters to the place of their destination. 
Furthermore, every 3 mOI~ths, or 4 times per year, -a convoy shall 
be sent from Kiakhta to Pekin, an1 vice versa, for the transportation 
of all types of goods and belongings. This convoy shall make the trip 
i~ the course of one month. All the expenses arising from the estab­
lisr~ent and the maintenanc~ of these communications shall be paid half 
and half by the two Governments. 
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Article 12 
All the political, com.'llercial, and other privileges which might 
in the future be acquired by the most favored N~tion$ from the Chinese 
Government, shall be extended at the same time to Russia without the 
necessity of any preliminary negotiations. 
This Treaty shall be ratified i~'llediately by the Emperor of China, 
and after it shall have beGn ratified by the Emperor of Russia, the ex­
change of ratifications shall take place at Pekin within a year, or 
earlier if possible. 
Copies in the Russian, Manchu, and Chinese languages, complete 
with the signatures and the seals of the Plenipotentiaries of the two 
States, shall be exchanged now, and the Manchu text shall serve as the 
basis for the interpretation of all the Articles of the Treaty, which 
shall be observed by the two High Contracting Parties, faithfully and 
inviolably. 
Done and signed in the city of Tientsin on the first day of June 
of the year 1858 after the .birth of Jesus Christ, and in the 4th year of 
the reign of His Alajesty the Emperor AlexandGr II. 
Count livfimy Putlatin 
Kui-leang 
Khurashan 
Supplementary Treaty 
Concluded November 2, 1860, in Peking 
Following an attentive examination and ansideration of existing treaties 
betwoen Russia and China. His Majesty, the Emperor and Autocrat of all 
the Russias and His Majesty, the Bogdikhan of the Chinese Empire, wishing 
to bind more close;y the ties of reciprocal friendship between the tViO 
Empires, to develop coromercla1 relations and to p~event any misunder­
standing, have resolved to draw up some adcitional articles, and for this 
purpose, have named as their Plenipotentiaries: 
For the Russian Emplre t Major General Nikolai Ignatiev, of the 
Suite of His Imperial Majesty and Chevalier of various Orders; 
For the Dei-Tsing Empire, the Prince Kung, Prince of the First 
Class, who bears the name I-Sing. 
The said Plenipotentiaries, after having made known their full 
powers, having found them sufficient. have agreed on the following: 
Article 1 
To' confirm and to c1arif¥ ArtIcle 1 of the Treaty concluded in the 
town of Aigun on May 16, 1858 (Eighth Year of Sien Fang, 21st day of the 
Fourth Moon). and in execution of Article 9 of1he~Treaty concluded on June 
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1 of the same year (third day of the Fifth Moon), In the ~own of 
Tientsin, it Is established that: 
Henceforth, the Eastern Frontier of the two Empires, beginning with 
the confluence of the~iRivers Shilka and Argun, shall descend along the 
course of the Aw~r River to the confluence of the latter river with the 
River Ussuri. The lands lying along the left bank (on the north) of 
the River Amur belong to the Russian Empire, while the lands lying along 
the right bank (on the south) to the mouth of the River Ussuri, belong 
to the Chinese Empire. Further, from the mouth of the Ruver Ussuri to 
Lake Khinkai, the frontier line lol1ows the Ussuri and Sungacha Rivers. 
The lands lying along the Eastern (right) banks of those rivers belong 
to the Russian Empire and those on the West (left) banks, to the Chinese 
Empire. Thereupon, the frontier line between the two Empires, from the 
source of the River Sungacha, cuts across Lake Khinkai and follows the 
River Belen-khe (Tur); from the mouth of the latter, it follows the crest 
of the mountains to the mouth of the River Khubitu (Khubtu) and from 
there along the mountains lying between the River Khunchun and the sea as 
far as the River Tu-min-dzi-m. Here, likewise, the lands lying on the 
East belong to the Russian Empire and on the West to the Chinese. The 
frontier line lies along the River Tu-min-dzian at 20 versts (Ii) from 
its mouth. 
Furthermore, in execution of the same Article 9 of the Treaty of 
Tientsin, there is confirmed a rna? drawn up on which the frontier line, 
for greater clarity, is indicated in red and its direction ma~ked with 
the letters of the Russian alphabet 
.1 -,_! n 'r' . oJ ~ ~t) T r ~T ~--:) '""! ~ 71 
.. - ---- - t, ...... ....., .,..# -. 
This map is signed by the Plenipotentiaries of both Empires and 

is validatod by their seals. 

Should there be, in the above-mentioned places, settlements of 
Chinese subjects, the Russian Government obligates itself to leave them 
there and to permit them, as in the past, to pursue their fishing and 
hunting occupations. 
After the frontier markers have been placed, the frontier lines 

shall remain forever unchanged. 

Article 2 
The frontier line on the west, up to now undetermined, must hence­
forth follow the direction of the mountains, the courses of the great 
rivers, and of the existing line of Chinese pickets. From the last 
outpost, named Shabindaga, established in 1728, upon conclusion of the 
Treaty of Kilakhta of 1728, (Sixth Year of Yun9 Ching), it shall proceed 
southwest to Lake Tsai-san and from there to the mountains lying to the 
south of Laka Issykul, called Tengcrishn or Kirgisnysh alatau, otherwise 
known as Tsian-Shan-Onan-lu (southern extension of the Celestial Moun­
tains) and along these mountains to the Kokand dominion. 
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Articlo 3 
Henceforth all treaty questions which may in future arise, must be 
settled on the basis set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of this Treaty, and 
for the placing of frontier markers on the East from Lake Khinkai to the 
River Tu-min-dzian and on the west from the outpost Shabindaga to the 
Kokand dominion, the Russian and Chinese Governments shall name reliable 
persons (Comnlission~rs). For the inspection of the Eastern frontier, 
the Commissioners shall meat at the mouth of tha Ussuri River during 
April of next year (lith Year of Sien-Fong, Third Moon). For the inspec­
tion of the western frontier, the meeting of the commissioners shall 
take place at Iarbagatai but the time is not set. 
On the basis of the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the present 
treaty the authorized officials (Colmnissioners) who are despatched are 
to prepare maps and detailed descriptions of the frontier line in four 
copies - t.wo in th(; Russian, and two in the Chinese or Manchu language. 
The maps and descriptions are to be validated by the signatures and 
seals of the Commissioners, following which two copies of them, one in the 
Russian, and one in the Chinese or Manchu languages - shall be remitted 
to the Russian Gover~~ent and two such copies to the Chinese Gover~~ent, 
for safekeeping. 
For the exchanging of maps descriptions of the frontier line, there 
shall be drawn up a protocol corroborated by the signing and placing of 
seals of the Co~~issioners and it shall be considered as an additional 
Article of the present Treaty. 
Article 4 
All along the frontier line established by Article 1 of the present 
Treaty, free trade without tariffs is authorized between the subjects of 
the two states. The local border commanders must give their special 
protection to this trade and to the people engaged in it. 
At the same time, all stipulations concerning trade established 

in Article 2 of the Treaty of Aigun are confirmed. 

Article 5 
To Russian merchants there is extended, over and above the existing 
trade at Kiakhta, their former right to travel on commercial matters 
from Kiakhta to Peking. En route, they shall be permitted to trade 
also at Urga and Kalgan, without opening up wholesale commerce. The 
Russian GovernL'Tlent is authorized to have a Consul (Lin-shl-guan) at 
Urga, accompanied by several persons and at its expense to construct a 
dwelling for him there. As to the concession of land for this dwelling, 
as well as the size of the latter, and as to thG concession of pastu=age, 
there must be an understanding with the authorities at Urga. 
Chinese merchunts are equally authorized to proceed to nussia to 

trade if they so desire. 

J 
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Russian merchants have the right to travel on business to China 
at all times, only there should be no more (in one party) than two 
hundred persons at one time in one place; moreover, they must have 
tickets from the Russian frontier authority indicating the name of the 
head of the caravan, th~ number of persons composing the caravan and 
the place of its destination. Dering the voyage, the merchants are 
permitted to buy and sellas they wish. All expenses of the road are to 
be borne by tho merchants themselves. 
Article 6 
Experimentally, commerce is to be opened at Kashgar on the same 
basis as at Ili and Tarbagatai. At Kashgar, the Chinese Government shall 
cede £ufficient land for construction of a trading post with all build­
ings necessary for dwellings, warehouses for storing of merchandise, 
etc., as well as for a cenetery and a pasture, at IIi and Tarbagatai. 
Orders will be given i~~ediately to the Administrator of Kadhgar for the 
cession of areas for the above-mentioned needs. 
The Chinese Gover~~ent shall not be responsible for thefts from 
Russian merchants in cases where such thefts have been co~nitted by people 
who have intruded frcm beyond the linos of the Chinese outposts. 
Article 7 
Russians in China, just as Chines£ in Russia, in places open to 
trade, may move about freely in their cOrP.mercial activities without any 
rp.straint on the part of the local authorities; they may fre~uent with 
the same freedom and at all times the market places and houses of local 
mel'chants and may sell and buy all manner of melchandise wholesale or 
retail, for cash or for barter, and may grant and receive credit as 
their mutual confidence permits. 
The duration of the stay of nerchants in places where trade is 
carried on is not to be limited but depends on their own desires. 
Article 8 
Russian merchants in China and Chinese merchants in Russia are 
placed under the special protection of both Governments. ' In order to 
supervise the merchants and to prevent misunderstandings that may arise 
between them and the local inhabitants, the Russian Government may 
immediately name Consuls at Kashgar and Urga, on th~ basis of rules 
adopted for Ili and Tarbagatai. The Chinese Gover~~lent may equally, 
should it so desire, name Consuls in the capitals and other cities of 
the Russian Empire. 
The Consuls of both Powers are to be lodged in houses constructed 
at the expense of their respective Governments. However, it is not for­
bidden them to rent, if they so desire, lodgings from the local inhabi­
tants. 
In their lclations with the local authorities, the Consuls of both 
states, on the basis of Article 2 of the Treaty of Tientsin, are to 
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observe perfect equality. All matters concerning the merchants of one 
or the other state are to be examined by them on the basis of mutual 
consent. Misdemeanors and crimes must be judged, as stip~lated in Arti­
cle 7 of the Treaty of Tientsin, in accordance with the laws of the State 
of which the guilty party is a subject. 
Disputes, lawsuits and disagreements of a similar nature arising 
among merchants in connection with co~mercial matters are to be settled 
by the merchants themselves by means of arbiters chosen from amongst 
themselves; the Consuls and the local authorities may only cooperate in 
bringing about conciliations, without taking any responsibllity relative 
to such suitg. 
In places where trade is authorized, merchants of both states may 
contract written commitments for orders of merchandise, rental of shops, 
houses, etc., and present them to be witnessed by the Consulate and the 
local administration. In case of non-execution of written co~~itments 
the Consul and local authorities are to take measures to bring (the 
parties concerned) to fulfil their obligations exactly. 
Matters not having to do with co~nercial affairs among merchants, 
such as disputes, complaints, etc., shall be examined by the Consul and 
the local authorities, by mutual consent; delinquents shall be punished 
according to the laws of their own country. 
In case vf concealment of a Russian subject among the Chinese, 
or of his flight into the interior of the country, the local authority, 
upon being informed by the Russian Consul, shall without delay take 
measures to seek out the fugitive and upon discovering him, shall imme­
diately turn him over to the Russian Consulate. The same procedure shall 
be equally followed relative to any Chinese s~bject hiding among the 
Russians or fleeing into Russia. 
In case of serious crimes, such as murder, brigandage VJith ser fous 
bodily injury, attack upon a person's life, premeditated arson, etc •• , 
after an inquiry, if the g~ilty party is Russian he shall be sent to 
Russia to be treated according to the la'l'I$ of his country, and if he is 
Chinese his punishment shall be infl ieted either by the authority of the 
place where the crime was co~~itted or, if the laws of the State require 
it, the guilty party shall be sent to another city or another province 
there to receive his punisr~ent. 
In cases of crimes, whether they be serious or minor, the Consul 
and the local a~thority may take necessary measures only against a guilty 
party of his own country but neither one has the right to detain or 
independently to judge, much le3s to p~nish, an individual who is nut a 
subject of his Government. 
Article 9 
The present extent of commercial relations between the subjects of 
the two states and the fixing of new frontier lines render inapplicable 
the old rules laid down in the treaties concluded in Nerchinsk and 
Kiakhta and in Agreements supplenentary to them; by the same token, the 
Xl 
relations of the frontier authorities and the rules for examining 

frontier matters do not correspond to the prosent circumstances; conse­

quently, in place of these rules the following procedures are established: 

Henceforth, besides the relations being carried on - on the eastern 
frontier through Urga and Kiakhta, between the civil governor of Kiakhta 
and the authorities at Urga t and on the western frontier between the 
Governor-General of Western Siberia and the Administration of Ili - there 
shall also be frontier relations between the military governors of the 
Priamur and Primorsk provinces and the Commanders-in-Chief of Heilung­
chiang and Kirin and between the Frontier Commissioner of Kiakhta and 
the- Tsargucheiu (Boy-yuan), in the sense of Al-ticle 8 of the present 
Treaty. 
On the basis of Article 2 of the Treaty of Tientsin, the above­
mentioned Military-Governors and Co:nmanders-in-Chief (Dzian-dzhungs) 
must observe complete equality in their relations and must carry them 
out exclusively in connection with matters in which their ad~inistration 
is directly concerned. 
In case of particularly important matters, the Governor-General of 
Eastern Siberia is authorized to enter into written relations - eithe! 
with the Supreme Council (Dzhun-tzi-chou) or with the Ministry of Ex­
ternal Relations (Li-fan-yuan), as the principal authority in charge of 
relations and administration along the frontiers. 
Article 10 
In investigations and decisions concerning frontier affairs, either 
major or minor, the frontier authorities shall be guided by the rules 
set forth in Article 8 of the present Treaty; as to investigattons con­
cerning subjects of one or the other Empire, and punishments to be 
inflicted on them, they shall be carried out, as stated in the Treaty 
of Tientsin, accordigg to the laws of the country to which the guilty 
party belongs. 
In case of passage, leading away or theft of cattle across the 
frontier, the local authorities, inmediately upon being informed and as [' 
soon as evidence is delivered to the head of the nearest outpost, shall 
send men to conduct a search. The cattle when found shall be restored 
promptly to the owner and if any are missing, monetary restitution is to 
be made according to the law; but in such a case the payment must not 
be raised to £everal times the value of the missing cattle (as has been 
the practice heretofore). 
In case of the flight of a person across the frontier,- at the first 
notification, measures shall be taken itrmediately to find the fugitive. 
The apprehended fugitive is to be turned over without delay with all of 
his possessions to the frontier authority. Inve~tigation of the reasons 
for the flight and the trial itself shall be carried out by the nearest 
local authority of the country to which the fugitive belongs. Through­
out the time of his stay across the frontier t from his apprehension to 
his return to the appropriate authorities, the fugitive is to be given 
necessary food and drink and, if needed, clothing; the guard accompanying 
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him must treat him humanely and must not indulge in arbitrary acts 
against him. The same applies to a fugitive about whom there has beer. 
no advance notification. 
Article 11 
Written communications between the superior frontier authorities 
of either State shall be carried out through the nearest frontier offi­
cials, to whom despatches are to be delivered under written rec~ipts. 
The Governor-General of Eastern Siberia and the Civil Governor 
of Kiakhta shall send their despatches to the Kiakhta Frontier Com­
missioner, who shall send them to the Tsargucheiu (Boy-yuan); the ad­
ministrators at Urga shall send their despatches to the Tsargucheiu 
(Boy-yuan), who shall transmit them to the Kiakhta Frontier Commissioner. 
The Military Governor of the Amur Province shall send his des­
patches through the assistant to the Co~mander-in-Chief (Dzian-dzhun) in 
the town ofo,Aigun through whom the Commanders-in-Chief of Heilungchiang 
and Kirin likewise shall transmit their despatches to the Military uover­
nor 6f:the Amur Province. 
The Military Governor of the Primorsk Province and the Ccmmander­
in-Chief of Kirin shall send their despatches through the chiefs of their 
frontIer posts on the Ussuri and Khun-chun Rivers. 
The transmittal of correspondence between the Governor-General of 
western Siberia and the Main Administration" of the COIT'Jnander-in-Chlef 
of IIi shall be effected through the Russian Consul in the town of IIi. 
In case of a matter of particular importance reqUIrIng verbal 
explanations, the superior authorities of the frontiers of the two Em­
pires may send their despatches to each other by reliable Russian offi­
cials. 
Article 12 
In conformity with Article 11 of the Treaty of Tientsin, letters 
and parcel post sent for official purposes from Kiakhta to Peking and 
return will leave at the following times; letter mail, once a month 
from each of the two points - parcel post, once every two months from 
Kiakhta to Peking and once every three months from Peking to Kiakhta. 
Letters must arrive at their destinaticn within no more than 2:) 
days - parcel post, within no more than 40. 
On each trip the parcel post must be composed of no more than 2:) 
cases each welghing not more than 120 Chinase pounds or four poods. 
Letter mail must depart the same day it is received; in cases of 
delay there shall be investigations and severe penalties. 
The postillion despatched with letters and parcels, while passing 
through Urga, must stop in at the Russian Consulate, deliver there 
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lotters and parc~ls addressed to persons residing 1n that city and at 
the same time, pi~k up letters and parcels addressed by them. 
In the sending of parcel post, the cases in which it is packed 
must be accompanied by way-bills; fl'om Kiakhta, the way-bills, vtith 
charges indicated, must be sent to Urga to the Administrator there and 
from Peking, likewise with charges indicated, to the Ministry of External 
Relations (Li-fan-yuan). 
The way-bills shall indicate exactly: the date of despatch, the 
number of cases and their total weight. The separate weight of each 
case shall be written on the outside of that case, in Russian figures 
and with a translation into Mongolian or Chinese weight. 
If the Russian merchunts find it necessary for their commercial 
affairs to establish, at their own expense, a postal service for let­
ters or for ~ransport of their wares, permission shall be granted to 
ttem in order to lighten the load of the Statn malls. In case of the 
establishment of such postal cOQrounications the merchants need only noti­
fy the local aut!writies in advance, in order to obtain their agreem6nt. 
Article 13 
Ordinary corr~spondence of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Af­
fairs for the Supreme Council (Dzhun-tzi-chou) of the Dai-Tsing Empire, 
as well as that of the Governor~en~ral of Eastern Siberia for that 
same Councilor for the Ministry of External Relations (Li-fan-yuan) 
shall be scnt in the usual wa~ by post but without being limited to thG 
fixed timns of departure of the post; 1n the case of matters of special 
importance, despatches from the above-mentioned individuals may be sent 
with a Russian courier. 
During the stay of Russian env~ys at Peking, despatches of special 
importance may likewise be sent via Russian officials expressly named 
for this purpose. 
Russian couriers must not be detained by anyone anywhere en route. 
The courier assigned to deliver despatches must, without exception, 
be a Russian subject. 
The sending of a courier is to be announced 24 hours in advance at 
Kiakhta by the Commissioner to the Tsargucheiu (aoy-yuan) and at Peking 
by the Russian mission to the War Ministry. 
Article 14 
When, with the passags of time, any aspect of the stipUlations 
regarding overland trade laid down in the present Treaty presents 
difficulties to one or the other Party, the Governor-General of E~stern 
Siberia is authorized to enter into an agreement with the frontier offi­
cials of the Dai-Tsing Empire and to draw up supplen.entary condltio:'1s, 
in conformity in all cases with the above-stated principles. 
Z()4 
Article 12 of the Treaty of Tientsin is hereby confirm~d and may 
not be altered. 
Article 15 
Having affirmed in this fashion all of the foregoing, by mutual 
agreement, the Plenipotentiaries of the Russian end Chinese Empires have 
signed with their ov.n hands and sealed with their own seals two copies 
of the Russian text of the Treaty and two copies of its translation 
into the Chineselsnguage and have exchanged one copy of each. 
The Articles of the present Treaty hav~ legal force from the day 
of this exchange betwoen the Plenipotentiaries of each Empire and are as 
if they had been inserted word for word in th$ Treaty of Tientsin, and 
must be forever strictly and inviolably carried out. 
After ratification by the Sovereign5 of the two Empires, this 
treaty wIll be promulgated in each of the two States for th~ infor,ila­
tion and guidance of those who must observe it. 
Concludrd and signed in the capital city of Peking, the 2nd./14th. 
of November, 1860 A.D., and in the 6th year of the reign of Emperor 
Alexander II and the 2nd day of the 10th Moon of tha loth Year of Sien­
fong. 
Nikolai Ignaticv 
Kung 
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